AJIT C. DESAI v. B. G. NAIK TRUST ET AL.
This appeal stems from a partition lawsuit. The real property at issue was sold at auction. The issues on appeal are whether Appellants have an ownership interest in the property and the proceeds from partition sale, and whether the trial court properly allocated the proceeds between the rightful owners. We reverse the trial court regarding ownership and hold that Appellants own one-half of the property. We affirm the trial court’s allocation of the funds from the partition sale. We vacate the trial court’s judgment as to whether Appellants’ attorneys’ fees should be paid from the partition proceeds and remand this issue for reconsideration in light of our Court’s determination of ownership. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
JASON DONALDSON v. SUSAN DONALDSON
Because the order from which the appellant has filed an appeal does not constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
Loudon | Court of Appeals | |
Piedmont Natural Gas Company, Inc. v. BlueRoad Fontanel, LLC
A gas company obtained an easement by eminent domain across a property owner’s land. A jury determined the amount of just compensation payable to the landowner. On appeal, the gas company argues that the trial court erred in allowing the jury to hear expert testimony from the landowner’s expert regarding the value of the property and that the jury verdict is not supported by material evidence. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Brandon Coleman, et al. v. CBL & Associates, Inc., et al.
This interlocutory appeal concerns the relation back doctrine under Tennessee Rule of Civil |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
William H. Lublin v. Vastland Northcrest Development, LLC
This matter arises from two failed real estate transactions. A buyer contracted to purchase two townhomes from a real estate developer. However, after the sales failed to close, the developer purported to cancel the transactions. The buyer then sued the developer, seeking decrees for specific performance and damages for breach of contract. The buyer also asserted a claim under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. After a bench trial, the trial court entered an order awarding the buyer specific performance but denying his claim for damages. The trial court also found a TCPA violation and awarded the buyer his attorney’s fees and costs. On the breach of contract claim, we have determined that the developer breached the contracts and that the buyer failed to sufficiently prove his damages, and we affirm the trial court’s decision. We also conclude that the trial court erred in finding a TCPA violation and reverse this finding, as well as the award of fees and costs pursuant to the TCPA. Finally, we have determined that the developer was not the prevailing party in the trial court or on appeal and deny its request for an award of attorney’s fees. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Poser Investments, Inc. v. Old National Hospitality Company et al.
A judgment creditor domesticated a Georgia judgment in Tennessee under the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act. When the creditor sought to enforce the domesticated judgment, the debtor raised a statute-of-limitations defense. The trial court ruled that the enforcement action was time-barred because the limitations period began to run when the foreign judgment was rendered in Georgia. Upon review, we conclude that domestication of the foreign judgment under the Uniform Act resulted in a new Tennessee judgment for purposes of the statute of limitations. So we reverse the trial court’s decision |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
KARS LLC ET AL. v. RONALD OGLE ET AL.
The plaintiffs sued the defendants alleging breach of contract, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, tortious interference with contract, tortious interference with business relations, fraudulent misrepresentation, unjust enrichment, and civil conspiracy. The trial court dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint after finding that the plaintiffs failed to timely close on their transactions with the defendants. The plaintiffs appeal. Following thorough review, we affirm in part, reverse in part, vacate in part, and remand the case for further proceedings. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Gail Gottesman v. Todd Hecker, et al.
In this matter involving the sale of a parcel of improved real property, the buyer claimed |
Benton | Court of Appeals | |
IN RE MAGNUS H. ET AL.
The trial court terminated a father’s parental rights to his five minor children after finding clear and convincing evidence that the father, who was incarcerated when the termination petition was filed, abandoned the children by wanton disregard; the children were victims of severe abuse; the father was confined under a criminal sentence of six years; and termination of the father’s parental rights was in the best interests of the children. The father appeals. Upon diligent review of the record, we find no error and affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Genesis Roofing Company v. Tennessee Occupational Safety and Health Administration Review Commission
This appeal arises from a petition for judicial review under Tennessee Code Annotated § 4- 5-322 of a decision of the Tennessee Occupational Safety and Health Administration Review Commission (the “Review Commission”). Asserting that the petition was untimely because it had been filed more than 60 days after entry of the agency’s final order, the Review Commission filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(1). The petitioner opposed the motion by asking for an enlargement of time pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 6.02. The trial court denied the petitioner’s motion for an enlargement of time and granted the Review Commission’s motion to dismiss. The petitioner appeals. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
MARY GERMAINE WILSON ET AL. v. DR. ALICIA JAMELLE MICKLES
The plaintiffs in a health care liability action moved to continue the trial date due to health issues from which one of the plaintiffs was purportedly suffering. The trial court denied the motion to continue, and the plaintiffs’ counsel informed the trial court that the plaintiffs would not be attending the trial, despite the denial of their motion for continuance. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the case due to the plaintiffs’ failure to prosecute the case and the plaintiffs’ noncompliance with a pretrial order. The trial court dismissed the case with prejudice. The plaintiffs unsuccessfully moved to alter or amend the dismissal order and ultimately appealed to this Court. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
YIN C. LEMLEY v. WILLIAM A. ROWE ET AL.
This appeal arises from an action for breach of a contract wherein the defendants had agreed to assist the plaintiff in purchasing improved real property. Following a bench trial, the trial court found that the plaintiff had committed the first material breach of the parties’ contract, had acted in bad faith, and had misrepresented information to the defendants regarding her performance of the contract. However, the court determined that the defendants had continued to accept payment on the contract after the plaintiff’s breach. The trial court awarded to the plaintiff a judgment in the amount of $170,470.04, representing reimbursement of all payments she had made to the defendants, plus interest, but minus expenses incurred by the defendants over the course of the agreement. The trial court denied the plaintiff’s request for specific performance. The plaintiff has appealed. Due to significant deficiencies in the plaintiff’s appellate briefs, we conclude that she has waived consideration of all issues on appeal. Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal. We deny the defendants’ request for an award of attorney’s fees incurred on appeal. |
Monroe | Court of Appeals | |
Randall L. Rice et al. v. The Tennessee Democratic Executive Committee
A majority of the members of the State Executive Committee of the Tennessee Democratic Party approved adding unelected “ex-officio members” as full members of the Executive Committee with voting rights. A group of dissenting Executive Committee members brought suit, claiming that the addition of voting members of the Executive Committee in this manner violated statutory provisions governing the composition of state party executive committees, codified at Tennessee Code Annotated section 2-13-101 et seq. In response, the Executive Committee argued the statutory provisions permit adding ex-officio members as full voting members and invoked constitutional avoidance principles in support of the Executive Committee’s interpretation of the statutory scheme. The Executive Committee filed a counterclaim challenging the constitutionality of the statutory scheme based on freedom of association principles. Both parties sought judgment on the pleadings. The trial court granted the Executive Committee’s motion for judgment on pleadings, construing the statutory scheme as permitting the Executive Committee’s actions. Accordingly, the trial court pretermitted the constitutional issue, dismissing the Executive Committee’s counterclaim as moot. The dissenting members appealed. We conclude the trial court erred in its interpretation of the statutory scheme. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
LEIGHTON H. LIPPERT ET AL. v. B & D REAL ESTATE PROPERTIES, LLC
A developer failed to use proper erosion control measures, resulting in recurring sediment runoff into a pond owned by neighboring landowners and increasing accumulation of sediment therein. The trial court concluded that developer’s actions constituted a temporary, not permanent, nuisance and awarded injunctive relief and damages. Damages for emotional distress were included among the damages the trial court awarded. The developer appeals, challenging the trial court’s finding as to proximate causation and asserting that its actions, if a nuisance, were a permanent and not temporary nuisance, and accordingly the landowners’ suit was barred by the statute of limitations. The developer also asserts that the trial court erred as to the remedies awarded, challenging both the injunctive relief and emotional distress damages. We affirm the trial court’s findings as to proximate causation and its conclusion that the nuisance is temporary. We also affirm the trial court’s imposition of an injunction. However, we reverse the award of damages for emotional distress based upon deficient pleading. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company, et al. v. Virginia Jones
The defendant was involved in a motor vehicle collision with a tractor-trailer truck in |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
TED PHILLIPS ET AL. v. NATIONAL AGGREGATES LLC ET AL.
The plaintiffs appeal from the trial court’s dismissal of their claims against two sets of |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
IN RE CHARLEE G. ET AL
This action involves the termination of a mother’s parental rights to her minor children. Following a bench trial, the court found that clear and convincing evidence established several grounds of termination and that termination was in the best interest of the children. We now affirm. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
OCOEE RIDGE PHASE I HOMEOWNERS’ ASSOCIATION, LLC v. DOMINIC CUSUMANO ET AL.
Because the order from which the appellant has filed an appeal does not constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
Polk | Court of Appeals | |
ANTHONY D. WALSH V. TIMOTHY ALLEN WALSH
In this case, two brothers accused each other of exerting undue influence on their aging mother, Latona Joyce Walsh. Timothy Walsh (“Defendant”) alleged that his brother Anthony Walsh (“Plaintiff”) had exerted undue influence over Ms. Walsh, resulting in her deeding her home to him, naming him as the executor of her estate, and placing his name on her bank accounts approximately four years before her death. Shortly before her death, Ms. Walsh made Defendant her attorney-in-fact and Plaintiff’s name was removed from her accounts. Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that Defendant had exerted undue influence over Ms. Walsh, and Defendant filed a counterclaim against Plaintiff for undue influence. Ms. Walsh died two days later. The Chancery Court for Anderson County (“the Trial Court”) found that both sons had exerted undue influence over their mother but that Defendant had not dissipated any of her assets, unlike Plaintiff. The Trial Court accordingly ordered that Ms. Walsh’s home was part of her estate and was to be distributed by the terms of her 1991 will. The Trial Court further credited Plaintiff with receiving $49,000 in rental income from renting his mother’s home after her death. Plaintiff appeals the Trial Court’s finding of undue influence. Based upon our review, we affirm. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
KELLY LISH, ET AL. v. O. RAYMOND LOWRY, ET AL.
This breach of contract case involves a partnership dispute where one partner who undertook the winding down of the long-term partnership sought (1) reimbursement of loans and advances made to cover partnership expenses together with interest thereon; (2) compensation for services rendered on behalf of the partnership and attorney fees; and (3) taking into account the foregoing, disbursement of partnership funds to the partners. The other two partners disputed the claims and made counterclaims. Because we cannot ascertain whether the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law support the judgment, we vacate the judgment and remand it for the entry of a more detailed order that reflects that it is the product of the trial court’s individualized decision-making and independent judgment. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
Randy Arnold v. Kamilah Sanders
This appeal arises from a modification of a Permanent Parenting Plan (“PPP”), pursuant to which Randy Arnold, (“Father”) replaced Kamilah Sanders, (“Mother”), as the primary residential parent of the parties’ only child. Mother timely filed a Motion to Review the decision of the juvenile court magistrate pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 37-1- 107, which motion the juvenile court judge denied. This appeal followed. We affirm the ruling of the juvenile court and remand with instructions to set child support. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, ex rel., Summer Springer v. Elijah Williams
The notice of appeal in this case was not timely filed. Therefore, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
Carroll | Court of Appeals | |
Billy Hughes et al. v. Lee Masonry Products, Inc. et al.
The homeowners and a general contractor commenced this action for breach of contract, breach of express warranty, and breach of implied warranty against a brick manufacturer and its distributor. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants based on the plaintiffs’ failure to provide an opportunity to cure. We affirm in part and reverse in part. Having determined that Article 2 of Tennessee’s Uniform Commercial Code controls the sale of the bricks and that the bricks were accepted, it was unnecessary for the plaintiffs to provide an opportunity to cure before filing suit. Still, we conclude that the manufacturer was entitled to summary judgment on all claims because it had no privity of contract with the plaintiffs. |
Robertson | Court of Appeals | |
Tammala Thompson v. State of Tennessee
This appeal arises from a premises liability action commenced by Tammala Thompson (“Plaintiff”) for injuries she sustained while camping for the weekend at Cedars of Lebanon State Park (“the Park”). Plaintiff alleges that the State of Tennessee (“the State”), which owns and operates the Park, is liable for her injuries because the State negligently maintained an unsafe sidewalk. Relying upon the affirmative defense provided by the Tennessee Recreational Use Statute (“the TRUS”), the State filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. Plaintiff opposed the motion arguing that she was not engaged in recreational activity when the injury occurred because she was walking on a sidewalk; thus, the TRUS is not applicable. She also asserted that sidewalks are “improvements” which are not expressly exempted from liability under the TRUS. Finding the TRUS applicable and that no exceptions applied, the Claims Commission granted the State’s motion to dismiss. We affirm. |
Court of Appeals | ||
In Re Hunter W., et al.
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights for abandonment by failure to visit, |
Shelby | Court of Appeals |
