In Re Zakary O.
Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her eldest child on a number of grounds. We reverse the trial court’s finding that Mother engaged in only token visitation with the child during the relevant time period. We vacate the trial court’s finding that Mother failed to manifest an ability and willingness to parent because the trial court failed to make findings as to whether the return of the child would pose a risk of substantial harm. We affirm the trial court’s findings as to the remaining grounds, as well as the trial court’s finding that termination is in the child’s best interest. |
Court of Appeals | ||
Aureus Holdings, LLC, d/b/a Media Brewery v. 3803 Partners, LLC
This case involves competing claims for breach of a commercial lease agreement. The tenant commenced this action seeking to recover the security deposit and pre-paid rent, contending that the landlord breached the lease by failing to comply with the notice-and-cure provision in the lease before leasing the premises to another tenant. The landlord denied any breach and filed a counterclaim for damages and attorney’s fees contending that the tenant breached the lease by not paying rent. Each party moved for summary judgment, seeking affirmative relief as well as dismissal of the other party’s claims. After ruling that the tenant was the first to materially breach the lease by failing to pay rent and holding that the landlord failed to comply with the notice-and-cure provision in the lease, the court summarily dismissed the tenant’s complaint and the landlord’s counterclaims. Both parties appeal. We affirm the dismissal of the tenant’s complaint but reverse the dismissal of the landlord’s counterclaims and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Betty H. v. Williamson County et al.
The mother of a minor filed suit against a county and county employees, alleging that the minor was sexually assaulted by a county employee while in custody at a county-run juvenile detention center. The trial court granted the county’s motion for summary judgment on several grounds, including that the county retained immunity under the Governmental Tort Liability Act because the claims against the county arose out of civil rights claims. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Charles Hardin, Jr. v. Amanda Warf
This appeal arises from the filing of a detainer warrant in general sessions court. The |
Benton | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Mary M.
In this appeal, the circuit court determined that the plaintiff had failed to timely perfect her |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Ricky L. Boren v. Hill Boren, PC, et al.
In this lawsuit between former law partners, a jury returned a verdict in favor of Appellees. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Anglin G. Wright v. Lisa Robison
This is an appeal from a final judgment entered on April 5, 2023. Because the appellant did not file her notice of appeal with the clerk of the appellate court within thirty days after entry of the final order as required by Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a), we dismiss the appeal. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Edward Ronny Arnold v. Deborah Malchow et al.
This is the second appeal in this matter involving a motor vehicle collision that occurred on October 23, 2019, in Nashville. Upon remand, following dismissal of the first appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to the absence of a final judgment, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the individual tortfeasor and subsequently dismissed the plaintiff’s claim against his underinsured motorist insurance carrier. The plaintiff has appealed. Determining that the plaintiff has demonstrated the existence of a genuine issue of material fact with respect to his negligence claim, we vacate the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the tortfeasor. We further vacate the dismissal of the plaintiff’s underinsured motorist claim against his automobile insurer. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects and remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Vandity A. Mitchell v. State of Tennessee
This appeal involves a personal injury action arising out of a car accident in a state parking lot. The original defendants raised the defense of comparative fault by the State of Tennessee, and the plaintiff filed a notice of claim in the Division of Claims and Risk Management and, later, filed a complaint in the Claims Commission. After the Claims Commission transferred the matter to circuit court, the State moved to dismiss based on the expiration of the statute of limitations, and the court granted the motion. We affirm the trial court’s ruling because, under Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-1-119, the complaint initiating a suit against the State was filed in the Claims Commission after the expiration of the 90-day grace period provided by the statute. Furthermore, we find the plaintiff’s argument that the State waived the statute of limitations defense unpersuasive. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Pamela Diane Stark v. Joe Edward Stark
This appeal arises from a divorce action filed in 2018. The wife appeals from the trial |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Timothy L. Morton v. Davidson County Government
The plaintiff made a claim for the return of bond money he paid to a private bonding company to secure his release from jail for charges that were pending and then nolled nearly 22 years before the filing of the present cause of action. The trial court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted pursuant to Rule 12.02(6) of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial court held that the complaint, giving it the benefit of all reasonable inferences, fails to articulate any facts or legal authority showing a right to relief against the defendant. Further, the court determined that if the gravamen of the claim is a tort action for conversion, the claim was also properly dismissed because it would have accrued long ago and is therefore barred under the applicable one-year statute of limitations. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Toby S. Wilt, Jr. v. ESPACES Franklin, LLC et al.
This appeal arises from a lawsuit filed by a former CEO seeking funds owed to him from his company and two of its subsidiaries. The trial court awarded summary judgment to the plaintiff. The defendants appeal. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
City of Memphis v. The Pension Board of The City of Memphis, et al.
This appeal arises out of the chancery court’s affirmance of the decision of the administrative law judge granting a Line of Duty Disability (“LODD”) pension to a Memphis Firefighter. The appeal hinges on a question of law concerning the meaning of Memphis Code of Ordinances § 25-1(27), which states that an employee is eligible for a LODD pension if:
[A] physical . . . condition arising as the direct and proximate result of an accident sustained by a participant, . . . while in the actual performance of duties for the city at some definite time and place . . . which totally and permanently prevents him or her from engaging in the duties for which he or she was employed by the city. The determination of the line-of-duty disability of a participant shall be made on medical evidence by at least two qualified physicians.
City of Memphis Code of Ordinances, § 25-1(27) (emphasis added).
Three qualified physicians testified, but only one of them found that both factors were established. In ruling in favor of the firefighter, the administrative law judge and the chancellor both held that it was not necessary that each qualified physician state that the injuries were caused while in the actual performance of duties for the City at a definite place and time and that he was permanently disabled from continuing in his chosen role as a consequence of that injury. The City of Memphis insists that this was error, contending that “the ordinance clearly requires at least two physicians to opine that the employee sustained a work-related injury which caused his/her disability.” Based on the plain language of the ordinance, we agree with the City’s interpretation of the evidentiary requirements for a LODD pension; we therefore reverse and remand with instructions to reinstate the decision of the Pension Board of the City of Memphis, which denied the application for a LODD pension. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Ervin Jack Quinn
A surviving spouse brought this action against the estate of her deceased husband and his ex-wife and children. The surviving spouse sought to set aside the decedent’s inter vivos transfer of three properties to the ex-wife and children and/or to have the value of the transferred property included in the decedent’s net estate under Tennessee Code Annotated § 31-1-105, which applies when a decedent transferred property “with an intent to defeat the surviving spouse’s elective or distributive share.” The decedent conveyed the properties within three days of his death by quitclaim deed for no consideration other than love and affection. One of the deeds was executed by the decedent, and the other two deeds were executed by the decedent’s attorney-in-fact, his daughter. The chancellor referred all issues in dispute to a special master who found that the properties conveyed by the attorney-in-fact were conveyed with the intent to defeat the plaintiff’s elective share but that the third tract, which was conveyed by the decedent, was not. The chancellor adopted the report and recommendations of the special master. This appeal followed. After considering the factors identified in Finley v. Finley, 726 S.W.2d 923 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986) and the totality of the circumstances, we hold that all three properties were conveyed with the intent to defeat the plaintiff’s elective share. Thus, we reverse, in part, the judgment of the trial court and remand for entry of a judgment consistent with this opinion, including a recalculation of the surviving spouse’s elective share based on a net estate that includes all three properties at issue. |
Houston | Court of Appeals | |
Sharon Weatherly v. Eastman Chemical Company
The plaintiff brought an action seeking damages for diminution of real property value, |
Court of Appeals | ||
In Re Andrew L.
This is a termination of parental rights case. Mother appeals the trial court’s order |
Court of Appeals | ||
Erroll Sherrod v. Smith & Nephew, Inc.
This products-liability case is dismissed with prejudice on the parties’ joint stipulation of |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Jessica Garvin v. Mariah Shelton
The plaintiff filed a complaint for a restraining order against the defendant, the wife of the |
Court of Appeals | ||
In Re Estate of Dariel Blackledge Washington
Decedent’s siblings filed a document they alleged to be decedent’s last will and testament. Decedent’s husband, the personal representative of her estate, moved to declare the alleged will invalid for lack of an effective signature. The trial court concluded that the will was ineffective due to the lack of decedent’s signature, and declined to admit it to probate. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Charlee N. et al.
This is a termination of parental rights case. The trial court terminated the parental rights of the parents to two children, finding that there was clear and convincing evidence as to both parents regarding the ground of severe child abuse and that termination of the parents’ rights was in the children’s best interest. Having carefully reviewed the record, we affirm. |
Overton | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Serenity S. et al.
Heather B. 1 (“Mother”) and John S., III (“Father”) are the biological parents of Serenity S. Mother and Raymond R. are the biological parents of Harmony R., Mellody O., and Angel O. Tina S. (“Grandmother”) and John S., Jr. (“Grandfather” or, together with Grandmother, “Petitioners”) petitioned the Chancery Court for Giles County (the “trial court”) for termination of Mother’s and Raymond R.’s parental rights in April of 2021 and for adoption of the children. Father voluntarily surrendered his parental rights as to Serenity S. As for the grounds for termination, Petitioners alleged: substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan, persistence of conditions, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to personally assume legal and physical custody of the children. Following a bench trial, the trial court concluded that Petitioners proved all three statutory grounds for termination and that termination was in the Children’s best interests. Mother appeals to this Court. Having reviewed the record, we conclude that the trial court’s order must be vacated and remanded. Because Petitioners proved no statutory grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence, we need not consider whether termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the Children’s best interests. |
Giles | Court of Appeals | |
Mazie F. White v. Thomas Gray Miller
The trial court found Father to be willfully underemployed and imputed income to him for calculation of child support. Mother appeals the juvenile court’s determination, arguing the trial court erred as to the amount of income imputed to Father for the purposes of setting child support and also as to its determination of the amount of retroactive support. We affirm the trial court’s income imputation. However, we conclude the trial court erred in its calculation of retroactive support owed by Father. Therefore, this Court affirms the judgment of the trial court in part and reverses in part. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Pam Holzmer v. The Estate of James F. Walsh, Jr.
This is an appeal from a jury verdict awarding damages to a plaintiff injured in a car accident. The plaintiff asserts that the trial court erred in excluding evidence of her medical bills. Because the plaintiff failed to present expert proof that her medical expenses were necessary, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the bills. The jury verdict is affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Daniel Harvey, et al. v. Shelby County, Tennessee, et al.
Plaintiffs filed this inverse condemnation suit against numerous defendants, alleging that |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Michael C. Et Al.
The appellant challenges the trial court’s termination of her parental rights. The trial court |
Court of Appeals |
