Hollingsworth, Inc. vs. Ruth E. Johnson E2002-02561-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: William E. Lantrip
This appeal questions the holding of the Trial Court regarding the right of a corporation to claim bad debt credits for sales tax remitted relative to health club membership contracts which were subsequently defaulted upon. We affirm in part and reverse and dismiss in part.
This case involves the seizure and forfeiture of a leased vehicle. The Department of Safety ("the Department") sent a notice of the forfeiture proceedings to the corporate owner/lessor at the address listed on the vehicle's certificate of title. Because the owner had moved two years previously and the Postal Service had ceased forwarding its mail, the unopened certified letter was returned to the Department marked "Not Deliverable as Addressed Unable to Forward." The Department took no further steps to locate the owner and summarily ordered the forfeiture of the vehicle. Upon learning of the forfeiture, the owner filed a petition for a stay and reconsideration, which the Department denied. The owner then filed a petition for review in the Chancery Court of Davidson County in which it challenged the adequacy of the notice procedure. The trial court ruled the notice procedure did not meet constitutional due process requirements under the circumstances, in which the corporate owner had a registered agent for service of process whose name and address were easily obtainable through the Secretary of State's Office. The Department appeals, arguing that due process does not require that it seek out a corporate owner that has failed to notify the Department of its change of address, as required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-4-131. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
This is a contract dispute between the plaintiff, an incorporated municipality, and the defendant, a nonprofit water systems corporation that supplied water to residents living outside the city limits. The parties entered into several agreements for the sale of potable treated water from the plaintiff to the defendant, the specific terms for which varied under each agreement. In particular, a 1981 agreement placed limits on the defendant's ability to assign its rights under the contract and required that the defendant purchase all its water requirements up to eight million gallons per month from the plaintiff, while an agreement executed in 1994 contained no minimum purchase requirement for the defendant and expressly provided that successors to the defendant, "whether the result of legal process, assignment, or otherwise," succeeded to the rights of the defendant under the contract. In 2002, the defendant entered into negotiations for the sale of its assets to a third party water company. In response, the plaintiff filed a petition for injunctive relief, alleging, inter alia, that the contract between the parties did not allow the defendant to assign its rights without the plaintiff's prior consent and that the City would suffer irreparable harm if deprived of the income generated by its water sale to the defendant. Following an injunction hearing and a subsequent trial, the trial court ruled, inter alia, that the 1994 contract superceded the previous agreements between the parties and the defendant was free to transfer its assets to the third party water company without the plaintiff's consent. The plaintiff appeals, arguing the 1994 contract was ultra vires because its mayor lacked the authority to execute it, there was no meeting of the minds to form a valid contract between the parties, and the trial court abused its discretion in dissolving the temporary injunction and denying the City's request for a permanent injunction. Having reviewed the entire record in this case, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
This is a divorce case involving the division of marital property. In 1988, the husband moved into the wife's house. The parties married in 1992 and remained married for ten years. During that time, the parties sold the wife's house and bought a new home with the proceeds. The new home was purchased in the names of both the husband and the wife. In 2002, the parties divorced. The trial court found that the parties' property had become so commingled that virtually none of it could be considered separate property, and divided the marital assets evenly. The trial court also allocated to the wife a larger portion of a marital debt to the wife's mother. From that decree, the wife now appeals. We affirm, finding that the evidence clearly supports the trial court's finding of commingling and transmutation of property, and finding no abuse of discretion in the trial court's allocation of the marital debt.
Wilson
Court of Appeals
In Re: C.L.J. M2003-01949-COA-R9-JV
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: W. Scott Rosenberg
This appeal involves a dispute over the custody of an eight-year-old boy. The child's parents never married and engaged in a protracted, bitter custody dispute until the father died of cancer in 2003. Immediately after the father's death, his sister and brother-in-law filed a petition in the Davidson County Juvenile Court seeking custody of the child. The child's mother opposed the petition, asserting that her custodial rights were superior to those of the boy's aunt and uncle. The juvenile court granted temporary custody of the child to his aunt and uncle pending a hearing. The court also determined that the child's mother could not gain custody of her son unless she proved that she would be able to adequately fulfill her parenting responsibilities. The juvenile court granted the mother's request for an interlocutory appeal, and this court granted the petition to determine whether the juvenile court applied the correct legal standard for custody disputes between a biological parent and non-parents. We have determined that the juvenile court has not employed the correct standard in this case and that the child's mother is entitled to have custody of her son unless the trial court determines that returning the child to his mother will expose him to a risk of substantial harm.
Davidson
Court of Appeals
Chattanooga Publishing. v. Hamilton County Election Commission E2003-00076-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: W. Frank Brown, III
In this case involving the Tennessee Public Records Act, the issue is whether the Appellee Hamilton County Election Commission should have been compelled to release to the Appellant certain records relating to the Democratic primary election in Hamilton County held on May 7, 2002. The Trial Court held that although the documents were public records, they were also investigative records of the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation ("TBI") and thus subject to the exception found at T.C.A. 10-7-504(a)(2) of the Public Records Act. We find that the records at issue were not investigative records of the TBI at the time the request was made and that they should have been released to the Appellant Chattanooga Publishing Company ("CPC"), and accordingly reverse the Trial Court's judgment to the contrary. We affirm the Trial Court's refusal to award attorney's fees to CPC.
Hamilton
Court of Appeals
Ruthie Curbow v. James Stucki M2001-02908-COA-R3-JV
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: Lonnie R. Hoover
In this case, Ruthie Ann Curbow appeals from a custody and support proceeding in Williamson County Juvenile Court. On the day of the hearing, parties and counsel appeared in camera for a pre-trial conference. Upon announcement of an apparent settlement in open court, Mother expressed disagreement with the terms of the settlement and a desire to preserve her right to appeal. The trial court determined that no settlement existed and trial on the merits proceeded with proof from all parties. The court entered an order awarding joint custody with Father as primary custodian under the statutory fitness comparison. Mother appeals. We affirm the judgment.
Williamson
Court of Appeals
Sherry Hunter v. Jay Ura M2002-02573-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Marietta M. Shipley
Administratrix of estate of deceased husband filed wrongful death action against defendants anesthesiologist and anesthesia services group. Jury returned a verdict for plaintiff, finding defendants at fault and awarding damages for medical and funeral expenses, and the pecuniary value of the life of the deceased including loss of consortium of wife and children. Defendants appeal, raising several procedural and evidentiary issues for consideration. We vacate and remand.
Davidson
Court of Appeals
Shemeka Buford v. State M2003-00176-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Sr. Judge William H. Inman
Trial Court Judge: C. L. Rogers
This is an action for damages against the Department of Children's Services of the State and one of its employees who allegedly strip-searched one of the plaintiff's young children, and attempted to strip-search another, while ostensibly seeking evidence of abuse allegedly inflicted by the mother. Process was never served on the employee. The claim was transferred to the Claims Commission. The plaintiff appeals, complaining of the dismissal of the employee, and of the transfer to the Commission. The judgment is affirmed.
Sumner
Court of Appeals
Karen Scoggins vs. Larry Scoggins E2002-02923-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Howell N. Peoples
Karen Thompson Scoggins ("Plaintiff") and Larry Browder Scoggins ("Defendant") were divorced in 2000. The divorce judgment ordered Defendant to use funds from his 401(k) plan to pay off certain marital debts and then to convey the remainder of the 401(k) to Plaintiff. Defendant did not do this. Instead, Defendant filed for bankruptcy, listed Plaintiff as a creditor, and was granted a discharge in bankruptcy. Plaintiff filed a complaint in Chancery Court ("Trial Court") seeking to enforce the divorce judgment. Defendant claimed the debt to Plaintiff was discharged in bankruptcy. The Chancery Court held that the discharge in bankruptcy does not bar Plaintiff from enforcing her rights in Defendant's 401(k) plan. Defendant appeals. We reverse and remand.
Hamilton
Court of Appeals
Arthur Lynn v. Randy Camp M2002-02708-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr.
This case concerns a petition for judicial review filed in chancery court. The petition sought review of the ALJ's order affirming the Petitioner's termination for sleeping on the job in violation of the Arlington Development Center's policy. The chancellor dismissed the Petition. We affirm the Chancellor.
Davidson
Court of Appeals
Paul Ivy v. Alton Hesson, W2003-01026-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Joseph H. Walker, III
Lauderdale
Court of Appeals
W2003-01816-COA-R3-CV W2003-01816-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Dewey C. Whitenton
Fayette
Court of Appeals
W2003-00303-COA-R3-CV W2003-00303-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Roger A. Page
Madison
Court of Appeals
Ed Netherland, et al v. Bill Hunter, et al M2002-03094-COA-R9-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: Walter C. Kurtz
In this matter we are asked to determine which statute controls the issue of venue for a claim filed under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, the venue provision of that act, Tennessee Code Annotated section 47-18-109, or Tennessee's general venue provision, section 20-4-101 of the Code. The trial court determined that section 47-18-109 controls venue in this action and denied Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Improper Venue. We affirm the decision of the trial court.
Davidson
Court of Appeals
LLoyd Williams vs. State E2003-01409-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Lloyd E. Williams ("Plaintiff"), who absconded while on bond, was tried, convicted, and sentenced on drug charges in absentia. Years later, Plaintiff was apprehended and placed in prison. Plaintiff sued the State of Tennessee ("the State") claiming that the trial and sentencing violated various statutory rights of his. The State filed a motion to dismiss. The Claims Commission ("the Commission") granted the State's motion to dismiss. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm.
Court of Appeals
Dept. of Children's Services vs. K.G., et al In re: K.L.H. E2003-00437-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Suzanne Bailey
The State of Tennessee, Department of Children's Services ("DCS") filed a petition seeking to terminate the parental rights of K.G. ("Mother"), and F.L.H., Jr. ("Father"), the biological parents of the minor child, K.L.H. ("the Child"). The trial court granted DCS' petition to terminate first Father's, and later Mother's, parental rights. Mother appeals. We vacate the order terminating Mother's parental rights and remand for a new termination decision.
Hamilton
Court of Appeals
Department of Children's services vs. R.A.W. E2003-00847-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Thomas J. Wright
R.A.W. ("Father") challenges the termination of his parental rights, claiming there was insufficient proof to establish grounds for termination or that it was in the best interest of the child to terminate the parent-child relationship. Father also claims the Juvenile Court erred when it refused to grant him visitation after the petition to terminate his parental rights had been filed. We affirm the decision of the Juvenile Court.
Greene
Court of Appeals
Myra Pate vs. State E2003-00297-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Myra Pate ("Plaintiff") filed a claim with the Tennessee Division of Claims Administration after she slipped and fell on her way to class at Pellissippi State Technical Community College ("PSTCC"). When her claim was denied, Plaintiff filed a complaint in the Tennessee Claims Commission ("Commission") against the State of Tennessee ("the State"). The State filed a motion for summary judgment claiming Plaintiff had filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy and failed to disclose the existence of her claim against the State. The State argued Plaintiff was judicially estopped from pursuing this lawsuit and also that she lacked standing. When Plaintiff failed to file a timely response to the motion for summary judgment, the Commission granted the motion solely because no response had been filed. Plaintiff appeals. We vacate the grant of summary judgment and remand for further proceedings.
Court of Appeals
Louis Laurent vs. Suntrust Bank E2003-01408-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Dale C. Workman
Louis A. Laurent and Barbara Laurent ("Plaintiffs") sued SunTrust Bank ("Defendant") for alleged defamatory statements made by Defendant's attorney in a separate lawsuit. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Trial Court granted the motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs appeal. We affirm.
Knox
Court of Appeals
Arthur Creech vs. Robert R. Addington E2003-00842-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Richard R. Vance
The plaintiffs leased land in Mississippi from D.C. Parker and Richard B. Flowers ("Defendants") for the purpose of building motels on the land. Plaintiffs claim they were told by Defendants' agent that financing was in place to build immediately and that this representation induced them to enter into the leases. Financing never materialized and the motels never were built. Plaintiffs sued Defendants, the parties expected to provide financing, and others. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, which the Trial Court granted. Plaintiffs appeal. We vacate and remand.
Sevier
Court of Appeals
In Re: Estate of Gloria Eleanor Franklin vs. W. Jess Waltman E2003-00926-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel P. Franks
Trial Court Judge: Telford E. Forgerty, Jr.
The Trial Court following an evidentiary hearing, held decedent's holographic will to be conditional and inoperative. On appeal, we reverse.
Cocke
Court of Appeals
Hitchock Metal Sources vs. John D. Mulford E2003-00738-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Sharon J. Bell
Diane Hitchcock ("Mrs. Hitchcock") and Hitchcock Metal Sources, Inc. ("HMS") sued John D. Mulford, Jr. ("Mulford") and Mulford Enterprises, Inc. ("the defendant corporation") for breach of an oral contract between Mulford and Mrs. Hitchcock's deceased husband, James H. Hitchcock ("Mr. Hitchcock"). Mulford and the defendant corporation responded by filing a counterclaim against Mrs. Hitchcock and HMS, asserting, inter alia, breach of contract. At the conclusion of a bench trial, the court found in favor of Mrs. Hitchcock, awarding her damages of $87,896.74 jointly and severally against Mulford and the defendant corporation, and an additional amount of $8,855.93 against the defendant corporation. The trial court dismissed the counterclaim of Mulford and the defendant corporation, as well as the original claim of HMS. Mulford and the defendant corporation appeal the trial court's dual determinations that the parties' oral agreement did not prohibit either party from pursuing other business opportunities and that the defendant corporation converted Mrs. Hitchcock's steel by selling it without her knowledge or consent. In addition, the defendants contend that the trial court erred in failing to reform the parties' contract and in its calculation of damages. By way of a separate issue, Mrs. Hitchcock asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to award her prejudgment interest. We affirm the trial court's judgment in toto.
Knox
Court of Appeals
Mary Ann Gurganus Eure v. Barry Lynn Eure E2003-00745-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Lawrence H. Puckett
This is a post-divorce modification case involving the custody of, and support for, the parties' minor child, Matthew Chandler Eure (DOB: July 22, 1996) ("the child"). Mary Ann Gurganus Eure ("Mother") filed a complaint seeking custody of the child. Barry Lynn Eure ("Father"), the child's custodian, answered and filed a counterclaim seeking an increase in Mother's weekly child support obligation. Following a hearing, the trial court denied Mother's complaint. The court subsequently increased Mother's support obligation to $113 per week. Mother appeals, arguing, in so many words, that the evidence preponderates against both of the trial court's rulings. We affirm.
Bradley
Court of Appeals
Monte Bounds vs. Zella Cupp E2003-00692-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Sharon J. Bell
The appellees filed suit against the appellant, alleging that the appellees, Lawrence R. Bozeman and wife, Imogene Bozeman ("the appellees Bozeman"), owned a 12-foot wide easement accross the property of the appellant. The appellant filed an answer, relying upon "the affirmative defense of abandonment plus adverse possession by the [appellant]." Following a plenary trial, the court below found that the appellees Bozeman had an express easement across the property of the appellant and that they "ha[d] not taken action of clear and unmistakable character indicating an abandonment of the easement." The appellant contends on this appeal that the trial court erred in failing to find abandonment of the easement. Since there is no transcript or statement of the evidence in the record before us, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
