Child Bride Music, Inc v. Jackson, et al.
Assignee appeals the judgment of the trial court holding it to be bound to a reclamation of rights provision in the contract between its assignor and a grantor of copyright interests. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
James L. Peach, et ux., v. Robert Wesley Medlin, et al.
Land owner filed complaint alleging trespass and seeking the removal of structures and signs erected by appellants encroaching upon his property. Owner further sought injunction prohibiting appellants from continued, unauthorized use of roads running across his property. The trial court found that appellants had an easement for use of one of two roads. The trial court’s final order granted owner’s request for attorney’s fees. Both parties raise issues on appeal. We affirm in part and reverse in part. |
Benton | Court of Appeals | |
Dorothy Sue Bryant v. Damon Eugene Bryant
This case involves an antenuptial agreement. Prior to their marriage, the husband and wife entered into an antenuptial agreement which stated that each party waived his or her interest in any property acquired after the marriage in the individual spouse’s name. After a nearly twenty-year marriage, the wife filed for divorce. During the divorce proceedings, the wife argued that the antenuptial agreement should not affect the trial court’s division of property acquired during the marriage. The trial court enforced the antenuptial agreement, awarding all property held in the husband’s name to the husband, regardless of whether it would otherwise have been classified as marital property. The wife appeals. We affirm, finding that the wife waived her interest in the property under the antenuptial agreement and that the evidence does not preponderate against either the enforceability of the agreement or the trial court’s division of property. |
Obion | Court of Appeals | |
Samuel Humphreys v. Richard Selvey
Plaintiff, Tennessee buyer, filed complaint in Shelby County, Tennessee circuit court against South Carolina seller for fraudulent, unlawful, and tortious conduct in connection with contract for purchase of antique soda dispensers. Seller filed motion to dismiss, alleging as grounds lack of personal jurisdiction and improper venue, and trial court granted motion on both grounds. Buyer appeals trial court’s finding that there were insufficient contacts to establish personal jurisdiction of seller. We reverse and remand. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, Ex Rel., Joeann Kee Davis v. Frankie Lee Davis
Appellant seeks relief, under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02, from final order setting child support obligations. Finding no extraordinary circumstances, extreme hardship, or excusable neglect, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Karen Thomas v. Robert D. Mayfield, M.D., et al.
This appeal challenges the trial court's dismissal of the Plaintiff's action, re-filed after the expiration of the initial statutory period of limitation. We affirm the trial court and deny Appellant's Motion for Transfer pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 16-1-116. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Beth A. Collins v. James B. Coode, III
This appeal involves a dispute regarding the post-divorce move by a primary residential parent from Clarksville to Knoxville. Upon receiving notice of the planned move, the non-residential parent petitioned the Chancery Court for Montgomery County to prevent the move or to change custody. The trial court conducted a bench trial and denied the petition. On this appeal, the non-residential parent asserts that the court applied the wrong relocation standards because it mistakenly concluded that the parents had not been spending substantially equal amounts of time with their children. We conclude that the record supports the trial court's conclusion that the parents had not spent substantially equal time with the children, and therefore, we affirm the judgment. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Gilbert Lee Smith v. Betty Darmohray
In this appeal a father seeks review of the juvenile court's refusal to modify his child support obligation. We affirm. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
John Jay Hooker v. Don Sundquist, de Facto Governor of Tennessee, in His Individual Capacity, in His Capacity as Candidate
This case involves Rule 11 sanctions. The plaintiff filed a lawsuit challenging the practice of serving meat and drink at political fund raisers, alleging that the practice violates Article X, section 3 of the Tennessee Constitution. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, based in part on the fact that the plaintiff had previously filed similar lawsuits against other defendants upon the same constitutional grounds, and that these prior lawsuits had been dismissed. The trial court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss. The defendants then filed a motion for sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 of the Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure. This motion was denied. The defendants appealed, and this Court reversed the denial of sanctions and remanded the case to the trial court. On remand, the trial court imposed as a sanction a screening mechanism whereby any complaint filed by the plaintiff within the next two years must be reviewed by a special master to ensure that it is not legally frivolous or duplicative. The plaintiff now appeals that order, claiming that the sanction imposed violates his constitutional rights. We affirm, concluding that the sanction imposed is reasonable and does not deprive the plaintiff of his constitutional rights. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: B.N.S.
This appeal involves the termination of the parental rights of a twelve-year-old child. The Hamilton County Juvenile Court placed the child in the custody of her uncle and aunt because she was chronically absent from school. The uncle and aunt later moved to Marion County. After the uncle and aunt decided that they no longer desired to have custody of the child, the Marion County Juvenile Court placed the child in the custody of the Department of Children's Services. Approximately fifteen months later, the Department filed a petition in the Marion County Juvenile Court to terminate the biological parents' parental rights. The juvenile court granted the termination petition after overruling the mother's objection that the petition should not have been filed in Marion County. The child's mother has appealed. We have determined that the order must be reversed because venue for this termination proceeding does not lie in Marion County. |
Marion | Court of Appeals | |
John W. Johnson v. Bernice Wade
This case involves a dispute over the ownership of certain real property abutting the parcels of two neighboring landowners in Gibson County, Tennessee. The trial court rendered a judgment for Appellee finding that Appellee owned the disputed property. Additionally, the trial court awarded Appellee her attorney’s fees incurred in defending against and counter-suing the Appellant. We affirm the trial court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Gibson | Court of Appeals | |
Chris Birdwell, and wife Virginia Birdwell, v. David Psimer and Patty S. Psimer
Action for Judgment on loan was defended on grounds defendant sold note to plaintiffs. The Trial Court held agreements violated statute of frauds and plaintiff failed to prove loan. On appeal, we reverse.Action for Judgment on loan was defended on grounds defendant sold note to plaintiffs. The Trial Court held agreements violated statute of frauds and plaintiff failed to prove loan. On appeal, we reverse. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
Castleton Capital Company, LLC. v. Lucius E. Burch, III
The Plaintiff filed suit seeking to recover a deficiency on a loan executed by the Defendant and another left owing after foreclosure upon real estate. The Defendant had purchased a parcel of real estate from a company in which he was a director, and had assumed responsibility for repayment of a loan secured by that real estate. The Defendant denied liability, and alleged mutual mistake and negligent misrepresentation surrounding the loan against the lender because the loan documents he signed contained language regarding cross-collateralization involving a separate parcel of real estate formerly owned by the company in which the Defendant was a director, which real estate was sold two days prior to assumption of the loan obligations by the Defendant. Following a bench trial, the Chancellor granted judgment for the Plaintiff for $134,127.65 and attorneys' fees totaling $73,417.37, for a total judgment of $207,545.02. The Defendant appealed. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Great River Insurance v. Edison Automation, Inc.
The Plaintiff filed suit for Declaratory Judgment seeking the order of the Court declaring that losses suffered by the insured were not covered losses under a general policy of business insurance. At issue is the interpretation of the insurance contract and a determination as to whether insurance coverage existed where the insured expended money and time fabricating parts for a custom project upon the mistaken belief that it had obtained a sub-contract, but where no such agreement existed inasmuch as the purchase order upon which the insured relied was forged by an employee of the insured. Motions for Summary Judgment were filed by each party. The Trial Court granted the insurance company's motion for Summary Judgment, from which the insured appealed. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the Trial Court, and also determine that Declaratory Judgment should be granted in favor of the insurance company, determining that no coverage exists for the loss suffered by the insured. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
William W. York v. Tennessee Board of Parole
Appellant is an inmate of the Department of Corrections serving two life sentences for two first degree murder convictions with sentences imposed in 1978. He became eligible for parole, and on July 3, 2001, a hearing was held before the Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole. His application for parole was denied on July 3, 2001 and review of parole was set for July of 2011. Final disposition denying parole was entered October 2, 2001. On October 29, 2001, Appellant petitioned for a writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court of Davidson County, Tennessee, which petition was dismissed by the trial court on January 10, 2003. We affirm the trial court Order of Dismissal relative to the merits of the denial of parole but hold that postponement of parole review until July of 2011 was an arbitrary exercise of power by the parole board and, therefore, reverse the Order of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Gloria Windsor v. DeKalb County Board of Education, et al.
This appeal involves an attempt by a dismissed tenured teacher to obtain common-law certiorari review of her dismissal. After voluntarily dismissing her own Petition for Review properly filed pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 49-5-513, she challenges the chancellor's Order dismissing her Petition for Common Law Writ of Certiorari. We affirm the action of the trial court. |
DeKalb | Court of Appeals | |
Patrick N. Lawson v. Bridget O'Malley
This case involves the subject matter jurisdiction of Juvenile Court. The mother and the father were divorced by final decree entered in Chancery Court in 1990. The final Chancery Court decree provided that the mother would have custody of the parties’ two children, and that the father would pay child support to the mother. Subsequently, the father filed a dependency and neglect action in Juvenile Court, and he was awarded permanent custody of the children. Subsequently, he filed a petition in the Juvenile Court below for child support. The Juvenile Court granted the father’s petition, ordering the mother to pay child support to the father. The mother now appeals. We reverse, finding that the Juvenile Court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to decide matters of child support between these parties, because the Chancery Court had previously assumed jurisdiction over such issues. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Charlie Spell, III D/B/A CNS Management, et al., v. Patti Labelle, et al.
Plaintiff sued Defendant for breach of contract. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint based upon an arbitration provision contained in the parties’ contract. The trial court entered an order staying litigation pending arbitration but found the site provision, providing that all disputes shall be settled by arbitration in Chicago, Illinois, unconscionable. The trial court reformed the parties’ contract so that the arbitration would be governed by Tennessee law and occur in Memphis, Tennessee. Defendants appealed this decision. We reverse in part, affirm in part and remand. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Monumental Life Insurance Company v. Linda Elain Donoho, et al.
In this interpleader action, two former spouses of the decedent who are mothers of the decedent's three surviving children filed conflicting claims under two marital dissolution agreements alleging beneficial interests in a $50,000 life insurance policy. One claimed an interest for herself; the other claimed an interest for her two children. The matters in dispute arise from inconsistencies in marital dissolution agreements resulting from the decedent's two divorces, and pertain to the duty of the decedent to maintain life insurance and the beneficiary designations. The trial court granted one of two competing motions for summary judgment ruling against the second wife by dividing the proceeds equally among the decedent's three children. We reverse and modify holding that the second wife, not the decedent's third child, was the designated beneficiary of the disputed policy pursuant to the second marital dissolution agreement and that the decedent's first two children had vested interests in the insurance proceeds as mandated by the first marital dissolution agreement. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Howard Fisher v. State of Tennessee
An inmate in the custody of the Department of Correction filed a claim in the Tennessee Claims Commission for the loss of seventy-eight cartons of cigarettes, which he alleged were removed from his prison cell during a search. The Commission denied his claim. We affirm the Claims Commission. |
Court of Appeals | ||
In Re: A.M.F and Z.T.F, State of Tennessee Department of Children's Services v. Lisa Frazier, et al.
This is a termination of parental rights case. The parents appeal from the order of the Juvenile Court of Maury County, terminating their parental rights. Specifically, the parents assert that the grounds cited for termination are not supported by clear and convincing evidence in the record. Because we find clear and convincing evidence in the record to support the trial court's findings, we affirm. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
Dept of Children's Srvcs v. Juanita Culbertson; In the Matter of W.J.R.C. and S.D.H.
This is a termination of parental rights case. Mother appeals from the order of the Juvenile Courtof Marshall County, terminating her parental rights. Specifically, Mother asserts that the grounds cited for termination are not supported by clear and convincing evidence in the record. Because we find clear and convincing evidence in the record to support the trial court's findings, we affirm. |
Marshall | Court of Appeals | |
The Lauderdale County Bank v. Lisa Wiggins, et al.
Plaintiff Lauderdale County Bank filed a declaratory judgment action to determine the obligations of the parties arising from its payment of a forged check. The trial court awarded summary judgment in favor of Defendant Newcourt Financial, holding Newcourt Financial was entitled to the proceeds of the check. Plaintiff appeals. We reverse. |
Lauderdale | Court of Appeals | |
Kenneth Martin v. Martha Martin
After a sixteen-year marriage and two children, Husband and Wife both filed for divorce. Wife stipulated that Husband was entitled to a divorce. After hearing the evidence, the trial court fashioned a parenting plan which named Mother the primary residential parent with visitation for Husband; accepted the parties' stipulation with respect to the marital property; divided the remaining contested marital property; and ordered the parties to pay their own attorney's fees. Husband appeals. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Ronald Stephen Satterfield v. Renata E. Bluhm, M.D., and Occupatient Medical Services, P.C.
Plaintiff's claims for defendants aiding and abetting the State in terminating him and for libel and slander, tortious interference with his employment contract, outrageous conduct, and negligence were dismissed in the Trial Court by summary judgment. Plaintiff has appealed. We affirm the Trial Court's Judgment. |
Knox | Court of Appeals |
