COURT OF APPEALS OPINIONS

Donnie Wayne Johnson, Jr., v. City Roofing Company
W2003-01852-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Judge William B. Acree

This case is an appeal from an order granting Appellee’s motion for summary judgment. Appellant argues, as he did at trial, that this case involves genuine issues of material fact, rendering summary judgment inappropriate for this action. For the following reasons, we affirm.

Obion Court of Appeals

St. Paul Reinsurance Co., LTD, v. Robert Williams and Sherrod Jackson, Individually and D/B/A Pure Passion, Pure Passion, Inc. and Eugene Pugh
W2003-00473-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Walter L. Evans

This case arises from events surrounding the shooting death of Decedent, Appellant’s son. Appellee filed a motion for summary judgment claiming its policy of insurance did not apply to the
circumstances of this case because Appellant’s claim was specifically excluded from the insurance policy. The trial court granted Appellee’s motion for summary judgment and, for the following reasons, we affirm.

Shelby Court of Appeals

Rocky Garner v. Phil Breeden & Associates
M2002-03103-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Carol L. McCoy

Appellant sued Appellee for breach of contract or in the alternative for quantum meruit value of services rendered. At the conclusion of Plaintiff's proof the trial court sustained a motion for a directed verdict on behalf of Defendant as to the quantum meruit claim and further sustained that motion on a large portion of the contract claim. As to remaining portions of the contract claim the motion for a directed verdict was overruled, and Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the remaining claims without prejudice. We hold that the trial court erred in granting the motion for a directed verdict as to the contract case but correctly granted a directed verdict as to quantum meruit. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded for trial on the contract issues.

Davidson Court of Appeals

Robert Kendall Broadbent v. Shari Katherine Langhi Broadbent
M2003-00583-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Marietta M. Shipley

This appeal involves a dispute over the responsibility for investment losses incurred by a spouse before and during the parties’ marriage. After only one year of marriage, the husband filed suit for divorce in the Circuit Court for Davidson County. The wife counterclaimed for divorce and, among other relief, sought alimony in solido to offset the loss of her separate property resulting from the husband’s aggressive stock market trading. Following a bench trial, the trial court granted the wife a divorce on the ground of inappropriate marital conduct and then, employing a comparative fault analysis, determined that the husband should pay the wife $51,500 in alimony in solido to reimburse her for her separate property lost in the stock market. The husband has appealed. We have determined that the wife is not entitled to be reimbursed for the losses caused by the husband’s investments.
 

Davidson Court of Appeals

Jamie Edward Hines v. Terrell Lynn Simms
M2003-01459-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Judge Muriel Robinson

This appeal involves a custody dispute triggered by a paternity action. The trial court fashioned a permanent parenting plan which named Father the primary residential parent during the school year and Mother the primary residential parent during summer vacation. Mother appeals. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Davidson Court of Appeals

Bobbi Jo Fisher v. Tennessee Insurance Company - Concurring
E2004-00189-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge D. Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Judge Harold Wimberly

While I concur in the majority’s decision to reverse and dismiss this case, I feel it necessary to concur separately to state my understanding that our holding in this case is limited to an insured’s claim for collision damage coverage only. I believe there may be public policy considerations that would need to be considered in a case involving liability, as opposed to collision, coverage. That question is not now before us, and I do not believe those public policy considerations are applicable in a case such as the one now before us involving an insurance claim solely for collision damage coverage. I, therefore, concur in the majority’s decision to reverse and dismiss.

Knox Court of Appeals

Bobbi Jo Fisher v. Tennessee Insurance Company
E2004-00189-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Sr. Judge William H. Inman
Trial Court Judge: Judge Harold Wimberly

The defendant issued a policy of automobile insurance to the plaintiff which provided coverage for liability claims and for collision damage, but each of these insuring agreements was subject to an exclusion of coverage if the insured automobile was being operated by a non-licensed driver at the time of the accident giving rise to the claim. The plaintiff loaned her Pontiac to a non-licensed driver under the mistaken belief that he was properly licensed. The trial judge found that the plaintiff reasonably believed that her permittee had a valid driver’s license and allowed recovery. We reverse and dismiss.
 

Knox Court of Appeals

Kyle Ann Wiltse v. Christopher Allen Wiltse
W2002-03132-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Judge James F. Russell

This case involves issues arising out of the parties’ divorce. The trial court divided the parties’ marital assets, awarded Appellee alimony in futuro, ordered Appellant to pay Appellee’s attorney’s fees, and ordered Appellant to pay for Appellee’s health insurance premiums. For the following reasons, we affirm in part, modify in part, and remand for any further proceedings.
 

Shelby Court of Appeals

Kenneth A. Brasel, Sr., v. John Stanley Brasel, Sr. et al.
W2003-02965-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Judge John R. McCarroll, Jr.

This is a child custody case. Father/Appellant appeals from the trial court’s Order, which
denied Father/Appellant’s Petition to change custody from the minor child’s grandparents to Father. Finding that there is not a material change in circumstances to warrant a change of custody and that Father is not entitled to the Superior Rights Doctrine, we affirm.
 

Shelby Court of Appeals

John Whitney Evans III v. Dinah Petree Evans
M2002-02947-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Judge Jim T. Hamilton

In this appeal, Husband seeks to be relieved from his obligation to pay alimony in futuro to his former wife. In support of his request, Husband asserts that his former wife’s cohabitation with another man terminated his obligation since Wife was being supported by that third person and was in no need of alimony. The trial court denied Husband’s petition finding Wife was not living with a third person, had rebutted presumption that she does not need the alimony, and that no material change in circumstances had occurred to warrant modification of the initial award of alimony. We affirm those holdings. However, we reverse the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees to Wife.
 

Lawrence Court of Appeals

John Whitney Evans III v. Dinah Petree Evans - Concurring
M2002-02947-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge William C. Koch, Jr.

I concur with the results of the court’s opinion. However, I have elected to file this separate
opinion because I cannot concur with several parts of the court’s analysis.
 

Lawrence Court of Appeals

Eloris Williams Presley v. Charles Ray Sattler
M2002-02868-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Carol L. Soloman

This appeal involves a former wife’s efforts to recover damages from her former husband for misdeeds during their marriage and following their divorce. Approximately ten years after the parties’ divorce in Louisiana, the former wife filed a pro se complaint in the Circuit Court for Davidson County seeking to recover $10,000,000 from her former husband for “eight years of trauma and distress, abuse and torture.” The former husband filed a pro se “exception” to the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction. The trial court dismissed the complaint, and the former wife has appealed. We affirm the dismissal of the complaint.
 

Davidson Court of Appeals

Mary Finchum, individually and as Next of Kin to William Finchum, Deceased, v. Ace, USA, individually and as successor to CIGNA Ins Co., et al.
E2003-00982-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel Pickens Franks
Trial Court Judge: Judge Wheeler A. Rosenbalm

The Trial Court dismissed the Complaint on a Motion filed pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6). We vacate and remand because the Motion to Dismiss did not comply with the Rules of Civil Procedure.
 

Knox Court of Appeals

Mary Finchum, individually and as Next of Kin to William Finchum, Deceased v. ACE, USA, individually and as successor to Cigna Insurance Co, et al.- Dissenting
E2003-00982-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.

The majority opinion concludes that the defendants’ motion to dismiss is deficient. I agree.
In Willis v. Tennessee Dep’t of Corr., 113 S.W.3d 706 (Tenn. 2003), the Supreme Court opined that Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.06(6), construed in light of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 7.02(1), requires that a motion filed pursuant to 12.06(6) must state “why the plaintiff has failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted.” Willis, 113 S.W.3d at 709 n.2 (emphasis added). For example, in the instant case, the motion should have recited, on its face, that (1) the motion was filed pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.06(6), and (2) that the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted “in that the claim is for breach of contract but fails to reflect a promise by any of the defendants,” or words to this effect. Having said all of this, I would hasten to add that I do not believe Willis requires that we vacate the trial court’s judgment in the case at bar.

Knox Court of Appeals

Joe Rankin and wife, Brenda Rankin v. Lloyd Smith
W2003-00992-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor J. Steven Stafford

This is a breach of contract case. The plaintiffs entered into a contract to sell their home and
farm to the defendant. On the scheduled closing date, the defendant refused to purchase the property. The plaintiffs sold the property to a third party for substantially less than the amount the defendant had agreed to pay. In April 2002, the plaintiffs filed the instant lawsuit against the defendant for breach of contract. The defendant argued that he was fraudulently induced into signing the contract, because the parties had a verbal understanding that the contract would not be enforced. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. The defendant now appeals. We affirm, finding that the defendant alleges promissory fraud, that evidence of the parties’ verbal agreement is inadmissible under the parol evidence rule, and that the evidence submitted by the defendant does not create a genuine issue of material fact regarding fraudulent inducement.

Dyer Court of Appeals

Tammy Barker v. Vernon Barker
W2003-01989-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor D. J. Alissandratos

This is a divorce case. The parties were married for three years prior to their separation, and two children were born during the marriage. The mother filed a petition for divorce, and the father filed a counterclaim for divorce. After a bench trial, the trial court entered a final decree of divorce and a parenting plan. In the plan, the father was permitted supervised visitation with the children, but was required to undergo a psychological evaluation in order to continue that visitation. The plan also provided that the children’s guardian ad litem would be the “binding arbitrator” on all matters involving the father’s visitation. The father now appeals, claiming that the trial court erred in requiring him to undergo a psychological evaluation and in appointing the guardian ad litem as the arbitrator on matters involving his visitation schedule. Because the father did not properly object to the issues raised on appeal, they are deemed to be waived. Therefore, we affirm.

Shelby Court of Appeals

James A. Drake, Jr. v. JPS Elastomerics Corp.
W2003-01579-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor D. J. Alissandratos

This case involves the breach of an employment compensation contract. Under the sales employee’s compensation plan with his employer, he was to earn extra commission for any sales that exceeded his annual quota. In the compensation plan, the employer reserved the right to pay only the standard commission on “windfall” sales. For the fiscal year at issue, the sales employee exceeded his quota. The employer invoked the windfall provision of his compensation plan and paid him only the standard commission on the sales over his quota. The sales employee sued his employer, arguing that he was entitled to the extra commission on the sales over his quota. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the judge ruled in favor of the plaintiff sales employee. On appeal, the defendant employer argues that the “windfall provision” applies to all sales that were unbudgeted or unforecast and that the plaintiff sales employee’s excess sales fall in that category. We hold that the defendant employer’s interpretation conflicts with the plain meaning of the contract, and affirm the decision of the trial court.

Shelby Court of Appeals

Norandal USA, Inc. v. Ruth E. Johnson, Commissioner of Revenue for the State of Tennessee
M2003-00559-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Ellen Hobbs Lyle

This is a sales tax case. The plaintiff owns an aluminum sheet and foil manufacturing plant. Located in the plant are two multi-ton roll grinders. In 1987, the defendant commissioner of revenue took the position that the roll grinders and roll grinder supplies were exempt from sales tax, because the roll grinders constituted "industrial machinery," which were exempt. In 1995, however, the department of revenue conducted an audit of the plaintiff and changed its position, concluding that the roll grinders were "equipment used for maintenance," which is an exception to the industrial machinery exemption. Accordingly, the plaintiff was assessed for sales tax on roll grinder supplies purchased between 1995 and 1998. The plaintiff paid the assessment under protest and filed the instant lawsuit, seeking to recover the sales tax paid on roll grinder supplies for the audit period. The trial court upheld the decision of the department of revenue, concluding that the roll grinders were "equipment used for maintenance." From that order, the plaintiff now appeals. We affirm, finding that the roll grinders fit within the "equipment used for maintenance" exception and that, consequently, roll grinder supplies are subject to sales tax.

Davidson Court of Appeals

Ronald C. Teachout v. Conseco Securities, Inc.A/K/A Conseco Financial Services, Inc., Conseco Finance Servicing Corp., Conseco Bank, Inc. and Lisa M. Bynum
M2003-00621-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Judge Thomas W. Brothers

This is an arbitration case. The plaintiff borrower executed a note in favor of the defendant bank. The note included an arbitration clause, requiring all disputes between the "Borrower(s)" and "Note Holder" to be arbitrated. The term "Note Holder" is defined in the note as the "Lender or anyone who takes [the] Note by transfer and who is entitled to receive payments under [the] Note." The bank transferred the note and the borrower began making payments to a third party. The borrower then filed this lawsuit against the bank and others, alleging fraud in the inducement, negligent misrepresentation, promissory fraud, and violation of the Consumer Protection Act. The defendants filed a motion to stay the proceedings and to compel arbitration. The trial court denied the motion. We affirm, holding that under the note, the bank is no longer a "Note Holder" and therefore does not have standing to invoke the arbitration clause.

Davidson Court of Appeals

Raymond LeDoux and wife, Virginia LeDoux v. Wendall Pierce
M2003-00671-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Judge Stella L. Hargrove

This case involves a default judgment. The plaintiffs filed a civil warrant in general sessions court against the defendant for intentional infliction of physical injuries. The defendant did not appear, and the plaintiffs obtained a judgment by default. The defendant appealed to the circuit court for a trial de novo. The circuit court set the case for trial. On the trial date, however, neither the defendant nor his counsel appeared, and the default judgment was reinstated. The defendant filed a Rule 60.02 motion to have the default judgment set aside, based on excusable neglect. The defendant's lawyer attached his own affidavit, which explained that the lawyer was in the midst of closing his law office after thirty-eight years of practice and, in the confusion, failed to put the hearing date on his calendar. The motion to set aside was denied. The defendant now appeals. We vacate and remand to the trial court to consider whether the defendant has a colorable defense to the plaintiffs' claims and to reweigh the pertinent factors in light of that finding.

Maury Court of Appeals

Sara Beth Stovall v. The City of Memphis
W2003-02036-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert L. Childers

This case arises from the trial court’s grant of Appellee’s Motion for Summary Judgment based on interpretation of T.C.A. § 36-3-103(a). Finding that T.C.A. § 36-3-103(a) requires couples to obtain a marriage license for a valid marriage in Tennessee and that Marriage by Estoppel does not apply, we affirm.

Shelby Court of Appeals

Mary O. McIntosh v. M. A. Blanton, III, M.D., et al.
W2003-02659-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Judge William B. Acree, Jr.

Plaintiff appeals the award of summary judgment to defendant physician based on the statute of limitations for medical malpractice actions. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

Obion Court of Appeals

American Chariot, et al., v. City of Memphis, Tennessee, et al.
W2004-00014-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor D. J. Alissandratos

Plaintiffs, horse-drawn carriage operators, filed a declaratory judgment action challenging the constitutionality of a provision of one section of an ordinance adopted by theMemphis City Council. The trial court elided the provision as an unlawful delegation of the City’s police power and enforced the remainder of the ordinance. Plaintiffs appeal, asserting the trial court erred in its application of the doctrine of elision. Defendants cross-appeal, asserting the trial court erred by finding the elided portion unconstitutional. We affirm.

Shelby Court of Appeals

B.M.M. v. P.R.M.
M2002-02242-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Judge Clara W. Byrd

This is a child custody dispute. The mother and father entered into a permanent parenting plan naming the mother the primary residential parent of their daughter. Under the plan, the father had supervised visitation because the mother was concerned about sexual abuse by the father. The father later sought to modify the parenting plan to allow for unsupervised visitation. The mother then filed a notice that she intended to move to Florida with the daughter, which the father opposed. The trial court granted the father's petition for unsupervised visitation and denied the mother's request to relocate to Florida with the child. The mother and daughter then left for a scheduled trip to Florida, with the understanding that they would return for the father's scheduled visitation. The mother remained in Florida with the daughter for six weeks, asserting that she, the mother, was too ill to travel. The father was granted an emergency change of custody. The father then retrieved the daughter through a private investigator, coordinating with Florida officials. Upon return to Tennessee, the trial court found the mother in criminal contempt for interfering with the father's visitation and for moving to Florida. The father was named the primary residential parent and the mother was granted supervised visitation. The mother was also required to pay the father for the cost of the private investigator. The mother appeals the denial of her request to move to Florida with the child, the award of unsupervised visitation to the father, the finding of contempt, the change of custody, the requirement that her visitation be supervised, and the requirement that she pay the private investigator's fee. We affirm.

Wilson Court of Appeals

In Re: T.H. and J.H.
M2003-02265-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge Frank G. Clement, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Royce Taylor

Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her two children. The circuit court found that Mother was in substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan, that she failed to remedy the persistent conditions that prevented her child's return, and that termination was in the child's best interest. We affirm. The record contains numerous extraneous documents that do not pertain to the petition to terminate parental rights or the issues raised on appeal. The parties and the clerk have a responsibility to abridge the record. Tenn. R. App. P. 8A(c). Failure to abridge the record may result in a reduction of the circuit court clerk's fee for the cost of preparing and transmitting the record.

Cannon Court of Appeals