COURT OF APPEALS OPINIONS

Bill Gibson, et al., v. Jimmy L. Gibson
W2004-00005-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Judge Dewey C. Whitenton

Appellants sought the rescission of a quitclaim deed from a mother to her son upon the grounds of undue influence, fraud, and lack of independent advice. The trial court found that the quitclaim was not invalid on any of these grounds. We affirm.
 

Tipton Court of Appeals

Stephanie Dubois v. Radwan Haykal, M.D., et al.
W2003-01549-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Judge John R. McCarroll, Jr.

This appeal arises out of a grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellees in a medical malpractice action. The trial court held a preliminary hearing, without a jury, to determine if Appellant could establish the essential elements of such an action, particularly the element of causation. After Appellant presented her experts’ testimony regarding causation for Appellant’s medical malpractice action, the trial court granted Appellees’ motions for summary judgment. Appellant filed an appeal to this Court, and, for the following reasons, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Shelby Court of Appeals

94th Aero Squadron of Memphis, Inc. v. Memphis-Shelby County Airport Authority v. Specialy restaurant Corporation
W2003-00227-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Arnold B. Goldin

This appeal involves the termination of a commercial real estate lease agreement. Among a multitude of other claims, Plaintiff, Lessee, contends that Defendant, Lessor, breached the lease by failing to provide lessee with notice of default, sufficient to satisfy the terms of the lease. Additionally, Lessee argues that Lessor violated section 29-18-101, et seq. of the Tennessee Code Annotated (Forcible Entry and Detainer) by re-entering the leased premises without first obtaining a writ of possession. Lessee appeals from the trial court’s final judgment in favor of Lessor. We affirm as modified.
 

Shelby Court of Appeals

American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees Local 1733, and Willie Joe Alexander
W2003-01554-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Judge John R. McCarroll, Jr.

This is a claim against a union for negligence. The plaintiff was a correctional officer at a county correctional facility and a member of the defendant union. The employee was terminated from his job after he was arrested for possession of a controlled substance. The employee sought the union’s assistance in appealing his termination through the county grievance process. After his grievance was preliminarily denied, the union had fifteen days in which to appeal the denial by requesting arbitration of the employee’s case. The employee urged the union to file a request for arbitration, and the defendant union officer agreed to do so. However, the defendant union officer failed to submit the request for arbitration by the deadline, and consequently the request was denied as untimely. The employee then sued the union and the union officer, alleging that the union officer’s conduct was negligent and that it constituted a breach of contract. After a bench trial, the trial court rejected the employee’s breach of contract claim. It concluded that the defendants’ failure to request arbitration in a timely manner was negligent, but that the negligence did not cause the employee’s damages. The employee now appeals. We affirm the dismissal of the breach of contract claim, but reverse the dismissal of the negligence claim, finding that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s conclusion that the employee failed to prove causation of his damages.

Shelby Court of Appeals

Mira Ann (Waller) Mosley v. Charles Raymond Mosley
M2003-01686-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: Judge Royce Taylor

The parties were married in 1980 with no children born of the marriage. The parties separated a number of times during their marriage. During a period of separation, in April of 1995, the parties signed a contract entitled Marital Dissolution Agreement, which, among other things, settled their rights in property acquired during their marriage. They reconciled in 1997 and lived together for some six months until their final separation, which was followed by Wife’s Complaint for Divorce filed June 11, 2001. The trial court held that the Agreement had been freely executed by both parties and meticulously followed until the time of the divorce Complaint. The parties were divorced by joint stipulation pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-4-129, and following final hearing, the trial court held the 1995 Agreement to be fair and equitable and divided property accordingly. Wife appeals, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
 

Rutherford Court of Appeals

Rebecca Paige Mulkey (Hurd) v. Bradley Warren Mulkey
E2004-00590-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Judge Ben K. Wexler

Rebecca Paige Mulkey (“Mother”) and Bradley Warren Mulkey (“Father”) were divorced in 1996. The parties agreed that Mother would be the primary residential parent of their two minor daughters with Father having reasonable visitation rights. Several years later and after Mother had remarried, Father filed a Petition for Change of Custody claiming the older child had been physically abused by her step-father. The Trial Court temporarily transferred custody of the children to Father and indicated this arrangement would be reviewed periodically. After the older child recanted her allegations of physical abuse, the Trial Court ordered that she be examined by a psychiatrist. An examination was undertaken and the psychiatrist concluded there was no evidence of abuse “of any kind.” The Trial Court later entered a judgment and held that its previous temporary decision to designate Father as the primary residential parent was to be the final determination. Mother appeals claiming the Trial Court erred when it transferred custody of the children to Father because Father failed to prove there had been a material change in circumstance. We agree and reverse the judgment of the Trial Court.
 

Hawkins Court of Appeals

Rebecca Paige Mulkey (Hurd) v. Bradley Warren Mulkey - Concurring
E2004-00590-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel Pickens Franks
Trial Court Judge: Judge Ben K. Wexler

The majority Opinion notes that the Trial Court talked to the minor children in camera in the presence of the parties’ attorneys, but no court reporter was present, and a record of that proceeding is not before us. We directed in Rutherford v. Rutherford, 971 S.W.2d 955 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997), p. 956: The Trial Judge has discretion to interview children apart from the courtroom setting if he considers it is in the best interest of the child. However, if he elects to follow this procedure, he must examine the child “in the presence of attorneys for each side and in the presence of the court reporter.” Newburger v. Newburger, 10 Tenn. App. 555, 566 (1930), and in order to have a complete record on appeal, a transcript of such evidence must be filed. This procedure was not followed in this case and the failure to follow this procedure is grounds, standing alone, to vacate and/or reverse the Judgment of the Trial Court, as we noted in Rutherford.
 

Hawkins Court of Appeals

Vaccaro Construction Co., Inc. v. Louis L. Schafer and C. Marie Schafer
W2003-02515-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Judge Arnold B. Goldin

This is a construction case. The defendant homeowners had an oral contract with the plaintiff contractor to perform renovations on their home. After problems with the renovations arose, including flooding of the home after a rainstorm, the homeowners terminated the contractor. The contractor filed a claim seeking enforcement of a lien on the improved property or payment for the work done on theories of breach of contract, quantum meruit, and unjust enrichment. The homeowners counter-claimed that the contractor owed them for the cost of repairing the contractor’s defective work. After a bench trial, the trial court found that the contractor’s work fell well below the applicable standard and awarded the homeowners damages for the repair of the contractor’s defective work. We affirm.

Sequatchie, Sevier Court of Appeals

Bill Fox et al. v. State of Tennessee
E2003-02024-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Vance W. Cheek, Jr., Commissioner

In this premises liability action,Debby Fox (“the plaintiff”)1 and her husband, Bill Fox, filed a claim against the State of Tennessee (“the State”) for damages sustained by the Foxes when the plaintiff was injured as a result of a fall from a stage during a play rehearsal on the campus of the University of Tennessee at Knoxville (“UT”). The claims commission found in favor of the State, holding (1) that the plaintiff failed to prove her claim of negligence and (2) that she was guilty of 100% of the fault in the accident. The plaintiff and her husband appeal, arguing, inter alia, that the evidence preponderates against the claims commission’s determinations. We affirm.

Court of Appeals

Roy Hugh Rushing, II v. Jill Marianne Rushing
W2003-01413-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor John Franklin Murchison

This is a post-divorce child custody case. The parties were divorced by a final decree which incorporated the parties’ marital dissolution agreement (“MDA”). The MDA provided, among other things, that the parties would have joint custody of their two minor children, and that the mother would be the primary residential parent. The MDA also stated that the father would provide life insurance on the children’s lives, and that the maternal grandmother would arbitrate the parties’ disputes. Approximately two years later, the mother filed a motion for contempt, claiming that the father had failed to provide the required life insurance on the children’s lives. In response, the father filed a motion to increase his residential time with the children and also sought court approval to provide term-life insurance as opposed to whole-life insurance on the children’s lives. In addition, the father asked the court to strike the MDA provision stating that the maternal grandmother would be the final arbiter of the parties’ child rearing disputes. The trial court denied the mother’s motion for contempt and granted the father’s motion for modification of the MDA. The mother now appeals. We affirm.

Madison Court of Appeals

In Re Estate of James A. Champion, Deceased
W2003-02054-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor George R. Ellis

This appeal challenges the chancery court’s subject matter jurisdiction to hear a will contest. The petitioner daughter filed a petition to probate the last will and testament of her father. Other siblings filed an objection to probate, alleging that their father did not have the requisite testamentary capacity to execute the will. After a hearing, the chancery court rejected the siblings’ claims and admitted the will to probate. Later, the siblings filed another petition contesting the will, again challenging testamentary capacity and, in addition, alleging undue influence. The chancery court certified the will contest to the circuit court. The circuit court granted summary judgment to the petitioner, finding that the issues raised by the siblings had been addressed in the former proceedings and were res judicata. The siblings then filed a Rule 60 motion in chancery court to set aside the order probating the will. The motion was denied. The siblings now appeal, arguing that the chancery court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear the will contest. We affirm, finding that the chancery court had concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit court to adjudicate a will contest.

Gibson Court of Appeals

Seiller & Handmaker, L.L.P. and Glen Cohen v. Kelly Finnell
W2002-02593-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Judge Kay S. Robilio

This is an action to enroll a foreign judgment. A Tennessee resident was represented by a Kentucky lawyer in a Kentucky lawsuit. When the Kentucky lawyer pursued collection of his fees, the Tennessee client filed a bar complaint against him in Kentucky. The bar complaint was dismissed, and the Kentucky lawyer filed a malicious prosecution lawsuit in Kentucky against the client, and obtained a judgment. In this action, the Kentucky lawyer seeks to enroll the Kentucky judgment against the Tennessee client. The client asserts that the judgment should not be enrolled in Tennessee because it falls under the public policy exception to the full faith and credit clause of United States Constitution. The client bases this argument on Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section 27.1, which prohibits any lawsuit based on a bar complaint, asserting that the enrollment of a foreign judgment based on this cause of action would violate Tennessee public policy. The trial court held that the Kentucky judgment was entitled to full faith and credit and domesticated the judgment. We affirm the decision of the trial court, finding that the enrollment of the foreign judgment does not violate Tennessee public policy.

Shelby Court of Appeals

State of Tennessee, ex rel., Donna Cottingham v. William B. Cottingham
M2003-00535-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor R.E. Lee Davies

This appeal concerns an order of the Williamson County Chancery Court finding William B. Cottingham in criminal contempt of court for failure to pay court-ordered child support and alimony. Mr. Cottingham appeals the order of the chancery court sentencing him to 170 days in jail for failure to comply with court orders concerning child support and alimony. We affirm.

Williamson Court of Appeals

Jean Ann Trudeau, et al. v. Department of Labor and Workforce Development for the State of Tennessee, et al.
W2003-01920-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Ron E. Harmon

This is an age discrimination case. In October 2001, a thirty-seven year old woman interviewed for a job position at the defendant’s Career Center. She was recommended for hire for the job. Subsequently, the defendant Career Center began accepting applications for a second job position, similar to the first. The forty-five year old aunt of the first applicant submitted an application for the second job position. The second job position was never filled. The forty-five year old job applicant filed a lawsuit, alleging that she was not hired due to age discrimination. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Career Center. We affirm, finding that the forty-five year old applicant failed to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination.

Henry Court of Appeals

James A. Bledsoe and Nannie Bledsoe v. Randall Buttry and Grange Insurance Company
E2003-01576-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Special Judge Howell N. Peoples
Trial Court Judge: Judge John K. Wilson

James A. Bledsoe and wife, Nannie, sued Randall Buttry and Grange Insurance Company (uninsured motorist carrier) for damages sustained in a motor vehicle crash. The Bledsoe's claim the jury verdict was insufficient and that the trial court erred in certain evidentiary rulings. We affirm.

Hawkins Court of Appeals

Charles Smith, Executor of the Estate of Ethel Rogers Smith v. Jerry Smith
E2003-02877-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel Pickens Franks
Trial Court Judge: Judge Thomas R. Frierson, II

The Trial Court held that the confidential relationship between defendant and deceased voids the transaction because deceased did not have independent advice. On appeal, we reverse.

Hamblen Court of Appeals

Clarence Mumford v. Board of Education of The City Of Memphis
W2004-01022-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Walter L. Evans

Board of Education of the City of Memphis suspended tenured teacher and assistant principal without pay pending an investigation of child abuse by the Department of Children’s Services. After teacher was reinstated, he sought to recover lost wages under T.C.A. §49-5-511. Trial court found that teacher was entitled to recover but that such recovery should be offset by wages earned during the period of suspension. We affirm as modified herein.
 

Shelby Court of Appeals

Bowdoin Grayson Smith v. Ginger Lee Marenchin Smith
M2003-01218-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge D. Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor C. K. Smith

Bowdoin Grayson Smith (“Father”) and Ginger Lee Marenchin Smith (“Mother”) were divorced in 1996. Mother was granted sole custody of the parties’ four minor children, and Father was granted visitation and ordered to pay child support. Two years later, Father filed a petition for joint custody and later a petition to modify child support. After a hearing, the Trial Court found that Father had failed to prove a material change in circumstances and denied the petition for joint custody; modified the visitation schedule; granted Father telephone and e-mail contact with the children at specified times; found that Mother had proved monthly expenses of $7,500 were reasonably necessary to provide for the support and needs of the children, but that Father would be responsible for paying only $5,000 in monthly child support with Mother responsible for the remainder; and granted Mother attorney’s fees. Mother appeals claiming the Trial Court erred in finding that only $7,500 per month was reasonably necessary for the support of the children and in holding that Father would be responsible for only $5,000 of these expenses. Father raises additional issues claiming the Trial Court erred in dismissing the petition for joint custody and in awarding Mother attorney’s fees. We affirm, in part; modify, in part; vacate, in part; and remand solely for the collection of the costs below.
 

Smith Court of Appeals

Anthony and Melinda K. Colston v. Citizens Tri-County Bank
M2003-01379-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Judge Buddy D. Perry

Following Appellees’ default on promissory note secured by a deed of trust, Appellant Bank placed a hold on Appellees’ accounts and instigated foreclosure proceedings. Despite the fact that Appellees cured the default, Appellant Bank continued its hold on accounts and failed to stop publication of foreclosure notice. Although Appellees failed to prove damages, trial court found Bank negligent and awarded nominal damages to Appellees. We reverse.

Marion Court of Appeals

Christopher Grey Cummings v. Pepper Lynne Werner Cummings
M2003-00086-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Russell Heldman

The trial court granted the husband a divorce on the ground of the wife’s adultery and made various rulings regarding the parenting arrangement for the parties’ one year old son, child support, property division, and award of attorney’s fees. The parties have appealed most of the those rulings. Although we affirm the equal sharing of residential placement, we find the six month alternating schedule is not in this child’s best interests. We also find other parts of the plan must be vacated in view of recent holdings by the Tennessee Supreme Court. Therefore, we vacate the parenting plan and remand for entry of a new permanent parenting plan addressing the residential schedule, the designation of primary residential parent, allocation of decision-making authority, and child support. In the interim, we reinstate the trial court’s pendente lite arrangement, as modified, and establish interim support. We affirm the division of property, modify the allocation of debt, and modify the award of attorney’s fees.
 

Williamson Court of Appeals

Linda C. Gorrell v. Tyree B. Harris, IV
M2003-00629-COA-R3-JV
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: Judge Max D. Fagan

This is a child support modification case. The child involved was born out of wedlock to the parties on June 13, 1996. Mother brought suit in the Juvenile court of Davidson County in July of 1996 seeking to establish paternity of the father and to establish child support. Both parties were represented by counsel, and on May 30, 1997, the juvenile court entered an Order of Compromise and Dismissal. The parties settled the case by Settlement Agreement under which Mr. Harris agreed to pay to Ms. Clark (now Gorrell) the sum of $20,000 cash for any and all claims against Mr. Harris through June 30 of 1998, including her child support claims as to the minor child. From June 13, 1998 forward, Mr. Harris agreed to pay $12,000 per year as child support together with medical insurance until the child reached age 18. On February 23, 2001, Mother filed a Petition to Modify the child support in order to bring it in compliance with Child Support Guidelines. The trial court held the Settlement Agreement to be void and set prospective child support but declined to either award retroactive child support or to order an upward deviation in child support because of failure of the father to visit the child. We affirm the ruling of the trial court that the Settlement Agreement is void, modify prospective child support, reverse the trial court on retroactive child support, deny an upward deviation as to retroactive support, but grant such deviation as to future support. The case is remanded for further proceedings.
 

Davidson Court of Appeals

In re: D.N.G., S.D.P., et ux, J.A.S.P., v. R.L.G. and K.S.R.
M2003-02810-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel Pickens Franks
Trial Court Judge: Judge Betty Adams Green

The Trial Court terminated the mother’s parental rights to the four year old child. On appeal, we
Affirm.
 

Davidson Court of Appeals

First Tennessee Bank, N.A., Executor, Estate of Glenn P. Webb, Sr. v. Barbara Webb Stanfield, Paul W. Stanfield, Jr., Alicia M. Stanfield, et al.
E2003-02756-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel Pickens Franks
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor W. Frank Brown, III

The Chancellor construed a will and granted plaintiff summary judgment. Defendants insist the will is ambiguous. On appeal, we affirm.

Hamilton Court of Appeals

J. Howard Johnson, et al., v. Michael R. Allison, et al.
M2003-00428-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Carol L. Mccoy

The parties entered into an option contract for the sale and purchase of a piece of land. The bargained-for option had a limited duration, with the buyer entitled to extend the option for additional consideration if it exercised that right within an agreed-upon time frame. The buyer paid for several extensions, but did not exercise the option before the final option deadline had passed. The sellers subsequently refused to sell, and the buyer sued for breach of contract and specific performance. The sellers filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court granted. We affirm the trial court.

Davidson Court of Appeals

Susan Begley v.State of Tennessee and Tennessee Department of Transportation
E2004-00202-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Commissioner Vance W. Cheek, Jr.

In May of 2000, a car being driven eastbound on Interstate 40 (“I-40”) in Knox County by Jeremy Roark left the travel lane and crossed the rumble strips onto the inside shoulder of the road where it collided with a Tennessee Department of Transportation (“TDOT”) truck parked during routine litter pick-up. Mr. Roark was killed in the accident and the TDOT employee operating the truck that day, Kenneth Siler, was injured. Susan Begley, Mr. Roark’s mother (“Plaintiff”), brought suit against the State of Tennessee. The case was transferred to the Claims Commission (“the Commission”) and was tried. The Commission held, inter alia, that a reasonable person standard applied and that it was not reasonable for the TDOT truck to be parked on the shoulder. The Commission assessed 45% of the fault for the accident to Mr. Roark and 55% to the State and awarded Plaintiff a judgment for $300,000. The State appeals claiming the Commission lacked jurisdiction, there was insufficient evidence that each element of the negligence cause of action had been met, and there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that Mr. Roark was less than 50% at fault. We affirm.
 

Knox Court of Appeals