Vernon F. Frame v. Davidson Transit Organization
Former Fleet Manager of Davidson Transit Organization contends he was demoted because of his age in violation of the Tennessee Human Rights Act. Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-21-401(a)(1). The employer conceded the employee had presented a prima facie case of employment discrimination; however, it contended a prima facie case was insufficient when the employer presented a nondiscriminatory reason for its decision. The trial court agreed. The summary dismissal was based upon a finding the burden of proof had shifted back to the employee who was required to, but did not provide additional evidence of age discrimination. An employee’s prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find the employer's stated reason for its employment decision false may permit the trier of fact to conclude the employer unlawfully discriminated. The employee provided evidence from which a jury could conclude the employer's stated reason for its employment decision was not credible, thus summary judgment was not appropriate. We, therefore, vacate the summary dismissal and remand for further proceedings. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Rickey W. Pendleton v. The Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County
Plaintiff seeks to recover from the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County for injuries received when he was arrested by officers of the Nashville Metropolitan Police. In his complaint, Plaintiff asserts that the actions of the officers constituted an assault and battery, and further argues that the government is vicariously liable through respondeat superior. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the government after finding that a stand alone allegation of respondeat superior was insufficient to sustain a claim under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act for damages resulting from intentional torts. Rather, the court held that Plaintiff needed to plead a separate and distinct claim of negligence on the part of the Metropolitan Government. Plaintiff has appealed the ruling of the trial court. Because we find that the trial court correctly found that the GTLA requires a plaintiff to assert separate claims of negligence against governmental entities in cases arising from intentional torts, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Sherman Alexander Henderson v. David Mills, Warden
Appellant is an inmate in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction. Appellant filed suit against the Warden of the West Tennessee State Penitentiary on grounds of retaliation and violation of inmate’s civil rights arising from inmate’s reclassification and transfer. The trial court granted Warden’s Tenn. R. App. P. 12.02 Motion to Dismiss. Inmate appeals. We affirm. |
Lauderdale | Court of Appeals | |
In the Matter of J.A.F.
This is an appeal from a Circuit Court determination, in a de novo appeal from juvenile court, that a juvenile was delinquent on the basis of a sale of marijuana to another juvenile. The defendant argues on appeal that the evidence presented was insufficient for a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. We agree, and we reverse the trial court. |
Dickson | Court of Appeals | |
Edward Lee Burch v. McKoon, Billings & Gold, PC., et al.
This is an action to quiet title filed by the grantor against an assignee of the grantees relative to an installment land contract. Remote grantees of the grantor were joined as third party defendants by the original defendant/assignee relative to portions of the land involved in the installment land contract and held by the third party defendants under deeds from the grantor. The trial judge granted summary judgment to the grantor and against the assignee of the grantees in the installment land contract. He further granted summary judgment to the remote grantees of the grantor in the third-party action by the assignee against them. The assignee appeals, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Sequatchie | Court of Appeals | |
Edward Earl DeWerff v. Christine Connie DeWerff (now Hand)
The trial court denied Father's petition to decrease child support upon finding Father was voluntarily underemployed. It also determined Father's previous payments of child support in excess of the court ordered amount were a gift and refused to credit them to Father's subsequent arrearage. Father appeals. We affirm. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
The Center for Digestive Disorders and Clinical Research, P.C. v. Ronald J. Calisher, Individually and Norman A. Lazerine, Individually
Plaintiff sued defendants alleging breach of contract and tortious conduct on the part of defendants resulting in damages to plaintiff. The Trial Court granted defendants summary judgment and plaintiff has appealed. On appeal, we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Jewell Turner, Deceased John LeCornu v. Dolores Archie and Frede Clements
This is a will contest. In May 2002, the decedent had a stroke at age ninety-five. She had no children, and the plaintiff nephew and the defendant niece and defendant nephew took over her care. The three parties established a conservatorship, became co-conservators, and placed the decedent in a local nursing home. Later, the parties agreed to move the decedent to a nursing home closer to the defendants. Soon after the move, without informing the plaintiff, the defendants brought a lawyer to the decedent so that she could draft a last will and testament. In October 2003, the decedent died. The decedent’s will left her $550,000 residuary estate to the defendants, and left only two pieces of furniture to the plaintiff. The plaintiff filed the instant petition to contest the will, alleging that the decedent was unduly influenced by the defendants. After a bench trial, the trial court upheld the will, concluding that the burden of proving undue influence had not been met. The plaintiff now appeals. We affirm, finding that the evidence supports the trial court’s finding that the decedent received independent advice in the drafting of her will. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Babajide Familoni v. The University of Memphis
This case is about subject matter jurisdiction. A professor employed by the University of Memphis filed a lawsuit in chancery court against the University, alleging claims under the Tennessee Human Rights Act and failure to execute a settlement agreement on his discrimination claims. The University filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, asserting that the chancery court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear contract claims against an agency of the State of Tennessee. The trial court granted the motion, finding that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear the complaint. We affirm in part and reverse and remand, finding that the chancery court has subject matter jurisdiction over claims for discrimination under the Tennessee Human Rights Act. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Rabia Kafozi, et al.. v. Windward Cove, LLC
Rabia Kafozi and Audry C. Kafozi ("Plaintiffs") signed an installment sales contract to purchase real property from Windward Cove, LLC ("Defendant"). Plaintiffs made some, but not all of the payments as scheduled. Defendant declared a default and then sold the real property to another party. Plaintiffs sued Defendant seeking, among other things, either specific performance or the return of payments made by them. The case was tried and the Trial Court held, inter alia, that the installment sales contract did not set a due date and, therefore, Plaintiffs never were in default. Defendant appeals claiming the Trial Court erred in interpreting the installment sales contract. We reverse, and dismiss Plaintiffs' claims. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
John Dolle, et al. v. Marvin Fisher, et al.
John and Christina Dolle ("Plaintiffs") entered into a contract with Fisher Builders, Inc., for the construction of a single family residence. Plaintiffs eventually obtained a judgment against Fisher Builders, Inc., for breach of contract and breach of warranty. Plaintiffs' judgment against Fishers Builders, Inc. was for $61,102, plus interest and costs. After the judgment against Fisher Builders, Inc., became final, Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit against Marvin Fisher, the president, secretary, sole director, and sole stockholder of Fisher Builders, Inc. Plaintiffs claimed, inter alia, that Fisher Builders, Inc., was a sham corporation, the corporate veil should be pierced, and Fisher should be held personally liable for the judgment against his corporation. The Trial Court agreed and entered a judgment against Fisher personally. We affirm. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Mold-Tech USA, LLC v. Holley Performance Products, Inc.
Mold-Tech USA, LLC ("the Supplier") brought this action against Holley Performance Products, Inc. ("the Manufacturer") for breach of contract, seeking to recover the cost of component parts purchased by the Supplier in connection with its contract with the Manufacturer. Following a bench trial, the court found that the Manufacturer had breached the contract, and the court awarded the Supplier $79,436.87 in damages. In addition, the court awarded the Supplier prejudgment interest at the rate of 4% per annum. The Manufacturer appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in finding for the Supplier because the Supplier failed to comply with the pertinent provisions of the Tennessee version of the Uniform Commercial Code. The Manufacturer also contends that the Supplier is not entitled to prejudgment interest. We affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Michael E Ingle, et al. v. Aaron Lilly Construction, LLC
Michael E. Ingle and his wife, Melissa R. Ingle ("the plaintiffs"), purchased a house from Aaron Lilly Construction, LLC ("the defendant"). The defendant had constructed the residence and the plaintiffs were the initial purchasers. The plaintiffs began to experience problems with their home and filed suit against the defendant on several theories, including a violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act ("the TCPA"). The trial court, following a bench trial, found that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover, but not under the TCPA. The defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of one of the plaintiffs' expert witnesses. They also claim that the evidence preponderates against the amount of damages found by the trial court. The plaintiffs, on the other hand, challenge the trial court's ruling with respect to their claim under the TCPA. We affirm. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
Carol Bracken Orten v. Thaddeus Charles Orten
Carol Bracken Orten (“Wife”) sued Thaddeus Charles Orten (“Husband”) for a divorce. During the course of discovery, Husband refused to provide certain financial information as he felt the information to be irrelevant. After Husband failed to appear without explanation at the second Trial Management Conference, the Trial Court entered a default judgment against Husband as a sanction for his actions. Husband’s attorney immediately withdrew from the case and the Trial Court then proceeded to distribute the marital property and award Wife alimony and child support based solely on Wife’s uncontested testimony. Husband secured new counsel and filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment, or for a new trial. The Trial Court denied Husband’s motion and this appeal followed. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Carol Bracken Orten v. Thaddeus Charles Orten - Dissenting
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. I would hold that the trial court erred in not setting aside the entry of the default judgment against Mr. Orten. In my judgment the evidence supports the conclusion that Mr. Orten did not intentionally fail to appear at the second Trial Management Conference, but simply forgot to appear. Entry of a default judgment against Mr. Orten is too drastic a measure in this case. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Donald Greg Hopper v. Betty J. Moling
The plaintiff, an unlicensed home improvement contractor, entered into an agreement with the defendant/homeowner to make certain improvements to her existing home. Shortly after the plaintiff left the job site, the defendant/homeowner began to experience several problems associated with the plaintiff’s work. The defendant/homeowner paid to have the defects repaired and/or completed. The plaintiff filed a petition against the defendant/homeowner to enforce a materialman’s lien. The defendant/homeowner filed a counter-complaint seeking damages for breach of contract, breach of implied warranties, fraud, and violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. At the conclusion of the bench trial, the chancellor held that the plaintiff’s conduct amounted to constructive fraud, thereby voiding the contract; the plaintiff was only entitled to recover the cost of his labor and materials under quantum meruit; and the defendant/homeowner was entitled to damages, attorney’s fees, and discretionary costs. The plaintiff appealed to this Court to contest the chancellor’s inclusion of certain costs in the damage award, the limitation of his quantum meruit recovery, the finding of constructive fraud, and the award of attorney’s fees to the defendant/homeowner. The defendant/homeowner appealed the chancellor’s exclusion of certain costs from the damage award and the method used by the chancellor in calculating the damages. We affirm in part and vacate in part. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Huan Ouyang v. Xiaohui Chen
This is a divorce case. The parties were declared divorced in February 2003. The divorce decree reserved issues regarding their minor child, property valuation and distribution, alimony, and attorney’s fees. After a hearing on the reserved issues, the trial court granted the wife alimony and designated her the primary residential parent of their child, set child support, and distributed the marital property. The husband appealed the trial court’s decision on all of the reserved issues. We affirm the trial court’s decision, with modification on the issue of the husband’s residential parenting time. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Patricia Hazlerig v. Millington Telephone Company, Inc.
This case involves the doctrine of res judicata. The plaintiff telephone customer paid a fee to the defendant telephone company to block calls to 900 numbers from being made from her phone. Despite this, charges for 900 calls continued to appear on the customer’s bill. The customer disputed this, and the telephone company cut off her telephone service. The customer filed a claim against the telephone company in general sessions court for breach of contract and the telephone company filed a counterclaim for the unpaid charges for the 900 number calls. The general sessions court ruled in favor of the telephone company, and the customer appealed to the circuit court. The circuit court ruled in favor of the customer. The customer then filed a separate lawsuit against the telephone company in chancery court, seeking injunctive relief to require the telephone company to reinstate her telephone service. The telephone company answered, and later sought to amend its answer to plead the defense of res judicata. The chancery court refused to allow amendment of the answer to assert the defense. The chancery court then ruled in favor of the telephone customer. The telephone company appeals, asserting that the chancery court erred in not allowing amendment of its answer to assert the defense of res judicata. We affirm, finding that the principle of res judicata did not apply and the chancery court did not abuse its discretion in declining to permit amendment of the answer. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Cathy Lee Barnes Williams v. Rodney Lee Williams
Former wife, Cathy Williams, appeals the action of the trial court in reducing the alimony in futuro obligation of former husband, Rodney Williams, from $4,000 per month to $2,000 per month based on a finding that a substantial and material change in circumstances sufficient to justify the decrease had occurred. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Cumberland County Bank v. Dee Downs Eastman, et al.
The Cumberland County Bank (“the bank”) filed an unlawful detainer action in general sessions court against Dee Downs Eastman. The bank sought to obtain possession of real property conveyed to it following the bank’s foreclosure of deeds of trust securing promissory notes executed by Ms. Eastman. The general sessions court entered judgment for possession “for which a Writ of Possession may issue.” Ms. Eastman appealed to the trial court and, along with the Dee Downs Eastman Revocable Trust (“the trust”), filed in that court a counterclaim that essentially challenged the validity of the foreclosure sale by which the bank acquired its title to the subject property. The trial court granted the bank summary judgment as to all issues. Ms. Eastman and the trust appeal. We affirm. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
Clyde Edwards v. Sarah Ann Edwards
This is a post-divorce case. Clyde Edwards (“Husband”) appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to modify his alimony obligation to his former wife, Sarah Ann Edwards (“Wife”). Husband’s original motion was premised on the fact that Wife was living with her adult daughter and son-in-law. We affirm. |
Unicoi | Court of Appeals | |
Clyde Edwards v. Sarah Ann Edwards - Dissenting
I concur completely with the majority’s resolution of Appellant’s first issue. I, respectfully, dissent from the majority’s decision as to Appellant’s second issue. |
Unicoi | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Audrey S. & Victoria L. - Concurring
I adhere to my longstanding view that a “preponderance of the evidence” standard and a “clear and convincing evidence” standard are incompatible with each other and cannot be reconciled either in the trial court or in appellate courts. The effort to make these standards compatible, as asserted in Ray v. Ray, 83 S.W.2d 726 (Tenn.Ct.App.2001), and its progeny are in my view incorrect for reasons stated at length in Estate of Acuff v. O’Linger, 56 S.W.3d 527 (Tenn.Ct.App.2001) and In re Z.J.S. and M.J.P., No. M2002-02235-COA-R3-JV, filed June 3, 2003 (Tenn.Ct.App.2003-Cain, concurring). |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Audrey S. & Victoria L.
This appeal involves the termination of the parental rights of a biological mother who is serving a lengthy prison sentence. Following years of drug abuse, criminal conduct, periodic incarceration, and inconsistent attention to the needs of her two children, the mother pled guilty to charges of especially aggravated kidnaping and aggravated robbery and was sentenced to serve concurrent terms of fifteen and twelve years in prison. Following her incarceration, the fathers of both children filed petitions to terminate her parental rights. The juvenile court consolidated these petitions with the mother’s petition for visitation and appointed guardians ad litem for the children. The guardians ad litem later filed a joint petition to terminate the mother’s parental rights, and the fathers voluntarily dismissed their termination petitions. Following a bench trial, the juvenile court entered orders terminating the mother’s parental rights to both children on three grounds. The mother has appealed. We have determined that the record contains clear and convincing evidence to support terminating the mother’s parental rights on two of the three grounds relied upon by the court and to support the court’s conclusion that terminating the mother’s parental rights is in the children’s best interests. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Bernice Walton Woodland and John L. Woodland v. Gloria J. Thornton
This is a personal injury case arising out of an automobile accident. The defendant rear-ended the plaintiff’s vehicle, and the plaintiff filed this lawsuit against the defendant for the damages resulting from the accident. A jury trial was held. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury awarded the plaintiff compensatory damages, including an amount for future pain and suffering and permanent injury. The trial court entered a judgment on the verdict. The defendant filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment, arguing that some elements of the jury’s verdict were not supported by the evidence at trial. The motion was denied. The defendant now appeals. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for the trial court to amend the judgment to conform with the evidence at trial. |
Fayette | Court of Appeals |
