COURT OF APPEALS OPINIONS

Sharon Kay Jackson v. Randall D. Jackson
W2006-00182-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Judge John R. McCarroll, Jr.

This is a divorce case. The parties had a long-term marriage and their children are now adults.  During the marriage, the husband worked in the telecommunications industry and the wife was primarily a homemaker. The parties’ marital estate consisted largely of real property. They had incurred a substantial debt to the Internal Revenue Service. After a three-day hearing, the trial court declared the parties divorced and ordered that the real property be sold to satisfy the debt owed to the IRS. The trial court equally divided the IRS debt and any remaining proceeds from the sale of the properties. The trial court also awarded the wife a lump sum judgment representing temporary support during the pendency of the action, ordered the husband to pay the wife transitional alimony for five years, and denied the wife’s request for attorney’s fees. The wife now appeals the division of the marital estate, the decision to make the alimony award transitional rather than in futuro, and the denial of her request for attorney’s fees. The husband appeals the amount of the alimony award and the judgment for temporary support awarded to the wife. We modify the alimony to award alimony in futuro instead of transitional alimony, and affirm the remainder of the trial court’s decision.

Shelby Court of Appeals

Dudley W. Taylor, D/B/A The Taylow Law Firm v. James Dalle, Katherine Dalle, Moshe Shloush, Clarence L. Hendrix and Robert Hickman
E2006-00634-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel P. Franks
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor John F. Weaver

In this action for a judgment for fees for legal services rendered, the Trial Court entered Judgment for plaintiff and defendants appealed. We affirm.

Knox Court of Appeals

State of Tennessee Department of Children's Services v. F.R.G.
E2006-01614-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Steven H. Jones

The trial court terminated the parental rights of F.R.G. (“Mother”) and R.K.B. (“Father”) with respect to their minor child, C.G.B. (“the child”) (DOB: December 31, 2003), upon finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that grounds for terminating their parental rights existed and that termination was in the best interest of the child. Mother appeals, arguing procedural defects in the trial court’s termination of her parental rights. We affirm.

Sullivan Court of Appeals

BFS Retail and Commercial Operations, LLC v. Charles Smith - Concurring
M2006-00163-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge William C. Koch, Jr
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Carol L. McCoy

I concur with the court’s opinion. However, I have prepared this separate opinion to point specifically to the provisions of Mr. Smith’s employment agreement that undermine the summary judgment in this case. 

Davidson Court of Appeals

Steve Wherry and Mary Hopkins, Co-Executors of the Estate of Margaret Archer, Deceased v. Union Planters Bank, N.A.
W2006-00256-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Walter L. Evans

This case involves the alleged negligent administration of a trust. In 1964, the plaintiffs’ decedent established a $1.7 million trust and named herself as the sole beneficiary. The defendant bank was named as the trustee and was given sole discretion to manage the trust investments. From 1964 until the decedent’s death in 1999, the bank managed the trust fund and sent the decedent monthly statements describing the trust activities. When the trust terminated, it was worth approximately $880,000. The plaintiffs, co-executors of the decedent’s estate, brought this action on behalf of the estate for negligent administration of the trust, arguing that the bank negligently failed to maximize the rate of return on the trust assets. The bank filed a motion for summary judgment based on, inter alia, the doctrine of ratification, asserting that the decedent had ratified the bank’s management of the trust assets by failing to object to its decisions over the thirty-five-year life of the trust. The plaintiffs argued that the decedent was not sufficiently sophisticated in financial matters to ratify the bank’s actions. The trial court granted the bank’s motion for summary judgment. The plaintiffs now appeal. We affirm, concluding that, in light of the undisputed facts that the decedent was legally competent and was fully informed of the bank’s actions in managing the trust investments, the decedent’s level of sophistication in financial matters is immaterial.

Shelby Court of Appeals

Anesthesia Medical Group, P.C. v. Pamela Greer Chandler
M2005-00034-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Carol L. McCoy

The plaintiff medical group loaned money to the defendant nurse for tuition at a school that trained its students to become nurse anesthetists. As part of the arrangement, the student promised to work for the group for three years after graduation. Seven months prior to graduation, the student notified the group that she would not be able to work for it upon completion of her training. She paid the loan back with interest, but the medical group filed suit to enforce a $15,000 liquidated damages clause in the loan contract. The student then filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court granted. The court held that the sum demanded constituted an impermissible penalty rather than a valid provision for liquidated damages and, thus, that it was unenforceable as a matter of law. We reverse the grant of summary judgment to the student and affirm the denial of summary judgment to the medical group because we find that the undisputed facts do not show that either party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Davidson Court of Appeals

Moss Service & Supply, Inc. v. Tommy F. Gragg, Jr., et al.
M2005-02587-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Frank G. Clement, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Thomas E. Gray

The defendants, homeowners, appeal an adverse jury verdict wherein the plaintiff, a heating, ventilation and air conditioning contractor, was awarded breach of contract damages plus discretionary costs.  Finding no error, we affirm.

Sumner Court of Appeals

Melody Weston, Personal Representative, et al. v. Community Baptist Church of Wilson County
M2004-02688-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor C. K. Smith

This case arises from a dispute between a church and the estate of one of its former members over money given by the former member and her spouse to enable the newly-formed church to pay off a loan on its property. The estate contended that the money was a gift subject to a condition subsequent, with return of the gift required in the event the church ceased existence. The church admitted that it had accepted the gift, but argued that it never accepted any conditions. The court took note of a church resolution that ratified the alleged condition and ruled in favor of the estate. We affirm.

Wilson Court of Appeals

Laura Johnson v. Clover Bottom Development Center, et al.
M2005-01440-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Frank G. Clement, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Claudia C. Bonnyman

An employee of Clover Bottom Development Center appeals the summary dismissal of her action under the Tennessee Handicap Act. The employee alleged she was the victim of discrimination due to her medical limitations. The trial court dismissed the action finding the employee failed to show she sustained an adverse employment action, an essential element of her claim. We affirm.

Davidson Court of Appeals

Lisa Ann (Gallahaire) Cartwright v. Robert Howard Cartwright, Sr.
W2005-02759-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Ron E. Harmon

This is a divorce case involving the classification and division of marital property. The parties signed a prenuptial agreement. After they married, the parties operated a cattle and farming business, which was conducted in the wife’s name only. After three years of marriage, the wife filed a petition for divorce. A trial was held primarily on issues related to property distribution. The husband argued that the cattle and farming equipment was purchased with his separate funds and therefore was his separate property under the prenuptial agreement. The husband also alleged that the wife had discarded or destroyed numerous items of his separate property. The trial court found that the cattle and farming equipment was marital property and divided it equally, and declined to find the wife responsible for the items that had been discarded or destroyed. The husband now appeals. We affirm, concluding that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s decision.

Benton Court of Appeals

Johnnie Mae Hall and Theresa Diane Jones, Co-Administrators for the Estate of Billy Wayne Jones, Deceased v. Andrew Stewart, et al.
W2005-02948-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Kay S. Robilio

This is a wrongful death case. On appeal, Ms. Theresa Diane Jones (Ms. Jones) and Ms. Johnnie Mae Hall (Ms. Hall) contend that two erroneous admissions of evidence unfairly influenced the jury’s award of damages for the wrongful death of Mr. Billy Wayne Jones (Mr. Jones). The jury found that Mr. Jones suffered damages in the amount of $100,000 but also found that he was 49% at fault. The jury’s verdict resulted in a net recovery of $51,000. Ms. Jones and Ms. Hall request a new trial of the action they instituted against Fullen Dock & Warehouse, Inc. (Fullen Dock), whose employee ran over Mr. Jones with a bulldozer, resulting in his death. Specifically, Ms. Jones and Ms. Hall argue that the trial judge abused her discretion in admitting evidence of Mr. Jones’s prior medical history during the cross-examination of their own medical expert and of Mr. Jones’s prior guilty plea and conviction for cocaine possession six years prior to his death. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm.

Shelby Court of Appeals

C & W Asset Acquisition, LLC, as Assignee of Chrysler First Financial Services Corporation v. Donald H. Oggs - Dissenting
E2006-01251-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge D. Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Judge John B. Hagler, Jr.

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion. I would reverse the Trial Court and
remand this matter for entry of judgment as requested and as proven by the plaintiff.

Monroe Court of Appeals

C & W Asset Acquisition, LLC, as Assignee of Chrysler First Financial Services Corporation v. Donald H. Oggs
E2006-01251-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Sharon G. Lee
Trial Court Judge: Judge John B. Hagler, Jr.

In this suit for breach of contract, the assignee of a loan agreement alleged that the defendant was in default of the agreement and requested judgment for monies advanced, plus interest and attorney’s fees. The defendant denied owing the debt. The trial court found the plaintiff had failed to carry its burden of proof and dismissed the case. Upon our determination that the evidence does not preponderate against the finding of the trial court, judgment in favor of the defendant is affirmed.

Monroe Court of Appeals

In Re M.L.P.
E2006-01492-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge Sharon G. Lee
Trial Court Judge: Judge Tim Irwin

B.R.P. (“Father”) was sentenced to serve eighteen years in prison when his daughter was six years old. The trial court terminated his parental rights based on Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-116(g)(6), which provides for the termination of parental rights of a person who is incarcerated under a sentence of ten years or more if that person’s child is under the age of eight at the time of sentencing. In this appeal, Father argues that Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-116(g)(6) is inapplicable because Father might not have to serve his entire sentence if he obtains postconviction relief. He also maintains that termination of his parental rights is not in the best interest of his daughter. After careful review of the evidence and applicable authorities, we hold that the possibility of postconviction relief is irrelevant to a trial court’s determination of whether the requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-116(g)(6) have been met. We further hold that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding by clear and convincing evidence that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the best interest of his daughter. Therefore, we affirm.

Knox Court of Appeals

Kenyale Pirtle v. Tennessee Department of Correction
W2006-01220-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joseph H. Walker, III

Upon review under common-law writ of certiorari, the trial court affirmed disciplinary actions against Petitioner/Appellant by the Tennessee Department of Correction. We affirm in part and remand.

Lauderdale Court of Appeals

Charles W. Darnell D/B/A European Service Werks v. Johnny W. Brown, et al.
W2006-01084-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Arnold B. Goldin

Plaintiff appeals the trial court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s action immediately following a hearing on Plaintiff’s motion for temporary injunction. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings.

Shelby Court of Appeals

Glenda White v. Fort Sanders-Park West Medical Center
E2006-00330-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel P. Franks
Trial Court Judge: Judge Wheeler A. Rosenbalm

Plaintiff sued her former employer on grounds of breach of contract, retaliatory discharge, and violation of the Tennessee Human Rights Act, as well as the Tennessee Public Protection Act. The Trial Court granted defendant summary judgment. Plaintiff appealed and we affirm the Trial Court.

Knox Court of Appeals

James Edward Williams v. Brent R. Watson, et al.
E2005-02403-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: Judge Harold Wimberly

James Edward Williams and Gladys Pineda Williams were divorced on December 13, 2004, following a very contentious proceeding in the Chancery Court of Knox County. Mr. Williams filed the action at bar against his former attorneys and also against attorneys representing his former wife. He alleges against these attorneys various acts of tortious activities, malpractice and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. The trial court dismissed all of his claims, and Mr. Williams appeals. We affirm the action of the trial court.

Knox Court of Appeals

Doris Britt v. Janny Russell Chambers
W2006-00061-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Dewey C. Whitenton

This is a boundary line dispute. The parties are adjacent landowners. In April 2003, a dispute arose between the parties over the exact boundary line between their properties. The plaintiff erected a seven-foot privacy fence on what she perceived to be the proper boundary line. The defendant dismantled the fence and removed it. The plaintiff brought this action for the trial court to set the appropriate boundary line and for damages related to the defendant’s removal of her fence. After a hearing, the trial court held in favor of the plaintiff, determining that the boundary line should be set according to a 1997 survey conducted when the plaintiff purchased her property and awarding the plaintiff damages for the removal of the fence. The defendant now appeals. We affirm, concluding that, in the absence of a trial transcript or a proper statement of the evidence, we must presume that the trial court’s decision was supported by the evidence.

Hardeman Court of Appeals

Paulette Dobbins v. Jeffery F. Dabbs, Jr., Jeanette Dabbs, Jeffery F. Dabbs, Sr., and Accredited Home Lenders, Inc., A California Corporation
W2006-00322-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor James F. Butler

This case involves accord and satisfaction. The defendants fraudulently transferred real property
owned by the plaintiff. The plaintiff filed this lawsuit against the defendants for damages related to
the fraudulent transfer. The parties later agreed to settle the matter for approximately $6,000. The
defendants initially paid the plaintiff $3,000 pursuant to the settlement agreement. Before the
remainder was paid, the plaintiff repudiated the agreement in writing. Later, the defendants sent the plaintiff a check for the remainder of the settlement. The plaintiff kept the second payment, but told the defendants that she did not consider the payment to satisfy the debt and stated her intent to set the case for trial. At the subsequent trial, the defendants did not appear. A judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff for $58,000. The defendants filed a motion to set aside the judgment as well as a motion to dismiss the case, based on the original settlement agreement. The trial court granted the defendants’ motions and dismissed the case on that basis. The plaintiff now appeals. We affirm, concluding that the parties’ settlement agreement was an executory accord which was not effectively repudiated and was properly enforced under the circumstances.

Henderson Court of Appeals

State of Tennessee, ex rel. Julie Pollard v. James Casteleman
W2006-00411-COA-R3-JV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert W. Newell

This is a petition for contempt for failure to pay child support. After a hearing, the trial court entered
an order dismissing the petition and reducing the respondent’s child support arrearage by $2,000. The petitioner now appeals, arguing that the trial court erroneously ordered a retroactive modification of the original child support order. We reverse.

Gibson Court of Appeals

James A. Carson v. The Challenger Corporation and Daniel R. Jones, M.D.
W2006-00558-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Arnold B. Goldin

This case involves a commercial lease. During the lessor’s divorce, his wife brought suit against the tenant to collect its current rent payments. The wife claimed that the underlying realty was marital property and she was entitled to the rent. The husband-lessor filed a motion to intervene in that case, but the trial court never addressed his motion. The husband signed some consent orders in the case and filed a motion on his own behalf, but he was never formally named as a party. After that case had concluded, the husband brought suit against the tenant for past due rent and other damages under the lease. The tenant claimed that his suit was barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel, but the trial court disagreed. After the trial court entered a judgment for the husband-lessor, the tenant appealed to this Court.  For the following reasons, we affirm.

Shelby Court of Appeals

Debra Jane Grey v. Bobbie Lee Brooks
E2006-00751-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel P. Franks
Trial Court Judge: Judge Bill Swann

Bobby Lee Brooks has appealed, seeking dismissal of an Order of Protection entered by the Trial Court. No record of the evidence has been filed. We affirm the Trial Court.

Knox Court of Appeals

Angie Sorhagen v. Williamson County Animal Shelter, a Division of the Williamson County Government
M2006-00697-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Frank Clement, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Russell Heldman

The plaintiff filed this action against Williamson County alleging the County failed and/or refused to return her dog and cat for which she sought monetary damages. The County filed a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) motion to dismiss, contending the negligence claim asserted pertained to a discretionary function for which the County was immune from suit under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss. Finding no error, we affirm.

Williamson Court of Appeals

Lyn S. Summers v. Christopher J. Ryan
E2006-01757-COA-R10-JV
Authoring Judge: Judge Sharon G. Lee
Trial Court Judge: Judge James W. McKenzie

In this interlocutory appeal, the issue we address is which trial court – the Rhea County Family
Court, the Williamson County Chancery Court, or the Rhea County Juvenile Court – has jurisdiction to adjudicate the parties’ post-divorce disputes. We hold that pursuant to the prior suit pending doctrine, the tribunal where the first petition was filed, the Rhea County Family Court, has subject matter jurisdiction. We therefore dismiss the later-filed actions in Williamson County Chancery Court and Rhea County Juvenile Court, and vacate the orders entered by those courts.

Rhea Court of Appeals