In the Matter of: FLBH, FJH, JR., FH, FLHH, and FEH
This is a termination of parental rights case. By final order entered in April 2008, the trial court terminated the parental rights of Respondent/Appellant Betsy Hawkins (Mother)2 to her five children, F.L.B.H.; F.J.H., Jr.; F.H.; F.L.H.H.; and F.E.H., based on persistence of conditions. Mother filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court. Sometime prior to the transmission of the record to this Court, nine exhibits were misplaced in the trial court.3 Petitioner/Appellee State of Tennessee, Department of Children’s Services (“the State”) and Mother agree that the missing exhibits cannot be recreated for the purpose of review on appeal. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re K.E.D.M. a/k/a/ K.E.D.S
The issue presented in this parental termination case is whether it was shown by clear and convincing evidence that termination was in the best interest of the child. After careful review, we hold that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding that there was clear and convincing evidence that termination was in the best interest of the child. Accordingly, we reverse the judgmnet of the trial court and dismiss the petition to terminate. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
Ervin D. Smith, et al. v. Paul Evans, et al.
Owners of property brought suit to terminate an ingress/egress easement across their land, contending that the necessity for the easement no longer existed. Following a trial, the Chancery Court ruled against the owners, finding that since the easement was reserved in a recorded plat, it was not an easement by necessity; consequently, the easement was not destroyed upon the sale of the dominant estate. On appeal, the owners maintain that the easement was destroyed at the end of the necessity. Finding the easement to be express, we affirm the decision of the Chancery Court. Finding the appeal not to be frivolous, no attorney’s fees are awarded. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Mary Polite v. Metropolitan Development and Housing Authority Agency
Plaintiff appeals the Rule 12.02(6) dismissal of her petition for a common law writ of certiorari which sought review of her termination from the Metropolitan Development and Housing Agency. Plaintiff, an at-will employee of the Agency, was terminated after an administrative hearing officer found that she had violated Agency policy. After the Agency filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the trial court determined the petition failed to state facts sufficient to satisfy the pleading requirements of a common law writ.ing the facts asserted in the petition in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, we find the petition failed to state factual allegations sufficient to state a claim that the Board acted illegally, arbitrarily, or fraudulently, and thus, it failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. We, therefore, affirm the Rule 12.02(6) dismissal. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee v. Walter Cuozzo
Walter Cuozzo (“the defendant”) was found guilty of traffic violations in general sessions court. He appealed to circuit court but failed to comply with a local rule that provides “an appellant [on an appeal from general sessions court] has forty five (45) days to secure a trial date from the court.” Because of this failure, the circuit court dismissed the defendant’s appeal. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
John C. Filson, et al. v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc.
The mortgagors filed suit, charging the mortgagee with breach of contract for failure to comply with terms of a note, deed of trust, and automatic payment service plan pursuant to which the mortgagee greed to automatically debit the mortgagors’ bank account for monthly payments. The jury found the mortgagee guilty of breach of contract and awarded damages in the amount of $250,000. The trial court remitted this damage award to $150,000. On appeal, the mortgagee argues that the trial court erred by failing to grant the mortgagee’s motions for directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the ground that the mortgagors were guilty of the first uncured material breach of contract, by excluding evidence as a discovery sanction and by awarding the mortgagors $150,000. The mortgagors contend that the mortgagee waived all issues by not including them in its motion for new trial. After careful review, we hold that 1) the mortgagee did not waive its issues for purposes of appeal because the issues were included in the memorandum of law it incorporated in the motion for new trial; 2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding certain evidence as a discovery sanction upon our finding that the mortgagee failed to explain why the excluded evidence was not timely provided to the mortgagors or to establish its importance at trial; 3) the trial court did not err in failing to grant the mortgagee’s motions for directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict upon our finding that the mortgagee was guilty of the first uncured material breach of contract by failing to timely institute its automatic payment service plan; and 4) in compliance with the mortgagee’s request, this case is remanded for a new trial solely on the issue of damages upon our finding that the trial court’s award of damages in the amount of $150,000 is not supported by the evidence. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Moore & Associates, Inc. v. Metropolitan Board of Zoning Appeals
Zoning administrator denied a waiver of the Metropolitan Zoning Code’s landscape buffer requirement and the Board of Zoning Appeals upheld the administrator’s interpretation of the ordinance. Plaintiff contractor appealed to the circuit court, which determined that the zoning administrator’s interpretation of the ordinance was incorrect and granted the waiver. The Board of Zoning Appeals appealed. The trial court’s interpretation of the ordinance is affirmed, but the decision to grant the waiver is vacated, and the case is remanded to the trial court with instructions to return the matter to the board for further action. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee ex rel. Michelle Strickland v. Terry Copley
This appeal arises from post-divorce proceedings involving child support obligations. The original divorce and support orders were entered in Michigan. The mother subsequently moved to North Carolina, and the child support order was transferred to that state. The father moved to Tennessee and became delinquent in making his support payments. The mother began to receive public assistance and executed an income assignment assigning to North Carolina the right to receive the back child support owed by the father. Upon request by North Carolina, Tennessee then brought suit to enforce the North Carolina order. In the Tennessee proceedings, the trial court changed custody from the mother to the father and ordered the mother to pay the father child support. In the process, the trial court determined that the mother owed back child support to the father and then used this amount to setoff the obligation owed by the father to North Carolina. For the reasons stated herein, we determine that a setoff cannot be used to deprive North Carolina of recoupment of its public assistance. The judgment below allowing the setoff is therefore vacated, and this case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Gibson | Court of Appeals | |
Meta-Sue Jones Woodall v. Jethero Jackson Woodall, Jr.
This appeal arises from a divorce action. The issues presented on appeal relate to the trial court’s classification and division of the parties’ property. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Estate of William Anthony Lucy Rita Clark, Shelby County Assessor or Property, et al. v. Naomi Schutte, as Administratrix of the Estate of William Anthony Lucy
The Shelby County Assessor and Shelby County moved to intervene in a probate case in order to amend a prior order previously entered adjudicating a claim made against the decedent’s estate by the City of Memphis for delinquent personal property taxes. The would-be intervenors claimed as their interest in the case the possibility that the probate court’s decision might be deemed preclusive in a tangentially related chancery proceeding. The probate court denied the motion to intervene and ordered that the movants pay the estate’s attorney’s fees. We conclude that the movants did not possess a substantial legal interest in the litigation warranting their intervention under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 24.01, and we further conclude that the probate court did not abuse its discretion in finding the motion to be untimely. Accordingly, we affirm the probate court’s denial of the motion to intervene as well as its denial of a companion motion made under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02. We, however, vacate its decision awarding the estate attorney’s fees. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Vicky Jones et al. v. Kindred Healthcare Opertaing, Inc. et al.
We here review a trial court’s denial of the defendants’ motion to compel arbitration. Each defendant is alleged to have been involved in the ownership and operation of a nursing home facility at which the mother of the plaintiff was a resident prior to her death. The mother had, several years earlier, executed a general durable power of attorney naming one of her daughters as her attorney-infact. Later that daughter signed a letter purporting to give another of the mother’s daughters certain powers. This daughter then secured the admission of their mother to the nursing facility in question here and in the admissions process signed an arbitration agreement. The defendants contend that her signature is effective to require arbitration of the claims raised in this suit. We conclude that the signing daughter did not possess the requisite authority to enter into a binding arbitration agreement. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s decision and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Jeanne W. Fickle v. James Edward Fickle
In this divorce action, Husband appeals the trial court’s valuation of his closely held stock and the classification of its appreciation as marital property; the $75,000 award of alimony in solido to Wife to account for her interest in the appreciation of that stock; the award of $1,500 per month in transitional alimony for 60 months; and the award to Wife of $25,000 in attorney’s fees incurred through trial and of $1,500 in attorney’s fees incurred in defending against husband’s motion to alter or amend the judgment. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Bobby E. White and Ann H. White v. Pulaski Electric System
Bobby E. White and Ann H. White sought judgment granting them title to a small portion of property that they claim to own by deed, adverse possession and by payment of taxes. The trial court granted Pulaski Electric System, a public electric company, summary judgment. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Giles | Court of Appeals | |
Elizabeth Bailey v. Mary Taylor, et al. and Mary Taylor v. Elizabeth Bailey, et al.
These consolidated appeals arise out of two forcible entry and detainer suits filed in general sessions court and appealed to circuit court. For the following reasons, we have determined that one appeal must be dismissed for lack of a final order, and one appeal must be reversed and remanded for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Ford Motor Credit Company v. Kurt F. Luna
This appeal arises from the dismissal of an appeal from a general sessions judgment. The appellant purchaser defaulted on a loan from the appellee finance company for the purchase of a vehicle. The finance company then filed an action to recover possession of the vehicle. The general sessions court entered a judgment in favor of the finance company. The purchaser appealed the judgment to the circuit court. The finance company moved to dismiss the appeal for failure to file the required bond. The circuit court found that the purchaser was not indigent and granted the motion to dismiss. The purchaser appeals, challenging the circuit court’s finding that he was not indigent. We find that an appeal bond was not required under Tennessee caselaw. Therefore, we reverse the decision of the circuit court and remand for further proceedings. |
Marshall | Court of Appeals | |
Ronnie Berke vs. Chubb Group of Insurance Companies and Pacific Indemnity Company
This action was filed on October 3, 1996 in the Chancery Court. The Final Judgment was entered in the Trial Court on September 13, 2007. On appeal, we vacate and remand for a new trial inter alia due to the unreasonable delay by the Trial Court in rendering judgment. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee Department of Children's Services v. J.C. et al.
The State of Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition seeking to terminate the parental rights of J.C. (“Father”) and B.C. (“Mother”) to the minor children S.A.C., K.O.C., and J.S.C. (“the Children”). After trial, the Juvenile Court entered an order finding and holding, inter alia, that clear and convincing evidence existed to terminate Father’s and Mother’s parental rights under Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-113(g)(1), (g)(2), and (g)(3), and that termination was in the best interests of the Children. Father and Mother appeal to this Court. We affirm. |
Hawkins | Court of Appeals | |
Roy S. Lawrence, et al. v. HCA Health Services of Tennessee, Inc. d/b/a Summit Medical Center; and Holladay Property Services, Inc.
Plaintiffs, husband and wife, filed this premises liability action for personal injuries sustained by the elderly husband who was injured when automatic doors at the entrance to a medical office building struck him causing him to fall. In the premises liability action that followed, Plaintiffs alleged that the major tenant of the office building and the property management company failed to exercise the required due care in the maintenance, inspection, and repair of the doors and/or to properly warn Plaintiffs of the dangers existing at the office building. The trial court summarily dismissed the claims against both defendants. We have determined the major tenant owed no duty to Plaintiffs and thus was entitled to summary judgment. We have also determined that the property management company did not create the alleged dangerous or defective condition, and it did not have actual or constructive knowledge that a dangerous or defective condition existed. Accordingly, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Rodolfo Castro v. Peace Officer Standards And Training Commission, et al.
The Peace Officers Standards and Training Commission (“POST Commission”) decertified an officer previously given preliminary certification pending a background check based upon a plea of guilty and nolo contendere to felonies that were entered and set aside in California decades ago. In decertifying the officer, the POST Commission relied upon the position that it had no discretion under its own rules, and that decertification was required. The Chancery Court reversed the POST Commission for failing to give full faith and credit to the California judgment. We hold that the POST Commission failed to adopt criteria for exceptions and waivers as required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 38-8-106. For reasons other than those used by the trial court, we affirm the judgment of the trial court, but modify the judgment to vacate the POST Commission’s decision to decertify and remand the matter to the POST Commission to reconsider the officer’s decertification in accordance with statutory directives. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Smith County Regional Planning Commission v. Hiwassee Village Mobile Home Park, LLC
County regional planning commission brought suit seeking civil penalties and injunctive relief against a mobile home park alleged to be in violation of a private act regulating mobile home parks in the county. The trial court found that the mobile home park was not protected by a grandfather provision and ordered injunctive relief to bring the mobile home park into compliance with the private act. We affirm the result reached by the trial court. |
Smith | Court of Appeals | |
Linda Kay Edwards v. Ronald Dell Edwards
After sixteen years of marriage, Linda Kay Edwards (“Wife”) sued Ronald Dell Edwards (“Husband”) for divorce. After the trial, the Trial Court entered an order, inter alia, granting the parties a divorce, distributing the marital property, and ordering Husband to pay Wife transitional alimony in the amount of $2,600 per month for twelve months. Wife appeals raising issues regarding the distribution of marital property and alimony. We modify the Trial Court’s Final Decree to order that Husband is to pay Wife alimony in futuro in the amount of $1,000 per month after the transitional alimony ends, and we affirm as modified. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
Devonna Taylor v. Brandicus McKinnie
This appeal involves modification of a parent’s status as primary residential parent. The mother and the father never married, and the mother was the children’s primary residential parent. The father filed a petition to modify, requesting to be named the primary residential parent. As a material change in circumstances, he alleged that the children had been living primarily with him for the past several months. After a hearing, the juvenile court established the father as the primary residential parent, gave the mother alternate parenting time, and set child support payments for the mother. The mother appeals, arguing that she never received proper notice of the father’s petition to modify, that there had been no material change in circumstances, and that the evidence did not support a finding that designating the father as the primary residential parent was in the children’s best interest. We affirm, finding that the mother waived her challenge to the sufficiency of service of process, and that the evidence supports the designation of the father as the primary residential parent. |
Gibson | Court of Appeals | |
Jeanette Tacker v. Michael Davidson
This appeal concerns a contempt proceeding arising from the alleged failure of the appellant to pay child support and other expenses as required by a prior court order. Neither the appellant nor counsel for the appellant appeared at the hearing below held on the issue of his contempt. The trial court found the appellant to be in contempt for nonpayment of his court-ordered obligations; the appellant was also taxed with attorney’s fees for the appellee. Because the trial court failed to find that the appellant possessed the present ability to pay and also failed to find that he was in willful noncompliance with the court’s prior order, we reverse that part of the decision below finding the appellant to be in contempt as well as awarding attorney’s fees, and we remand for further proceedings. We leave undisturbed the trial court’s finding that the appellant was in arrears on his obligations to the appellee. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Robert T. Hogan v. Illinois Central Railroad Company
Plaintiff failed to comply with the trial court’s discovery order to produce two witnesses for deposition within forty-five days, and Defendant moved to dismiss under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 37.02. Plaintiff appeals, asserting the trial court abused its discretion where there was no evidence of willful or dilatory conduct by Plaintiff. We vacate and remand. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Bobby C. (Clark) King v. Sevier County Election Commission, et al.
This case arises from an election for Gatlinburg City Commission in May 2007. Six candidates were on the ballot; the top three finishers were elected. Bobby C. (Clark) King received 210 votes and finished fifth, 304 votes behind the third-place finisher. Mr. King now seeks to have the election declared void, and a new election ordered, on the basis of several alleged procedural errors that he says render the election results invalid. After a bench trial, the court rejected Mr. King’s arguments, declaring some of his accusations factually lacking and holding that others, even if true, were not sufficiently serious to justify voiding the election. Mr. King appeals. We affirm. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals |
