In Re: Corey N.A., Kayla M.A. and Robert L.A.
The Department of Children's Services petitioned the Court to terminate the parental rights of both parents to the minor children. Following trial, the trial judge ruled that grounds to terminate the parental rights by clear and convincing evidence existed, as well as clear and convincing evidence that it was in the children's best interest to terminate the parental rights of the parents. The parents have appealed and we affirm the Judgment of the trial court. |
Grainger | Court of Appeals | |
Robert E. Covington vs. Barbara Covington
In this divorce case following a twenty-one year marriage, the trial court designated Barbara Covington ("Wife") as primary residential parent, distributed the marital property, and awarded Wife transitional alimony. Robert Covington ("Husband") appeals claiming the trial court incorrectly determined that the entire amount of each party's pension was separate property. Husband also appeals the award of transitional alimony, claiming that both the amount and the length of time he was ordered to make payments were excessive. Wife claims she should have been awarded rehabilitative alimony after the transitional alimony ended. We hold that the trial court incorrectly classified as separate property those portions of the parties' pensions earned during the marriage. We also conclude, however, that the overall property division nevertheless was equitable, and so we find the error to be harmless. We agree with Husband that the amount of transitional alimony awarded was excessive and modify the award. As so modified, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Allen Mathis, et al. v. State of Tennessee
TN Claims Commission - This is an appeal from the Tennessee Claims Commission. The Commission dismissed the appellant's claim pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 9-8-402(b) for failure to prosecute. In its order, the Commission also denied a motion to transfer the claim to the Wayne County Circuit Court for consolidation with a companion case. We affirm. |
Wayne | Court of Appeals | |
Robert J. Davidson and wife, Jeanette Davidson v. Riley Wilson
This case involves a contract for the sale of real property and a subsequent verbal agreement. The trial court found that the seller breached the contract. We reverse and remand. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Hartford Underwriters Insurance Co. vs. Dale Penney, d/b/a DLP Construction Co.
Hartford Underwriters Insurance Co. ("Hartford") filed this suit against Dale Penney, d/b/a DLP Construction Co. ("Mr. Penney"), seeking compensation for additional workers' compensation insurance premiums, as well as court costs and service of process fees. The trial court awarded judgment in favor of Hartford for $12,316 plus costs. Hartford subsequently filed a motion seeking pre-judgment interest, which was granted after a hearing resulting in an additional award of $4,823.77. Mr. Penney appeals. We affirm in part, vacate in part and remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Nancy Luna vs. Roger Deversa, M.D. and Hamilton County Hospital Authority
This appeal arises from a medical malpractice claim. A surgeon performed a procedure on the plaintiff at the defendant hospital. The defendant hospitalist physician monitored the plaintiff's post-surgery recovery. The plaintiff filed this lawsuit asserting that the defendant hospitalist was negligent in releasing her from the hospital prematurely. The defendant hospitalist filed a motion for summary judgment, as did the hospital. The trial court granted summary judgment to both. We affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Karen Michelle Pearson vs. Paul Jason Pearson
This appeal arises from the dismissal of an ex parte order of protection filed by Wife. After finding that Wife failed to prove the allegations in the petition by a preponderance of the evidence, the trial court dismissed the order of protection and assessed the costs against Wife. Wife appeals. We reverse. |
Greene | Court of Appeals | |
Dr. William P. Harman vs. The University of Tennessee
This appeal involves the Tennessee Public Protection Act. The plaintiff professor was a department head at the defendant university. As the department head, the plaintiff evaluated a subordinate professor. The dean of the university instructed the plaintiff to remove negative information from the evaluation; the plaintiff refused. The plaintiff was then removed from his position as department head. He continued at the university as a tenured professor. The plaintiff sued the university asserting a claim under the Public Protection Act, alleging that he was discharged or terminated for refusing to participate in or remain silent about illegal activities. The trial court granted the university's motion for judgment on the pleadings on the basis, inter alia, that the plaintiff was neither terminated nor discharged. The plaintiff now appeals. We affirm, concluding that the removal of the plaintiff from his position as department head, when he remained employed as a professor, is not a termination or discharge under the Public Protection Act. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Memphis Area Teachers Credit Union v. David Jones
This appeal involves dismissal for failure to prosecute. After receiving an adverse judgment in general sessions court, the defendant appealed to the circuit court. At the circuit court hearing on his appeal, the defendant failed to appear because he mistakenly went to the wrong court. The circuit court dismissed the appeal for failure to prosecute and remanded the case to general sessions for entry of a final judgment. The defendant now appeals. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In The Matter of The Conservatorship of Donald E. Todd vs. Tonya Todd Justice
This is a conservatorship case. Appellee filed a petition to appoint a conservator for her father, the Appellant herein. The trial court granted the petition, appointing co-conservators for Appellant, and charging fees and expenses to the Appellant's funds, pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. _ 34-1-114. Appellant appeals. Finding that the record is incomplete and, as such, does not support, by clear and convincing evidence, a finding that Appellant was in need of the court's assistance, and that the trial court failed to properly follow the statutory mandates required for appointment of a conservator, we vacate and remand. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
William Robert Lindsley vs. Lisa Whitman Lindsley
The plaintiff had filed suit for divorce against defendant and defendant moved for summary judgment on the ground that plaintiff had a prior marriage and theirs was a bigamous relationship. The Trial Judge held that defendant had a prior marriage and voided the parties' marriage ab initio and dismissed the action. Plaintiff has appealed. We hold that under Texas law where they married, and California law where they resided prior to coming to Tennessee, they could, under the statute, enter into a common-law marriage after the spouse was divorced in the prior marriage. The disputed issue of fact in the summary judgment is whether the parties entered into a common-law marriage after the plaintiff's prior marriage ended. We remand for a determination of this factual issue. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
Bobby Gerald Riley, and wife, Tanya Riley, Individually and as next of kin for Hunter Riley v. James Orr
This is an appeal of a jury verdict. The plaintiff was hunting with his son. The defendant was also hunting in the general area, and accidentally shot the plaintiff. The plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the defendant for negligence, and included a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress on behalf of his son. The parties stipulated as to the defendant's liability, and a jury trial was held on the issue of damages. The jury instructions included instructions on the plaintiff father's mental pain and suffering and the son's emotional injury, but did not separately address the plaintiff father's emotional injury. After deliberating, the jury returned a verdict awarding damages to the plaintiff father as well as an award for the son's emotional injury. The trial court denied the defendant's motion for a new trial and approved the verdict. The defendant now appeals. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the verdict on several elements of damages, and argues that the inconsistency in the jury instructions on emotional injury necessitates a new trial. We affirm in part, vacate in part, suggest remittitur as to the awards for future medical expenses and for emotional injury, and remand for further proceedings. |
Marshall | Court of Appeals | |
Pamela C. Bess v. Properties, L.P., et al.
Car A was traveling north on a two-lane highway. Car B, a city police vehicle with its lights and siren on, was also traveling north on the same highway to answer a call. Car A could not pull off the road to the right to yield to Car B and instead turned left as Car B was passing. A collision ensued in which the driver of Car A suffered serious injuries. The driver of Car A sued the city. The trial court found the city 75% liable for the accident. The city appealed. We reverse the trial court's judgment, finding the driver of Car A more than 50% responsible for the accident. |
Grundy | Court of Appeals | |
Rocky Glen Ross vs. Donna Angela Ross
This is a divorce case. The trial court granted the husband a divorce on the ground of inappropriate marital conduct and awarded the husband what appears to be a sizable majority of the parties' assets. The trial court, however, did not adjudicate the wife's counterclaim for spousal support. Because the order appealed does not adjudicate all of the claims, rights, and liabilities of the parties, it is not a final judgment that is appealable of right. We dismiss. |
Morgan | Court of Appeals | |
Charles McBee vs. Patricia Anne Greer, et al.
Plaintiff was violently attacked as he was attempting to serve process on the defendant in a divorce case. Plaintiff had been employed by a law firm to serve the divorce complaint on the defendant in the divorce case and the firm had attached a written statement to the process "Be forewarned he's an ex-cop with anger issues". Plaintiff's claims for recovery against defendants were intentional infliction of emotional distress/outrageous conduct, negligent misrepresentation and negligence. The trial court dismissed the action responding to defendants' Tenn R. Civ. P. 12.02(6), and plaintiff has appealed. On appeal, we hold that plaintiff failed to state a cause of action for negligent misrepresentation and intentional infliction of emotional distress/outrageous conduct, but vacate the dismissal of the claim for negligence against defendants, and remand for further proceedings. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In the matter of: Nathan T.
Mother appeals the termination of parental rights to her child, asserting that the findings of the Juvenile Court that she abandoned the child by failing to provide a suitable home, that the conditions which led to the removal of the child persisted, and that termination of her rights were in the best interest of the child are unsupported by clear and convincing evidence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Dickson | Court of Appeals | |
Christine Greenwood v. Kirby Family Dentistry, P.C., et al.
The trial court granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment in this action for dental malpractice. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Charles E. Jackson, III v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville et al.
The matters at issue pertain to the alleged negligence of a Davidson County probation officer and the quasi-judicial immunity defense. Plaintiff, a probationer who was arrested and detained in jail on a probation violation warrant, filed this action alleging he was unlawfully arrested and jailed because his probation officer negligently failed to recall a probation warrant after he cured the deficiencies for which it was issued. The trial court granted the probation officer's Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) motion to dismiss based on the defense of quasi-judicial immunity because the complaint asserted that she was acting in her capacity as his probation officer when she failed to recall the warrant. Plaintiff insists this was error, contending the probation officer is not entitled to quasi-judicial immunity because she was not performing a function essential to the judicial process and she had no discretion but to recall the warrant. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Jerry Ann Winn v. Welch Farm, LLC and Richard Tucker
This is an appeal from the trial court's decision to grant summary judgment to the Appellees. After reviewing the record, we find that the order granting summary judgment fails to comply with Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04, as it does not "state the legal grounds upon which the court denies or grants the motion." Consequently, this Court cannot proceed with our review and must vacate the judgment of the trial court. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Christopher M., Jr., et al
K.C. ("Grandmother") filed a petition seeking to terminate the parental rights of C.W.M. ("Father") to the minor children Christopher M., Jr. and Darius M. ("the Children"), and to adopt the Children. The case was tried and the parties stipulated that grounds existed to terminate Father's parental rights under Tenn. Code Ann. __ 36-1-113(g)(6) and (g)(7). After trial, the Trial Court entered its order terminating Father's parental rights finding and holding, inter alia, that it was in the best interest of the Children for Father's parental rights to be terminated. Father appeals to this Court the finding that it was in the best interest of the Children for his parental rights to be terminated. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Self Help Ventures Fund v. Glenna Robilio
The pro se defendant in an unlawful detainer action appeals an award of summary judgment in favor of the ultimate purchaser at foreclosure. Because the purchaser has demonstrated undisputed facts that show the existence of the elements of its unlawful detainer action, and because the defendant has failed to show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact, we affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment. We further dismiss the defendant's remaining issues. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Self Help Ventures Fund v. Glenna Robilio
The pro se defendant in an unlawful detainer action appeals an award of summary judgment in favor of the ultimate purchaser at foreclosure. Because the purchaser has demonstrated undisputed facts that show the existence of the elements of its unlawful detainer action, and because the defendant has failed to show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact, we affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment. We further dismiss the defendant’s remaining issues. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Erin McLean vs. Jason Eric McLean
This appeal arises from a post-divorce case in which the trial court found the appellant to be in criminal contempt. Procedural deficiencies by the trial court require reversal. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Randall D. Kiser v. Ian J. Wolfe & Consumers Insurance Company
This interlocutory appeal considers an issue of uninsured motorist coverage following an automobile accident in which Plaintiff Randall D. Kiser was permanently injured. The plaintiff was working within the scope of his employment, driving for a towing company, when his truck was struck by Defendant Ian J. Wolfe’s vehicle. The defendant driver tendered his liability policy limits to the plaintiff and is not a party to this appeal. The employer towing company was insured by Defendant Consumers Insurance Company. In anticipation of arbitration for determination of damages and liability, the insurance company moved for partial summary judgment. The trial court denied summary judgment but granted the insurance company permission for an interlocutory appeal to determine two issues, on which we hold: (1) On a policy of vehicle insurance, the statutory requirement of Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-7-1201(a)(2) for a written rejection of uninsured/underinsured motorist benefits or written selection of uninsured/underinsured motorist benefits lower than liability limits is met when the insured signs an application containing a lower selection but neglects to initial a block provided for that purpose; and (2) the insurer bears the burden of proof to show that the insured signed an insurance contract application containing a stated limit of uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage, but once that burden has been met, the insured must raise any issue that the insurer obtained the insured’s signature unlawfully under Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-7-1201(a)(2). We vacate the trial court’s denial of the insurance company’s |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Keisheal N.E. et al
Father appeals the termination of his parental rights to his children. The trial court found three grounds upon which Father's parental rights could be terminated: lack of mental capacity to care for the children, abandonment by failure to visit, and substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan. The psychologist who testified at trial stated that Father was presently unable to properly care for his children due to the diagnosis of schizoaffective disorder. The psychologist also testified that it was possible Father could become a competent parent with the proper medication and treatment. The Department, however, provided no mental health services to assist Father. The statutory ground of mental incompetency as a basis for the termination of a parent's rights requires clear and convincing proof that the parent's mental condition is presently so impaired and is so likely to remain so that it is unlikely the parent will be able to care for the children in the near future. The Department proved that Father's mental condition was such that he could not presently care for the children; however, the Department failed to prove that Father's mental condition is likely to remain impaired to the degree that it is unlikely Father will be able to care for the children in the near future. We have also determined the Department was not excused from exerting reasonable efforts and yet it failed to establish that it exerted reasonable efforts to assist Father to accomplish the goal of reunification because it provided no services that dealt with the root of Father's problems, his mental illness. For the above reasons, we find the Department failed to prove any ground upon which Father's parental rights could be terminated. Accordingly, we reverse the termination of Father's parental rights. |
Coffee | Court of Appeals |
