Denzil Russ Partin v. Mary Ava Partin, et al.
This lawsuit arose out of two transfers of real property. Denzil Russ Partin (“Husband”) sued Mary Ava Partin (“Wife”) and Hazel Walden (“Mrs. Walden”), seeking declaratory relief that the two properties Wife transferred to Mrs. Walden, Wife’s mother, were held in trust for Husband, Wife, and their son, Courtney Partin. The Trial Court found that title to the real property at issue was vested in Mrs. Walden, that no resulting trust had been created, and, that, in any event, the statute of limitations had run on Husband’s action. Husband appeals. We hold that although the Trial Court erred in stating that the statute of limitations had run on Husband’s claim, the Trial Court did not err in declining to impose a resulting trust on the real property at issue. We affirm the judgment as modified. |
Campbell | Court of Appeals | |
Judy Davis, as Next Friend of Eloise Gwinn, an Incapacitated Person v. Kindred Healthcare Operating, Inc., et al.
This is a nursing home abuse case. The trial court denied Appellant nursing home’s motion to compel arbitration based upon an alternative dispute resolution agreement that was executed by Appellee, the niece of the patient being admitted to Appellants’ nursing facility. The patient had executed a power of attorney in favor of her niece and her niece’s husband, but only the niece had signed the admission papers on behalf of the patient. The trial court determined that the power of attorney created a joint agency, whereby the signatures of both the niece and her husband were required in order to bind the patient, as principal, to arbitration. Affirmed and remanded. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Estate of Miguel Robles, etc. et al. v. Vanderbilt University Medical Center, et al.
Defendants in medical malpractice action appeal the denial of their motion to set aside order entered on plaintiff’s Tenn. R. Civ. P. 41.01 notice of voluntary dismissal without prejudice. Defendants contend that, because the certificate of good faith required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-122 was not filed with the complaint, dismissal should have been with prejudice. Finding that Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-122 does not limit plaintiff’s right to voluntarily dismiss an action without prejudice under the circumstances presented, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: The Estate of Ernest Dwight King, Deceased
Following the death of her husband, a widow filed a petition in probate court and sought to aggregate the estate’s assets. The decedent had been in partnership with two brothers in a company that owned real estate and operated a nursery. The widow sought to partition the land and sell the partnership’s assets to obtain the estate’s one-third share of the partnership. The trial court ordered the land be sold at auction and the proceeds partitioned as the widow requested, and decreed certain expenses be paid from the sale before the proceeds were distributed to the estate and the two brothers. The brothers appealed the trial court’s decree affirming the payment of certain expenses before the proceeds were divided up among the partners, and claimed the estate should be liable for additional expenses the partnership incurred following the decedent’s death. However, the brothers failed to present evidence to the trial court in support of their arguments, with the result that we are unable to provide the brothers with any of the relief they seek. Accordingly, the trial court is affirmed in all respects. |
Warren | Court of Appeals | |
Joseph C. Barna v. W. Martin Seiler
An investor who lost money on stock transactions filed a claim against his stockbroker that was dismissed in arbitration. The investor then filed a complaint for legal malpractice against the attorney who had represented him in the arbitration proceeding. The attorney filed a motion for summary judgment accompanied by his expert affidavit, declaring that in his representation of the investor he had complied with all applicable standards of legal professional practice. The investor did not respond with an expert testimony contradicting the defendant. Following a series of delays, the trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant attorney after declining to grant another continuance. The former client filed a motion for relief from judgment, and the trial court denied the motion. After the attorney voluntarily dismissed his counterclaim, the judgment became final, and the investor appealed. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Elmwood Apartments v. Jessica Woodson, et al.
This appeal arises out of a detainer action originally filed in general sessions court in which landlord of apartment was awarded possession of leased premises. Tenants filed a petition for writs of certiorari and supersedeas for de novo review to the circuit court, accompanied by an affidavit of indigency; the writs were issued. Landlord subsequently sought dismissal of both writs on several grounds. The court granted the motion, finding that the writ of supersedeas was improperly granted and, as a consequence, review by certiorari was not available as a substitute for appeal. Finding that the court erred in considering grounds for dismissal which were added by landlord within five days of the hearing on the motion, we reverse the judgment and remand for further proceedings. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
Joseph C. Barna v. W. Martin Seiler - Dissenting
I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the movant, attorney Martin Seiler, shifted the burden of persuasion to the plaintiff Joseph Barna for purposes of summary judgment. Admittedly, Mr. Barna did not refute the affidavit of Mr. Seiler, but I submit he did not have to because Mr. Barna was not obliged to come forward with countervailing evidence to create a dispute of fact. This is due to the fact that Mr. Seiler failed to provide a sufficient affidavit or other proof. Specifically, Mr. Seiler’s affidavit, which is the only evidence to support his motion for summary judgment, is insufficient because he failed to provide any specific material fact for this court to consider that pertains to the legal services he actually rendered. Mr. Seiler only informed us of the fact that he has many years of experience as a lawyer in the field of security litigation, which is a relevant and material fact, but by itself is insufficient to refute the specific allegations in the complaint as to what Mr. Seiler failed to do in his representation of Mr. Barna. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Bennie Joe Poteet, II, Individually and by and Through Evelyn Poteet, as Conservator of Bennie Joe Poteet, II v. National Healthcare of Cleveland, Inc., et al.
This appeal involves a claim of medical malpractice. Bennie Joe Poteet, II, individually and by and through his mother, Evelyn Poteet, as his conservator (collectively “the Plaintiffs”), sued Adam E. Fall, M.D. (“Dr. Fall”) and National Healthcare of Cleveland, formerly doing business as Cleveland Community Hospital (“the Hospital”) (collectively “the Defendants”) for medical malpractice after Mr. Poteet suffered a stroke while admitted at the Hospital which rendered him completely paralyzed from the nose down. Both parties moved for partial summary judgment on Mr. Poteet’s later added claim of negligence per se based on a bonus incentive plan allegedly maintained by the Hospital that indirectly set forth the reduction of MRIs ordered by Dr. Fall as a factor in his annual bonus determination. The trial court granted the Hospital’s dispositive motion on the issue, as well as the Hospital’s motion to dismiss on the bonus issue. Prior to trial, the court also granted the Defendants’ motions in limine to exclude any evidence of the bonus incentive plan offered to Dr. Fall, but denied the Defendants’ motion to exclude all testimony of one of the Plaintiffs’ neurology experts. At the close of the case, the trial court submitted a special verdict form to the jury which instructed that the question regarding the Hospital’s negligence based on insufficient neurology coverage was to be disregarded if neither Dr. Fall nor the treating nurses were found to be negligent. The jury subsequently returned a verdict favorable to the nurses and Dr. Fall, leaving the question on the adequacy of neurology coverage unaddressed. Judgment was entered on the jury’s findings. The Hospital thereafter filed a motion for directed verdict on the neurology coverage issue while the Plaintiffs moved for a new trial on multiple grounds. The trial court denied the Plaintiffs’ motion for new trial but granted the Hospital’s motion for directed verdict as well as the Defendants’ motions for discretionary costs. The Plaintiffs have appealed. We affirm. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Darryl Suggs as Administrator of the Estate of Billy Ray Suggs v. Gallaway Health Care Center, et al.
This appeal arises out of a complaint filed against various healthcare providers. Before the trial court, Plaintiff filed a motion to consolidate this case with an identical lawsuit he had filed against the same defendants in another county. The motion to consolidate was denied. The trial court later dismissed the Plaintiff’s claim against one of the defendant physicians for improper venue, and the other defendants were dismissed for various reasons not relevant to this appeal. Plaintiff appeals the dismissal of his claim against the physician for improper venue, and he argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to consolidate. We affirm. |
Fayette | Court of Appeals | |
Barry Ogle v. Ben Seigler, d/b/a Ben's Bobcat
In this breach of contract action, the defendant appealed the Judgment of the Trial Court, who entered a monetary judgment against defendant and awarded attorney's fees. Defendant has appealed, and on appeal we reverse the award of attorney's fees, vacate the Trial Court's Judgment and remand, with directions for the parties or the Court to prepare a complete Statement of Evidence. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Dawn A. Moss v. William Barry Moss
At issue is when Husband shall pay $250,000 in cash awarded to Wife in the division of the marital estate and whether post-judgment interest shall accrue. In the Final Decree, payment of the $250,000 was deferred pending Husband’s receipt of an expected inheritance from his recently deceased uncle. The Decree, however, expressly provided that Wife could petition the court for relief in the event the deceased uncle’s estate was not closed within one year. As authorized by the trial court, one year later, Wife filed a motion requesting that Husband be ordered to pay the $250,000 award. The trial court denied Wife’s request for immediate payment of the money and denied her request for post-judgment interest. Wife appeals contending that the trial court erred in not awarding the immediate payment of the full amount and post-judgment interest. Finding it inequitable for Husband to have the use and benefit of the marital estate, much of which is income producing, while Wife is deprived of the bulk of her share of the marital estate, we reverse and remand with instructions for the entry of a judgment in favor of Wife of $250,000 plus post-judgment interest from the filing of the motion for relief. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
In the Matter of: Melanie T. et al.
This dependent and neglected action involves the defendant’s minor biological child and two minor stepchildren. The defendant appeals the finding by the circuit court that he severely abused his two stepchildren. He contends that DCS failed to state a claim against him upon which relief could be granted because he is not the biological or legal father of the children. He also contends the evidence is insufficient to find that he committed severe child abuse. We have determined the petition states a claim against the defendant, and that the evidence clearly and convincingly supports the findings that all three children are dependent and neglected, and that the defendant severely abused the two stepchildren children. Thus, we affirm. |
Coffee | Court of Appeals | |
4215 Harding Road Homeowners Association v. Stacy Harris
The Homeowners’ Association of a high-rise condominium building filed this action against an owner/occupant of a condominium unit alleging she was in violation of the Master Deed and Bylaws due to grossly unsanitary conditions in the defendant’s unit and extremely offensive odors that emanated from her unit into common areas. The Association requested that the defendant’s condominium unit be sold at a judicial sale and that it be awarded its attorneys’ fees. The trial court found the defendant’s acts and omissions violated the Master Deed and Bylaws and that the Association was entitled to the relief it requested; accordingly, the court ordered that the unit be sold and awarded $116,037.77 in attorneys’ fees against the defendant. We affirm the trial court in all respects. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Gwen Shamblin, et al. v. Rafael Martinez
This defamation action arises out of the publication of a statement to an internet website. The trial court held that plaintiffs were unable to show actual malice in order to sustain defamation and false light invasion of privacy claims and granted summary judgment to the defendant. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Vivian Kennard v. Arthur M. Townsend, IV, M.D., et al.
This is a medical malpractice case. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellee healthcare provider after its determination that Appellant patient’s medical expert did not meet the locality requirement, Tennessee Code Annotated Section 29-26-115(a)(1). Discerning no error, we affirm and remand. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Carl A. Baker v. Antoinette Welch
Defendant in malpractice action was granted summary judgment. Plaintiff filed two motions seeking to set aside the grant of summary judgment, which were denied. Plaintiff appealed. We reverse for reconsideration of the motion filed within 30 days of entry of the judgment under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 59. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Carl A. Baker v. Antoinette Welch
Defendant in malpractice action was granted summary judgment. Plaintiff filed two motions seeking to set aside the grant of summary judgment, which were denied. Plaintiff appealed. We reverse for reconsideration of the motion filed within 30 days of entry of the judgment under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 59. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Cynthia Lynn Liner v. Robert Clifford Liner, Jr.
In a divorce action, Husband appeals the trial court’s classification of the residence he owned before the parties’ marriage as marital property and its award of one-half of the equity in the residence to Wife. We affirm. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Alicia Mathes, et al v. DRD Knoxville Medical Clinic, et al
This is an appeal from the trial court’s grant of separate motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The trial court determined that Appellants had failed to comply with the written notice and certificate of good faith requirements of the Tennessee Medical Malpractice Act, and had failed to state a claim for vicarious liability based on theories of agency or joint venture. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand, concluding that Appellants’ claims of direct negligence do not sound in medical malpractice, but that Appellants failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted with respect to vicarious liability based on agency or joint venture. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
James M. Flinn v. Jon K. Blackwood
Plaintiff filed a cause of action against Defendant judge, alleging Defendant wrongfully refused to grant his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The trial court dismissed the action. We affirm. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Easter Baugh v. Barbara Thomas, et al.
Nephew of grantor of quitclaim deed conveying property to grantor’s sister appeals the declaration that the deed was null and void based on a finding that the nephew exercised undue influence on grantor. Finding that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding of a confidential relationship between grantor and nephew and in light of nephew’s failure to rebut the presumption of undue influence raised thereby, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Coffee | Court of Appeals | |
In the Matter of: LaPorsha S.
This appeal involves a dispute over the placement of a child formerly in the custody of the Department of Children’s Services. Because the child turned eighteen years old during the pendency of these proceedings, this appeal is moot and must be dismissed. |
Gibson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Zada M.
In this parental termination case the Trial Court, upon hearing evidence, terminated the mother's parental rights upon finding grounds of abandonment and that it is in the best interest of the child. The mother has appealed and we conclude from the record that the statutory grounds for abandonment were established by clear and convincing evidence, and we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court. |
Greene | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: The Adoption of Gabrielle N. N.
Jeanenne W. M. (“Petitioner”) filed a petition seeking to adopt the minor child, Gabrielle N.N. (“the Child”) and to terminate the parental rights of Russell A.N. (“Father”) to the Child. After a trial, the Trial Court entered its order on June 14, 2010 finding and holding, inter alia, that clear and convincing evidence existed to support a termination of Father’s parental rights pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-113(g)(3) and (g)(5), and that clear and convincing evidence existed that it was in the Child’s best interest for Father’s parental rights to be terminated. Father appeals to this Court. We affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Rebecca Lynn Weingart v. Jonathan Shane Forester
This appeal arises from an entry of divorce. The parties executed a prenuptial agreement prior to their marriage. The prenuptial agreement outlined the classification of separate property and the parties’ respective rights in the event of divorce. After nearly seven years of marriage, the wife filed a petition for divorce. The parties participated in mediation, and a hearing was held to resolve the remaining issues. At the hearing, counsel for both parties presented arguments regarding the unresolved issues and eventually reached an agreement to settle those issues during a recess of the hearing. Counsel for the parties announced the agreement before the trial court, and the trial court subsequently entered an order. The husband appeals and challenges the trial court’s finding that the wife’s retirement account is entirely her separate property. After reviewing the record, we find that the trial court erred in finding that the prenuptial agreement was ambiguous. Nevertheless, the trial court properly awarded the wife’s retirement account to her as separate property. Therefore, we reverse in part and affirm in part. |
Washington | Court of Appeals |
