O'Rane M. Cornish, Sr. v. Steven C. Cooper, et al.
Appellant filed his Notice of Appeal one day past the deadline imposed by Rule 4 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. Accordingly, this Court lacks jurisdiction and we must dismiss this appeal. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Heritage Operating, LP v. Henry County Propane Gas, Inc., et al.
The trial court entered an order granting Plaintiff’s motion to compel discovery and for discovery sanctions, and stated that the order was final under Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure 54.02. Defendant did not file a notice of appeal within 30 days of entry of the trial court’s order. Plaintiff subsequently filed a notice of voluntary nonsuit. Defendants filed a notice of appeal within 30 days of the trial court’s entry of an order of voluntary dismissal, and appeal the trial court’s award of discovery sanctions to Plaintiff. We hold that the order awarding sanctions was not an effective final judgment under Rule 54.02. Defendants’ appeal accordingly is timely. We vacate the award of sanctions and remand for further proceedings. |
Henry | Court of Appeals | |
Michael Stevison v. State of Tennessee
Michael Stevison (“the Claimant”), an inmate in the custody of the Department of Correction, filed a breach of contract claim against the State of Tennessee. His claim was assigned to the small claims docket of the Claims Commission. The State filed a “Motion to Dismiss and/or Motion for Summary Judgment,” both of which were granted by the Commission. The Claimant filed a notice of appeal seeking to appeal the adverse decision to this Court. The State filed a motion to dismiss the appeal based upon its argument that the relevant statutory scheme prohibits appeals from decisions on claims “appearing on the small claims docket.” Since we have no jurisdiction to hear this appeal, it is dismissed. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re William S. et al.
Father appeals the termination of his parental rights. The trial court found multiple grounds for termination of his rights and that termination was in the best interest of the two children. Father appealed. Because he did not appeal the ground of wanton disregard for the welfare of the children, we find it unnecessary to discuss the other grounds at length. We do find, however, that there is clear and convincing evidence supporting a finding that additional grounds exist. We further find that termination of Father’s parental rights is in the best interest of the children. Consequently, we affirm the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Trena Winkler v. Pinnacle Properties I, LLC and Ershig Properties, Inc.
The plaintiff tripped and fell in a parking lot. She sued the owners, claiming that the step up from the parking lot to a ramp leading onto the sidewalk was a hidden danger because it was painted the same color as the top surface of the ramp. The court below granted the defendants a summary judgment, holding that the defendants had not violated any duty to the plaintiff and that the sole cause of the injury was the plaintiff’s inattention to the surroundings. After a review of the record, we hold that the defendants are not entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. We therefore reverse the lower court’s judgment and remand the cause for further proceedings. |
Warren | Court of Appeals | |
Dawn Ann Davis v. Daniel Pace Goodwin
Because the order appealed is not a final judgment, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Dixie A. Willis, et al. v. David A. West, D.O.
The trial court denied Plaintiffs’ Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02 motion to set aside a second order of voluntary nonsuit in this medical malpractice action. We affirm. |
Dyer | Court of Appeals | |
John Van Zyll and Ann Furlong v. Phil Mitchell
This appeal involves a dispute between neighbors. Plaintiffs live in a home next door to the defendant neighbor. The defendant neighbor embarked on a campaign of harassment that included, among other things, blasting an air horn in the wee hours on intermittent nights. The air horn blasts occurred on over forty nights. The plaintiffs filed the instant lawsuit against the noisome neighbor, seeking injunctive relief and compensatory damages. Summonses were issued on two occasions, but no return of summons was filed with the trial court. The defendant neighbor wrote a pro se letter to the trial court, acknowledging receipt of a notice of hearing, but no other papers, and stating that he would not appear at the hearing. After the hearing, the trial court issued an injunction and awarded a default judgment for compensatory damages to the plaintiffs. The defendant neighbor then filed a Rule 60.02 motion to set aside the judgment, based on failure to serve process. This motion was granted. Pursuant to the defendant neighbor’s motion, the trial court then dismissed the complaint. The plaintiffs now appeal, arguing that the defendant neighbor’s pro se letter constituted an appearance and that the trial court erred in setting aside the default judgment and dismissing the complaint. We affirm. |
Roane | Court of Appeals | |
Gregory L. Smith v. State of Tennessee
This case involves the denial of a handgun carry permit by the Department of Safety to an individual who had previously been convicted of a felony and sentenced to two years in the Department of Correction. The applicant appealed to the General Sessions Court, which reversed the decision of the Department of Safety. The Department of Safety then appealed to Circuit Court, which affirmed the General Sessions Court and held that the applicant was entitled to obtain a handgun carry permit because his full civil rights had been restored upon the issuance of a Certificate of Restoration of Voting Rights. We hold that the applicant is not entitled to obtain a handgun carry permit pursuant to Tennessee law because the applicant’s right to seek and hold public office has not been restored by a court of competent jurisdiction. Reversed and remanded. |
Macon | Court of Appeals | |
Town of Middleton, Tennessee, et al. v. City of Bolivar, Tennessee, et al.
In this case, we are asked to address the question of whether the Municipal Gas System Tax Equivalent Law of 1987, Tennessee Code Annotated Section 7-39-401 through 406, or the Revenue Bond Law, Tennessee Code Annotated Section 7-34-101, et seq., negate the provisions of ordinances passed by Appellees, the Town of Middleton, Tennessee and the Town of Whiteville, Tennessee, which granted Appellant, the City of Bolivar and its municipal utility, the right to franchise in the Appellee towns. We conclude that: (1) Appellants may be liable for both franchise fees under the ordinances, and for payments in lieu of taxes under the Municipal Gas System Tax Equivalent Law because franchise fees are not in the nature of taxes on the valuation of property and are “operating expenses” for the privilege of doing business; (2) although the ordinances initially granted Bolivar’s utility exemption from payments in lieu of taxes to Appellees, by resolution, Bolivar waived its exemption and is now obligated to make payments in lieu of taxes to Appellees under the Municipal Gas System Tax Equivalent Law; (3) to the extent that the Whiteville ordinance conflicts with Bolivar’s statutory right to charge consumers for the actual costs of its services (which would include the franchise fee expenses), it is void; (4) the trial court’s award of pendente lite payments to Appellees was not reversible error in light of our holding that Appellees were (and are) entitled to the franchise fees. Reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded. |
Hardeman | Court of Appeals | |
Tia Gentry v. Dale Larkin
This appeal arises from a dispute over the settlement of a lawsuit. Teresa Larkin died in 2003, with her life insurance proceeds and her estate passing to her husband, Dale Larkin (“Larkin”). Teresa Larkin’s minor daughter, Tia Gentry (“Gentry”), sued Larkin, her stepfather, alleging that he caused the death of her mother and that, as a result, he should not receive any life insurance proceeds or inheritance because of the “Slayer’s Statute.” Gentry and Larkin settled the lawsuit and split the life insurance proceeds and the estate of Teresa Larkin. Later, Larkin was convicted of first degree murder in the death of Teresa Larkin. Gentry filed this suit in the Circuit Court for Washington County (“the Trial Court”), seeking to overturn the agreement based upon fraud in the inducement as Larkin had represented that he did not kill Teresa Larkin. Larkin filed a motion to dismiss. The Trial Court held that the issues in this lawsuit already had been, or could have been, litigated, and, as inequitable as the result might seem in light of Larkin’s conviction for first degree murder in the death of Teresa Larkin, Gentry’s lawsuit must be dismissed. Gentry appeals. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
Kenneth A. Parigin , et al v. M. Shane Mills, et al
On February 23, 2012, M. Shane Mills (“Defendant”) filed a notice of appeal of an order entered by the Trial Court on January 24, 2012. On June 12, 2012, this Court entered an order directing Defendant to show cause why this appeal should not be dismissed as premature. Defendant did not respond to the show cause order. We dismiss this appeal for lack of a final judgment. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In the Matter of Robert B.
This appeal concerns the termination of a father’s parental rights with respect to his son. The father was incarcerated for sexually abusing his stepdaughters, the son’s half sisters, while all resided in the same home. The trial court also found that the father had physically abused the son. The trial court found that all of this conduct constituted severe abuse pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated §§ 36-1-113(g)(4) and 37-1-102(b)(23)(C). It found that termination of the father’s parental rights was in the son’s best interest. The trial court entered an order terminating the father’s parental rights; the order was entered over thirty days after the termination hearing. The father appeals the tardiness of the termination order and the best interest finding. We affirm. |
Benton | Court of Appeals | |
Rosheay Ragland and wife, Theresa Ragland v. Oakland Deposit Bank
This appeal involves the foreclosure of real property owned by the Appellants. The Appellants filed a request for a temporary and permanent injunction, alleging that the Appellee bank that held the mortgage on the property had violated the Appellants’ rights. After the Appellants testified at the temporary injunction hearing, the Bank moved for involuntary dismissal and the trial court dismissed the case. Both parties filed post-trial motions regarding possession of the subject property. The appellate record contains no record that either of these motions was adjudicated by the trial court. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is not final, and this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this appeal. Dismissed and remanded. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Depot Property, LLC and Terry C. Cox v. Town of Arlington, Tennessee
This appeal concerns the requirements for a petition for certiorari. This case is on remand from the Tennessee Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of Board of Professional Responsibility v. Cawood, 330 S.W.3d 608 (Tenn. 2010). After reviewing the petition for certiorari in light of the requirements set forth in Cawood, we find that the trial court was without subject matter jurisdiction to hear this case. Therefore, we vacate the trial court’s decision and dismiss the case. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
John P. Bilby v. Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole, et al.
A prisoner filed a pro se petition for writ of certiorari, which the trial court dismissed sua sponte for failure to prosecute due to the prisoner’s failure to file the necessary summonses. The prisoner appeals. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Michael B.Q.
This is a termination of parental rights case. Father/Appellant appeals the trial court's termination of his parental rights to the minor child at issue. By clear and convincing evidence, the trial court found two grounds for termination of Father’s parental rights: (1) abandonment by an incarcerated parent, and (2) prison sentence of more than ten years, imposed when the child was under the age of eight. The trial court also found, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Robert Mears v. Kendra M. Williams, et al.
This appeal focuses on State Farm’s ability to claim an offset of uninsured motorist coverage for workers’ compensation benefits paid to its insured. The trial court construed the case of State Farm Insurance Company v. Schubert, et al., No. E2000-02054-COA-R3-CV, 2001 WL 584206 (Tenn. Ct. App. May, 31, 2001) so as to preclude offset. We reverse and we remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Amber D. Brewster v. Nicholas Galloway
This appeal arises out of a custody dispute over Amber D. Brewster and Nicholas Galloway’s minor child. When presented with a petition to establish paternity and set child support, Nicholas Galloway acknowledged paternity but filed a petition to be named the primary residential parent. The trial court denied Nicholas Galloway’s petition, designated Amber D. Brewster as the primary residential parent, and granted Nicholas Galloway co-parenting time. We affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Amber D. Brewster v. Nicholas Galloway - Concurring
I concur in the result reached by the majority and, with one caveat, its rationale in reaching that result. While I agree with the majority that “[t]he record before this [C]ourt does not reflect that Father ever raised an issue regarding Mother’s ability to recover attorney fees because she was never his spouse,” I disagree with the majority’s holding, in dicta, that Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-103(c)(2010) supports such an award. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Smith County Planning Commission v. Carver Trucking, Inc.
This appeal involves a contempt finding against a closely-held corporation. The defendant closely-held corporation owned real property located on a highway. The trial court held that the corporation had violated zoning ordinances by maintaining and operating a trucking terminal and salvage yard in an unauthorized area. The trial court enjoined the corporation from maintaining a trucking terminal at this location and directed the corporation to remove junk from the property. The corporation then leased the property to a business associate who continued to operate a trucking terminal on the property and failed to remove the junk. A contemptpetition wasfiled againstthe defendantcorporation. The trialcourtdetermined that the defendant corporation had violated the injunction and was in contempt of court. The defendant corporation now appeals, arguing that the corporation cannot be held in contempt for the actions of the tenant on the property. We affirm. |
Smith | Court of Appeals | |
Bobby MacBryan Green v. Jodi Jones, et al.
A neighborhood association president, fearing that members conspired to improperly oust him at an upcoming meeting, filed suit, requesting declaratory relief regarding the proper procedure for removal of a president. Prior to a hearing, the members voted to remove him from office and filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The court dismissed the complaint and denied a subsequent motion to alter or amend its judgment. The president appeals. We affirm. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
David Byars and wife, Elizabeth Byars, M.D. v. Randy Frazier and Jeff Kelley
The trial court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss, finding, among other things, that Defendants were entitled to GTLA immunity. Because we find a question of fact exists as to whether Defendants acted within the scope of their employment in communicating with Plaintiff’s teaching supervisor, in communicating with the named individuals, and in ordering destruction of the surveillance video tapes, we reverse the trial court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ slander, false light, defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress and loss of consortium claims with regard to such conduct. The decision of the trial court is affirmed in all other respects. The case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Weakley | Court of Appeals | |
Peggy Giffin d/b/a Re/Max Realty Center, et al. v. Anthony Sawyer, et al.
Peggy Giffin d/b/a Re/Max Realty Center and Racia Futrell (collectively “Plaintiffs”) sued Anthony Sawyer and Hope Sawyer alleging, among other things, that the Sawyers had breached a real estate sales agency contract. After a bench trial, the Trial Court entered its order finding and holding, inter alia, that the Sawyers did not breach the sales agency contract and that Plaintiffs were not entitled to collect a commission under the sales agency contract. Plaintiffs appeal to this Court. We find that the evidence does not preponderate against the Trial Court’s findings, and we affirm. |
Roane | Court of Appeals | |
Lynette Rooney (Pollan) v. Edward S. Pollan
Wife appeals the trial court’s division of marital property and award of alimony among other issues. The trial court granted Wife a divorce on the ground of Husband’s inappropriate marital conduct. Wife was awarded 51% of the marital assets and Husband received 49%. Wife was awarded $5,000 month in alimony in futuro until she reached the age of 65, at which time the amount would be reduced to $2,000 until Wife’s death or remarriage. Wife contends that the trial court erred in its determination as to the division of marital property, its award of alimony, its denial of her request for an additional $170,000 as alimony in solido due to Husband’s alleged dissipation of assets, its denial of Wife’s request that Husband pay her medical insurance following the end of an eight-year employment agreement with Husband’s company, and its denial of her request for attorney’s fees and expert witness fees in the amount of $115,528.88. For his part, Husband contends the trial court made a mathematical error regarding the parties’ 2010 tax liability. We affirm the trial court in all respects except for the tax liability and remand the issue of the parties’ 2010 tax liability. Although Wife does not challenge this issue, we are unable to determine the correct amount; thus, we remand this issue for the court to determine whether a mathematical error exists and, if so, to modify the decree accordingly. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals |
