Lori R. Torres v. Michael S. Torres
The appellee in this case filed a motion to dismiss appeal on July 20, 2012, arguing that the judgment of divorce entered by the trial court on December 6, 2010, is not a final judgment from which an appeal can be taken and the appellate record on file is therefore incomplete. The orders entered by the trial court on July 9, 2012, confirm that the notice of appeal was filed prematurely, as all claims between the parties have not yet been resolved. The appellant did not file a response to the motion. Our review of the record reveals that the order to which the notice of appeal is directed is not “a final judgment adjudicating all the claims, rights, and liabilities of all parties” from which an appeal as of right would lie. See Tenn. R. App. P. 3(a). Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal. |
Campbell | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Stephen M.P.
A show cause order was entered in this case on August 16, 2012, directing the non-attorney father of the minor child in this case to state why this appeal should not be dismissed based upon his filing of the notice of appeal on behalf of his son and without the benefit of counsel. The father responded to the show cause order, but his contentions do not cure the defect in the notice of appeal. Our review of the record reveals that this court lacks jurisdiction. See Tenn. R. App. P. 3(a). Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
DKB Trucking Company, LLC v. JNJ Express, Inc.
Plaintiff sued for damages for the destruction of a tractor and trailer and for the loss of its |
Putnam | Court of Appeals | |
E. Ron Pickard and Linda Pickard, as Trustees of the Sharon Charitable Trust and as Individuals v. Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation, Tennessee Water Quality Control Board and Tennessee Materials Corporation
The Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation issued a draft permit allowing a proposed rock quarry to discharge storm water and wastewater into a nearby creek. Owners of property allegedly affected by the discharge filed a declaratory order petition with the Water Quality Control Board, seeking a declaration construing the rules regarding the protection of existing uses of waters.The Water Quality Control Board dismissed the petition as not ripe. The Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation subsequently issued a final permit to the quarry and the property owners filed both a permit appeal and another declaratory order petition with the Water Quality Control Board. The Water Quality Control Board again dismissed the declaratory order petition. The property owners subsequently filed a petition for a declaratory judgment in the Davidson County Chancery Court. The Water Quality Control Board and the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation argued that the petition was not ripe and that the property owners had not exhausted their administrative remedies. In addition, the Water Quality Control Board and the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation argued that Tennessee Code Annotated Section 69-3-105(i) precluded the property owners from bringing a declaratory order petition prior to issuance of a permit. The trial court ruled in favor of the property owners and issued a declaratory judgment on the construction of Tennessee Compiled Rule and Regulation 1200-04-03-.06. We affirm the trial court’s rulings with regard to ripeness, exhaustion of administrative remedies, and Tennessee Code Annotated Section 69-3-105(i), but reverse the grant of summary judgment on the construction of Tennessee Compiled Rule and Regulation 1200-04-03-.06 and remand for further proceedings. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Norman C. Loggins v. First Tennessee Bank, N.A.
The trial court entered an order of involuntary dismissal pursuant to Rule 41.02(2) in this action for malicious prosecution. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Jeffery Smith and Brenda K. Smith v. Methodist Hospitals of Memphis, et al.
This lawsuit originated as a medical malpractice action that was filed against the Hospital and other defendants in 2000. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Hospital on the medical malpractice claim in 2003 because Plaintiffs had failed to come forward with competent testimony from a medical doctor regarding causation. Thereafter, Plaintiffs filed a supplemental complaint to allege that the Hospital had tortiously interfered with the Plaintiffs’ contract with a nurse expert witness. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Hospital on this claim in 2010. Plaintiffs appealed. We affirm the trial court’s order granting summary judgment on the issue of tortious interference with contract, but we reverse the trial court’s order granting summary judgment on the medical malpractice claim and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Chyna L.M.D.
The State of Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition seeking to terminate the parental rights of Anthony P.D. (“Father”) to the minor child Chyna L.M.D. (“the Child”). After a trial, the Trial Court entered its judgment finding and holding that clear and convincing evidence of grounds existed to terminate Father’s parental rights pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(1) and § 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv), and that the termination was in the Child’s best interest. Father appeals to this Court. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Jamie Paul Ledbetter and wife, Charlene Ledbetter v. Donald L. Schacht, et al.
After purchasing a home, the plaintiffs sued the sellers’ real estate agent under the Tennessee Residential Property Disclosure Act for failing to disclose that work was done on the foundation of the home prior to the purchase. The trial court granted summary judgment to the real estate agent, finding that she had no knowledge of adverse facts as defined by the Tennessee Residential Property Disclosure Act. The plaintiffs appeal. We affirm. |
Henderson | Court of Appeals | |
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation as Receiver for Tennessee Commerce Bank v. Bill Chapman, Jr.; Lisa Chapman; Chapman Ventures, LLC f/k/a Chapman Homes, LLC; State of Tennessee
Defendants in suit to reform deed of trust or warranty deed appeal the denial of their motion to dismiss action on ground of prior suit pending. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Weston T. R.
Father has a son who was placed in the custody of his maternal grandmother when he was ten months old because Mother was deceased and Father was incarcerated. Grandmother filed a petition for termination of Father’s parental rights. Following a hearing the trial court determined Father had abandoned his child as that term is defined by Tenn. Code Ann. §361-102(1)(A)(iv) and that it was in the child’s best interests for Father’s parental rights to be terminated. Father has been incarcerated for all but five months of the child’s life and has engaged in conduct that exhibits his wanton disregard for his son’s welfare. The child has no meaningful relationship with Father due to Father’s life choices, which have resulted in repeated arrests and periods of incarceration. We agree with the trial court that Father has abandoned his child and that it is in the child’s best interest for Father’s parental rights to be terminated. We therefore affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Doris Hinkle, et al. v. Kindred Hospital, et al.
The widow of a man who suffered a devastating injury while undergoing a medical procedure in the defendant hospital filed suit against the hospital and the doctor who ordered the procedure, claiming medical malpractice, failure to obtain informed consent, and battery. The defendant hospital filed a motion for summary judgment, and the defendant doctor filed a motion to dismiss, both arguing that the plaintiff’s malpractice claims had to be dismissed because she failed to strictly comply with requirements of the Medical Malpractice Act, specifically Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121 (a)(1) (60-day notice) and §29-26-122(a) (certificate of good faith). The trial court granted both motions in part and denied them in part. We reverse the trial court’s dismissal of the medical malpractice claims against both defendants as well as the related claims. We also reverse the trial court’s dismissal of the claim against the defendant doctor for failure to obtain the patient’s informed consent, but we affirm its dismissal of the medical battery claim against the defendant doctor. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Doris Hinkle, et al. v. Kindred Hospital, et al. - CONCUR/DISSENT
I concur with the majority’s decision in all respects, except the decision to affirm the dismissal of the medical battery claim against Dr. Nguyen pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6). |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Danny E. Iloube, Sr. v. Don M. Cain
This action arises from an automobile accident. The trial court granted Defendant’s motion for a directed verdict on Plaintiff’s claim for damages for medical expenses at the close of proof. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Defendant on Plaintiff’s claim for pain and suffering and loss of earning capacity. On appeal, Plaintiff asserts the trial court erred by granting the directed verdict on his claim for medical expenses. We reverse and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Anna Parker, Administrator of Estate of Wanda Faye Dobbs, Deceased et al. v. Portland Nursing & Nursing Rehab et al.
In this action, the plaintiff has attempted to assert claims for ordinary negligence and medical malpractice against nursing home defendants by filing two separate actions and then seeking to consolidate the cases or to amend the complaint to assert both types of claims in one case. The first complaint filed only asserted claims for ordinary negligence against the nursing home defendants. Sixty days after having given the statutory notice to the healthcare providers of her intent to file medical malpractice claims, the plaintiff commenced a separate action against the same nursing home defendants and an additional defendant, a physician who treated the nursing home patient, by filing a complaint for medical malpractice. Upon motions of the nursing home defendants, the trial court refused to consolidate the cases, dismissed the medical malpractice claims against the nursing home defendants upon the ground of a prior suit pending, and denied the plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint in the first case to add claims for medical malpractice against the nursing home defendants. Having determined that the plaintiff complied with Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-26121(a) by giving the requisite 60 days notice to the medical providers and that the statute of limitations had not run, we have concluded that the trial court erred in denying the plaintiff’s Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 15.01 motion to amend the complaint. Accordingly, we reverse and remand with instructions to grant the plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint for ordinary negligence against the nursing home defendants thus allowing the plaintiff to assert medical malpractice claims against the nursing home defendants and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
City of Memphis, A Municipal Corporation for the Use and Benefit of Memphis Light Gas and Water v. Tandy J. Gilliland Family, L.L.C., et al
This is a condemnation case. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellees, the landowners, finding that Appellant MLGW's attempted condemnation was not necessary. The evidence clearly establishes that MLGW had the right to take, and that the taking was for a public purpose. Therefore, the burden fell to Appellees to show that MLGW’s taking was arbitrary or capricious. The evidence contained in the record does not establish that the taking was arbitrary or capricious with the result being that the condemnation is “conclusive upon the court.” Because the court considered necessity and location in contravention of MLGW’s condemnation power, we reverse the grant of summary judgment and remand to the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Sapinder Singh v. Larry Fowler Trucking, Inc.
This case arises from an accident involving two semi-trucks. The truck owned by Appellee trucking company rear-ended the truck driven by Appellant, causing injury to Appellant’s back. Litigation ensued and the Appellee filed a motion in limine to exclude portions of Appellant’s medical expert’s testimony concerning Appellant’s possible future need for surgery and the costs thereof. The trial court granted the motion, and Appellant appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm |
Henderson | Court of Appeals | |
Lori Anne Yattoni-Prestwood v. John Stewart Prestwood
This is a divorce case that focuses on the parties’ debt and the issue of attorney’s fees. The trial court dissolved the marriage of Lori Anne Yattoni-Prestwood (“Wife”) and John Stewart Prestwood (“Husband”). During their brief time together, the parties accumulated only debt, no assets. Husband’s liability for the parties’ debts was discharged in bankruptcy. In considering the issue of property division and allocation of debt, the trial court found that expenditures made by Wife to and for Husband’s benefit, both before and during the marriage, were “gifts” to him; accordingly, the court declined to treat the after-marriage payments as marital obligations. Instead, the court decreed that each party would be responsible for that party’s “own respective liabilities.” Wife appeals and contends that the trial court erred in failing to properly classify and equitably divide the marital debt and in denying, after first approving, her request for an award of attorney’s fees. She also seeks an award of her fees for legal work on appeal. We modify the judgment as it pertains to the parties’ debt in a way that results in an alimony in solido award to Wife. As additional alimony in solido, we award Wife her reasonable attorney’s fees for work at the trial court level. We further grant Wife’s request for an award of her attorney’s fees incurred for work on appeal as further alimony in solido. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Teresa Holt, et al. The Dollywood Company
Teresa Holt and Archie J. Holt (“Plaintiffs”) sued The Dollywood Company, a joint venture between Dolly Parton Productions, Inc. and Herschend Family Entertainment Corp. (“Defendant”) with regard to injuries Ms. Holt received as a result of her fall on a Dollywood tram. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. After a hearing, the Trial Court granted Defendant summary judgment finding and holding, inter alia, that Ms. Holt’s own negligence was the primary cause of her fall and that Ms. Holt was at least 50% at fault. Plaintiffs appeal to this Court. We find and hold that a reasonable jury could find that Ms. Holt was less than 50% at fault. We, therefore, reverse the Trial Court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Sonya Frances Kelly Rutledge v. Dan Kenneth Kelly
Father was found guilty of five counts of criminal contempt for his failure to pay child support and was sentenced to 50 days in jail. On appeal, Father argues the trial court failed to make the requisite finding regarding his ability to pay. We have determined that the evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt that Father did have the ability to pay the child support obligation, but that the maximum sentence is not appropriate based on the circumstances. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court with modifications to Father’s sentence. We also award Mother attorney fees for this appeal and remand the case to the trial court for a determination of the appropriate amount. |
Robertson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Mavis A. Combs
Decedent’s adult daughter and three adult grandchildren appeal from the trial court’s judgment that the grandchildren are not entitled to survivor pension benefits under decedent’s employee pension plan. Summary judgment was appropriate because there are no genuine issues of material fact and because there exists no legal basis on which to extend survivor pension benefits to the grandchildren. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Millard Burris et al. v. Dexter Watson et al.
This case began when the original plaintiffs filed a complaint to quiet title seeking a declaration of the boundary line separating their land from the defendants’ neighboring property. The disputed line is the northern boundary of the plaintiffs and the southern boundary of the defendants. The defendants asserted in their answer that they had adversely possessed the disputed property. Shortly after this action was filed, the plaintiffs’ property was sold to a third party in a court-ordered sale. The purchaser was substituted as the sole plaintiff in place and instead of the original plaintiffs. The defendants moved that the case be dismissed on the ground that the sale to the new owner was champertous. The court denied the motion and conducted a trial on the merits after which it entered judgment in favor of the remaining plaintiff. The defendants appeal. We affirm. |
Monroe | Court of Appeals | |
Norma Simpson, Individually and next of kin of J. W. Simpson v. Faye Fowler, et al.
This is an appeal from the trial court’s order, setting aside certain transfers by decedent to Appellant. Decedent and Appellee were married, but had been separated for over twenty years. Before his death, Decedent transferred certain property to his paramour, the Appellant herein. When Decedent died, Appellee, his surviving, but estranged spouse petitioned the court to set aside the transfers to Appellant under Tennessee Code Annotated Section 31-1-105. The trial court made certain findings from the bench, but the trial court did not incorporate these oral findings into its order as required under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 52.01, and specifically made no finding that Decedent acted fraudulently or with intent to deprive Appellee of her share of the estate as required for application of Tennessee Code Annotated Section 31-1-105. Accordingly, we vacate and remand to the trial court for further proceedings. |
Obion | Court of Appeals | |
James Lynch, Sr. v. Cleon Portis
The trial court awarded summary judgment to Defendant on Plaintiff’s claim for property damages arising from a motor vehicle collision, finding that Plaintiff did not own the vehicle allegedly damaged. On appeal, Plaintiff asserts the trial court erred by awarding summary judgment to Defendant where ownership of the vehicle is a genuine issue of material fact. We reverse the award of summary judgment and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Ruth Meadows, et al. v. James W. Smith
The dispute in this case is between siblings over whether an express trust was created at or before the mother, after the father's death, deeded the remainder of the parents' property to four of the children. Plaintiffs claim the four defendants created an oral express trust by agreeing to share the farm equally among all the children upon the mother's death. The Trial Court granted defendants summary judgment and plaintiffs have appealed. We vacate the Trial Court's Judgment on the grounds that there is disputed material evidence as to whether or not an express trust was created among the parties. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Estate of Sidney Wes Jenkins
Claimant, the wife of decedent, filed a claim against his estate claiming that she loaned her husband monies over time, and his estate was indebted to her for the amount of the loans. The Trial Court heard testimony on the claim, and held that claimant failed to meet her burden of proof to establish that she had loaned monies to her husband. Claimant appealed, and we affirm the Trial Judge on the ground that the evidence does not preponderate against the Trial Court's factual determinations. |
McMinn | Court of Appeals |
