Griffith Services Drilling, LLC, et al. v. Arrow Gas & Oil, Inc.
Griffith Services Drilling, LLC (“Griffith”) and Lexington Insurance Company, Griffith’s insurance company, sued Arrow Gas & Oil, Inc. (“Arrow”) for property damage caused by a fire that occurred while Arrow was refueling a drilling rig operated by Griffith in Anderson County, Tennessee (“the Drilling Site”). Arrow answered the complaint and counterclaimed for breach of contract based upon Griffith’s refusal to pay for the fuel delivered by Arrow on the day of the fire. Arrow also filed a motion to dismiss for spoliation, which the Circuit Court for Anderson County (“the Trial Court”) granted dismissing Griffith’s claims against Arrow. Arrow then filed a motion for summary judgment on its counterclaim, which the Trial Court granted in part. Griffith appeals to this Court raising issues regarding the dismissal of their claims and the grant of summary judgment to Arrow. We find and hold that both Griffith and Arrow were guilty of spoliation, and, therefore, that dismissal of Griffith’s claims was not an appropriate sanction. We vacate the dismissal of Griffith’s claims against Arrow and reinstate them. Because the Trial Court granted Arrow summary judgment based upon its decision on the issue of spoliation, and we have vacated the Trial Court’s decision on the issue of spoliation, we also vacate the grant of summary judgment to Arrow. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Winfred Errol Ankton v. Chandranita Michelle Ankton
The parties to this action were divorced in Shelby County, Tennessee in 2002. The parties had one child together during the marriage. Pursuant to the original parenting plan, Mother had primary custody of the child. Father remarried and moved to Arkansas in 2003. In 2003, Father brought an action in the trial court charging Mother with contempt and petitioning the court to award him custody of the child. The trial court granted Father’s petition, and the child moved to Arkansas to live with Father. In 2012, Father was granted permission by the court to relocate to Texas with the child. In 2013, Mother brought this action in the trial court charging Father with contempt and petitioning the court to award her custody of the child once again. The trial court dismissed Mother’s petitions, ruling that Tennessee no longer had exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over custody issues related to the child. On appeal, we affirm the trial court’s ruling. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Frank W. Wilson, et al. v. TMBC, LLC
The plaintiff took his bass fishing boat to defendant’s business for it to repair a “rodbox lid” that did not fit properly. While the boat was there, defendant replaced the lid. Subsequently, plaintiff went to the defendant’s store and got in the boat, which was on a trailer in the parking lot, in order to examine the new lid. While attempting to exit the boat, plaintiff caught his foot on something, tripped, and fell out of the boat. Plaintiff’s theory was that an employee of the defendant had negligently left the old rodbox lid inside the boat and that plaintiff tripped over the old lid. At the close of plaintiff’s proof, defendant moved for a directed verdict, arguing that plaintiff failed to prove breach of duty because, according to defendant, he offered no evidence of the object that caused his fall; and defendant could not, as a matter of law, be liable because plaintiff was at least 50% at fault for his injuries. The trial court directed a verdict for defendant. We hold that plaintiff presented sufficient proof that the old lid caused him to trip and fall, and that a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the employee had negligently caused plaintiff’s injury. We further hold that the question of comparative fault is properly for the jury to decide under the proof presented at this trial. We therefore vacate the directed verdict and remand for further proceedings. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
In Re A Transfer Of Structured Settlement Payment Rights By Laurel J. Shanks
The respondent financial services company appeals the trial court’s entry of an order approving a transfer of the payee’s structured settlement payment rights to the petitioner financial services company and its assignee, pursuant to Tennessee’s Structured Settlement Protection Act (“SPPA”). See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 47-18-2601 to 2607 (2013). The trial court found that the transfer at issue met all statutory requirements. On appeal, the respondent company raises the issue of whether the transfer order contravened two prior court orders partially transferring the payee’s structured settlement payment rights to the respondent and if so, whether this contravened applicable law under the SSPA. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
Ashley Purdy v. Matthew C. Smith
This case involves the difficult issue of disestablishment of paternity and its effect on child support arrears. Over a year after the trial court entered an order requiring the respondent to pay child support, he requested Rule 60 relief on the grounds that he was not the biological father of the child. Based upon the statutory prohibition against the retroactive modification of child support and the related caselaw, we must affirm the trial court’s decision denying the respondent Rule 60 relief for any time period prior to the filing of his petition. |
Wayne | Court of Appeals | |
Summer Ann-Michelle MIller v. Richard Anthony McFarland
In this post-divorce modification of alimony case,Husband contends that the trial court erred in concluding that his alimony obligation was not subject to modification. We reverse the trial court’s judgment and conclude that Husband’s alimony obligation constitutes transitional alimony that is subject to modification pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 36-5-121(g)(2). Reversed and remanded. |
Robertson | Court of Appeals | |
David Allan Fogle, Sr. v. Mardonna Shawn Fogle
In this divorce action, the trial court granted Wife a divorce, divided the marital assets, and awarded Wife alimony of $700 per month for 48 months. Wife appeals. We modify the trial court’s judgment to reflect an award of periodic alimony in the amount of $1,000 per month. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
Barbara G. Lovejoy v. Department of Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities
This is an appeal from an order dismissing a petition for judicial review of a decision of the Tennessee Civil Service Commission. Because the appellant did not file her notice of appeal with the trial court clerk within the time permitted by Tenn. R. App. P. 4, we dismiss the appeal. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Kaitlynne D
The circuit court adjudicated the child dependent and neglected on the ground of severe child abuse by her father. The father appeals contending the evidence is insufficient to sustain a finding of severe child abuse. Finding the evidence clear and convincing, we affirm. |
Coffee | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Serenity B.
In this termination of parental rights proceeding, both Mother and Father maintain that the trial court erred in finding clear and convincing evidence that they willfully abandoned the child by failure to visit within the four months preceding the filing of the termination petition. Mother additionally claims that the trial court erred in finding clear and convincing evidence that it is in the best interest of the child to terminate Mother’s parental rights. We affirm the trial court’s findings that both parents abandoned the child by willfully failing to visit and that the termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the child’s best interest. Consequently, we affirm the trial court’s decision to terminate the parental rights of both parents. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
Arlena Tippie v. Tennessee Department of Revenue, Et Al
Former revenue enforcement officer challenges her termination from the Tennessee Department of Revenue. Because substantial and material evidence supports the Civil Service Commission’s decision, we affirm the chancery court’s judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Scott McIllwain, et al. v. Michael Scott Hoover, et al.
Former revenue enforcement officer challenges her termination from the Tennessee Department of Revenue. Because substantial and material evidence supports the Civil Service Commission’s decision, we affirm the chancery court’s judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Gerald Rogers, Next of Kin of Vicki L. Rogers v. Paul Jackson, M. D., Et Al
Defendants in a health care liability action appeal the denial of their motions to strike the allegations of comparative fault raised in the amended answer of other defendants and their motions to dismiss the amended complaint. Finding no error, we affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Daniel H. Jones v. Robert H. Montgomery, Jr., Et Al.
The order from which the pro se incarcerated appellant seeks to appeal was entered on December 13, 2013. The Notice of Appeal was filed more than thirty (30) days from the date of entry of the December 13, 2013 order, even considering the date upon which the appellant placed the Notice of Appeal in the mail for filing with the trial court clerk (February 28, 2014). See Tenn. R. App. P. 20(g). Because the Notice of Appeal was not timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
Jerry Wynn v. Dana Wynn
The order appealed is not a final judgment and therefore, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. |
Gibson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Donovyn B. H.
The juvenile court set aside its parental visitation order with respect to a child born to married parents as void for lack of jurisdiction. Mother appeals. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Delores Blackmon, et al. v. Illinois Central Railroad Company, et al.
Plaintiff filed this lawsuit pursuant to the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, alleging that her husband was exposed to toxic substances, including asbestos and other chemicals, during his employment with the defendant railroad and that such exposure led to his death from mesothelioma. The railroad filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the deceased employee had executed a release, when he settled previous litigation with the railroad, which served to bar the current litigation. The trial court granted the railroad’s motion for summary judgment based on the release. We reverse and remand for further proceedings. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Club LeConte v. Caroline Swann
This appeal arises from a dispute concerning the payment for Defendant’s wedding reception. Plaintiff filed suit when Defendant failed to pay for the reception as agreed. At trial, Plaintiff presented theories of breach of contract and unjust enrichment. The jury found for Plaintiff and returned a verdict against Defendant in the amount of $10,787.18. On appeal, Defendant requests reversal of the judgment entered against her because she believes that the jury verdict form erroneously allowed for recovery pursuant to both theories of breach of contract and unjust enrichment. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Elisha Michelle (Cantrell) Dickerson v. Johnathan Bradley Cantrell
This post-divorce appeal concerns the modification of a parenting plan designating Mother as the primary residential parent and awarding Father reasonable visitation. Father filed a petition to modify, claiming that a material change in circumstances necessitated a change in the parenting plan. Following a hearing, the trial court designated Father as the primary residential parent and awarded Mother visitation. Mother appeals. We affirm the trial court’s decision. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Anna May Diggs, et al. v. Reneese Carter, et al.
The trial court awarded summary judgment to Defendant in this will contest. We affirm. |
Carroll | Court of Appeals | |
Philip H. Morson v. Tennessee Department of Mental Health And Developmental Disabilities, Et Al.
A doctor employed by a state mental health facility lost his job in a reduction in force. He claims this action was the result of complaints he made about the facility. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Because the doctor failed to present evidence to establish an issue of material fact (after the defendants shifted the burden to the doctor), we affirm the trial court’s decision. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Daven S. L.
Father of one child appeals the termination of his parental rights on the grounds of abandonment by wilful failure to support and visit and the finding that termination of his parental rights would be in the child’s best interest. Finding no error we affirm. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
In Re D.W.M., Jr.
This appeal involves termination of parental rights. While she was pregnant, the mother of the child at issue made threats to harm herself and the unborn child. Both of the parents are mentally impaired. The mother has other serious disorders as well, and the father is a registered sex offender. The state took the child into protective custody four days after the child was born. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of both parents on grounds of mental incompetence and persistent conditions. After a trial, the trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that the Department of Children’s Services had established grounds for termination and that termination of parental rights was in the child’s best interest. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
David Ray Hoggatt v. Lori Ann Hoggatt
The divorce in this case brought to an end the thirteen-year marriage of David Ray Hoggatt (“Husband”) and Lori Ann Hoggatt (“Wife”). The trial court classified, valued, and distributed the parties’ property. On this appeal, Husband challenges aspects of the division of marital property. We modify the amount that the trial court ordered Wife to pay Husband in the property division. In all other respects, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
David Ray Hoggatt v. Lori Ann Hoggatt - Dissenting
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion affirming the trial court’s division of the marital property as modified by the majority. I believe the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s property division, even as modified by the majority, as being an equitable division of the marital property. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals |
