Rebecca Webb v. Mark Thomas Webb
Father appeals the trial court’s amended judgment in this divorce action. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Bedford | Court of Appeals | |
Wal-Mart Stores East, L. P. v. North Edgefield Organized Neighbors, Inc.
This appeal arises from a Complaint to Quiet Title and for Declaratory Relief filed by WalMart Stores East, L.P. Pursuant to a 2008 Quitclaim Deed, Wal-Mart conveyed, subject to a reversion clause, a one-quarter acre parcel to the defendant upon which stood a 1930’s era Fire Hall. The reversion clause states, in pertinent part, that fee-simple ownership of the property shall revert to Wal-Mart in the event the improvements are subject to any casualty. “Casualty” is defined in the deed to include a fire that results in damage to all or substantially all of the Fire Hall or damage that is not repaired within 180 days after the occurrence of such casualty. It is undisputed that substantially all of the Fire Hall was damaged following a fire that occurred on December 1, 2011. This action ensued, and Wal-Mart subsequently filed a motion for summary judgement contending fee-simple title reverted to Wal-Mart due to the December 2011 casualty. The defendant did not dispute the fact that substantially all of the Fire Hall was damaged by the fire; nevertheless, the defendant opposed the motion on the basis that the term “casualty,” as defined in the deed, is ambiguous. The trial court concluded as a matter of law that the term “casualty” was clear and unambiguous, that the damage resulting from the December 2011 fire constituted a casualty, and that the property reverted back to Wal-Mart. Therefore, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the petitioner. The defendant appeals. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Estate of Charles W. McGinnis
George E. Copple, Jr., and Suzette Peyton, attorneys who represented the administrator of the decedent’s probate estate, appeal from an order of the trial court holding them personally liable for expenses incurred by a non-party in responding to a subpoena duces tecum. One year after the subpoena was issued and the expenses were incurred by non-party Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., to comply with the subpoena, the attorneys for the administrator of the estate filed a motion to withdraw. Merrill Lynch did not object to the motion to withdraw, but did file a response requesting that its expenses to comply with the subpoena be assessed against the attorneys personally. The trial court granted leave to withdraw; however, the court did not relieve the attorneys as sureties for “costs to date including and limited to $776.00 incurred by Merrill Lynch in the reproduction of materials produced by Merrill Lynch to counsel for the Administrator.” In its order, the trial court stated that its ruling was based upon the record as a whole, including, but not limited to, Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 45. No other authority was cited in the order. The attorneys appeal. Being unable to identify any authority upon which to hold the attorneys personally liable for the expense of a non-party to comply with a subpoena duces tecum, we reverse. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Kristina Morris v. Jimmy Phillips, et al.
A multi-vehicle accident occurred in August 2010. The plaintiff initially named only one of the drivers involved in the accident along with the record owner of the driver’s vehicle. The record owner filed an answer identifying three other drivers/tortfeasors involved in the accident in December 2011,and the driver identified the same three individuals as tortfeasors in his answer that was filed seven months later, in July 2012. The plaintiff did not file an amended complaint adding the individuals identified as defendants until August2012, which was more than 90 days after the first answer was filed. One of the individuals named as a defendant filed a motion to dismiss, arguing the plaintiff waited too late to add her as a defendant. The trial court denied the motion. The late-added defendant appealed, and we reverse the trial court’s judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
William Lane Lanier v. Corie J. Dizol (F/K/A Lanier)
Court in post-divorce modification of custody action dismissed Mother’s motion to alter or amend the order adopting parenting plan proposed by Father, holding that the motion was unsigned and not promptly corrected as allowed by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 11.01. Having determined that the motion was properly signed, we reverse the trial court’s decision and remand the case for consideration of the motion. |
Marshall | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, on Relation of the Commissioner of Transportation v. E.G. Meek, et al
This appeal arises from a condemnation action. The State of Tennessee (“the State”) acquired real property owned by E. G. Meek (“Meek”) and Shirley T. Meek. The acquisition of the property is not at issue. Rather, the dispute is over the amount of money Meek is entitled to receive from the State. This case was tried before a jury in the Circuit Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”). Meek and the State’s expert witness testified. The jury reached, and the Trial Court approved, a verdict for $15,250. Meek had sought considerably more money at trial for his property than the $15,250 awarded by the jury. On appeal, Meek alleges numerous errors, such as that the Trial Court erroneously allowed certain evidence to be admitted and that the Trial Judge failed to properly exercise his responsibility as thirteenth juror. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Karen Renae Aleo v. Joe Weyant
Client sued her former attorney for legal malpractice, breach of contract, and negligent infliction of emotional distress arising from the attorney’s failure to include in the marital dissolution agreement, prepared for the client and incorporated into Final Divorce Decree, provisions that would permit the client to receive one-half of her husband’s military pension and to be listed as the beneficiary of his Survivor Benefit Plan following their divorce. The trial court granted summary judgment to the attorney on the grounds that the statute of limitations had passed on the malpractice and the breach of contract claims and that the evidence did not support a finding of serious mental injurysufficient to support the negligent infliction of emotional distress claim; client appeals. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Rebecca J.R.M.
The State of Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition seeking to terminate the parental rights of Christopher W.C. (“Father”) to the minor child Rebecca J.R.M. (“the Child”). After a trial, the Juvenile Court entered its judgment finding and holding, inter alia, that clear and convincing evidence was proven that grounds existed to terminate Father’s parental rights to the Child pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-113 (g)(2) and (g)(9)(A), and that clear and convincing evidence was proven that it was in the Child’s best interest for Father’s parental rights to be terminated. Father appeals to this Court. We affirm the termination of Father’s parental rights to the Child. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Aretha Moss v. Shelby County Division of Corrections, et al.
Petitioner/Appellant was terminated from her position with the Shelby County Division of Corrections for violating the Division’s Standards of Conduct and for untruthfulness. The Civil Service Merit Board affirmed. On appeal, the Chancery Court for Shelby County affirmed the Board’s decision. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Ike J. White, III v. David A. Beeks, M.D.
This appeal involves the question of whether the trial court properly limited a medical expert’s testimony at trial regarding the standard of care in an informed consent health care liability action. In the case at bar, the defendant filed a motion in limine seeking to limit the testimony of the plaintiff’s expert at trial regarding risks that should have been disclosed to the plaintiff to only those risks that actually resulted in injury. The trial court granted the motion. A jury trial was held, and the jury found in favor of the defendant. Plaintiff appeals, asserting that the trial court committed reversible error when it restricted the ability of the plaintiff’s medical expert to testify about other known risks. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Ike J. White, III v. David A. Beeks, M.D. - Dissenting
I respectfully dissent from the decision of the majority to affirm the Trial Court. I believe the Trial Court did commit reversible error when it limited Plaintiff’s medical expert’s testimony at trial regarding the standard of care in this health care liability informed consent action. Specifically, I do not believe that the Plaintiff’s expert’s testimony on what risks should have been disclosed to the Plaintiff to meet the acceptable standard of care for informed consent should have been limited to disclosure of only those risks that actually came to pass. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Ike J. White, III v. David A. Beeks, M.D. - Concurring
I concur in the majority opinion. I write separately to further address the causation aspect of the trial court’s rationale in excluding portions of Dr. Law’s testimony. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Jonathan Burke Skelton v. Freese Construction Company, Inc.
This appeal involves the enforceability of an arbitration agreement between the parties. The trial court found the agreement was not unconscionable, but that the defendant had waived its right to enforce the agreement. We reverse the decision of the chancery court and we remand for entry of an order compelling arbitration. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: David L. R. et al
The parents of six children appeal the termination of their parental rights. The trial court terminated the parental rights of both parents on two grounds, substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans and persistence of conditions, and the determination that termination of both parents rights was in the best interests of the children. We affirm. |
Lawrence | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Jacobe M.J.
This is a termination of parental rights case. Father appeals the trial court's termination of his parental rights on the ground of abandonment by willful failure to visit and willful failure to support pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Sections 36-1-113(g)(1) and 36-1102(1)(A)(i). We conclude that the ground of abandonment by willful failure to visit and willful failure to support is met by clear and convincing evidence in the record, and that there is also clear and convincing evidence that termination of Father's parental rights is in the child's best interest. Affirmed and remanded. |
Putnam | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Trinity M. H.
Grandparents were awarded custody of Child after a dependency and neglect finding. Grandparents later filed petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights and to adopt Child. The trial court terminated Mother’s rights after concluding Mother abandoned Child and that it was in Child’s best interest for Mother’s rights to be terminated. The evidence supports the trial court’s finding by clear and convincing evidence that Mother abandoned Child by failing to visit her in the four months leading up to Grandparents’ petition, but the evidence is not clear and convincing that it is in Child’s best interest that Mother’s rights be terminated. |
Marshall | Court of Appeals | |
Kim Brown v. Gossett Kia-Hyundai South d/b/a Gossett Kia South and Gossett Hyundai South
Appellant filed his Notice of Appeal of an order of the trial court which failed to adjudicate all claims. We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Charles Haynes v. Formac Stables, Inc.
Plaintiff filed retaliatory discharge suit against his former employer, Defendant. According to his complaint, Defendant’s owner engaged in illegal activity. Plaintiff complained to Defendant’s owner of the illegal activity and was subsequently terminated. The trial court dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint because Plaintiff did not report the illegal activity to any person or entity other than the Defendant’s owner, who was a participant in the illegal activity. Plaintiff contends that where a company’s owner is a participant in illegal activity, reporting the illegal activity solely to the owner should not preclude a retaliatory discharge claim premised on refusal to remain silent. We do not agree and therefore affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s complaint. |
Obion | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Richard Sanford White Living Trust
Because the order appealed is not a final judgment, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
James Bevels, Sr. v. Alma Tubbs and Danny Tubbs, et al.
This appeal involves removal from general sessions court to circuit court. The defendant tenants rented residential property from the plaintiff property owner. The owner filed a civil warrant in general sessions court against the tenants for unpaid rent. The tenants filed an application in the general sessions court to remove the case to circuit court; they asserted that the counterclaim they anticipated filing would exceed the jurisdictional limits of the general sessions court. The general sessions court granted the application for removal, the tenants filed their counterclaim in the circuit court, and the case proceeded in the circuit court for over two years. The circuit court then issued a sua sponte order directing the parties to show cause why the case should not be remanded to the general sessions court, because the removal statute does not apply in that county and because the tenants did not file a cost bond when the case was removed. The tenants objected to the remand on several grounds and alternatively asked the circuit court to retain jurisdiction over the counterclaim even if it remanded the original claim to general sessions court. The circuit court remanded the original claim to general sessions court holding, inter alia, that the tenants failed to file a proper cost bond in connection with the removal. It then held that the counterclaim and all other pleadings filed in the case were “null and void” and dismissed the counterclaim on that basis. The tenants now appeal. We reverse the circuit court’s decision that the tenants failed to file a proper bond, vacate that portion of the circuit court’s order declaring that all proceedings other than the original claim were a nullity, and remand for reconsideration in light of Rules 13.09 and Rule 42.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Jack Stevens v. Karns Volunteer Fire Department
This is a declaratory judgment action in which Plaintiffs sought the return of property that had been donated to the Karns Volunteer Fire Department (“Fire Department”). Plaintiffs alleged that a reversionary clause in the warranty deed had been triggered when Fire Department began paying firefighters and charging subscription fees for its services. The parties filed competing motions for summary judgment. The trial court determined that the reversionary clause had not been triggered and granted Fire Department’s motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs appeal. We affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Patsy R. Cowart, et al v. Linda M. Hammontree
Patsy Reba Cowart, Debbie Buff, and David Buff (collectively “Plaintiffs”) sued Linda M. Hammontree to establish a boundary line and quiet title on a parcel of real property located in McMinn County, Tennessee. Ms. Hammontree answered and filed a counterclaim for trespass and slander of title, among other things. After trial, the Trial Court entered judgment finding and holding, inter alia, that Plaintiffs had superior title to the disputed real property. Ms. Hammontree appeals to this Court raising issues regarding whether the Trial Court erred in finding that Plaintiffs rebutted Ms. Hammontree’s presumption of ownership pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-2-109, and whether the Trial Court erred in dismissing Ms. Hammontree’s claim for slander of title. We find and hold that the evidence preponderates against the finding that Plaintiffs rebutted Ms. Hammontree’s presumption of ownership, but that the Trial Court did not err in dismissing Ms. Hammontree’s claim for slander of title. We reverse, in part, and affirm, in part. |
McMinn | Court of Appeals | |
James Everett Ferrell v. State of Tennessee
This is an appeal from a decision of the Tennessee Claims Commission dismissing a claim filed by James Ferrell alleging that his pickup truck was unlawfully taken from him. The State of Tennessee has filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for failure to file a timely notice of appeal. Claims Commissioner Hibbett entered an order dismissing Mr. Ferrell’s claim on September 24, 2012. Mr. Ferrell filed a Motion to Reconsider that was denied on November 21, 2012. On December 3, 2013, Mr.Ferrell filed a Petition for En Banc Hearing. The Claims Commission denied the Petition for En Banc Hearing on February 26, 2013. Mr. Ferrell then filed a Motion to Reconsider En Banc Denial. The Claims Commission denied the Motion to Reconsider En Banc Denial on March 26, 2013. Mr. Ferrell filed his notice of appeal on April 24, 2013. |
Court of Appeals | ||
Jason Ferrell v. Robert Miller and Kayla Ivey
While the defendant spouses were separated and living in separate counties, the defendant driver fatally shot himself during a police pursuit while driving a Toyota 4Runner vehicle which was to be awarded to him in the defendants’ pending divorce. Said vehicle struck the plaintiff, allegedly causing serious injuries. The plaintiff sued the defendant driver alleging negligence, and he sued the defendant spouse on claims of imputed negligence. Much later, the plaintiff sought to amend his complaint to assert a negligent entrustment claim against the defendant spouse. Because the plaintiff failed to have appointed, to substitute, and to serve an administrator ad litem prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, the trial court dismissed the negligence claims against the deceased defendant driver and the imputed negligence claims against the defendant spouse. It implicitly denied the plaintiff’s motion to amend. We affirm the circuit court’s dismissal of the claims against the deceased defendant driver and its dismissal of the imputed negligence claims against the defendant spouse; however, we remand for consideration of the request to add a negligent entrustment claim against the defendant spouse and for express findings. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
William David Russell v. Mary Beth Russell
In this action, the trial court granted Wife a divorce on fault-based grounds against Husband and awarded $1,500.00 monthly in transitional alimony to Wife for a period of thirty-six months. Husband appeals. Determining the amount of alimony to be beyond Husband’s ability to pay, we modify the transitional alimony award to $1,000.00 monthly to Wife for thirty-six months. We affirm the judgment in all other respects. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals |
