Kimberly A. Sparkman v. Burns Phillips, Commissioner, Tennessee Department of Labor And Workforce Development, and First Tennessee Bank, N. A.
This appeal involves the denial of unemployment compensation benefits. The petitioner was employed by the defendant bank. When the petitioner employee arrived for work, the employee’s supervisor smelled alcohol on her and asked her to take an alcohol test. The employee refused to take the alcohol test, and as a result her employment was terminated. The employee filed for unemployment benefits. The defendant commissioner held that the employee was discharged for work-related misconduct and was disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits,and the denial of benefits was affirmed in the administrative appeals process. The employee then filed the instant lawsuit for judicial review of the administrative decision. The trial court affirmed the agency’s decision, and the petitioner now appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Justin A. H.
This is a petition for dependency and neglect, child support, and breach of contract arising out of an international adoption. The respondent adopted the subject child from Russia. A few months later, after experiencing difficulties with the child, she placed the child on a oneway flight to Russia and sought to annul the adoption. The adoption agency that brokered the adoption filed this lawsuit against the respondent in juvenile court, seeking child support and alleging that the child was dependent and neglected. The juvenile court dismissed the case, and the case was appealed to the circuit court below. On appeal to circuit court, the petition was amended to add the child as a petitioner and to seek child support and damages arising out of the adoption contract. After protracted proceedings, the trial court granted the petitioners’ motion for default judgment against the respondent for failing to file an answer to the petition and failing to cooperate in discovery. The trial court later conducted a hearing on damages, at which the respondent did not appear. The trial court awarded damages to the petitioners and ordered the respondent to pay child support. It later denied the respondent’s motions for post-judgment relief. The respondent now appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Bedford | Court of Appeals | |
Raines Brothers, Inc. v. H. Michael Chitwood et al.
This contract action stems from the defendant’s, H. Michael Chitwood’s, failure to pay for construction work that was performed by the plaintiff, Raines Brothers, Inc. (“Raines”). The work was performed on a home that was occupied by Mr. Chitwood but owned by a trustee, James Dreaden, who was also named as a defendant. Following a bench trial, the trial court awarded Raines a judgment against Mr. Chitwood and Mr. Dreaden (collectively “Defendants”) in the amount of $66,762.71. The trial court also awarded pre-judgment interest at the rate of eighteen percent per annum, beginning August 14, 2007. The trial court denied Raines’s claim for attorney’s fees. Defendants timely appealed the trial court’s ruling. Having determined that Raines adequately proved its entitlement to this amount pursuant to the parties’ contract, we affirm the trial court’s judgment of $66,762.71 against Mr. Chitwood. We reverse the trial court’s judgment against Mr. Dreaden. We modify the trial court’s award of the rate of interest from eighteen percent per annum to ten percent in accordance with relevant statutory and case law. We also reverse the trial court’s denial of Raines’s claim for attorney’s fees pursuant to the parties’ contract and remand for a determination of the proper amount of interest to be charged, as well as a reasonable award of attorney’s fees. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Doyle S. Silliman, et al. v. City of Memphis
In this case, we are called upon to review the trial court’s decision to set aside a consent order regarding an annexation on the basis of the subsequent passage of legislation allegedly affecting the agreed-upon annexation. Because we conclude that Tennessee Code Annotated Section 6-51-122 does not apply to prohibit the annexation ordinance at issue, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and reinstate the consent order. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Estate of Mary Lou Lamb v. D. Jimmy Brinias, et al.
The Estate of Mary Lou Lamb appeals a grant of summary judgment to defendant Ernest L. Joyner raising issues regarding whether the Chancery Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”) erred in finding that the plaintiff’s response to the defendant’s motion for summary judgment was filed untimely and therefore was not considered by the Trial Court, and whether the Trial Court erred in granting summary judgment on the issue of adverse possession. We find and hold: (1) that the Trial Court did not err in finding that the plaintiff’s response was filed untimely; and (2) that Ernest L. Joyner failed to show that he was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. We vacate the grant of summary |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Capital Bank v. Oscar Brock, et al.
Capital Bank filed a complaint seeking a deficiency judgment against Oscar Brock and Frank E. Cowden, III (“Defendants”) after they defaulted on a loan and following the sale at foreclosure of the property securing the debt. After settlement discussions were unsuccessful, Capital Bank moved for summary judgment. It asserted that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that it is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Defendants contested the motion but only as to the amount of the deficiency and the issue of whether Capital Bank is entitled to an award of attorney’s fees. As a defense to the deficiency claim, Defendants stated that the property was sold at foreclosure for an amount “materially less” than its fair market value and that Capital Bank’s knowledge of the alleged less-than- arketvalue sales price amounted to fraud, collusion or misconduct. The trial court granted Capital Bank’s motion. It was awarded a judgment of $168,798.98 which amount includes 70,628.85 in attorney’s fees. Defendants appeal. We affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
In re: Kiara C.
This is a termination of parental rights case, focusing on Kiara C., the minor child (“Child”) of Mark C. (“Father”) and Pamela B. (“Mother”). On April 9, 2012, Mother and Mother’s husband, Richard B. (“Stepfather”), filed a petition for termination of Father’s parental rights and adoption of the Child by Stepfather. Following a bench trial, the trial court granted the petition for termination upon its finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that Father had abandoned the Child by willfully failing to visit her and willfully failing to provide financial support in the four months preceding the filing of the petition. The court further found, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the Child’s best interest. Father has appealed. We affirm. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
Brittany Evans, by and through her attorney-in-fact, Mary Evans, her natural mother, v. Jennifer Williams, et al.
This is a health care liability action appeal. The case was tried before a jury, resulting in a judgment for the defendant physicians. The trial court excluded the testimony of one of the plaintiff’s expert witnesses on the applicable standard of care after finding that he was not qualified under the locality rule. The plaintiff appealed to this Court arguing, among other things, that the trial court erred in its application of the locality rule. We hold that it was error for the trial court to exclude the witness, but find that any error was harmless under the facts of this case. We therefore affirm. |
Gibson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Jane Kathryn Ross et al.
This is the second appeal of an action to recover, under either the theoryof unjust enrichment or a resulting trust, the value of improvements paid by the plaintiff for a house constructed on her son’s property. The plaintiff paid the construction costs to build a new home on her son’s land for both of them to reside. This action was commenced when the son refused to put his mother’s name on the deed after the house was constructed. Following the first trial, the trial court found that the plaintiff never intended to convey an inter vivos gift to her son, and, after considering the plaintiff’s alternative claims for relief, the court established a resulting trust in favor of the plaintiff in the amount of $417,000. In the first appeal, we ruled that a resulting trust was not an available remedy and remanded for further proceedings. On remand, the trial court awarded the estate a judgment against the son based on unjust enrichment. The son appeals again, this time contending the estate waived its unjust enrichment claim in the first appeal and that the estate did not prove the value of the improvements. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Susan Taylor Moore v. John Thomas Taylor
This is the second appeal in this divorce action. Husband appealed from the Final Decree of Divorce in 2012, and we affirmed the trial court in all respects in an opinion filed by this court on May 30, 2013. While the appeal was pending, the parties filed several motions in the trial court regarding a variety of financial obligations arising from the Final Decree of Divorce. Following one hearing, the trial court modified the division of the marital property; however, in our opinion which was filed a week earlier, we affirmed the division of the marital estate. Wife now appeals that ruling, and she raises several issues regarding, inter alia, the division of marital property, alimony, attorney’s fees, and civil contempt. Finding the trial court erred in modifying the division of the marital estate after we had affirmed that decision, we reverse that modification. As for all other issues raised, we affirm. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Jeannie McFarland v. Brandon Bass
Mother of two children appeals the denial of her petition to modify the parenting plan, the increase of her child support obligation, and the award of attorney fees to the Father. We reverse the increase in Mother’s child support obligation; we affirm the judgment in all other respects. |
Giles | Court of Appeals | |
National Door & Hardware Installers, Inc. v. Hassan Mirsaidi et al.
A subcontractor filed this breach of contract action to recover damages against a general contractor for two types of damages: work performed but unpaid and damages resulting from delays caused bythe general contractor.The plaintiff alleged the general contractor breached the contract by failing to make the appropriate progress payments and otherwise withholding payments without cause. It further alleged that the general contractor failed to properly supervise the project and failed to maintain proper working conditions on the job site which caused the construction to drag on for nine months beyond the agreed-upon completion date. While suit was pending, the general contractor was terminated by the owner and a different contractor was hired to complete the project; the new contractor hired the plaintiff to complete the job. The plaintiff completed its work for which it was paid more than the balance owing on the subcontract.Following a bench trial,the courtfound the former general contractor had breached the subcontract but the plaintiff had failed to prove damages flowing from these breaches. The trial court specifically determined that the subcontractor recouped its damages for work performed but unpaid through the completion subcontract, and that it did not prove damages flowing from the delay of construction. The plaintiff appeals. Having determined that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings, we affirm the trial court in all respects. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Mike Locke and Cvan Avian v. The Estate of David Rose
After the death of David Rose, his two putative non-marital sons became involved in three separate lawsuits related to the proper distribution of his property. When Mr. Rose’s Executrix filed to probate his Will in solemn form, the putative sons, who were named residuary beneficiaries, objected, but later withdrew their objection. They then filed suit to set aside a 2006 Trust Agreement in order to reinstate prior trusts, the assets of which were to be distributed to Mr. Rose’s issue at his death. They also filed a separate lawsuit to establish Mr. Rose as their biological father. Their attempts to obtain some of their father’s assets were all unsuccessful. In all three cases, the trial court held that they were barred from establishing a father-son relationship because their attempts were time barred. We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the sons’ petition to establish paternity filed in the probate case two years after the order admitting the will to probate. However, we reverse the trial court’s dismissal of the petitioners’ complaint challenging the validity of the 2006 Trust Agreement because they have standing to attempt to establish that they are “issue” of Mr. Rose. The deadline imposed by the trial court applied only “for purposes of intestate succession,” and the trust case did not involve inheritance through the statute regarding heirs of a person dying without a will. Mr. Rose had a will, which was probated. Any assets to be distributed to Mr. Locke and Mr. Avian from the preexisting trust(s) would be pursuant to the terms of the trust document(s), not pursuant to intestate succession. For the purpose of establishing their interest in the prior trust(s), the purported children were entitled to present proof that they were the children of Mr. Rose and were not time barred. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Mike Locke and Cvan Avian v. The Estate of Thomas W. Schlater, et al. - Dissenting in Part and Concurring in Part
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the plaintiffs are not time barred to establish that they have standing to contest David Rose’s 2006 Trust Agreement. I fully concur with the affirmance of the dismissal of the other underlying cases. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
David N. Halbrooks v. Jacobus Marinus Durieux
Holder of easement (dominant estate) brought suit against owner of land (servient estate) alleging interference with his use of the easement by the servient estate’s construction of a building on the easement. The trial court found that the servient estate’s actions did not constitute unreasonable interference with the dominant estate’s use of the easement for ingress and egress. Because the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings, we affirm. |
Hickman | Court of Appeals | |
Mike Locke and Cvan Avian v. The Estate of David Rose - Dissenting in Part and Concurring in Part
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the plaintiffs are not time barred to establish that they have standing to contest David Rose’s 2006 Trust Agreement. I fully concur with the affirmance of the dismissal of the other underlying cases. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Mike Locke and Cvan Avian v. The Estate of Thomas W. Schlater, et al.
After the death of David Rose, his two putative non-marital sons became involved in three separate lawsuits related to the proper distribution of his property. When Mr. Rose’s Executrix filed to probate his Will in solemn form, the putative sons, who were named residuary beneficiaries, objected, but later withdrew their objection. They then filed suit to set aside a 2006 Trust Agreement in order to reinstate prior trusts, the assets of which were to be distributed to Mr. Rose’s issue at his death. They also filed a separate lawsuit to establish Mr. Rose as their biological father. Their attempts to obtain some of their father’s assets were all unsuccessful. In all three cases, the trial court held that they were barred from establishing a father-son relationship because their attempts were time barred. We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the sons’ petition to establish paternity filed in the probate case two years after the order admitting the will to probate. However, we reverse the trial court’s dismissal of the petitioners’ complaint challenging the validity of the 2006 Trust Agreement because they have standing to attempt to establish that they are “issue” of Mr. Rose. The deadline imposed by the trial court applied only “for purposes of intestate succession,” and the trust case did not involve inheritance through the statute regarding heirs of a person dying without a will. Mr. Rose had a will, which was probated. Any assets to be distributed to Mr. Locke and Mr. Avian from the preexisting trust(s) would be pursuant to the terms of the trust document(s), not pursuant to intestate succession. For the purpose of establishing their interest in the prior trust(s), the purported children were entitled to present proof that they were the children of Mr. Rose and were not time barred. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Mike Locke and Cvan Avian v. The Estate of David Rose - Dissenting in Part and Concurring in Part
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the plaintiffs are not time barred to establish that they have standing to contest David Rose’s 2006 Trust Agreement. I fully concur with the affirmance of the dismissal of the other underlying cases. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Mike Locke and Cvan Avian v. The Estate of David Rose
After the death of David Rose, his two putative non-marital sons became involved in three separate lawsuits related to the proper distribution of his property. When Mr. Rose’s Executrix filed to probate his Will in solemn form, the putative sons, who were named residuary beneficiaries, objected, but later withdrew their objection. They then filed suit to set aside a 2006 Trust Agreement in order to reinstate prior trusts, the assets of which were to be distributed to Mr. Rose’s issue at his death. They also filed a separate lawsuit to establish Mr. Rose as their biological father. Their attempts to obtain some of their father’s assets were all unsuccessful. In all three cases, the trial court held that they were barred from establishing a father-son relationship because their attempts were time barred. We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the sons’ petition to establish paternity filed in the probate case two years after the order admitting the will to probate. However, we reverse the trial court’s dismissal of the petitioners’ complaint challenging the validity of the 2006 Trust Agreement because they have standing to attempt to establish that they are “issue” of Mr. Rose. The deadline imposed by the trial court applied only “for purposes of intestate succession,” and the trust case did not involve inheritance through the statute regarding heirs of a person dying without a will. Mr. Rose had a will, which was probated. Any assets to be distributed to Mr. Locke and Mr. Avian from the preexisting trust(s) would be pursuant to the terms of the trust document(s), not pursuant to intestate succession. For the purpose of establishing their interest in the prior trust(s), the purported children were entitled to present proof that they were the children of Mr. Rose and were not time barred. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
James E. Whalen, et al v. Quint Bourgeois
This action arose over the sale of improved real property (“the Property”), consisting of approximately twenty-five acres located in Morgan County, Tennessee. Co-plaintiffs, James E. and Karen M. Whalen, entered into an agreement to purchase the Property from the defendant, Quint Bourgeois. The Whalens subsequently entered into an agreement with coplaintiffs, Alan and Kathleen Bone, to borrow the purchase price of the Property in return for an executed promissory note, secured by a deed of trust. The parties closed the purchase and sale of the Property on January 19, 2012, at the Roane County office of US Title of Tennessee, Inc. (“US Title”). On January 20, 2012, Mr. Bourgeois, upset that he had not received $900.00 in rent he believed the Whalens owed him, returned to the US Title office and convinced staff there to accept his uncashed check from the sale and give him the unrecorded deed. The plaintiffs filed this action against Mr. Bourgeois, ultimately amending their complaint to allege breach of contract, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, and intentional interference with contractual relations. Following a bench 1 trial, the trial court found that Mr. Bourgeois had committed the tort of intentional interference with the |
Morgan | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Harli B.
Father appeals the modification of the primary residential plan and specifically the designation of Mother as the primary residential parent of the parties’five-year-old daughter. In 2010, Father was designated as the primary residential parent of their two-year old child and the parents were awarded equal and shared parenting time based on an alternating weekly schedule. Over the next two years, the employment and marital status of each parent changed and Mother had three additional children. Based on these changes, Mother filed a petition in July 2012 to modify the primary residential plan requesting that she be designated as the primary residential parent. Finding, inter alia, that Mother was no longer employed, that she worked in the home caring for the parties’ child as well as her three younger children who were born after the initial plan went into effect, and that she had been acting as the de facto primary residential parent, the court granted Mother’s petition and designated her as the primary residential parent. We affirm. |
Dickson | Court of Appeals | |
William H. Thomas, Jr. v. Tennessee Department of Transportation
This appeal arises from a petition for judicial review of the Tennessee Department of Transportation’s decision to deny the petitioner’s applications for billboard permits. Discerning no error, we affirm the chancery court’s decision upholding the Department’s denial. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
George Hutsell v. Jeff Kenley D/B/A Trademark Investments
This case presents issues regarding the propriety of the trial court’s rulings on evidentiary issues as well as a motion for directed verdict. The plaintiff sustained damages when his personalty, which was stored in a warehouse owned by the defendant, was subjected to water damage after the roof of the warehouse collapsed. The plaintiff filed the instant action seeking compensatory damages for the value of his damaged property. Prior to trial, the trial court ruled that the plaintiff could present evidence that the defendant also filed a claim with respect to his own damaged property stored in the warehouse. The trial court ruled, however, that the defendant would not be allowed to present evidence regarding the profitability of the plaintiff’s business. During the three-day trial, the defendant made a motion for directed verdict that was denied by the trial court. Following deliberations, the jury returned a verdict, finding the defendant to be 100% liable for the plaintiff’s loss and awarding damages to the plaintiff of $325,000. The defendant filed a renewed motion for directed verdict, a motion for new trial, and a motion for remittitur. All of the post-trial motions were denied by the trial court. The defendant appeals. Having determined that the trial court committed reversible error by allowing the plaintiff to present prejudicial evidence regarding the defendant’s own claim for damages, we vacate the jury’s award and remand for a new trial. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
Steven Barrick and Janice Barrick v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company and Thomas Harry Jones
This appeal arises from a trial court’s judgment granting State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (“State Farm”) and Agent Thomas Harry Jones’ motion for summary judgment and dismissing the Barricks’ action for negligence and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. The Barricks held automobile insurance coverage through State Farm, with Thomas Jones as their agent, from 1985 until 2009, and their coverage limits remained the same throughout this period. The Barricks sued, claiming State Farm and Jones had a duty of care to advise the Barricks of their need for increased coverage. The Barricks now appeal, arguing the trial court erred in dismissing their claims. We affirm the trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment regarding the negligence claim. We reverse the trial court’s judgment based on the assumption of duty, which the trial court did not directly address, and the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act claims, since State Farm and Mr. Jones cannot meet their burden under Hannan v. Alltel Publ'g Co., 270 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Tenn. 2008), in these claims. We also reverse the trial court’s summary judgment in favor of State Farm for vicarious liability and failure to supervise in regard to the alleged assumption of duty by the agent. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Dereck Cruz Legens v. Bobby Lecornu, et al.
This is an appeal from a bench trial in a suit over the sale of a used vehicle. The trial court originally ruled in favor of the seller-defendants, finding that the plaintiff-buyer failed to meet his burden of proving fraud or misrepresentation in the sale of the vehicle. The court found that defendant-sellers had violated one subsection of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, but that plaintiff-buyer had failed to prove any actual damages, so the trial court dismissed the complaint. Upon considering the plaintiff-buyer’s motion to alter or amend, the trial court changed its original decision and found that the defendant-sellers had engaged in fraud, and the court rescinded the sale of the vehicle. Upon considering plaintiffbuyer’s second motion to alter or amend, the trial court clarified its ruling and awarded attorney’s fees to the plaintiff-buyer. Both parties appeal. For the following reasons, we reverse the trial court’s decision, reinstate its original ruling, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Obion | Court of Appeals |
