In Re Karisah N. Et Al.
Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights, arguing that termination was not in the children’s best interest. We conclude that clear and convincing evidence supports both the grounds for termination found by the trial court and the trial court’s best interest determination. Affirmed. |
Warren | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Savanna I.
This is a termination of parental rights case involving the parental rights of the mother, Melody I. (“Mother”), to her minor child, Savanna I. (“the Child”), who was eight months old at the time of trial. Shortly after the Child’s birth, the Knox County Juvenile Court (“trial court”) entered an order removing the Child from Mother’s custody and placing the Child into the temporary legal custody of the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”). The Child was immediately placed in foster care, where she remained at the time of trial. The trial court subsequently entered an order on November 28, 2017, finding that the Child was dependent and neglected due in part to Mother’s prenatal drug use, incarceration, and severe abuse of the Child. The trial court relieved DCS from making reasonable efforts to reunite Mother with the Child. Also on November 28, 2017, DCS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Mother. Following a bench trial, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights to the Child upon determining by clear and convincing evidence that (1) Mother had severely abused the Child, (2) Mother had abandoned the Child by engaging in conduct prior to her incarceration that exhibited wanton disregard for the Child’s welfare, and (3) Mother had failed to manifest an ability and willingness to personally assume custody of or financial responsibility for the Child. The trial court further found by clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the best interest of the Child. Mother has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Dent Road General Partnership, et al. v. Synovus Bank, et al.
Appellants appeal the grant of summary judgment to defendants title company and legal professionals on claims related to a real estate transaction that occurred in 2004. We affirm the grant of summary judgment as to Appellants’ legal malpractice claim based upon the expiration of the statute of limitations. Based upon agreement of the parties, we also affirm the dismissal of Counts I through VII against the title company. The grant of summary judgment in favor of the title company as to all remaining claims is vacated. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Conoly Brown, Et Al. v. Metropolitan Government Of Nashville And Davidson County, Tennessee
Landowners appeal the trial court’s dismissal of their petition seeking a declaratory judgment that the requirement in the Metropolitan Nashville zoning ordinance that alternative financial services providers be located 1,320 feet apart violates the due process and equal protection provisions of the state and federal constitutions. Upon our de novo review, we affirm the judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Carl Allen v. Joseph S. Ozment
Appellant appeals the dismissal of his legal malpractice claim, arguing that the affirmative defenses raised by the defendant attorney were waived. Because we conclude that the defendant attorney’s affirmative defenses were not waived, we affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Camdon H.
This action involves the termination of a mother’s and father’s parental rights to their minor child. Following a bench trial, the court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to support the statutory grounds of abandonment for failure to support, to visit, and to provide a suitable home; substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan; and the persistence of conditions which led to removal. The court further found that termination was in the best interest of the child. We affirm. |
Jefferson | Court of Appeals | |
Mary Wenzler v. Dr. Xiao Yu, et al.
This is a health care liability case filed against a dentist and the dental practice that employed him. Before filing the complaint, the plaintiff gave written notice to the two potential defendants of her health care liability claims against them. Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(a)(2)(E) requires that a plaintiff’s pre-suit notice include a HIPAA compliant medical authorization permitting the health care provider receiving the notice to obtain complete medical records from every other provider that is being sent a notice. After the plaintiff filed suit, the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint based on noncompliance with the statute, as the defendants alleged that the HIPAA authorizations provided by the plaintiff did not contain all of the required information and were therefore invalid. After a hearing, the trial court granted the motion to dismiss, concluding that the authorizations provided by the plaintiff were not HIPAA compliant and therefore the plaintiff did not substantially comply with the statute. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Freddie Armstrong v. Shelby County Juvenile Court, et al.
This appeal involves the termination of a county employee for insubordination and intentional failure to carry out instructions. The employee appealed to the Shelby County Civil Service Merit Board, which upheld his termination after a hearing. The employee then sought review in chancery court, and again his termination was upheld. He now seeks review before this Court. For the following reasons, we affirm the decision of the chancery court and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Steven E. Warrick, Sr., et al. v. Penny Mullins
Steven E. Warrick, Sr. and Cindy Heffernan (petitioners) filed this action to enforce a settlement agreement and partition a parcel of real property pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-27-101 (2012) et seq. Penny Mullins (respondent) filed a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The trial court, relying on the terms of the settlement agreement filed as an exhibit to the petition, granted the motion. We hold that the agreement conclusively establishes that petitioners have no present ownership interest in the property, and thus have no standing to ask the court for partition. We consequently affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Hawkins | Court of Appeals | |
In Re E.W.N.
This case involves a custody dispute between M.J.L. and J.L. (paternal grandparents) and B.G. and M.N. (maternal grandparents) with respect to their grandchild, E.W.N. Paternal grandparents initiated a dependency and neglect action in juvenile court. The juvenile court adjudicated the child dependent and neglected and awarded full custody to paternal grandparents. Soon thereafter, maternal grandparents filed a petition to intervene, seeking custody or joint custody of the child. The juvenile court entered a final order that granted all grandparents joint legal custody of the child. The court’s order further provided that during the school year paternal grandparents would have primary physical custody and that during the summer maternal grandparents would have primary physical custody. Both sets of grandparents were also awarded visitation. Maternal grandparents appealed the decision of the juvenile court to the circuit court. After a hearing, the circuit court ordered a custody arrangement essentially identical to the one ordered by the juvenile court. Maternal grandparents appeal. We affirm. |
Lincoln | Court of Appeals | |
Bailey Cooper, et al. v. Pete Patel
This is a breach of contract case. Defendant-lessee operated a motel pursuant to a lease with plaintiffs-lessors, which contained two options to renew for two additional 25-year terms that allowed the renewal options to be exercised if there had been no breaches of the lease terms. When defendant attempted to exercise the option for the second additional 25-year term, plaintiffs-lessors refused and subsequently brought suit, alleging defendant had breached several provisions of the lease. The chancery court agreed with plaintiffs, assigning to defendant six breaches of the terms of the lease and holding that, as a result, defendant could not exercise the renewal option. Finding all of the alleged breaches to be either de minimis or non-issues to the case, we reverse. |
Gibson | Court of Appeals | |
James Curtis Pierce v. Hollie Marie Pierce (Marszalek)
In this post-divorce matter, the trial court determined that the father’s child support obligation should be increased due to the father’s significant increase in income subsequent to the parties’ divorce. In calculating the father’s new child support obligation amount, however, the trial court included the children’s private school expenses, which the father had previously agreed to bear, as a “work-related childcare” expense for the father on the respective child support worksheet, thereby reducing the father’s child support obligation. The mother has appealed. We vacate the trial court’s modifications to the parties’ permanent parenting plan and its calculation of child support, including its inclusion of private school tuition and health insurance premiums paid by a stepparent on the child support worksheet. We remand the child support issue to the trial court for recalculation of the father’s child support obligation consistent with this opinion. We also vacate the trial court’s partial award of attorney’s fees to the mother and remand that issue to the trial court for determination of a reasonable award of all attorney’s fees incurred by the mother concerning her petition to increase the father’s child support obligation. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects. In addition, we grant the mother’s request for attorney’s fees incurred on appeal. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Edna Green v. St. George's Episcopal Church
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Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Catherine Caton v. Kyle Austin Caton
About a year after the parties’ divorce, the mother, who had been named primary residential parent, decided to move to Murfreesboro. Alleging that her move constituted a material change in circumstance, she filed a petition in the divorce court requesting a change in the residential parenting schedule. Because she planned to move less than fifty miles, the mother asserted that the parental relocation statute did not apply. But, in case the court disagreed, the mother also asked the court to approve the move. In response, the father filed a counter-petition seeking to change either the primary residential parent designation or the parenting schedule. After a hearing, the trial court denied both modification petitions. And although the court agreed that the parental relocation statute did not apply, the court ordered the mother to remain in Sumner County, Tennessee. The mother has appealed the court’s restriction on her ability to move. Upon review, we conclude that the trial court had no legal basis for prohibiting the mother from moving. So we reverse that part of the court’s order. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Joe King v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner was convicted of rape in 1988, served a six month sentence of incarceration, and successfully completed five and a half years of probation; in 2016 he was advised that he was required to register as a sex offender. After registering, he filed a petition for declaratory judgment, challenging the constitutionality of the Tennessee Sex Offender Registration and Monitoring Act of 2004, as written and as applied to him, and requested that he not be required to register as a sex offender. The court dismissed the action for failure to state a claim, and the petitioner appeals. Upon our de novo review, we reverse the dismissal of his as-applied challenge to the Act and remand the case for further proceedings; in all other respects, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Grundy | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Corbin W.
This appeal arises from Father’s Petition for Custody and/or Visitation with the parties’ only child. The juvenile court granted the petition following an evidentiary hearing and established a parenting plan and parenting schedule. Mother appeals contending, inter alia, the evidence does not support the court’s findings and ultimate rulings. We have determined that both parties’ briefs are profoundly deficient. Moreover, because Mother failed to provide a transcript of the evidence or a statement of the evidence, there is a conclusive presumption that there was sufficient evidence before the juvenile court to support its judgment. Accordingly, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re S.D. Et Al.
L.D. (mother) appeals the trial court’s judgment terminating her parental rights to her children S.D., S.B.D., and M.D. Both mother and father were convicted of especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor and statutory rape. On September 28, 2007, the criminal court ordered them to serve an effective twelve-year sentence. After serving less than one year, mother was granted probation and subsequently regained custody of her two older children. Later, mother gave birth to M.D. Still later, mother violated probation and returned to jail in July of 2011. Petitioners filed a petition to terminate parental rights, and for adoption of the children. The trial court terminated mother’s rights to S.D. and S.B.D. on the ground that she was incarcerated under a sentence of ten or more years, and the subject children were under eight years old at the time of the sentence. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(6) (2017). The court further held that mother had abandoned all three children by failing to visit and support them during the four months immediately preceding her re-incarceration following her probation violation. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-113(g)(1); 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv). We affirm the trial court’s judgment regarding S.D. and S.B.D. pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(6). We reverse the trial court’s judgment terminating mother’s rights with respect to M.D. on the ground of abandonment, because the proof at trial fails to demonstrate abandonment for the entirety of the pertinent four-month period. |
Marshall | Court of Appeals | |
Mark Pintaure Et Al. v. Andrew Farmer Et Al.
Mark Pintaure and Patricia Pintaure (plaintiffs) sued Andrew Farmer and Mariah Farmer (defendants) for breach of a lease agreement. Plaintiffs, the landlords, leased a residence to defendants under a six-month lease agreement. Defendants counterclaimed for alleged breach of contract, violation of the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, and fraud. Following a bench trial, the court awarded plaintiffs $2,256 in damages and dismissed the counterclaim. Because the lease provides for an award of attorney’s fees, the trial court initially awarded plaintiffs a fee of $694. Plaintiffs objected, arguing that the attorney’s fee they had paid was significantly higher. After plaintiff’s counsel submitted an affidavit and documentation of time spent on the case, the trial court awarded plaintiffs an additional $500 in attorney’s fees. Plaintiffs appeal, arguing that the trial court’s award was unreasonably low. Because the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees was unsupported by a finding of reasonableness or analysis of the required factors provided in Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 8, RPC 1.5, we vacate the award of attorney’s fees and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
FDA Properties, LLC v. David Doyle Miller
This appeal concerns the potential dissolution of an LLC under the Tennessee Limited Liability Company Act due to the bankruptcy of one of its members. The trial court held that the LLC was not dissolved under the Act because neither section 48-245-101(a)(5)(G) nor 48-245-101(b) of the Tennessee Code applied to the LLC. We reverse and remand for further proceedings. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Ruger N.
This action involves the termination of a father’s parental rights to his minor child. Following a bench trial, the court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to support the statutory grounds of abandonment for failure to support and to visit. The court further found that termination was in the best interest of the child. We affirm |
Polk | Court of Appeals | |
Scott A. Padgett v. Clarksville-Montgomery County School System, Et Al.
A teacher dismissed from his teaching position filed suit against the school system and the chief human resources officer for libel and breach of contract. The trial court denied the teacher’s motion for leave to file an amended complaint and granted the defendants’ motions for summary judgment as to both claims. Finding no error, we affirm the decision of the trial court in all respects. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Riverland, LLC v. City of Jackson, Tennessee
Appellant sued the City of Jackson, Tennessee, after Appellant’s commercial building was damaged by flooding. Appellant stated claims, under the Governmental Tort Liability Act, for temporary and permanent nuisance, trespass, negligence, and gross negligence. Appellant also sought relief for inverse condemnation and equitable relief under a theory of nuisance. On a grant of summary judgment, the trial court dismissed the GTLA claims, finding that the City’s immunity to suit was not removed. The trial court also granted summary judgment to the City on the inverse condemnation and nuisance claims. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Sonya Brooks v. Ron Woody, Et Al.
In this wrongful dismissal case, Sonya Brooks (“Brooks”) sued her former employer Roane County and county officials Ron Woody and Gloria Wright (“Defendants”). In a March 9, 2017 order, the Circuit Court for Roane County (“the Trial Court”) dismissed Brooks’ lawsuit against Defendants with prejudice. The Trial Court reserved taxation of costs for a later date. Brooks filed a notice of appeal on January 10, 2018. Defendants argue that Brooks’ appeal was filed untimely. Brooks contends that the March 9, 2017 order was not final and appealable because it reserved the issue of costs. We hold that, in keeping with longstanding Tennessee case law, taxation of costs is incidental and not a factor in determining whether a judgment is final. As Brooks’ notice of appeal was not filed timely, we are constrained to dismiss her appeal for lack of jurisdiction. |
Roane | Court of Appeals | |
Pamela Annette Dotson v. Willie Jefferson Dotson
This post-divorce dispute concerns the enforcement of a retirement benefits provision in a marital dissolution agreement. After the defendant retired, he refused to pay any portion of his retirement benefits to his ex-wife based on his interpretation of their marital dissolution agreement. His ex-wife disagreed with his interpretation and petitioned the trial court to enforce their agreement. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion and granted his ex-wife’s cross-motion. Upon review, we affirm the trial court in all respects and award the ex-wife her attorney’s fees incurred on appeal. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Melba P. Mershon, Surviving Spouse Of Rondell M. Mershon Ex Rel. Hyland M., Et Al. v. HPT TA Properties Trust Et Al.
A motor vehicle accident on the roadway abutting a truck stop resulted in the death of the plaintiff’s husband. The driver of the vehicle turning left into the truck stop was using the entrance meant for semi-trailer trucks and had a limited view of oncoming traffic due to a hill that crested a short distance ahead. The plaintiff filed a negligence claim against the truck stop owners and operators, asserting they created a hazardous condition by failing to place visible signage on their property directing passenger vehicles to the appropriate entrance. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, contending they owed no duty to the traveling public because the collision occurred on a municipal road, not on their property. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, and the plaintiff appealed. We reverse the trial court’s judgment, holding that a balancing test is required to determine whether the defendants owed a duty to the plaintiff’s husband and that dismissing the complaint is premature at this stage of the proceedings. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals |
