William H. Lublin v. Vastland Northcrest Development, LLC
This matter arises from two failed real estate transactions. A buyer contracted to purchase two townhomes from a real estate developer. However, after the sales failed to close, the developer purported to cancel the transactions. The buyer then sued the developer, seeking decrees for specific performance and damages for breach of contract. The buyer also asserted a claim under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. After a bench trial, the trial court entered an order awarding the buyer specific performance but denying his claim for damages. The trial court also found a TCPA violation and awarded the buyer his attorney’s fees and costs. On the breach of contract claim, we have determined that the developer breached the contracts and that the buyer failed to sufficiently prove his damages, and we affirm the trial court’s decision. We also conclude that the trial court erred in finding a TCPA violation and reverse this finding, as well as the award of fees and costs pursuant to the TCPA. Finally, we have determined that the developer was not the prevailing party in the trial court or on appeal and deny its request for an award of attorney’s fees. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Poser Investments, Inc. v. Old National Hospitality Company et al.
A judgment creditor domesticated a Georgia judgment in Tennessee under the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act. When the creditor sought to enforce the domesticated judgment, the debtor raised a statute-of-limitations defense. The trial court ruled that the enforcement action was time-barred because the limitations period began to run when the foreign judgment was rendered in Georgia. Upon review, we conclude that domestication of the foreign judgment under the Uniform Act resulted in a new Tennessee judgment for purposes of the statute of limitations. So we reverse the trial court’s decision |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
KARS LLC ET AL. v. RONALD OGLE ET AL.
The plaintiffs sued the defendants alleging breach of contract, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, tortious interference with contract, tortious interference with business relations, fraudulent misrepresentation, unjust enrichment, and civil conspiracy. The trial court dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint after finding that the plaintiffs failed to timely close on their transactions with the defendants. The plaintiffs appeal. Following thorough review, we affirm in part, reverse in part, vacate in part, and remand the case for further proceedings. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Gail Gottesman v. Todd Hecker, et al.
In this matter involving the sale of a parcel of improved real property, the buyer claimed |
Benton | Court of Appeals | |
IN RE MAGNUS H. ET AL.
The trial court terminated a father’s parental rights to his five minor children after finding clear and convincing evidence that the father, who was incarcerated when the termination petition was filed, abandoned the children by wanton disregard; the children were victims of severe abuse; the father was confined under a criminal sentence of six years; and termination of the father’s parental rights was in the best interests of the children. The father appeals. Upon diligent review of the record, we find no error and affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Genesis Roofing Company v. Tennessee Occupational Safety and Health Administration Review Commission
This appeal arises from a petition for judicial review under Tennessee Code Annotated § 4- 5-322 of a decision of the Tennessee Occupational Safety and Health Administration Review Commission (the “Review Commission”). Asserting that the petition was untimely because it had been filed more than 60 days after entry of the agency’s final order, the Review Commission filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(1). The petitioner opposed the motion by asking for an enlargement of time pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 6.02. The trial court denied the petitioner’s motion for an enlargement of time and granted the Review Commission’s motion to dismiss. The petitioner appeals. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Randall L. Rice et al. v. The Tennessee Democratic Executive Committee
A majority of the members of the State Executive Committee of the Tennessee Democratic Party approved adding unelected “ex-officio members” as full members of the Executive Committee with voting rights. A group of dissenting Executive Committee members brought suit, claiming that the addition of voting members of the Executive Committee in this manner violated statutory provisions governing the composition of state party executive committees, codified at Tennessee Code Annotated section 2-13-101 et seq. In response, the Executive Committee argued the statutory provisions permit adding ex-officio members as full voting members and invoked constitutional avoidance principles in support of the Executive Committee’s interpretation of the statutory scheme. The Executive Committee filed a counterclaim challenging the constitutionality of the statutory scheme based on freedom of association principles. Both parties sought judgment on the pleadings. The trial court granted the Executive Committee’s motion for judgment on pleadings, construing the statutory scheme as permitting the Executive Committee’s actions. Accordingly, the trial court pretermitted the constitutional issue, dismissing the Executive Committee’s counterclaim as moot. The dissenting members appealed. We conclude the trial court erred in its interpretation of the statutory scheme. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
LEIGHTON H. LIPPERT ET AL. v. B & D REAL ESTATE PROPERTIES, LLC
A developer failed to use proper erosion control measures, resulting in recurring sediment runoff into a pond owned by neighboring landowners and increasing accumulation of sediment therein. The trial court concluded that developer’s actions constituted a temporary, not permanent, nuisance and awarded injunctive relief and damages. Damages for emotional distress were included among the damages the trial court awarded. The developer appeals, challenging the trial court’s finding as to proximate causation and asserting that its actions, if a nuisance, were a permanent and not temporary nuisance, and accordingly the landowners’ suit was barred by the statute of limitations. The developer also asserts that the trial court erred as to the remedies awarded, challenging both the injunctive relief and emotional distress damages. We affirm the trial court’s findings as to proximate causation and its conclusion that the nuisance is temporary. We also affirm the trial court’s imposition of an injunction. However, we reverse the award of damages for emotional distress based upon deficient pleading. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company, et al. v. Virginia Jones
The defendant was involved in a motor vehicle collision with a tractor-trailer truck in |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
TED PHILLIPS ET AL. v. NATIONAL AGGREGATES LLC ET AL.
The plaintiffs appeal from the trial court’s dismissal of their claims against two sets of |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
IN RE CHARLEE G. ET AL
This action involves the termination of a mother’s parental rights to her minor children. Following a bench trial, the court found that clear and convincing evidence established several grounds of termination and that termination was in the best interest of the children. We now affirm. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
KELLY LISH, ET AL. v. O. RAYMOND LOWRY, ET AL.
This breach of contract case involves a partnership dispute where one partner who undertook the winding down of the long-term partnership sought (1) reimbursement of loans and advances made to cover partnership expenses together with interest thereon; (2) compensation for services rendered on behalf of the partnership and attorney fees; and (3) taking into account the foregoing, disbursement of partnership funds to the partners. The other two partners disputed the claims and made counterclaims. Because we cannot ascertain whether the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law support the judgment, we vacate the judgment and remand it for the entry of a more detailed order that reflects that it is the product of the trial court’s individualized decision-making and independent judgment. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
Randy Arnold v. Kamilah Sanders
This appeal arises from a modification of a Permanent Parenting Plan (“PPP”), pursuant to which Randy Arnold, (“Father”) replaced Kamilah Sanders, (“Mother”), as the primary residential parent of the parties’ only child. Mother timely filed a Motion to Review the decision of the juvenile court magistrate pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 37-1- 107, which motion the juvenile court judge denied. This appeal followed. We affirm the ruling of the juvenile court and remand with instructions to set child support. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
OCOEE RIDGE PHASE I HOMEOWNERS’ ASSOCIATION, LLC v. DOMINIC CUSUMANO ET AL.
Because the order from which the appellant has filed an appeal does not constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
Polk | Court of Appeals | |
ANTHONY D. WALSH V. TIMOTHY ALLEN WALSH
In this case, two brothers accused each other of exerting undue influence on their aging mother, Latona Joyce Walsh. Timothy Walsh (“Defendant”) alleged that his brother Anthony Walsh (“Plaintiff”) had exerted undue influence over Ms. Walsh, resulting in her deeding her home to him, naming him as the executor of her estate, and placing his name on her bank accounts approximately four years before her death. Shortly before her death, Ms. Walsh made Defendant her attorney-in-fact and Plaintiff’s name was removed from her accounts. Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that Defendant had exerted undue influence over Ms. Walsh, and Defendant filed a counterclaim against Plaintiff for undue influence. Ms. Walsh died two days later. The Chancery Court for Anderson County (“the Trial Court”) found that both sons had exerted undue influence over their mother but that Defendant had not dissipated any of her assets, unlike Plaintiff. The Trial Court accordingly ordered that Ms. Walsh’s home was part of her estate and was to be distributed by the terms of her 1991 will. The Trial Court further credited Plaintiff with receiving $49,000 in rental income from renting his mother’s home after her death. Plaintiff appeals the Trial Court’s finding of undue influence. Based upon our review, we affirm. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, ex rel., Summer Springer v. Elijah Williams
The notice of appeal in this case was not timely filed. Therefore, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
Carroll | Court of Appeals | |
Billy Hughes et al. v. Lee Masonry Products, Inc. et al.
The homeowners and a general contractor commenced this action for breach of contract, breach of express warranty, and breach of implied warranty against a brick manufacturer and its distributor. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants based on the plaintiffs’ failure to provide an opportunity to cure. We affirm in part and reverse in part. Having determined that Article 2 of Tennessee’s Uniform Commercial Code controls the sale of the bricks and that the bricks were accepted, it was unnecessary for the plaintiffs to provide an opportunity to cure before filing suit. Still, we conclude that the manufacturer was entitled to summary judgment on all claims because it had no privity of contract with the plaintiffs. |
Robertson | Court of Appeals | |
Tammala Thompson v. State of Tennessee
This appeal arises from a premises liability action commenced by Tammala Thompson (“Plaintiff”) for injuries she sustained while camping for the weekend at Cedars of Lebanon State Park (“the Park”). Plaintiff alleges that the State of Tennessee (“the State”), which owns and operates the Park, is liable for her injuries because the State negligently maintained an unsafe sidewalk. Relying upon the affirmative defense provided by the Tennessee Recreational Use Statute (“the TRUS”), the State filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. Plaintiff opposed the motion arguing that she was not engaged in recreational activity when the injury occurred because she was walking on a sidewalk; thus, the TRUS is not applicable. She also asserted that sidewalks are “improvements” which are not expressly exempted from liability under the TRUS. Finding the TRUS applicable and that no exceptions applied, the Claims Commission granted the State’s motion to dismiss. We affirm. |
Court of Appeals | ||
In Re Hunter W., et al.
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights for abandonment by failure to visit, |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Tristan J.
The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) sought the termination of the mother’s and father’s parental rights to their son in the Juvenile Court for Davidson County (“the Juvenile Court”). The Juvenile Court found that DCS had failed to prove the statutory grounds for termination of the mother’s parental rights by clear and convincing evidence. Although the Juvenile Court found sufficient evidence for grounds for termination of the father’s parental rights, it declined to find that termination was in the child’s best interest given that the mother retained her parental rights. The guardian ad litem (“GAL”) appealed, and DCS joined in filing briefs arguing that the Juvenile Court erred. Upon careful review, we find that the Juvenile Court misapplied the law in its consideration of the ground of persistent conditions and provided insufficient findings of fact addressing relevant testimony in its consideration of both persistent conditions and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody as alleged against the mother. The Juvenile Court also provided conclusory statements for each best interest factor that it considered in relation to the father. We accordingly vacate the Juvenile Court’s judgment and remand this case for the Juvenile Court to properly apply the law in its analysis of persistent conditions against the mother and provide sufficient findings of fact in support of its conclusory statements in its analysis of persistent conditions and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody against the mother. We also remand for the Juvenile Court to provide factual findings in support of its conclusions as to the best interest factors applied to the father. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Walker & Associates, Inc. v. Cecilia Walker Heffington, et al.
This is an appeal from a trial court’s decision to grant a motion to enforce a settlement |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Madison County, Tennessee v. Vatisha Evans-Barken
In this appeal, an employee of the Madison County Sheriff’s Department challenges the termination of her employment on the ground that she lacked a required certification to serve as a police officer after a psychological examiner deemed her not qualified to hold her position. The local civil service board initially upheld the termination, but that decision was vacated by the trial court, and the matter remanded. On remand, the local civil service board disapproved of the termination and reinstated the officer. The matter was appealed once again to the trial court, where a different judge held that the board’s decision was based on improper procedure, unsupported by substantial and material evidence, and arbitrary and capricious. We reverse the decision of the trial court and reinstate the decision of the local civil service board. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Steve Paschall v. Pension Board of the Memphis Light Gas and Water Division Retirement and Pension System, et al.
The petitioner was employed at the Light, Gas, and Water Division of the City of Memphis (“MLGW”). During his employment, the employee participated in a pension plan. The employee was terminated in July 2016 but did not apply for his pension benefits. In 2022, the employee filed two retirement applications that were rejected. Both applications sought the payment of pension benefits retroactive to the 2016 termination date. The employee appealed to MLGW’s pension board. The pension board accepted the second application and instituted the payment of benefits as of its filing date. However, the board declined to award benefits retroactive to 2016. The employee sought judicial review in the Shelby County Chancery Court. The court held that the decision to deny the first application was arbitrary and capricious and ordered the payment of benefits to be deemed effective as of the date it was filed. However, it found that the decision to deny the claim for retroactive benefits stemming from the date of termination was not arbitrary and capricious as it was in accordance with the pension system’s plan. The employee appeals. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Jontae A. Fischiettie v. Econo Auto Painting of West Tennessee, Inc.
Appellant brought this action after his car was painted the wrong color. During the course |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
IN RE NAME CHANGE OF JOHN MONTRAIL DARISAW
Because the order from which the appellant has filed an appeal does not constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
Knox | Court of Appeals |
