APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is a suit by two high school students and their parents seeking damages resulting from alleged assaults by a high school coach.

The Travelers Insurance Company ("Travelers") filed an interpleader in the Chancery Court for Davidson County. It alleged that both defendant/appellee, Maudine Y. Lancaster Webb ("Ms. Webb"), and defendant/appellant, Vicky Austin Lancaster ("Mrs. Lancaster"), claimed the proceeds of an insurance policy which covered the life of decedent, Charles S. Lancaster.

The only issue raised in this paternity action is whether there is any material evidence to support the jury's verdict that the appellant was the father of the child. We affirm.

The plaintiff, A. J. Hall, Inc., has appealed from the summary dismissal of a part of its suit against the defendant, Federated Mutual Insurance Company. The Trial Court expressly directed the entry of final partial judgment as permitted by T.R.C.P. Rule 54.02.

This appeal involves a boundary line dispute between two neighbors. The Appellants, William and Rebecca Pevear, and the Appellees, Evans and Irene Hunt, own real estate which is separated by an alley which is owned by the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County.
 

Both the trial court and the majority of this panel have decided that Tom and Karen Moore are not entitled to a jury trial on their medical malpractice claim against Dr. Lloyd A. Walwyn because of shortcomings in the affidavits they filed in opposition to Dr. Walwyn’s motion for summary judgment. While I do not relish defending sloppy lawyering, I am convinced that my colleagues have scrutinized the Moores’ counter-affidavits using standards stricter than those required by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.05 and Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-115 (1980). I would vacate the summary judgment because the counter-affidavits demonstrate the existence of genuine and material factual issues that only a jury should resolve.
 

The captioned respondent has appealed from an order entered by the Trial Court regulating visitation of the two children of respondent with the captioned petitioners, parents of respondent's deceased husband. Respondent-mother has remarried, and her husband, David McClintock, has adopted the children. However, he is not a party to this proceeding.

Charles N. Delatte ("plaintiff") filed suit in the Circuit Court of Davidson County against South Mark Realty Partners, Ltd. ("defendant") seeking damages for injuries sustained by him when a metal hand railing on a stairway in the common area of defendant's apartment complex collapsed, causing him to fall.  The trial court granted defendant's motions for  summary judgment. The sole issue presented by this appeal is whether the trial court was in error in so doing. For the reasons herein set forth, we find no error and affirm.

This case presents what is purportedly an appeal under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b). The issue of law involves a juvenile's plea of guilty to delinquency in the Circuit Court of Dickson County.

Plaintiff-Appellant Blake Weber brought suit against the Defendants-Appellees, Jack Moses and Jefferson Pilot LIfe Insurance Company ("Jefferson Pilot"), alleging that he was unlawfully discharged due to his refusal to participate in Appellee Jefferson Pilot's illegal employment practices. The chancellor dismissed Appellant's suit, stating that this cause of action was barred by the applicable one year statute of limitation. Weber appeals the lower court's dismissal of his Complaint.

From the decision of the Trial Court establishing a boundary line dividing tracts of land owned by the parties, the Defendants appeal.

From the decision of the Trial Court modifying the final decree of divorce between the parties, terminating payments of spousal support previously ordered to be paid by the husband to the wife, the wife appeals.

This appeal involves a venue dispute. Plaintiff, Sue McGee, appeals from the order of the Circuit Court for the Twenty-Second Judicial District in Maury County, Tennessee, that dismissed her suit against defendants, First National Bank and Neal Lovlace, for improper venue. The record in the case consists of what was formerly called the technical record and a "transcript of proceedings" which has no testimony and contains only argument and statements of counsel and the court.

General Oils Company ("plaintiff") filed suit in the Chancery Court of Davidson County against the Assessor of Property for Hamilton County ("Hamilton County Assessor") and the Tennessee State Board of Equalization ("Board of Equalization") seeking judicial review of the decision by the Assessment Appeals Commission ("AAC") of the Board of Equalization that for tax assessment purposes plaintiff's petroleum storage tanks located in Hamilton County were real property. The chancellor reversed the AAC, holding that the tanks were personal property. On appeal Hamilton County Assessor and Board of Equalization present one issue 1On appeal the Board of Equalization only challenges the lower court's action to the effect that tanks are automatically considered tangible personal property under T.C.A. § 67-5-903(f) for property tax purposes. Because the broader issue raised by Hamilton County Assessor in essence encompasses this secondary issue, we approach this case from the standpoint of Hamilton County Assessor. 2 for our consideration: Whether the trial court erred in holding that the storage tanks should be classified as personal property for tax assessment purposes.1 For the reasons hereinafter stated, we find no error and affirm.