State of Tennessee v. Robert "Bobby" Powell
W2003-02723-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Trial Court Judge: Judge Clayburn L. Peeples

The defendant, Robert “Bobby” Powell, pled guilty to statutory rape and sexual battery, Class E felonies, in exchange for an effective two-year sentence as a Range I, standard offender, with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. Finding that a sentence less serious than confinement would depreciate the seriousness of the offenses, the trial court denied the defendant’s request for probation or other alternative sentencing and ordered that he serve his sentence in the Department of Correction. The court subsequently denied the defendant’s motion to reconsider, and the defendant appealed to this court. Based on our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Carlos Haynes v. State of Tennessee
W2004-00081-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Norma McGee Ogle
Trial Court Judge: Judge Roger A. Page

The petitioner, Carlos Haynes, pled guilty in the Madison County Circuit Court to one count of possession of over one-half ounce of marijuana with intent to sell and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia. He received a total effective sentence of two years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his counsel was ineffective and the trial court erred in failing to pursue the issue of the identity of the confidential informant whose tip led to the search of the petitioner’s home. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition, and the petitioner now appeals. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

State of Tennessee v. Timothy E. Ballard
W2003-01627-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Trial Court Judge: Judge C. Creed McGinley

The defendant, Timothy E. Ballard, was convicted of DUI, a Class A misdemeanor, and driving on a revoked license, a Class B misdemeanor, and was sentenced to an effective sentence of eleven months, twenty-nine days, suspended except for sixty days, with the balance to be served on supervised probation. On appeal, he argues that his sentence is excessive and that the trial court erred in denying full probation or alternative sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In the Matter of: D.A.H., DOB 12/11/00, A Child Under Eighteen (18) Years of Age, et al.
W2002-00733-SC-R11-JV
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Harold W. Horne

We granted permission to appeal to determine whether the amendment to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(9)(A), effective June 2, 2003, applies retroactively to this parental termination case. Prior to the 2003 amendment, Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(9)(A) (2001) provided as follows:

State of Tennessee, Ex Rel. Anne. B. Pope v. United States Fire Insurance Company, et al.
E2002-01092-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor W. Frank Brown, III

We granted permission to appeal pursuant to Rule 11 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure to determine whether the liability of a surety company that issues bonds to self-insured employers under Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-405(b) is limited to the penal amount listed on the face of each bond. Because section 50-6-405(b) requires that bonds be of a single, continuous term, we conclude that a surety company’s liability is limited to the penal amount on the face of the bonds. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

Michael Mitchell v. William Henegar, D/B/A Henegar Realty Company; and Geneva Brown, individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Fred Brown
E2003-01885-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel Pickens Franks
Trial Court Judge: Judge William E. Lantrip

Plaintiff sought rescission of a purchase of real property, and damages pursuant to the Consumer Protection Act. The Trial Court held plaintiff failed to carry his burden of proof on the issues presented. On appeal, we affirm.

Luke N. Gibson, et al. v. Chrysler Corporation, et al.
W2002-03134-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Judge Kay S. Robilio

This is an appeal from a judgment entered on a jury verdict for Defendant/Appellee. Plaintiff/Appellant, a minor, was allegedly injured when an integrated car seat in a vehicle manufactured and sold by Defendant/Appellee malfunctioned. Plaintiff/Appellant asserts that: (1) the jurors conducted unauthorized experimentation with certain exhibits, which constituted extraneous prejudicial information under Tenn. R. Evid. 606(b); (2) that there is no material evidence on which the jury could have based its verdict; (3) that the trial judge failed to properly perform her duty as thirteenth juror; (4) that the trial court erred in allowing an expert to testify outside the scope of his expertise in violation of McDaniel v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 955 S.W.2d 257 (Tenn. 1997); and (5) that the trial court erred, either under Tenn. R. Evid. 702 and 704 or on the theory of judicial estoppel, in excluding a portion of the testimony of a second expert. We affirm.

State of Tennessee v. Robert Page - Concurring and Dissenting
W2003-01342-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David G. Hayes
Trial Court Judge: Judge W. Fred Axley

I am unable to join with the majority in concluding that the waiver provision of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-18-110 is unconstitutional. Because the Defendant did not request that the jury be instructed as to facilitation, he has waived his right to challenge this issue on appeal.  Accordingly, I would affirm the conviction.

State of Tennessee v. Robert Page
W2003-01342-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David H. Welles
Trial Court Judge: Judge W. Fred Axley

The Defendant, Robert Page, was convicted by a jury of the second degree murder of Roosevelt Burgess. The Defendant was subsequently sentenced as a Range II offender to thirty-eight years in the Department of Correction. In this direct appeal, the Defendant raises the following issues: 1) whether the evidence is sufficient to support the verdict; 2) whether the trial court improperly limited the impeachment of State witness Carrie Jones; 3) whether the trial court properly admitted a photograph of the victim; 4) whether the trial court committed error in providing supplemental jury instructions; 5) whether comments by the trial court compromised the Defendant’s right to a fair trial; and 6) whether the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of facilitation to commit second degree murder. Because the trial court committed reversible error in omitting a jury instruction on facilitation of second degree murder, we reverse the Defendant’s conviction and remand this matter for a new trial.

Victor Rivera v. Jeld-Wen, Inc.
M2003-01651-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Patricia J. Cottrell, Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: John A. Turnbull, Judge
In this case, the plaintiff whose arm was amputated as a result of a work-related injury had entered into a settlement agreement with his employer. The plaintiff claims this agreement obligated his employer to pay for an expensive, state-of-the-art myoelectric prosthesis. The trial court agreed and expressly found that the provision of the myoelectric arm was within the reasonable contemplation of the parties at the time of the agreement and compelled the employer to pay for it. The Panel has concluded that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.

Samuel L. Rowe v. Sverdrup Technology, Inc. and
M2003-01467-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Roger A. Page, Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: John E. Rollins, Judge
. In this appeal, the employer contends that the trial court erred by finding by a preponderance of the evidence that the employee's hip replacement surgery and subsequent disability were due to an injury that arose out of his employment. Specifically, the issue is whether the employee's injury resulted from a pre-existing cancerous condition of the right hip. We find no error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Rachel Stephens v. John Manville International, Inc.
E2003-01068-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Sr. J.
Trial Court Judge: Jerri S. Bryant, Chancellor
The trial court awarded the Plaintiff an additional 5 percent for an injury to her left arm for which she had been compensated. This award was supported essentially by the Plaintiff's testimony. She was also awarded benefits for an injury to her right arm and neck. The award for an additional 5 percent to the left arm is vacated. Otherwise, the judgment is affirmed.

State of Tennessee v. Christopher Davis
M2001-01866-SC-DDT-DD
Authoring Judge: Justice E. Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge: Judge J. Randall Wyatt, Jr.

The defendant, Christopher A. Davis, was convicted of two counts of premeditated first degree murder,¹ two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, and two counts of especially aggravated robbery. The jury imposed death sentences for both counts of premeditated first degree murder after finding that evidence of three aggravating circumstances, i.e., (1) the defendant was previously convicted of one or more felonies whose statutory elements involved the use of violence to the person, (2) the murders were committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with, or preventing a lawful arrest of the defendant, and (3) the murders were knowingly committed, solicited, directed, or aided by the defendant while the defendant had a substantial role in committing or attempting to commit a robbery or kidnapping, outweighed evidence of mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. In addition, the trial court sentenced the defendant to concurrent 25-year sentences for the especially aggravated kidnapping convictions to run consecutively to concurrent 25-year sentences for the especially aggravated robbery convictions.

After the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the convictions and the sentences, the case was automatically docketed in this Court. We entered an order specifying seven issues for oral argument, and we now hold as follows: (1) the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s verdicts; (2) the trial court did not err in refusing to disqualify the District Attorney General; (3) the trial court did not err in refusing to allow defense counsel to withdraw; (4) the death sentences were not invalid on the ground that the aggravating circumstances were not set out in the indictment; (5) the trial court did not err in allowing the prosecution to establish the “prior violent felony” aggravating circumstance by relying on an offense committed as a juvenile; (6) the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s finding of three aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt and its determination that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the evidence of mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt; and (7) the death sentences were not arbitrary or disproportionate. We also agree with the Court of         Criminal Appeals’ conclusions with respect to the remaining issues, the relevant portions of which are included in the appendix to this opinion. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

State of Tennessee v. Christopher Davis - Concurring and Dissenting
M2001-01866-SC-DDT-DD
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho E. Birch
Trial Court Judge: J. Randall Wyatt, Jr.

The City of Humboldt, et al. v. J.R. McKnight, et al.
M2002-02639-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Ellen Hobbs Lyle

This lawsuit is about the operation and funding of public schools educating the children in Gibson County. Since 1981 the county has not operated a county school system, and all K-12 students have been in schools operated by the municipal and special school systems. The county ceased operating schools when a 1981 Private Act created the Gibson County Special School District. This arrangement was ratified by a 2002 Public Act stating that where all K-12 students are eligible to be served by city and special school systems, the county is not required to operate a separate county school system or have a county board of education. The trial court held that the 2002 Act was unconstitutional as special legislation and that the 1981 Act, though constitutional, was illegal. It ordered the dissolution of the Gibson County Special School District and that the county undertake operation of the schools not included in the other municipal or special school systems within the county. The court further found that the county was required to levy a countywide property tax to fund the local share of education costs and divide the proceeds among all school systems in the county. We hold that the 2002 Act does not violate Article XI, Section 8 of the Tennessee Constitution and, consequently, there is no obligation for the county to operate a county school system. We also conclude that the facts do not establish any disparity of educational opportunity among the school systems in the county and, consequently, the principles and holdings in the Small Schools cases do not apply to require a specific organizational structure and do not preclude the method used in Gibson County. Finally, we conclude the county is not required to levy a countywide property tax for schools. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's judgment.

Patricia Conley, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Martha Stinson, Deceased v. State of Tennessee
M2002-00813-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice E. Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge: Commissioner W.R. Baker

We granted review in this case to address three issues: (1) whether the State is a “governmental
entity” under Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-1-119(g) (Supp. 2003); (2) whether the State may be liable for medical malpractice under Tennessee Code Annotated section 9-8-307(a)(1)(D)
(2003), when there was no “professional/ client” relationship between the claimant and a state
employee; and (3) whether the State may be liable for the “negligent care, custody, or control” of a
person under Tennessee Code Annotated section 9-8-307(a)(1)(E) (2003) when it administers preadmission screening of a nursing home patient as required by federal statute. The Claims
Commission held that the claimant’s action was barred by the one-year statute of limitations because the State was not a governmental entity and also that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The Court of Appeals reversed on the statute of limitations issue and remanded for further proceedings on the actions formedicalmalpractice and negligent care, custody, and control. After reviewing the record and applicable authority, we conclude: (1) that the complaint was timely filed under Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-1-119(g) because the State is a “governmental entity”; (2) that the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted for medical malpractice because there was no “professional/client” relationship between a state employee and the claimant; and (3) that the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted for the State’s “negligent care, custody and control” when it is based on the State administered pre-admission screening of a nursing home patient as required by federal statute. We therefore affirm the Court of Appeals’ judgment in part and reverse in part.

Sheryl Heggs v. Wilson Inn Nashville-Elm Hill, Inc.
M2003-00919-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Thomas W. Brothers

This appeal involves a dispute between a hotel and a guest who slipped on a wet tile floor as she was making her way to an elevator on one of the hotel's guest floors. The guest filed a negligence action against the hotel in the Circuit Court for Davidson County, and the hotel answered and filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted the hotel's motion after determining, as a matter of law, that the hotel had satisfied its duty to the guest by setting out a yellow "wet floor" warning sign and that the guest was fifty percent or more at fault for her injuries. The guest has appealed. We have determined that the hotel has not demonstrated that it is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law and, therefore, we vacate the summary judgment.

Susan Chales and James Charles v. Ruth Latham and Ralph Latham
E2003-00852-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel Pickens Franks
Trial Court Judge: Judge W. Dale Young

In a dispute over an easement, the Trial Court awarded damages to plaintiffs for interference with use of easement, nuisance and punitive damages. On appeal, we affirm the award of compensatory damages, but vacate the award of punitive damages and remand to assess punitive damages in accordance with Hodges v. Toof & Co., 833.S.W.2d 896 (Tenn. 1992).

Jasmine Ali v. Eric Fisher, et al
E2003-00255-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice E. Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge: Judge John S. McLellan, III

We granted this appeal to determine whether an owner who negligently entrusted his car to another may be held vicariously liable for the driver's negligence in the operation of the car. The trial court submitted the case to the jury for allocation of fault on comparative fault principles, and the jury found the owner twenty percent (20%) at fault and the driver eighty percent (80%) at fault. The trial court later amended the judgment by holding that the owner-entrustor was vicariously liable for the negligence of the driver-entrustee and thus liable for all of the compensatory and punitive damages. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in concluding that the owner-entrustor was vicariously liable for the driver-entrustee's actions and reinstated the initial judgment. After reviewing the record and applicable authority, we conclude that an owner-entrustor's liability for negligent entrustment does not result in vicarious liability for the negligence of the driver-entrustee and that the trial court erred in holding the owner-entrustor liable for all the damages. We therefore affirm the Court of Appeals' judgment and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Donnie Wayne Johnson, Jr., v. City Roofing Company
W2003-01852-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Judge William B. Acree

This case is an appeal from an order granting Appellee’s motion for summary judgment. Appellant argues, as he did at trial, that this case involves genuine issues of material fact, rendering summary judgment inappropriate for this action. For the following reasons, we affirm.

St. Paul Reinsurance Co., LTD, v. Robert Williams and Sherrod Jackson, Individually and D/B/A Pure Passion, Pure Passion, Inc. and Eugene Pugh
W2003-00473-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Walter L. Evans

This case arises from events surrounding the shooting death of Decedent, Appellant’s son. Appellee filed a motion for summary judgment claiming its policy of insurance did not apply to the
circumstances of this case because Appellant’s claim was specifically excluded from the insurance policy. The trial court granted Appellee’s motion for summary judgment and, for the following reasons, we affirm.

Rocky Garner v. Phil Breeden & Associates
M2002-03103-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Carol L. McCoy

Appellant sued Appellee for breach of contract or in the alternative for quantum meruit value of services rendered. At the conclusion of Plaintiff's proof the trial court sustained a motion for a directed verdict on behalf of Defendant as to the quantum meruit claim and further sustained that motion on a large portion of the contract claim. As to remaining portions of the contract claim the motion for a directed verdict was overruled, and Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the remaining claims without prejudice. We hold that the trial court erred in granting the motion for a directed verdict as to the contract case but correctly granted a directed verdict as to quantum meruit. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded for trial on the contract issues.

Robert Kendall Broadbent v. Shari Katherine Langhi Broadbent
M2003-00583-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Marietta M. Shipley

This appeal involves a dispute over the responsibility for investment losses incurred by a spouse before and during the parties’ marriage. After only one year of marriage, the husband filed suit for divorce in the Circuit Court for Davidson County. The wife counterclaimed for divorce and, among other relief, sought alimony in solido to offset the loss of her separate property resulting from the husband’s aggressive stock market trading. Following a bench trial, the trial court granted the wife a divorce on the ground of inappropriate marital conduct and then, employing a comparative fault analysis, determined that the husband should pay the wife $51,500 in alimony in solido to reimburse her for her separate property lost in the stock market. The husband has appealed. We have determined that the wife is not entitled to be reimbursed for the losses caused by the husband’s investments.
 

Jamie Edward Hines v. Terrell Lynn Simms
M2003-01459-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Judge Muriel Robinson

This appeal involves a custody dispute triggered by a paternity action. The trial court fashioned a permanent parenting plan which named Father the primary residential parent during the school year and Mother the primary residential parent during summer vacation. Mother appeals. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Ricky Eugene Cofer v. State of Tennesse
E2003-01400-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Norma McGee Ogle
Trial Court Judge: Judge James B. Scott, Jr.

The petitioner, Ricky Eugene Cofer, appeals the order of the Circuit Court for Anderson County dismissing his post-conviction relief petition. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel was previously determined on direct appeal. The petition was properly dismissed. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.