State of Tennessee v. Michael Gooding
After a jury trial, Defendant Michael Gooding was convicted of third offense driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI). The trial court sentenced him to serve 160 days in the county workhouse. Defendant’s sole issue on appeal is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the conviction of DUI. We affirm the conviction of DUI, third offense, but remand for entry of a corrected judgment setting forth the correct sentence of 11 months and 29 days, with all but 160 days suspended for DUI, third offense, and for designation that counts 1, 2, and 4 are merged with count 3. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Kenneth Rich v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Kenneth Rich, appeals from the habeas corpus trial court’s order dismissing, without an evidentiary hearing, the petition for writ of habeas corpus relief filed by Petitioner. After reviewing the entire record, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court. |
Lake | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Ulysses Durham, Jr. ex rel. Ulysses Durham, III, a minor v. John Noble, et al.
This appeal arises out of a lawsuit brought by the parents of a minor child who was struck by a school bus while riding his bicycle. The matter proceeded to a bench trial, and the trial court found that the child was 58% percent at fault for the accident and that the defendants were 42% at fault; judgment was entered in favor of the defendants. Plaintiffs appeal. The trial court’s finding that the child was negligent was proper, and the evidence does not preponderate against the court’s allocation of fault between the parties; the judgment is affirmed in all respects. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Charles Raymond Loveday, et al v. Blount County, Tennessee, et al
Charles Raymond Loveday and his wife, Virginia Hope Loveday (collectively “the Plaintiffs”), filed this action in January 2011 against Blount County and the Blount County School Board (collectively “the Defendants”) to recover for flood damage to their property allegedly caused by the construction of a new school next to the Plaintiffs’ property. The school was built in 2007. The Plaintiffs allegedly sustained “permanent” damage in 2008, 2009 and 2010. The Defendants filed a motion to dismiss asserting that the action was barred by the statute of limitations for a taking. The trial court granted the motion. The Plaintiffs appeal. We affirm. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
Deborah Mason Hawkins, as Administratrix of the Estate of Wayne Hawkins, Deceased, and Deborah Mason Hawkins, Individually, v. Rodney A. Martin, M.D., et al.
The trial court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss in this medical malpractice action where Plaintiff failed to attach a HIPPA compliant medical authorization to her notice to Defendants prior to filing her complaint as required by Tennessee Code Annotated 29-26-121. Plaintiff appeals. We vacate and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Mark L. Holton, et al
The defendants filed a notice of appeal in the trial court seeking to appeal the court’s order of May 11, 2012. That order is not a final judgment. Accordingly, the defendants’ putative appeal is hereby dismissed. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Terry Mullins v. Alfred L. Locke, et al
Terry Mullins (“the Plaintiff”) filed this action seeking a declaratory judgment and an injunction to prohibit landowners (collectively “the Defendants”) to his south from using a driveway they constructed across his property. Following a bench trial, 1 the court dismissed the Plaintiff’s complaint. The court held that the proof established that the Defendants had a prescriptive easement over the Plaintiff’s property. The Plaintiff appeals. We remand to the trial court for the purpose of allowing that court to correct a defect in the record. |
Rhea | Court of Appeals | |
Griffith Services, LLC, et al v. Arrow Gas & Oil, Inc.
This appeal is from an order of the trial court entered February 23, 2012, which order denied the motion of the plaintiffs below, as later supplemented, seeking to amend, alter or set aside a prior order of the trial court dismissing the plaintiffs’ complaint. The order appealed from is not a final order. Accordingly, the plaintiffs’ appeal is hereby dismissed. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
J.M. Hanner Construction Co. v. Thomas Brothers Construction Co.
The plaintiff filed suit against the defendants to recover monies alleged to be due the plaintiff on two construction projections. The first complaint was involuntarily dismissed. The defendants averred that the plaintiff’s claims against them in the second complaint are barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The trial court found that the involuntary dismissal was not an adjudication on the merits. The defendants pursued this interlocutory appeal. We affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Erie Insurance Exchange v. Gary Rose, Individually and d/b/a American Masonry and Capital Builders, LLC
Defendant in a lawsuit filed in Williamson Countyappeals the dismissal of its separate action filed in Davidson County seeking a declaratory judgment; the Davidson County action was dismissed on the basis of prior suit pending. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Ashley E., Robert E., Jr. and Evan E.
Parents appeal the termination of their parental rights to three children, contending that the court erred in finding that the Department of Children’s Services complied with the notice requirements of Tenn. Code. Ann. § 37-2-403. We affirm the judgment terminating parental rights. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Robert Beazley, Jr.
This case concerns a dispute over attorney’s fees. Attorney, who was hired to represent a client in connection with the probate of her uncle’s estate, sued his former client and the beneficiaries of the estate under theories of civil conspiracy and inducement of breach of contract. Court found in favor of attorney and held the attorney was entitled to $20,000 in damages. The court trebled the damages in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-50-109. Finding that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s holding regarding inducement of breach of contract, we reverse the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Barry W. Bethel, et al. v. Neill Sandler Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc., et al.
This is an appeal of a jury verdict in favor of Plaintiff in an action for misrepresentation and breach of contract. The jury returned a general verdict finding Defendant liable and awarding Plaintiff $62,083.18 in compensatory damages. Defendant appeals, asserting that the elements of misrepresentation are not supported by the evidence and that the jury was improperly instructed on the issue of damages. We hold there is substantial and material evidence in supportof a finding that Defendant breached the contract between the parties and affirm the jury’s verdict in all respects. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Mickel Hoback v. City of Chattanooga
The City Commission terminated plaintiff as a police officer. He then filed a certiorari petition to the Chancery Court, where the Chancellor held that the Commission applied the wrong legal standard to the case, and the Chancellor reversed the Commission and ordered plaintiff to be reinstated as a policeman. On appeal, we affirm the Trial Court's ruling that the Commission applied the wrong legal standard to the facts of the case, but vacate the reinstatement of the officer and remand to the City Commission to apply the proper legal standards in a new trial in plaintiff's case. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Roger D. Roach v. Don Bunch, et al
Plaintiffs who own homes in Mallard Baye subdivision, brought this action against defendants who had constructed a septic system on several of the residential lots serving other properties, alleging that defendants acted in violation of the restrictive covenants of their subdivision. Following a bench trial, the Trial Court held that the defendants' construction of the septic system violated the subdivision restrictive covenants, and the defendants appealed. On appeal, we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court. |
Grainger | Court of Appeals | |
In the Matter of: Alijah K.F.
Because the order appealed is not a final judgment, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Tommy Lee Pendleton v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Tommy Lee Pendleton, pled guilty to two counts of aggravated sexual battery and received concurrent sentences of fourteen years. He filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to file a bill of particulars, by failing to obtain an expert witness to review the statements of the child victim, and by failing to spend adequate time investigating the case and preparing for trial. He further contends that his guilty pleas were involuntary because trial counsel’s errors tainted the plea process. Finally, he claims that the trial court should not have accepted his plea in light of his hesitance during the guilty plea hearing. Discerning no error in the proceedings, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Franklin | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Michael Jones v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Michael Jones, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his conviction for second degree murder and resulting thirty-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was unknowing, involuntary, and unintelligent because he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
O'Rane M. Cornish, Sr. v. Steven C. Cooper, et al.
Appellant filed his Notice of Appeal one day past the deadline imposed by Rule 4 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. Accordingly, this Court lacks jurisdiction and we must dismiss this appeal. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Heritage Operating, LP v. Henry County Propane Gas, Inc., et al.
The trial court entered an order granting Plaintiff’s motion to compel discovery and for discovery sanctions, and stated that the order was final under Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure 54.02. Defendant did not file a notice of appeal within 30 days of entry of the trial court’s order. Plaintiff subsequently filed a notice of voluntary nonsuit. Defendants filed a notice of appeal within 30 days of the trial court’s entry of an order of voluntary dismissal, and appeal the trial court’s award of discovery sanctions to Plaintiff. We hold that the order awarding sanctions was not an effective final judgment under Rule 54.02. Defendants’ appeal accordingly is timely. We vacate the award of sanctions and remand for further proceedings. |
Henry | Court of Appeals | |
Phedrek Davis v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Phedrek Davis, appeals from the Davidson County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis. In this appeal as of right, the Petitioner contends that the coram nobis court erred by summarily dismissing his petition. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Michael Stevison v. State of Tennessee
Michael Stevison (“the Claimant”), an inmate in the custody of the Department of Correction, filed a breach of contract claim against the State of Tennessee. His claim was assigned to the small claims docket of the Claims Commission. The State filed a “Motion to Dismiss and/or Motion for Summary Judgment,” both of which were granted by the Commission. The Claimant filed a notice of appeal seeking to appeal the adverse decision to this Court. The State filed a motion to dismiss the appeal based upon its argument that the relevant statutory scheme prohibits appeals from decisions on claims “appearing on the small claims docket.” Since we have no jurisdiction to hear this appeal, it is dismissed. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jerry Elliot
The Defendant, Jerry Elliot, was found guilty by a Henderson County Circuit Court jury of aggravated assault, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. § 39-13-102 (2010). He was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to ten years’ confinement. On appeal, he contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Henderson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Tucson Biggs
A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Tucson Biggs, of voluntary manslaughter. At the sentencing hearing, the State requested that the Defendant be sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender. The Defendant objected, claiming that the State did not comply with Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-202(a) by providing notice of its intent to seek an enhanced punishment. The trial court agreed with the Defendant and sentenced him to six years as a Range I offender. On appeal, the State contends that the Defendant was on notice that he would face an enhanced punishment because, before trial, the State filed a notice of intent to seek the death penalty and a notice of intent to impeach the Defendant’s testimony with his prior convictions, which satisfied the statutory requirements. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we agree that the State’s filings satisfied the purposes of the statutory notice requirement. As such, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for a new sentencing hearing. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Darnell Hubbard v. State of Tennessee
A Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner, Darnell Hubbard, of first degree murder, and he received a sentence of life without the possibility of parole. On appeal, this Court affirmed the Petitioner’s conviction. State v. Darnell Hubbard, No. W2007-02482-CCA-R3-CD, 2009 WL 2568200, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Aug. 20, 2009), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Nov. 23, 2009). The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, asserting several claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and a claim that the State failed to disclose exculpatory evidence to the defense. After a hearing on the petition, the post-conviction court denied the petition. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred when it denied his petition. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals |