City of Knox vs. Garuin
03A01-9801-CV-00038

State vs. Lester
03C01-9702-CR-00069

State vs. Gann
03C01-9707-CR-00274
Trial Court Judge: E. Eugene Eblen

State vs. Katz
03C01-9704-CC-00150
Trial Court Judge: James B. Scott, Jr.

3A01-9801-CH-00034
3A01-9801-CH-00034

3A01-9801-CV-00033
3A01-9801-CV-00033

Rodney Smith vs. State
01C01-9707-CC-00252
Trial Court Judge: L. Terry Lafferty

State vs. David McCormick
01C01-9707-CR-00295
Trial Court Judge: L. Terry Lafferty

Purkey vs. Purkey
03A01-9707-CV-00317

Atkins vs. Grooms
03A01-9708-JV-00337

Eblen vs. Johnson
03A01-9709-CH-00423

Hankins vs. Seaton
03A01-9710-CV-00468

Canonie vs. Tennessee
03A01-9710-CH-00481

Roach vs. Renfro
03A01-9711-CH-00517

Special Judge Hamilton v. Gayden, Jr.
01S01-9706-CV-00188
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Jim T. Hamilton,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Review of the findings of fact made by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the findings, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2). Stone v. City of McMinnville, 896 S.W.2d 548, 55 (Tenn. 1995). The application of this standard requires this Court to weigh in more depth the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court in a workers' compensation case. See Corcoran v. Foster Auto GMC, Inc., 746 S.W.2d 452, 456 (Tenn. 1988). In this case, the plaintiff brought suit against Epsco, Inc. ("Epsco") and later Hughes Parker Industries, Inc. ("Hughes Parker")1, alleging that he was entitled to workers' compensation benefits as a result of developing carpal tunnel syndrome in the course of his employment. The trial court dismissed the suit against Hughes Parker and found that Epsco was not prejudiced by the plaintiff giving notice of his injury on April 3, 1996. The trial court awarded the plaintiff 4 percent permanent partial disability to both arms and seven weeks of temporary total disability. Epsco appeals and presents the following issues: 1. The plaintiff's cause of action is barred by the plaintiff's failure to give timely notice. 2. The plaintiff's cause of action is barred by the applicable statute of limitations. 3. The permanent partial impairment award is excessive. 4. There is no basis for an award of temporary total disability. We affirm the judgment of the trial court that the plaintiff timely notified and filed suit against Epsco, we modify the judgment of the trial court to find that the plaintiff can recover 2 percent permanent partial disability to each upper extremity, and we reverse the judgment of the trial court that the plaintiff is entitled to temporary total disability benefits. 1 There is no issue raised concerning the dismissal of Hughes Parker in this case. 2

Charlotte Hull v. Emro Marketing Company
01S01-9709-CH-00201
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Don R. Ash,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court found that the plaintiff suffered an injury by accident on February 23, 1995 and was entitled to an award of 22 percent permanent partial impairment to the body as a whole ( $14,8. for permanent partial disability and $96. for temporary total disability payable in a lump sum), medical expenses incurred after March 9, 1995, and future medical treatment caused by the injury. The trial court ruled that Emro Marketing Company ("Emro") was liable for the award because it was the employer at the time of the most recent injury that bore a causal relation to the plaintiff's incapacity. Emro raises the following issues: 1. Whether the Chancellor erred in finding the subsequent employer liable under the last injurious injury rule when the subsequent injury was not suffered in the scope of the employee's employment with the subsequent employer. 2. Whether the Chancellor erred in applying the last injurious injury rule when the employee's initial injury was the strongest causal link to the disability of the employee, who had not fully recovered from her initial injury? The plaintiff contends the trial court properly found Emro liable, but says if it is not then Kwik Sak, Inc. ("Kwik Sak") and Reliance Insurance Company ("Reliance") are liable. Kwik Sak and Reliance say that Emro is liable as found, but if it is not then the plaintiff has not appealed from the action of the trial judge dismissing them as defendants. We find the trial judge erred in applying the repetitive injury rule and/or the last injurious injury rule in this case and find Kwik Sak and Reliance were the insurers at the time of the plaintiff's injury. Review of the findings of fact made by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the 2

Kevin Curtis v. Grundy Co. Sheriff's Dept., et al .
01S01-9607-CH-00131
Authoring Judge: William S. Russell, Retired Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon.

Charles D. Price vs. State
01C01-9702-CR-00042

Stone vs. Stone
M1997-00218-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Vernon Neal
This appeal involves a former spouse's efforts to extricate himself from the spousal support obligations contained in a marital dissolution agreement. Approximately one year after the entry of the divorce decree approving the agreement, the former husband requested the Chancery Court for Putnam County to set the agreement aside because he did not have independent legal advice and his judgment was impaired by antidepressant medication when he signed the agreement. The trial court modified portions of the decree but did not relieve the former husband of his spousal support obligation. Thereafter, the former husband filed a second motion seeking to terminate or reduce his spousal support obligations because of his former wife's improved financial circumstances. The trial court again declined to relieve the former husband of his obligation to pay spousal support. On this appeal, the former husband renews his argument that he should no longer be required pay spousal support because of his former wife's improved financial circumstance and his own weakened financial condition. We affirm the trial court's decision that the former husband has failed to prove the existence of a substantial, material change in circumstances that would warrant modifying his spousal support obligation.

State vs. Larry Catron
02C01-9710-CC-00376
Trial Court Judge: Joseph H. Walker, III

Albert Gregurek v. Swope Motors
M2002-02854-COA-R3-CV
Trial Court Judge: J. Curtis Smith
This case involves an interlocutory appeal from the trial court's denial of the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss on grounds of lack of personal jurisdiction and/or Motion for Summary Judgment. We reverse.

Evans vs. Steelman
01S01-9701-JV-00019

Evans vs. Steelman
01S01-9701-JV-00019

Tennessee Farmers Mutual Ins. Co. vs. Joseph Farmer & Debra Farmer
03S01-9707-CH-00081

State vs. Owen
03C01-9707-CC-00271
Trial Court Judge: D. Kelly Thomas, Jr.