03C01-9311-CR-00370
03C01-9311-CR-00370
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Polk County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 07/11/96 | |
01C01-9503-CC-00095
01C01-9503-CC-00095
Originating Judge:W. Lee Asbury |
Fentress County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 07/11/96 | |
03C01-9505-CR-00150
03C01-9505-CR-00150
Originating Judge:James E. Beckner |
Greene County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 07/11/96 | |
03C01-9509-CC-00270
03C01-9509-CC-00270
Originating Judge:R. Steven Bebb |
Monroe County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 07/11/96 | |
State of Tennessee ex. rel, John Jay Hooker, v. Brook Thompson, et. al., et al., State of Tennessee ex. rel., Lewis Laska v. Brook Thompson
01A01-9606-CH-00259
These cases are before the Court upon a Motion for Leave to File an Amicus Curiae Brief filed by Victor S. Johnson, III, District Attorney General for the Twentieth Judicial District, and Appellant John Jay Hooker's Supplemental Petition to Rehear. The Court having considered these matters, it is ORDERED: 1. The Motion for Leave to File an Amicus Curiae Brief is DENIED. 2. Appellant John Jay Hooker's Supplemental Petition to Rehear is DENIED.
Authoring Judge: Chief Justice William D. Fones
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Supreme Court | 07/11/96 | ||
02A01-9504-CH-00088
02A01-9504-CH-00088
Originating Judge:Paul E. Morris |
Chester County | Court of Appeals | 07/11/96 | |
Lamonte Pearson v. Day International, Inc, d/b/a Colonial Rubber Works, Inc. and Reliance Insurance Company
02S01-9503-CV-00023
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Worker's Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6- 225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The sole issue for review is the trial court's determination that an amended complaint filed against the Second Injury Fund was barred by the statute of limitations. For the following reasons, we affirm the decision of the trial court. On January 26, 1989, Lamonte Pearson ("Mr. Pearson") injured his back in an automobile accident that was not work related. Mr. Pearson's lawsuit was apparently unsuccessful at trial and no damages were awarded. On March 4, 1991, he again injured his back in the course of his employment with Day International, d/b/a Colonial Rubber Works, Inc. and was treated by the same physician. A complaint for worker's compensation benefits was timely filed on April 15, 1991. The complaint alleged that Mr. Pearson "suffered, and will continue to suffer, temporary total, temporary partial and possibly permanent total disability as a result of this work related injury." His prayer for relief requested an award of "such further temporary total, temporary partial, permanent partial, or permanent total disability and medical expenses to which this Court finds him entitled . . ." A motion to amend the complaint was filed on April 24, 1992, and leave to amend was granted on the same date. An amended complaint adding the Second Injury Fund was filed on May 29, 1992, more than one (1) year after the work related injury. The amended complaint further alleges that Mr. Pearson had previously sustained a permanent physical disability capable of supporting a workers' compensation award if it had arisen out of and in the course of employment and that he had become permanently and totally disabled through the subsequent work related injury. The Second Injury Fund asserted the bar of the statute of limitations. During his deposition in this case, Mr. Pearson's treating physician found him to have a permanent partial disability of 9% to the body as a whole as a result of the non-work related incident and 6% to the body as a whole as a result of the work related incident, or a 12% combined impairment rating under the AMA Guidelines. The trial court found Mr. Pearson to be 1% disabled and apportioned 45% of the award to Colonial and 55% to the Second Injury Fund; the court ruled that recovery against the Second 2
Authoring Judge: Janice M. Holder, Special Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. J. Steven Stafford, Judge |
Dyer County | Workers Compensation Panel | 07/11/96 | |
Lamonte Pearson v. Day International, Inc, d/b/a Colonial Rubber Works, Inc. and Reliance Insurance Company
02S01-9503-CV-00023
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Worker's Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6- 225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The sole issue for review is the trial court's determination that an amended complaint filed against the Second Injury Fund was barred by the statute of limitations. For the following reasons, we affirm the decision of the trial court. On January 26, 1989, Lamonte Pearson ("Mr. Pearson") injured his back in an automobile accident that was not work related. Mr. Pearson's lawsuit was apparently unsuccessful at trial and no damages were awarded. On March 4, 1991, he again injured his back in the course of his employment with Day International, d/b/a Colonial Rubber Works, Inc. and was treated by the same physician. A complaint for worker's compensation benefits was timely filed on April 15, 1991. The complaint alleged that Mr. Pearson "suffered, and will continue to suffer, temporary total, temporary partial and possibly permanent total disability as a result of this work related injury." His prayer for relief requested an award of "such further temporary total, temporary partial, permanent partial, or permanent total disability and medical expenses to which this Court finds him entitled . . ." A motion to amend the complaint was filed on April 24, 1992, and leave to amend was granted on the same date. An amended complaint adding the Second Injury Fund was filed on May 29, 1992, more than one (1) year after the work related injury. The amended complaint further alleges that Mr. Pearson had previously sustained a permanent physical disability capable of supporting a workers' compensation award if it had arisen out of and in the course of employment and that he had become permanently and totally disabled through the subsequent work related injury. The Second Injury Fund asserted the bar of the statute of limitations. During his deposition in this case, Mr. Pearson's treating physician found him to have a permanent partial disability of 9% to the body as a whole as a result of the non-work related incident and 6% to the body as a whole as a result of the work related incident, or a 12% combined impairment rating under the AMA Guidelines. The trial court found Mr. Pearson to be 1% disabled and apportioned 45% of the award to Colonial and 55% to the Second Injury Fund; the court ruled that recovery against the Second 2
Authoring Judge: Janice M. Holder, Special Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. J. Steven Stafford, Judge |
Dyer County | Workers Compensation Panel | 07/11/96 | |
State vs. Estenico Slayton
02C01-9703-CC-00117
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Dyer County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 07/11/96 | |
Billy Clevinger v. Burlington Motor Carriers, Inc.
03S01-9508-CV-00092
This workers' compensation appeal from the Hawkins County Circuit Court has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated Section 5-6-225(e) (3) (1995 Supp.) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. I. The plaintiff, Billy Clevinger ("employee"), is a resident of Hawkins County, Tennessee. The defendant, Burlington Motor Carriers, Inc., ("employer"), is a trucking company with its principal place of business in Indiana. The employee, who was hired in Tennessee, worked for the employer as truck driver. On December 1, 1993, the employee was driving one of the employer's trucks from Kentucky to Arkansas. While traveling through Tennessee on the way to Arkansas, he was involved in a single vehicle accident. The employee was hospitalized for a short time due to injuries sustained in the accident. He then returned to his home in Hawkins County. On December 28, 1993, the employee signed a document sent to him by the employer's claim adjustor entitled "Agreement to Compensation of Employee and Employer." The form contained the heading "Indiana Workers' Compensation Board, . . . Indianapolis, Indiana." The document included information concerning the date of injury, the type of injury (bruised left arm and strain of lower back), the place of injury, the employee's average weekly wage, and the amount the employee would be receiving as temporary total disability. The form also contained the declaration that " [w]e (employee and employer) have reached an agreement in regards to compensation for the injury sustained by said employee . . . ." The form further indicated that the "terms of the agreement . . . shall be payable . . . until terminated in accordance with the provisions of the Indiana Workers' Compensation/Occupational Diseases Acts." The employee 2
Authoring Judge: Penny J. White, Justice
Originating Judge:Hon. Ben K. |
Hawkins County | Workers Compensation Panel | 07/10/96 | |
State of Tennessee, ex rel. John Jay Hooker v. Brooke Thompson. State of Tennessee, ex rel., Lewis Laska v. Brook Thompson, State of Tennessee, ex rel., Lewis Laska v. Brook Thompson
01A01-9606-CH-00259
The matters currently pending before this Court are a Petition to Rehear filed by Appellant Hooker, Appellees' Motion for Clarification and Appellees' Motion to Supplement the Record filed by the Attorney General, Petition on behalf of Holly K. Lillard and Jerry L. Smith to Intervene for the Limited Purpose of Responding to Appellees' Motion for Clarification, Petition for Rehearing and Motion to Supplement the Record filed by appellant Laska, Appellees' Petition to Rehear filed by the Attorney General and Motion of Penny J. White to Intervene.
Authoring Judge: Chief Justice William H. D. Fones
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Davidson County | Supreme Court | 07/10/96 | |
William Cantrell vs. DeKalb County, et al
M1998-00964-COA-R3-CV
This appeal involves two deputy sheriffs' response to a church's complaint that one of its members was disrupting a church assembly. After the deputy sheriffs suggested that he leave the premises, the church member filed a civil rights action in the Circuit Court for DeKalb County alleging that the two deputies had unlawfully detained him and had interfered with his right to practice his religion. The law enforcement officers, asserting qualified immunity, moved for a summary judgment. The trial court denied their motion. We have determined that the trial court erred because the undisputed facts demonstrate that the officers are entitled to qualified immunity because they acted reasonably and did not violate any of the church members' clearly established statutory or constitutional rights. Accordingly, we vacate the order denying the summary judgment and remand the case with directions that it be dismissed.
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Originating Judge:John J. Maddux |
DeKalb County | Court of Appeals | 07/10/96 | |
01A01-9502-CV-00045
01A01-9502-CV-00045
Originating Judge:Vernon Neal |
Putnam County | Court of Appeals | 07/10/96 | |
Byrd v. Hall, (Tenn.1995), 847 Sw2D, 213, "A Conclusory Assertion That The Non-Moving
01A01-9502-CV-00045
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Putnam County | Court of Appeals | 07/10/96 | |
02A01-9507-JV-00155
02A01-9507-JV-00155
Originating Judge:Kenneth A. Turner |
Shelby County | Court of Appeals | 07/10/96 | |
01A01-9511-CV-00527
01A01-9511-CV-00527
Originating Judge:Walter C. Kurtz |
Davidson County | Court of Appeals | 07/10/96 | |
01A01-9510-CH-00458
01A01-9510-CH-00458
Originating Judge:Tom E. Gray |
Sumner County | Court of Appeals | 07/10/96 | |
02A01-9409-CH-00221
02A01-9409-CH-00221
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Shelby County | Court of Appeals | 07/10/96 | |
02A01-9511-CH-00259
02A01-9511-CH-00259
Originating Judge:C. Neal Small |
Shelby County | Court of Appeals | 07/10/96 | |
02A01-9506-CH-00138
02A01-9506-CH-00138
Originating Judge:Floyd Peete, Jr. |
Shelby County | Court of Appeals | 07/10/96 | |
X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX
X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX
Originating Judge:Thomas W. Brothers |
Davidson County | Court of Appeals | 07/10/96 | |
02A01-9504-CV-00089
02A01-9504-CV-00089
Originating Judge:Robert A. Lanier |
Shelby County | Court of Appeals | 07/10/96 | |
01A01-9601-CH-00039
01A01-9601-CH-00039
Originating Judge:Cornelia A. Clark |
Hickman County | Court of Appeals | 07/10/96 | |
Billy Clevinger v. Burlington Motor Carriers, Inc.
03S01-9508-CV-00092
This workers' compensation appeal from the Hawkins County Circuit Court has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated Section 5-6-225(e) (3) (1995 Supp.) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. I. The plaintiff, Billy Clevinger ("employee"), is a resident of Hawkins County, Tennessee. The defendant, Burlington Motor Carriers, Inc., ("employer"), is a trucking company with its principal place of business in Indiana. The employee, who was hired in Tennessee, worked for the employer as truck driver. On December 1, 1993, the employee was driving one of the employer's trucks from Kentucky to Arkansas. While traveling through Tennessee on the way to Arkansas, he was involved in a single vehicle accident. The employee was hospitalized for a short time due to injuries sustained in the accident. He then returned to his home in Hawkins County. On December 28, 1993, the employee signed a document sent to him by the employer's claim adjustor entitled "Agreement to Compensation of Employee and Employer." The form contained the heading "Indiana Workers' Compensation Board, . . . Indianapolis, Indiana." The document included information concerning the date of injury, the type of injury (bruised left arm and strain of lower back), the place of injury, the employee's average weekly wage, and the amount the employee would be receiving as temporary total disability. The form also contained the declaration that " [w]e (employee and employer) have reached an agreement in regards to compensation for the injury sustained by said employee . . . ." The form further indicated that the "terms of the agreement . . . shall be payable . . . until terminated in accordance with the provisions of the Indiana Workers' Compensation/Occupational Diseases Acts." The employee 2
Authoring Judge: Penny J. White, Justice
Originating Judge:Hon. Ben K. Wexler |
Hawkins County | Workers Compensation Panel | 07/10/96 | |
State of Tennessee, ex rel. John Jay Hooker v. Brook Thompson, et al. State of Tennessee , ex rel. Lewis Laska
01A01-9606-CH-00259
At the oral argument in this matter on July 5, 1996, an amicus curiae brief was filed by John King, who purports to be the Tennessee Republican party's nominee for the Supreme Court vacancy at issue in these cases. Verbal permission was granted by the Court at the July 5 hearing for the filing of additional briefs no later than Monday, July 8, 1996. Yesterday, in accordance with the Court's deadline, Mr. King filed a supplemental amicus curiae brief in this matter, asserting that this Court had erred in denying him the equitable relief granted to Justice Penny White and Appellant Lewis Laska. Mr. King does not assert that it was inappropriate for this Court to fashion the equitable relief granted; he “. . . simply asserts that, under the circumstances he is also entitled to an equitable remedy in the form of an extension of the qualifying deadline for nominees of a party to the same extent extended for Justice White and Mr. Laska.” (Supplemental Amicus Curiae Brief of John K. King, page 5.) Because of the pressing nature of this matter, the Court made its ruling and entered an Order on July 5, 1996 within a few hours after oral argument, to be followed by an opinion. Although none of the parties had called T.C.A. § 17-1-301 to the Court's attention, in the course of researching the law and preparing to write its opinion over the weekend, the Court reviewed the provisions of T.C.A. § 17-1-301, which make it clear that the Supreme Court vacancy at issue in this case must be filled from the Eastern Grand Division of Tennessee. This effectively mooted the issue of Appellant Laska's residence in the Western Grand Division. On Monday, July 8, 1996, this Court issued its Order vacating its remand to the Chancellor for a ruling as to Mr. Laska's residence vel non in the Western District and denying Mr. Laska’s request for mandamus on grounds that he lacked standing to become a candidate.
Authoring Judge: Chief Justice William H. D. Fones
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Davidson County | Supreme Court | 07/09/96 |