APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is an estate recovery action initiated by TennCare, the State of Tennessee’s Medicaid program. The trial court denied the estate’s administrator’s exception to TennCare’s claim. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Donavan Daniel, was convicted in the Weakley County Circuit Court of three counts of first degree felony murder, one count of first degree premeditated murder, one count of especially aggravated robbery, and one count of possession of marijuana with intent to sell or deliver. After a bifurcated sentencing hearing, the jury sentenced him to life without parole for two counts of first degree felony murder, life for the remaining count of first degree felony murder, and life for first degree premeditated murder. This court affirmed the convictions on direct appeal and affirmed the denial of post-conviction relief. Subsequently, the Petitioner filed a motion to reopen his post-conviction petition. After a hearing, the post-conviction court granted the motion to reopen, granted post-conviction relief, and reduced the Petitioner’s two sentences of life without parole to life. On appeal, the State contends that the post-conviction court erred in applying State v. Booker, 656 S.W.3d 49 (Tenn. 2022), to the Petitioner’s sentences of life without parole and, therefore, erred in reducing the Petitioner’s sentences to life. We agree with the State. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is reversed, and the Petitioner’s sentences of life without parole for first degree felony murder in counts three and four are reinstated.

Petitioner, Richard E. Reed, appeals as of right from the Knox County Criminal Court’s
denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, wherein he challenged convictions for
possession with intent to sell 0.5 grams or more of cocaine in a drug-free school zone;
possession with intent to deliver 0.5 grams or more of cocaine in a drug-free school zone;
possession with intent to sell 0.5 grams or more of cocaine within a drug-free childcare
zone; possession with intent to deliver 0.5 grams or more in a drug-free childcare zone;
possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony; and unlawful
possession of a weapon by a convicted felon, for which the trial court imposed an effective
twenty-year sentence. On appeal, Petitioner asserts that he received ineffective assistance
of appellate counsel for failure to include an offer-of-proof transcript in the appellate
record; that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress; and that he was denied
due process because he was not permitted to testify or call trial counsel as a witness at the
post-conviction hearing. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of
the post-conviction court.

A hearing panel of the Board of Professional Responsibility found that James B. Johnson violated Rules 1.6, 1.16, and 8.4(a) and (d) of the Tennessee Rules of Professional Conduct when he publicly filed confidential communications between him and his client as an exhibit to a motion to withdraw. The panel suspended him from the practice of law for three months with thirty days as an active suspension and imposed additional continuing legal education requirements. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm.

In 2012, the Defendant, Jesse L. Kutrieb, pleaded guilty to two counts of vandalism of property valued at $500 or less, three counts of burglary other than a habitation, theft of property valued at $500 or less, and two counts of theft of property valued between $1,000 and $10,000. The trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of four years of supervised probation. The Defendant moved out of state without notifying his probation officer and was arrested and convicted of multiple offenses in Michigan. On this basis, the trial court revoked his probation and ordered the Defendant to serve his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court erred when it revoked his probation because it did not rely on the facts set forth in the probation violation warrant, which only included absconding. After a thorough review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Tammy Cothren Dabbs, Defendant, pleaded guilty to possession of 0.5 grams or more of methamphetamine with intent to sell, and the trial court sentenced her to eight years suspended to probation. The trial court subsequently issued a probation violation warrant and multiple amended warrants alleging violations of probation Rule 8 based upon Defendant’s multiple positive drug tests for amphetamine and methamphetamine. At an evidentiary hearing, Defendant admitted to violating the terms of her probation, and the trial court determined the consequences of the violation. Defendant appeals, claiming that the trial court erred by ordering her to serve the balance of her eight-year sentence. Following a review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Following a retrial, Defendant, William Eugene Moon, was convicted by a Coffee County jury of attempted second degree murder and employment of a firearm during the commission of or attempt to commit a dangerous felony and sentenced to an effective sixteen-year sentence to serve in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter; that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a written request for the jury instruction before the jury began its deliberation; that the trial court erred by denying Defendant’s motion to suppress his statements; and that Defendant was denied a speedy trial. Having reviewed the entire record and the arguments of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In 2023, the Defendant, Aimee Lee Higby, entered a guilty plea to the facilitation of first degree felony murder, aggravated child abuse, and abuse of a corpse. By agreement, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of twenty-seven years. Thereafter, the Defendant filed a motion to withdraw her plea, which the trial court denied after a hearing. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it denied her motion to withdraw her guilty plea. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The majority opinion offers a thoughtful examination of this challenging case. I agree with much of the majority’s well-stated analysis, but there is a salient point of departure between the majority’s understanding and mine. This point of departure relates to whether admission into evidence of Mr. Moon’s post-shooting statements to Officer Wilder violates the protections afforded by Miranda. I conclude that it does, and, accordingly, respectfully dissent.

This is a parental rights termination case.  Nathaniel D. (“the Child”) is the minor child of Haleigh D. (“Mother”) and Richard L. (“Father”).  Mother later married Zachary D. (“Stepfather”).  Meanwhile, Father sought to be a part of the Child’s life.  In an agreed order of paternity, the Juvenile Court for Knox County (“the Juvenile Court”) stated that “any and all issues related to Custody, visitation, and child support are reserved and referred to the Custody Magistrate.”  The issue of child support remained unaddressed.  Ultimately, Mother and Stepfather (“Petitioners,” collectively) filed a petition in the Chancery Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”) seeking to terminate Father’s parental rights.  The Trial Court terminated Father’s parental rights on the sole ground of abandonment by failure to support.  Father appeals.  It is uncontested that Father failed to pay any support even though he had the means to do so.  However, Father has successfully asserted and proven by a preponderance of the evidence that his failure to support was not willful.  We reverse.

A landlord filed a detainer action in general sessions court against a tenant, seeking possession of the property and unpaid rent. The tenant agreed to move out, and the rent obligation was later discharged by a third party. The tenant filed an appeal to circuit court, and the circuit court dismissed the case, finding that the tenant did not appeal within ten days of the general sessions court’s judgment. The tenant appealed. On appeal, the tenant, appearing pro se, does not address the basis of the circuit court’s dismissal of the case, an untimely appeal from general sessions court to circuit court. Because the tenant has not challenged the basis of the circuit court’s ruling, we dismiss the appeal.

Although I agree that Father did sufficiently raise in his answer the affirmative defense of lack of willfulness regarding the statutory ground of failure to pay child support, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding and instead believe that Father’s failure to pay support was willful according to Tennessee law. As the majority points out, the proof was “undisputed that Father paid no child support during the relevant four-month period despite having the ability to pay.” Father argued that such failure was not willful because he had relied on the January 2021 agreed order of paternity entered by the juvenile court, which stated that “any and all issues related to . . . child support are reserved and referred to the Custody Magistrate,” and the fact that no further orders concerning child support had been entered.

In proceedings to terminate his parental rights, a father who lived out of state claimed that he was not served with process.  The case went to trial based upon substitute service, and the father’s parental rights were terminated.  Because we conclude that the father was not properly served, we vacate the judgment terminating his parental rights.

The Petitioner, Bernard Woodard, was convicted of burglary, theft of property valued at $2500 or more, and felony evading arrest. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner, as a career offender, to an effective eighteen-year sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, this court affirmed the judgments. State v. Woodard, No. M2020- 01538-CCA-R3-CD, 2021 WL 5467384, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 23, 2021), no perm. app. filed. The Petitioner filed a post-conviction petition alleging, among other claims, that he had received the ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition for failure to state a colorable claim. On appeal, this court reversed and concluded that the petition raised colorable claims and remanded the case for further proceedings. Woodard v. State, No. M2022-00162-CCA-R3-PC, 2022 WL 4932885, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 4, 2022), no perm. app. filed. On remand, the post-conviction court held a hearing and later issued an order denying relief. The Petitioner appeals, maintaining that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

The defendant, Christopher Alan Ayotte, pled guilty to one count of sexual exploitation of a minor with greater than one hundred images, two counts of rape of a child, two counts of aggravated sexual battery, and one count of rape. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered an effective sentence of one hundred and twenty-four years in confinement. On appeal, the defendant contends the trial court erred in sentencing him. Upon review of the record, the parties’ briefs, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand for entry of a corrected judgment form as to Count One of Case No. 2023-B-1260 reflecting the defendant's multiple offender status.

The Petitioner, Keinesa Lillard, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of her petition for post-conviction relief challenging her convictions for attempted second degree murder, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, especially aggravated robbery, evading arrest by use of a motor vehicle involving risk of death or serious bodily injury to others, and four counts of simple possession of a controlled substance. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by denying relief on her claim that she received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Specifically, the Petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective for (1) failing to communicate with her regarding the State’s proof; (2) failing to review discovery materials with her; and (3) failing to discuss pretrial motions and strategy with her. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This matter is before the Court upon the pro se Appellant’s petition for an accelerated interlocutory appeal pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, § 2. The Appellant asks this Court to review the trial court’s July 31, 2025 order denying his motion to recuse Judge Donald Allen. The State has filed a response in opposition to the petition. Having reviewed the petition, the supporting documents, and the State’s response, this Court has determined that additional briefing and oral argument are unnecessary. See Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B, § 2.05, 2.06. The trial court’s order is hereby AFFIRMED.

James Patrick Stout, Defendant, appeals the summary dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 as well as the denial of his motion for recusal and motion for contempt. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Lacey Jones, appeals the trial court’s summary dismissal of his motion1 to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 based on his claim that he was illegally sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Petitioner, Kevin D. Buford, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing that the post-conviction erred in denying his claims that trial counsel was ineffective by failing to seek a continuance, failing to establish a defense, calling him to testify, and failing to call an expert witness. He further argues that trial counsel’s representation resulted in prejudice and that he is entitled to relief based on the cumulative effect of trial counsel’s errors. Following our review of the entire record, the briefs of the parties, and arguments of counsel, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

An inmate at Turney Center Industrial Complex (“TCIX”) was convicted of introducing drugs into the complex by the prison’s disciplinary board. After failed administrative appeals, the inmate filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court for Hickman County. The inmate alleged that the TCIX Disciplinary Board and TCIX staff violated multiple disciplinary policies and that there was no material evidence to support his conviction. The trial court denied his petition. This appeal followed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

The sole issue in this interlocutory appeal is whether the plaintiffs properly served the corporate defendant with process. The trial court determined that plaintiffs did so because the employee who signed for the documents was an appointed subagent of the defendant’s registered agent. Having reviewed the record and relevant authorities, we reverse.

On August 27, 2025, Defendant Timothy Laquan Davis, Jr. filed an application seeking an extraordinary appeal of the trial court’s order, filed on July 24, 2025, denying his motion to strike the State’s notice to seek enhanced punishment in this case pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202(d). Tenn. R. App. P. 10. Pursuant to prior order, the State filed its response on September 8, 2025. In the meantime, on September 2, 2025, Defendant Braze Roland Rucker filed an almost identical application for permission to appeal. Given the fact Mr. Davis and Mr. Rucker are co-defendants, and considering the identical issue being raised, the court hereby consolidates the two applications for purposes of its review. Tenn. R. App. P. 16(b). Upon full consideration, the applications are denied for the reasons stated below.

An extraordinary appeal may be granted from an interlocutory order of a trial court if this Court determines the trial court “has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings as to require immediate review” or “if necessary for complete determination of the action on appeal.” Tenn. R. App. P. 10(a). A party must obtain permission from this Court for an extraordinary appeal; it is not a matter of right. Id. To that end, an application for permission to appeal must contain a statement of the question(s) presented for review, a statement of the facts, a statement of the reason(s) supporting an extraordinary appeal, and the relief sought. Tenn. R. App. P. 10(c). Furthermore, the application must contain a copy of the trial court order from which an appeal is being sought, as well as copies of other parts of the record necessary for determination of the application, such as the transcript of any hearing held on the motion at issue. Id. Because, generally, there is no record on appeal when a party seeks an extraordinary appeal, it is the party’s responsibility to provide this Court with an ad hoc 09/12/2025 2 record of the proceeding below. The Defendants’ applications are adequate for this Court’s review.

The Defendant, John Wendell Lewis, appeals from his guilty-pleaded conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, a Class B felony. See T.C.A. § 39- 17-1307(b)(1)(A) (Supp. 2022) (subsequently amended). The trial court ordered the Defendant to serve an eight-year sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant, a Range I offender, contends the court erred by denying alternative sentencing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Lionel Vashon Champion, was convicted by a Madison County Circuit Court jury of possession with intent to sell .5 grams or more of cocaine, a Class B felony; possession with intent to deliver .5 grams or more of cocaine, a Class B felony; use or unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor; two counts of unlawful possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony, Class D felonies; four counts of unlawful possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a felony drug offense, Class C felonies; unlawful possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a crime of violence, a Class C felony; and eight counts of unlawful possession of a firearm during the commission of or attempt to commit a dangerous felony having previously been convicted of a felony drug offense, Class D felonies. See T.C.A. §§ 39-17-417 (Supp. 2022) (subsequently amended) (possession of a controlled substance), 39-17-425 (2018) (possession of drug paraphernalia); 39-17-1324 (Supp. 2024) (armed dangerous felonies); 39-17-1307 (Supp. 2022) (subsequently amended) (carrying or possession of weapons). The trial court sentenced the Defendant, a career offender, to serve an effective sentence of forty-two years, eleven months, and twenty-nine days. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the Defendant’s incoming and outgoing text messages, (2) the court erred in permitting a witness to read one of the text messages to the jury, and (3) the court erred in denying the motion for a new trial. We affirm the trial court’s judgments.