APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The trial court determined Defendants/Appellants were liable for damages arising from
negligent misrepresentation and breach of contract. We reverse.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Bradley Michael Lesniewski, was convicted of possession of a handgun by a felon; possession of a firearm by a felon-prior felony drug conviction; false imprisonment; evading arrest; possession of a Schedule I controlled substance with intent to sell or deliver (Heroin); possession of a Schedule II controlled substance with intent to sell or deliver (0.5 grams or more of Methamphetamine); possession of a Schedule II controlled substance with intent to sell or deliver (Fentanyl); possession of drug paraphernalia; and driving while license is suspended, cancelled, or revoked. For these offenses, the trial court imposed a total effective sentence of twenty years’ incarceration. On appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions. Following a thorough review, we affirm Defendant’s convictions but remand for the merger of two counts and the entry of corrected judgment forms.

The majority opinion offers a thoughtful examination of the issues before this court.
I agree fully with the majority that the failure to make an offer of proof results in the waiver
of Wife’s challenge to exclusion of the testimony of Anthony Bradley, the drafter of the
trust. Nevertheless, because I do not understand the trust to operate in the same manner as
my colleagues, I respectfully dissent.

The decedent left a will in which he directed the majority of his property into a trust. The
trust named his wife as the trustee. The trust made several specific distributions to wife
effective upon the decedent’s death, including the grant of life estate interests in certain
assets. Several other beneficiaries were designated to receive distributions from the life
estate assets upon wife’s death. The trust directed its remaining assets into a separate
marital trust which provided that all income generated by its property would be distributed
to wife. It also provided that the trustee would be required to distribute as much of the
principal of the marital trust to wife as she requested in writing and granted her a power of
appointment. Several of the remaining trust beneficiaries filed a petition to construe the
trust in the Shelby County probate court. They sought an order declaring that the remainder
interests of assets in which wife had been granted life estates did not pass into the marital
trust. The probate court held that the remainder interests did not pass into the marital trust
and wife could not alter or destroy them. Wife appeals. We affirm in part and reverse in
part.

Petitioner, Kevin Waggoner, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing (1) the trial court participated in an ex parte jury proceeding which violated hisright to an impartial jury; (2) his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to attend the jury proceeding at the local high school; (3) his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to remove a juror who admittedduring trial that she knew one of the State’s witnesses; (4) his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to request a subpoena duces tecum for a single record from a juror’s Facebook record; (5) the post-conviction court erred in denying a subpoena duces tecum for the juror’s Facebookaccount; and (6) the cumulative errors undermine confidence in the verdict. Upon review of the entire record, the briefs and arguments of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

In this case involving termination of a mother’s parental rights to her child, the trial court determined that clear and convincing evidence supported two grounds for termination: abandonment by failure to visit and abandonment by failure to financially support the child. The trial court also found that termination was in the child’s best interest. The mother has appealed. After thorough review, we affirm the trial court’s determination relative to the ground of abandonment by failure to support. However, the evidence did not support a finding of abandonment by failure to visit, and we reverse the trial court’s determination as to that ground. We vacate, for insufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial court’s conclusion that termination was in the child’s best interest and remand this case to the trial court with instructions to conduct a thorough analysis of the best interest factors found in Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(i).

In this case involving termination of a mother’s parental rights to her child, the trial court
determined that clear and convincing evidence supported two grounds for termination:
abandonment by failure to visit and abandonment by failure to financially support the
child. The trial court also found that termination was in the child’s best interest. The
mother has appealed. After thorough review, we affirm the trial court’s determination
relative to the ground of abandonment by failure to support. However, the evidence did
not support a finding of abandonment by failure to visit, and we reverse the trial court’s
determination as to that ground. We vacate, for insufficient findings of fact and
conclusions of law, the trial court’s conclusion that termination was in the child’s best
interest and remand this case to the trial court with instructions to conduct a thorough
analysis of the best interest factors found in Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(i).

This appeal involves a grandmother and grandfather’s petition to terminate the parental
rights of a father to two of his children. The petition alleged the following grounds for
termination: (1) abandonment by failure to visit, (2) abandonment by failure to support,
and (3) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody. The trial court
held that each ground was proven by clear and convincing evidence. The trial court also
determined that the termination of parental rights was in the best interests of the children.
The father appeals. We ultimately affirm the termination of the father’s parental rights but
must vacate the trial court’s determination regarding the failure to manifest an ability and
willingness to assume

Petitioner, James Hudgins, was convicted in 2014 of first degree murder. State v. Hudgins, No. E2015-01363-CCA-R3-CD, 2016 WL 4413281, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 18, 2016), perm. app. denied(Tenn. Oct. 19, 2016). His conviction was affirmed on appeal. Petitioner sought post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, including a claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to present evidence that Petitioner’s mother told multiple people she drugged him with Xanax on the day of the shooting.Hudgins v. State, No. E2019-02173-CCA-R3-PC, 2020 WL 7589670, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 22, 2020), perm. app. denied(Tenn. Apr. 7, 2021). Petitioner was unsuccessful in pursuingpost-conviction relief. Petitioner then filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis alleging that newly discovered evidence existed to show that his mother drugged him on the night of the shooting. In a supplement to the petition, Petitioner acknowledged the petition was untimely but claimed that he was entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. After a hearing, the coram nobis court issued an order denying the petition. Petitioner appealed. After a review, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

Because the order from which the appellant has filed an appeal does not constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

The pro se Defendant has filed an application seeking an interlocutory appeal from the trial court’s order granting counsel’s motion to withdraw from representation. Upon preliminary consideration, we determine that the application is procedurally insufficient for this court’s review. Therefore, the State need not file an answer to the application. The Defendant’s application for interlocutory appeal is DENIED

Defendant, Roderick Darnell Stafford, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for two counts of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon in Counts 1 and 2, one count of possessing a firearm after being convicted of a felony drug offense in Count 3, and one count of possessing a firearm after being convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence in Count 4. Defendant pleaded guilty as charged in Counts 2 and 3, with the trial court to determine the length, manner, and alignment of service. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant to four years’ confinement for Count 2 and five years’ confinement for Count 3, ordering the sentences to run consecutively for an effective sentence of nine years’ confinement. The remaining counts were dismissed. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred by (1) imposing enhanced sentences, (2) ordering consecutive alignment of his sentences, and (3) ordering him to serve his sentences in confinement. After review, we remand the matter to the trial court for entry of judgment forms for Counts 1 and 4. In all other respects, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Laquala Malone, pled guilty in the Shelby County Criminal Court to one
count of aggravated assault. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied the
Defendant’s application for judicial diversion and imposed a three-year sentence to be
served on supervised probation. The Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred
by denying her request for judicial diversion. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The plaintiff in this action sought to collaterally attack a child support judgment and raised allegations of constitutional and other violations of law by several named defendants, including Child Support Services, the plaintiff’s former spouse, and the State of Tennessee. The trial court dismissed the complaint, determining, inter alia, that the plaintiff had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The plaintiff has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

The Defendant, Nakeavious Milan, entered a guilty plea to one count of voluntary
manslaughter, a Class C felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-211 (Supp. 2022). Pursuant
to his plea agreement, the Defendant was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to
eight years, with the trial court to determine whether the Defendant would be permitted to
serve his sentence on probation. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied the
Defendant’s request for full probation and ordered him to serve his eight-year sentence in
confinement. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in
denying his request for full probation. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial
court.

The Defendant, Kyle Baptiste, appeals his Hardeman County Circuit Court conviction of
rape, for which he received a sentence of twenty years’ incarceration. On appeal, the
Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction. Discerning
no error, we affirm.

Because the order from which the appellant has filed an appeal does not constitute a final
appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

A Madison County jury convicted the defendant, Jeremy Brian Poe, of one count of theft of property greater than $10,000, but less than $60,000. On appeal, the defendant contends the evidence was insufficient to sustain hisconviction, and the trial court erred in sentencing the defendant as a Range III offender. Upon our review of the record, the parties’ briefs, oral argument, and the applicable law, we affirm the defendant’s conviction.However, following ourreview of the defendant’s sentence, we conclude the trial court erred in its application ofTennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-107(b)and in finding the defendant to be a Range III, persistent offender. Accordingly, the defendant’s Range III sentence requires reversal, and we remand this matter for resentencing.

A Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B petition for recusal appeal was filed in this Court
following the denial of Petitioner’s motion for the disqualification of the trial court judge.
Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant appeals the trial court’s judgment in favor of Appellee for work performed pursuant to an oral contract between the parties. Discerning no error, we affirm.

A Macon County jury convicted the Defendant, Keith Douglas Garrett, of one count of unlawful photography and one count of observation without consent. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to serve eleven months and twenty-nine days and to register as a sexual offender. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the prosecution was void due to alleged defects in the arrest process and that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress statements he made to investigators under Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967).He also challenges the admission of digital evidence extracted from his cell phone and alleges that the State failed to disclose an additional forensic extraction report. In addition, he contends that the State engaged in an improper closing argument. Finally, he challenges the trial court’s sentencing determinations, including the denial of judicial diversion and alternative sentencing and the requirement that he register as a sexual offender. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner seeks accelerated review of the denial of her motion to recuse the trial judge.
The trial court deemed the motion repetitive. We agree.

A Madison County jury convicted the defendant, Jason O. Miller, of aggravated assault
and domestic assault, for which he received an effective sentence of eight years in
confinement to be served at 100%. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of
the evidence supporting his conviction for aggravated assault. The State concedes that the
evidence is insufficient to support the defendant’s conviction. Upon review, we conclude
there was insufficient evidence to sustain the defendant’s conviction for aggravated assault.
However, as there was sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction of assault, we reverse the
judgment for aggravated assault, modify the conviction to assault, and remand for a new
sentencing hearing and entry of an amended judgment.

The appellant, AA/AAA Bonding Company, appeals its suspension from writing bonds in
the Twenty-Sixth Judicial District due to its failure to comply with the applicable statutes.
Based upon the record, the parties’ briefs, and oral argument, we affirm the decision of the
trial court.

This appeal concerns a local board of education’s decision to dismiss a tenured teacher.
The teacher sought judicial review of his dismissal in the trial court. The trial court found
no grounds for dismissal and reversed the board’s decision. The board appeals. We
conclude that the teacher was insubordinate in showing his class a video containing
profanity without parental consent. However, this lone act of insubordination did not
warrant the drastic step of dismissal given the teacher’s long record of good service. We
affirm the trial court’s judgment as modified.