APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, Michael Thomas Hunter, Jr., was convicted of six counts of aggravated sexual battery of a child less than thirteen years of age, a Class B felony, at a bench trial in the Montgomery County Circuit Court. See T.C.A. § 39-13-504 (2018) (subsequently amended). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to serve ten years at 100% for each offense, with five of the six sentences to be served consecutively. The court also ordered community supervision for life and placement on the sexual offender registry. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss for violation of his right to a speedy trial, (2) the court erred in denying his motion to suppress his post-polygraph statements, (3) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, and (4) the court erred in sentencing him. We affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand for the correction of a clerical error in the offense date on the judgment for Count 6.

The Defendant, Lucian A. Clemmons, appeals from his convictions for first degree premeditated murder, aggravated assault, and reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon. On appeal, he asserts constitutional and evidentiary claims related to the trial court’s exclusion of prior statements he made to the lead detective following his arrest. Additionally, as to the murder conviction, the Defendant contends that it was error for the trial court to refuse to instruct the jury on self-defense and that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s verdict because the State failed to establish premeditation beyond a reasonable doubt. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is a declaratory judgment action in which the plaintiff sought to determine whether the defendant was an heir to the estate. The trial court determined that the defendant was not an heir and divided the estate accordingly amongst the legal heirs. We now affirm.

The Defendant, Cody R. Mashburn, pled guilty to aggravated burglary and criminal simulation. As part of the plea, the parties agreed that the Defendant would be sentenced to an effective term of ten years, but the trial court would determine the manner of service. After a hearing, the trial court denied the Defendant’s request for an alternative sentence and imposed a sentence of full confinement. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying an alternative sentence because, among other things, it improperly sentenced the Defendant without considering the results of a validated risk and needs assessment. Upon our review, we agree with the Defendant. Accordingly, we respectfully reverse and vacate the judgments and remand the case to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing.

This appeal concerns a father’s petition to modify a permanent parenting plan to name him as the primary residential parent for his two daughters. The trial court found a material change in circumstance based on, inter alia, the mother’s remarriage and frequent out-of-state travel, and it concluded that modification was in the children’s best interests. This appeal followed. The mother contends that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding of a material change in circumstances. We disagree and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Defendant, Cristobal J. Quintana II, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of second offense driving under the influence (DUI), a Class A misdemeanor; possessing an open container of alcohol while operating a motor vehicle, a Class C misdemeanor; and violation of the financial responsibility law, a Class C misdemeanor.  See T.C.A. §§ 55-10-401(1) (2020) (DUI), 55-10-402(a)(2) (Supp. 2022) (subsequently amended) (sentencing for second-offense DUI), 55-10-416 (open container law), 55-12-139 (2020) (financial responsibility).  He was also found civilly liable by the trial court for violation of the implied consent law. See id. § 55-10-406 (2020) (subsequently amended) (implied consent).  The trial court imposed an effective eleven-month, twenty-nine-day sentence, forty-five days of which was to be served in jail, and the balance on probation.  On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the superseding indictment for second offense DUI and that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and the finding on the implied consent violation.  We affirm the judgments of the trial court and remand for correction of clerical errors on the judgment forms for Counts 1, 2, and 3.

In June 2021, the Maury County Grand Jury indicted Defendant, Chaisty Dawn Jones, for first degree premeditated murder in Count 1, first degree felony murder perpetration of aggravated burglary in Count 2, aggravated burglary in Count 3, employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony in Count 4, and simple possession of marijuana in Count 5. At trial, the jury convicted the Defendant of the lesser included offense of second degree murder in Count 1 and convicted her as charged in Counts 2, 3, 4, and 5. The trial court merged the conviction in Count 1 with the conviction in Count 2 and imposed an effective life sentence. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that the Defendant had a “duty to retreat” prior to acting in self-defense. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand for entry of corrected judgments in Count 1 and Count 2.

This action involves the termination of a mother and father’s parental rights to their minor child. Following a bench trial, the court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to establish several statutory grounds of termination as applied to each parent. The court also found that termination was in the child’s best interest. We now affirm.

In 2018, the Defendant, Ronald Gray, pleaded guilty to several drug related charges in
exchange for a total effective sentence of eleven years. He was ordered to serve a portion
of his sentence in confinement and then released on May 1, 2018, to Community
Corrections. In 2019, the trial court entered an amended judgment to reflect an enhanced
sentence for his “plea to Violation of Community Corrections.” The order indicated that,
as of June 5, 2019, his Community Corrections was revoked, he was reinstated and
transferred to state probation, and he had to restart the eleven years of probation. In June
2020, the trial court issued an arrest warrant for the Defendant based upon a probation
violation. In 2024, the trial court ordered that the Defendant be incarcerated for the
duration of his sentence based on the probation violation. The Defendant appeals, but his
notice of appeal was not timely filed. As such, we dismiss the appeal.

Defendant, Allen Fitzgerald Ailey, pleaded guilty in two cases to felon in possession of a weapon, possession with intent to sell or deliver .5 grams or more of cocaine, and possession with intent to sell or deliver oxycodone. Pursuant to the plea agreement, Defendant received concurrent four-year sentences for the drug offenses to be served consecutively to a sentence of six years for the weapon offense, with the manner of service of Defendant’s sentences to be determined by the trial court. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied alternative sentencing and ordered Defendant to serve his entire ten-year sentence in confinement. Defendant argues on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion by denying probation. Finding no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. However, we remand for entry of judgments on the counts that were dismissed pursuant to the plea agreement.

This is an appeal from the denial of two class action certifications. The trial court found
that the classes proposed by the Appellants did not meet the requirements of Tennessee
Rule of Civil Procedure 23. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this divorce case, Father/Appellant appeals the trial court’s: (1) allocation of parenting time; (2) inclusion of special provisions in the parenting plan; (3) finding that Father was willfully underemployed; (4) award of an upward deviation in Father’s child support obligation; (5) division of the marital estate; and (6) grant of Mother/Appellee’s petition for divorce on the ground of inappropriate marital conduct. Discerning no error, we affirm. Wife’s request for appellate attorney’s fees is granted.

This is an action to enforce a 2020 arbitration award (the “Award”), which was confirmed by the Chancery Court for Davidson County in 2021. The subject of the arbitration was Chevy Chase ASC, LLC (“CCASC”), a two-member Tennessee limited liability company, which was formed and operated by Chevy Chase G.I. Investors, L.C. (“Plaintiff”), and AmSurg Holdings, Inc. (“Defendant”). The Award stated, in pertinent part, that the voluntary dissolution of Plaintiff would “trigger the mandatory dissolution” of CCASC. Following Plaintiff’s voluntary dissolution, however, Defendant refused to dissolve or wind up the affairs of CCASC. Defendant contended that it had the statutory right under the “dissolution avoidance” provision of Tennessee Code Annotated § 48-245-101(b) to continue operating CCASC as a single-member limited liability company. Relying on the Award and the 2021 court order confirming the Award, Plaintiff commenced this action to compel Defendant to dissolve CCASC and wind up its business affairs. Finding the Award to be unambiguous, the Chancellor ordered “the immediate liquidation and dissolution of CCASC.” This appeal followed. Finding no error, we affirm.  

The Defendant, Esau Caleb Kelly, was convicted of voluntary manslaughter, attempted
second-degree murder, employment of a firearm during commission of a dangerous felony,
and reckless endangerment by discharge of a firearm into an occupied habitation, for which
he received an effective sentence of 24 years. The sole issue raised on appeal is whether
the trial court erred in affirming the jury verdict for the attempted second-degree murder
conviction and reckless endangerment by discharge of a firearm into an occupied habitation
conviction. Upon our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Ronnie Lee Clayborn, appeals from the Fentress County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for rape of a child and incest. The Petitioner alleges that the post-conviction court erred by denying him relief on his claim that he was denied a fair and impartial jury. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A mother appeals a juvenile court judgment terminating the mother’s parental rights to three minor children. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Defendant, Jay Junior Heifner, appeals the Knox County Criminal Court’s revocation of the three-year term of probation imposed for his 2021 guilty-pleaded conviction of theft, arguing that the trial court was without jurisdiction to revoke his probation because the violation warrant was void and that the trial court erred by ordering that he serve the balance of his sentence in confinement. We conclude that because the affidavit in support of the violation warrant failed to comply with the statutory and rule-based requirements, the affidavit was void, the violation warrant was void, and the ensuing revocation proceeding was void. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the case is remanded to the trial court to determine whether, in the absence of a validly issued probation violation warrant, Defendant’s term of probation has expired.

In this termination of parental rights case, the trial court denied Appellant’s multiple motions to recuse.  Appellant filed this interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B.  Discerning no error, we affirm.

Defendant, Christophe Swearengen, pled guilty to one count of aggravated assault, one count of theft of property over $10,000, one count of aggravated burglary, and one count of being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm. The trial court sentenced Defendant to five years’ probation. After a revocation hearing, the trial court fully revoked Defendant’s probation for violating the conditions of his probation and ordered him to serve the remainder of his sentence in incarceration. Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by fully revoking his probation because his violation constituted his first technical violation. The State agrees. After review, we reverse the judgment of the trial, reinstate Defendant’s probationary sentence, and remand the case for the trial court to determine the appropriate consequence of Defendant’s violation.

The Petitioner, Brian Armstrong, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to maintain communication and for failing to file a motion to suppress evidence obtained through the execution of an illegal search warrant. We affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

Because the order from which the appellant has filed an appeal does not constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

Defendant, Keith Hopkins, was convicted of one count of aggravated assault, one count of theft of property valued at more than $1,000 but less than $10,000, and one count of domestic assault. The trial court sentenced Defendant to an effective four years’ probation with the condition that if his probation was revoked, he could not later petition to have the remainder of his sentence suspended. The trial court later revoked Defendant’s probation but nevertheless reprobated Defendant. After a subsequent revocation hearing, the trial court revoked Defendant’s probation based on the original probation order, reasoning that Defendant was on probation when “he never should have been.” Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by fully revoking his probation. After review, we reverse the judgment of the trial court, reinstate Defendant’s probation, and remand the case for the trial court to determine the appropriate consequence of Defendant’s violations.

Because the order from which the appellant has filed an appeal does not constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

This is the second appeal in this healthcare liability matter. The plaintiff first appealed from the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendant physician. This court reversed that judgment in 2020. Upon remand, a trial before a jury resulted in a defense verdict. The plaintiff again appeals. We affirm.

In this action, the trial court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims based on res judicata and failure to prosecute. The plaintiffs have appealed in companion appeals. 1 Upon our review, we vacate the trial court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ claims and remand for further proceedings. We deny the plaintiffs’ request for an award of attorney’s fees on appeal.