APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is an appeal from a final decree of divorce. The wife primarily challenges the trial court’s decision to deny her alimony. Finding no error or abuse of discretion, we affirm the trial court’s decision.

The Defendant, Antonio D. Bennett Tate, appeals from the Blount County Circuit Court
revocation of his community corrections sentence. On appeal, the Defendant argues that
the trial court erred by improperly admitting video footage from a police officer’s bodyworn
camera during the revocation hearing. Following our review, we affirm the judgment
of the trial court.

The Defendant, Boone Beverly, appeals the trial court’s revocation of his probation. On
appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying the
Defendant’s request to allocute or speak on his own behalf at his revocation hearing.
Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Christopher Lance Osteen, entered a guilty plea to two counts of
aggravated kidnapping. As a part of his plea, and pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal
Procedure 37, the Defendant sought to reserve one certified question of law related to the
trial court’s finding that his right to a speedy trial did not attach when he was arrested in
Florida due to his escape status as well as being served with a warrant from Kentucky; one
certified question related to the trial court’s finding that the Defendant’s verbal request to
the Florida court to invoke his constitutional rights was insufficient to properly invoke his
rights to speedy trial and due process; and one certified question related to the trial court’s
finding that the Defendant’s written letters and motion to dismiss sent to both the general
sessions clerk and the district attorney’s office failed to properly invoke his constitutional
rights to a speedy trial and due process as it pertained to his Henry County, Tennessee
general session case arrest warrants. Because the Defendant did not properly reserve
certified issues for review, we are without jurisdiction to review the merits of the
Defendant’s claims, and we dismiss his appeal.

Defendant, Jerome Nchiyako Dooley, pled guilty to one count of sexual battery and received an agreed sentence of five years as a Range III offender, to be served on probation. Following a hearing on a warrant for violation of his probation, the trial court revoked Defendant’s probation and ordered him to serve his original sentence incarcerated. Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in revoking probation based on a video Defendant posted to TikTok and that the court erred in failing to recuse itself sua sponte. Following a review of the entire record, the briefs and arguments of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The plaintiff filed an action in the Davidson County general sessions court to recover the balance of an unpaid loan from the defendant. An agreed final order was entered in favor of the plaintiff. Approximately six months later, the defendant filed a motion to set aside the judgment based on an alleged fraudulent misrepresentation perpetrated by the plaintiff. The general sessions court denied the motion. The defendant appealed the denial to the Davidson County circuit court. The plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss the appeal. The circuit court held that because the defendant had failed to file the motion to set aside within the ten-day statutory period outlined in Tennessee Code Annotated section 16-15-727(b), the general sessions court had correctly dismissed the motion as it lacked jurisdiction to set aside the judgment. Likewise, the circuit court held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear an appeal on the merits as an appeal had not been timely filed. The defendant appeals. We affirm.

This appeal arises from a petition to terminate the parental rights of a father for the purposes of adoption. The petitioners, the child’s stepfather and mother, alleged that the father abandoned the child both by failing to visit and by failing to support. When father failed to participate in discovery, the petitioners moved for a default as a sanction. After granting the requested default and holding an evidentiary hearing, the trial court concluded that there was clear and convincing evidence of abandonment and that termination of father’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the termination of parental rights.

This appeal presents issues relating to the probate court’s admission of a copy of a will for muniment of title. However, we do not reach the merits of the appeal due to Appellant’s failure to comply with the briefing requirements outlined in Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27(a), and Rule 6 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals of Tennessee.

Because the order from which the appellant has filed an appeal does not constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

Defendant, Anthony Glover, appeals the denial of his bid for judicial diversion, arguing that the trial court’s ruling is not entitled to a presumption of reasonableness and that, upon our de novo review, this court should grant him diversion. Because the trial court failed to consider all the appropriate factors and to make the required findings to support its denial of judicial diversion, the judgment of the trial court is reversed. Because we find that the record is insufficient for de novo review, the case is remanded for a new sentencing hearing.

Shamone Davis, Defendant, was convicted of four counts of statutory rape by an authority figure, one count of attempted statutory rape by an authority figure, and three counts of sexual battery by an authority figure for events that involved his stepdaughter. As a result of the convictions, Defendant was sentenced to an effective sentence of thirty years. Defendant appeals, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial, the trial court improperly admitted testimony of several witnesses, the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction for attempted statutory rape by an authority figure, and his sentence is excessive. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioners attempted to terminate the parental rights of the child’s biological father on the
grounds of abandonment by failure to visit and support. The trial court found that neither
ground had been proven but proceeded to find that had grounds for termination been
proven, it would be in the child’s best interest for the biological father’s parental rights to
be terminated. Although we affirm the trial court’s finding that the biological father proved
that his failure to visit was not willful, we reverse the trial court’s finding as to the ground
of abandonment by failure to support. We also affirm the trial court’s finding that
termination is in the child’s best interest.

The petitioner, Fred Auston Wortman, III, pled guilty to two counts of attempted
first-degree murder and solicitation of first-degree murder, stemming from his repeated
attempts to kill his wife. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court imposed an effective
Range II sentence of thirty years with a Range I release eligibility of thirty percent. The
Board of Probation and Parole denied the petitioner release, and after challenging the denial
via other avenues, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief in which he
claimed entitlement to relief on grounds of breach of contact. In his petition, the petitioner
claimed that the State violated the terms of his plea agreement by opposing his release at
the parole hearing. The post-conviction court denied the petition, finding it was timebarred.
However, this Court reversed and remanded with instructions for the postconviction
court to make findings relative to whether due process considerations tolled the
statute of limitations. See Wortman v. State, No. W2023-00017-CCA-R3-PC, 2023 WL
6318088, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 28, 2023). On remand, the post-conviction court
-found the petitioner was not guaranteed release, that the State did not attempt to thwart
the petitioner’s ability to have a parole hearing, and rejected the petitioner’s claim that the
State “acted in bad faith by attending and opposing his parole” because the petitioner
received the benefit of everything to which he bargained. Following a thorough review of
the record, the briefs, and oral arguments of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction
court denying the petitioner post-conviction relief.

The Petitioner, Darren Brown, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s summary
denial of his petition for a writ of error coram nobis from his conviction for first degree
premeditated murder, for which he received a sentence of life imprisonment. He contends
that he is entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of limitations and that he is entitled to
relief on the merits of his petition. We affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

A Sullivan County jury convicted the Defendant, Michael Wayne Strouth, of first degree
premeditated murder and conspiracy to comrnit first degree premeditated rnurder. The trial
court irnposed a life sentence for the first degree murder conviction and a consecutive
twenty-five year sentence for the conspiracy conviction. On appeal, the Defendant asserts
that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) the trial court erred when
it failed to give jury instructions on enhanced identification and general inferences; and (3)
the trial court abused its discretion when it sentenced hirn. After review, we affirm the
convictions and the Defendant's life sentence for first degree prerneditated murder;
however, we vacate the Defendant's sentence for conspiracy to commit first degree murder
and the trial court's imposition of partial consecutive sentencing. We remand this case to
the trial court for a new sentencing hearing.

Lacy Frank Walls, III, Defendant, was convicted of evading arrest and three counts of possession of a firearm after being convicted of a felony. The trial court sentenced Defendant to an effective sentence of forty years in incarceration. After the denial of a motion for new trial, Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court refused to consider all of the issues presented in his motion for new trial. After a review, we find the trial court erred by refusing to consider all the issues presented in the motion for new trial. On remand, the trial court should hold a new hearing on the motion for new trial, at which the trial court should consider all the issues in the motion. The trial court should also enter judgment forms for Counts Four and Five and enter corrected judgment forms in Counts One, Two, and Six, reflecting Defendant was convicted after a jury trial and the proper statute under which Defendant is required to serve eighty-five percent of his sentence.

This appeal stems from a partition lawsuit. The real property at issue was sold at auction. The issues on appeal are whether Appellants have an ownership interest in the property and the proceeds from partition sale, and whether the trial court properly allocated the proceeds between the rightful owners. We reverse the trial court regarding ownership and hold that Appellants own one-half of the property. We affirm the trial court’s allocation of the funds from the partition sale. We vacate the trial court’s judgment as to whether Appellants’ attorneys’ fees should be paid from the partition proceeds and remand this issue for reconsideration in light of our Court’s determination of ownership.

Because the order from which the appellant has filed an appeal does not constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

Petitioner, Brian Howard, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in concluding that he received the effective assistance of trial counsel. He argues trial counsel was ineffective in two ways: first, by failing to sever Petitioner’s trial from that of his co-defendant, or alternatively, failing to introduce the co-defendant’s pretrial statement to police during their joint trial; and second, by failing to waive lesser included offense instructions. He also raises a standalone due process claim, arguing that criminal defendants should have a constitutional right to affirmatively waive lesser included charges contrary to Tennessee law. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner appeals from the order of the post-conviction court denying his petition seeking relief from his conviction for first-degree murder. In this appeal, the Petitioner argues (1) that trial and appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to object to or raise as an issue on appeal the admissibility Chamere Talley’s prior statement based on Tennessee Rule 803(26); (2) that the State and the trial court violated due process in failing to conduct a hearing pursuant to Rule 803(26); (3) that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to conduct an adequate closing argument; and (4) that the cumulative effect of trial counsel’s errors deprived the Petitioner of a fair trial.1 We affirm.

This interlocutory appeal concerns the relation back doctrine under Tennessee Rule of Civil
Procedure 15.03. The plaintiffs sued a corporate entity for premises liability. The
corporate defendant successfully moved for summary judgment on grounds that it did not
own the subject property. The plaintiffs then filed a motion to alter or amend in which they
sought leave to amend their complaint to name a separate corporate entity as a defendant.
The trial court granted the plaintiffs’ motion, finding that the initial mistake was a
misnomer and that the plaintiffs were not seeking to add a new party even though the
defendant to be added was a distinct corporate entity. The defendants sought permission
to file an interlocutory appeal, which the trial court granted. The record contains no
evidence that the separate corporate entity named by the plaintiffs in their amended
pleading received timely notice of the plaintiffs’ lawsuit. We therefore reverse the
judgment of the trial court.

A gas company obtained an easement by eminent domain across a property owner’s land. A jury determined the amount of just compensation payable to the landowner. On appeal, the gas company argues that the trial court erred in allowing the jury to hear expert testimony from the landowner’s expert regarding the value of the property and that the jury verdict is not supported by material evidence. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Defendant, Jennifer Leigh Sexton, was convicted in the Knox County Criminal Court
of vehicular homicide by recklessness, a Class C felony; initiating a false report, a Class D
felony; driving on a suspended license, a Class B misdemeanor; and following too closely,
a Class C misdemeanor, and received an effective sentence of ten years in confinement.
On appeal, the Defendant claims that (1) the trial court abused its discretion by admitting
testimony from the State’s expert because the expert’s method of data collection was
unreliable, (2) the trial court erred by failing to provide the Defendant’s requested special
jury instructions, and (3) the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction of initiating
a false report. Based on our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This matter arises from two failed real estate transactions. A buyer contracted to purchase two townhomes from a real estate developer. However, after the sales failed to close, the developer purported to cancel the transactions. The buyer then sued the developer, seeking decrees for specific performance and damages for breach of contract. The buyer also asserted a claim under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. After a bench trial, the trial court entered an order awarding the buyer specific performance but denying his claim for damages. The trial court also found a TCPA violation and awarded the buyer his attorney’s fees and costs. On the breach of contract claim, we have determined that the developer breached the contracts and that the buyer failed to sufficiently prove his damages, and we affirm the trial court’s decision. We also conclude that the trial court erred in finding a TCPA violation and reverse this finding, as well as the award of fees and costs pursuant to the TCPA. Finally, we have determined that the developer was not the prevailing party in the trial court or on appeal and deny its request for an award of attorney’s fees.