APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

In this case involving Tennessee’s Public Records Act, the plaintiff requested copies of
proposals submitted in response to a request for proposals announced by the defendant
county. After the county denied the plaintiff’s request pursuant to an exception set forth
in Tennessee Code Annotated § 10-7-504(a)(28), the plaintiff filed a complaint with the
trial court. Upon the county’s motion, the trial court dismissed the complaint with
prejudice. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

The Defendant, Marty Lynn Judd, appeals from his Warren County Circuit Court convictions of second degree murder and possession of a prohibited weapon, for which he received an effective sentence of twenty-six years’ incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. He also asserts that the trial court erred by overruling his objections to hearsay and to leading questioning during the State’s direct examination of a witness. Discerning no error, we affirm.

A Coffee County jury convicted the Defendant, Jonathan Andrew Berretta, of one count of vehicular homicide by intoxication and one count of vehicular homicide per se. The trial court merged those convictions and sentenced the Defendant to twelve years’ imprisonment. On appeal, the Defendant raises thirteen issues in three broad categories: challenges to the denial of his motion to suppress the seizure of his blood, trial issues, and a sentencing issue. Challenging the denial of his motion to suppress, he contends that the trial court erred by finding that(1) the affidavit supporting the Vanderbilt University Medical Center (“VUMC”) search warrant for his blood contained no false or reckless statements; (2)probable cause supported the search warrant and judicial subpoena; (3) the search warrant was not overbroad; (4) the search warrant and judicial subpoena established a sufficient nexus between VUMC and the evidence sought; (5) the VUMC blood draws were not the result of state action; and (6) an earlier warrantless EMS blood draw was supported by probable cause and exigent circumstances. Regarding his trial, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred by (7) admitting a life-in-being photograph of the victim; (8) finding that the VUMC specimen release form satisfied the business records exception to the rule against hearsay; (9) finding that chain of custody was established for the VUMC blood samples; (10) admitting the VUMC blood draw evidence in violation of the Confrontation Clause; (11) instructing the jury on vehicular homicide per se in a manner that created an unconstitutional presumption of guilt; and (12) allowing the cumulative effect of those errors to deprive him of a fair trial. Finally, the Defendant maintains that the trial court erred in (13) ordering his sentence to run consecutively to a sentence he had pending in Davidson County at the time of these offenses. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgments of the trial court. 

Christopher W. Gadsden, Petitioner, sought post-conviction relief from his convictions for second-degree murder and theft, claiming that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because an attorney with the Office of the Public Defender of Metropolitan Nashville & Davidson County (herein “Public Defender’s Office”)previously represented the victim, thereby creating a conflict of interest that rendered trial counsel’s representation ineffective. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. We affirm.

Appellant filed an accelerated interlocutory appeal seeking to recuse the trial judge. Because Appellant did not file a written motion to recuse and because the trial court never entered an order on same, we dismiss the appeal.

A bookkeeper allegedly made unauthorized payments to herself from company funds. After a bench trial, the court found the bookkeeper breached her duty of loyalty to her employers and unjustly enriched herself. On appeal, the bookkeeper faults the trial court’s evidentiary decisions and contends that the plaintiffs’ claims and the damage award were not supported by a preponderance of the evidence. We affirm.

In 1996, a Montgomery County jury convicted the petitioner, Courtney B. Mathews, of four counts of felony murder and one count of especially aggravated robbery for which he received an effective sentence of life without parole plus twenty-five years in confinement. On June 24, 2025, the petitioner applied for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging “the indictment upon which his judgment is based is duplicitous and, therefore, void. ”The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the application, concluding the petition failed to state a cognizable claim for relief. The petitioner appealed. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The Defendant, Hunter Jay Chantler, appeals from his jury conviction for aggravated sexual battery and resulting eight-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that (1) the evidence introduced at trial was insufficient to support his conviction due to the victim’s lack of credibility and (2) the trial court abused its discretion by questioning the minor victim during the State’s direct examination at trial. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this appeal, the appellants challenge administrative and legal fees the trial court awarded the administrators of the estate and the parties’ respective legal counsel. We have determined that these issues have been waived for a variety of reasons including the appellants’ failure to comply with Tennessee Court of Appeals Rule 6 and Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. We find that the administrator of the estate is entitled to reasonable compensation for services rendered and expenses incurred in defending this appeal. We also find this appeal to be frivolous. We remand for the trial court to award the administrator an appropriate fee and to award damages in favor of the estate against the appellants, Robert Davidson, Sr. and Shuntae Davidson, for fees and expenses the estate incurred in defending this appeal.

The petitioner, David C. Sands, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis by the Rutherford County Circuit Court, alleging newly discovered evidence exists that demonstrates his innocence. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Shawn Sheeks (“Decedent”) and Paul Slate (“Mr. Slate”) co-owned and managed several business entities. Following Decedent’s untimely death, Mr. Slate, acting on behalf of the businesses they co-owned, filed a Verified Claim against Decedent’s estate in the Chancery Court (Probate Division) for Montgomery County seeking an accounting and damages of $382,207.48. Shortly thereafter, Janet Sheeks (“Ms. Sheeks”), Decedent’s widow and the Administratrix of the Decedent’s estate, filed a complaint in the Chancery Court for Davidson County (hereinafter “the Business Court”) on behalf of herself and Decedent’s estate against Mr. Slate seeking an accounting and to windup and dissolve the business entities. Mr. Slate filed a counterclaim against the estate and Ms. Slate, as well as cross-claims against the business entities, seeking an accounting and payment for debts allegedly owed to him. While the Claim in the Probate Court was held in abeyance, all claims by and among the parties in the Business Court were tried. In a detailed and thorough final order, the Business Court ordered dissolution of the business entities and allocated the distribution of the assets among the parties after applying offsets and credits. No one appealed the judgment from the Business Court. Thereafter, the Administratrix of the Estate filed a motion for summary judgment in this Probate Court proceeding contending the Claim should be dismissed on the ground of res judicata. The Probate Court granted the motion and summarily dismissed the Claim on the ground of res judicata finding that the Claim was not a separate and distinct cause of action from the Business Court action, that the underlying facts at issue were the same in both lawsuits, and that the Claim could have, and should have, been litigated in the Business Court action. We affirm.

Defendant, Gregory Keontae Lyons, appeals from his convictions for first-degree premeditated murder; employing a firearm during the attempt to commit a dangerous felony; attempted sale of a Schedule I controlled substance; and conspiracy to sell a Schedule I controlled substance, for which he is serving an effective sentence of life plus twelve years. On appeal, Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; that the trial court erred by granting the State’s motion in limine to exclude references to his age; and that the trial court failed to properly consider Defendant’s age as a mitigating factor in sentencing. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm.

Joseph Ervin Bobo, the Defendant, was convicted by a Knox County jury of one count of conspiracy to possess three hundred grams or more of methamphetamine with the intent to manufacture, deliver, or sell and one count of conspiracy to possess twenty-six grams or more of cocaine with the intent to manufacture, deliver, or sell. See T.C.A §§39-17-417 (a)(4), (c), (j)(2021Supp.) (subsequently amended) (possession of a controlled substance with intent to manufacture, deliver or sell);39-12-103 (2025) (conspiracy). The Defendant alleges that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erred in sentencing. The State responds that the Defendant’s appeal should be dismissed because this court does not have jurisdiction as no valid notice of appeal was filed. We dismiss the appeal.

This appeal involves a complaint to quiet title and for injunctive relief and damages
stemming from a boundary line dispute. The defendant, a farming corporation, executed a
deed containing a written description that included an 11.28-acre area of land which lies
along the southern border of its property. The plaintiffs became aware of the deed and
filed this action, alleging that they owned the 11.28 acres at issue. Both parties claimed to
have paid taxes on the disputed area for many years. The plaintiffs had their property
surveyed, and the surveyor determined that they owned the disputed area. The farm had
its property surveyed twice. Those surveyors agreed the farm owned the disputed area.
The chancery court found that both parties had paid taxes on the disputed area for at least
the preceding 20 years. The chancery court also determined that the surveys provided by
the defendant farm accurately reflected the boundary line at issue and found it owned the
disputed area. The court also made an alternative holding that the farm had acquired the
disputed property by adverse possession. The plaintiffs appeal. We affirm.

This appeal arises out of a divorce proceeding. Appellant and appellee married in 2007. Appellee filed the current divorce action in the trial court on February 8, 2021. The parties entered into a reconciliation agreement suspending the divorce proceeding on July 24, 2023. The trial court set aside this agreement on July 19, 2024 at appellee’s request. A trial was held on November 4, 2024. The trial court ordered the parties divorced on the ground of inappropriate marital conduct by appellant; divided the marital estate; entered a permanent parenting plan designating appellee as primary residential parent of the parties’ minor children; and awarded appellee child support, transitional alimony, and attorney’s fees. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Anthony Todd Ghormley, appeals from the Morgan County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus from his convictions and his effective 105-year sentence. We affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

In May 2024, the Petitioner, Laura Naomi Clifton, pleaded guilty to two counts of sexual
exploitation of a minor via electronic means, and the trial court entered the agreed sentence
of concurrent two-year sentences, to be served at 30%. The plea agreement specified that
the Petitioner would not be placed on the sex offender registry. After serving her sentence,
the Petitioner was placed on the sex offender registry and forced to comply with its
requirements. Accordingly, she filed a petition for post-conviction relief. During the
hearing on the petition, the post-conviction court offered her time to consider her options.
She went to the parking lot to consider the matter and, while she was outside, the postconviction
court dismissed her petition for failure to prosecute. The Petitioner asked the
post-conviction court to reconsider, and it denied her request. After a review of the record,
we reverse the post-conviction court’s judgment, and we remand the case for a hearing
during which the Petitioner should be given the opportunity to pursue her petition for postconviction
relief.

Petitioner, Jeremy James Dalton, appeals from the Fentress County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his pro se petition for writ of error coram nobis as untimely. Based on our review, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

The Defendant, Joshua Cortez Moten, was convicted by a Madison County Circuit Court
jury of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, a Class B felony; evading arrest in a
motor vehicle, a Class D felony; and possession of ANPP, a Schedule II controlled
substance, a Class A misdemeanor, and was sentenced by the trial court to an effective
term of nine years at 85% in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying alternative
sentencing. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Horace Palmer Williamson, III, was convicted of two counts of first-degree felony murder, two counts of first-degree premeditated murder,1 two counts of especially aggravated robbery, two counts of aggravated robbery, two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, two counts of aggravated sexual battery, and one count of felon in possession of a weapon. The jury imposed a sentence of life without the possibility of parole on the murder counts, and the trial court imposed an effective sentence of twenty-five years on the remaining counts. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the imposition of a life sentence without the possibility of parole. Following our review of the record, the parties’ briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Joshua Cortez Moten, was convicted by a Madison County Circuit Court
jury of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, a Class B felony; evading arrest in a
motor vehicle, a Class D felony; and possession of ANPP, a Schedule II controlled
substance, a Class A misdemeanor, and was sentenced by the trial court to an effective
term of nine years at 85% in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying alternative
sentencing. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The parties in the underlying action are a plaintiff hospital, Springfield Health Services, LLC, d/b/a TriStar NorthCrest Medical Center (“NorthCrest”), and defendant dialysis services company, Sanderling Renal Services-USA, LLC (“Sanderling”). Sanderling and NorthCrest executed a contract wherein Sanderling agreed to provide dialysis and telehealth services to patients at NorthCreston a fee schedule. A disagreement arose between the parties over which party was responsible for securing payments from third-party providers, and Sanderling terminated the parties’ agreement as a result. Sanderling then submitted a demand for arbitration to the Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services (“JAMS”) pursuant to the arbitration provision in the parties’ contract. After the arbitrator delivered an award in favor of NorthCrest, Sanderling filed a notice of appeal pursuant to the JAMS optional appeals procedure, relying on language in the parties’ contract providing that the parties had “reserve[d]the right to contest the arbitrator’s decision and to appeal from any award.” NorthCrest objected to application of the JAMS optional appellate procedures, arguing that the contested phrase was not an agreement to submit to the JAMS appellate process but instead reserved only the parties’ statutory right to judicial review of the arbitrator’s decision. JAMS appointed an appellate arbitration panel, who dismissed the JAMS appeal due to NorthCrest’s objection, noting that the JAMS optional appellate procedures required both parties to agree to the appeal in writing. NorthCrest then filed an application for confirmation of the arbitration award in the trial court, to which Sanderling filed a response in opposition and a motion to compel arbitration pursuant to the JAMS appellate procedures. Deferring to the JAMS panel’s decision to dismiss the appeal, the trial court denied Sanderling’s motion to compel appellate arbitration and confirmed the arbitration award in NorthCrest’s favor. Sanderling has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

A Montgomery County jury convicted the defendant, Marc Anthony Crowder, of first-degree felony murder and attempted aggravated robbery, for which he received a sentence of life imprisonment plus fifteen years. On appeal, the defendant contends the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his convictions. The defendant also contends the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentencing. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The pro se Petitioner, Thomas N. Allen, appeals the habeas corpus court’s summary
dismissal of his second petition for writ of habeas corpus for failure to state a cognizable
claim for relief. Specifically, the Petitioner alleges that his life sentence for first degree
murder is illegal and his judgment of conviction is void because (1) the trial court’s
comments regarding parole eligibility were in direct contravention of the relevant statute
and (2) the statutory sentencing scheme for persons convicted of first degree murder
rendered his sentence unfairly disparate and in direct contravention to the purposes and
principles of the Tennessee Criminal Sentencing Reform Act of 1989 (“the Sentencing
Act”). He further claims that the habeas corpus court erred by failing to appoint him
counsel despite the Petitioner’s indigent status. After review, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Jason White, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s summary
dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. On appeal, he contends that the
indictment, which charged him with conspiracy to possess methamphetamine with the
intent to sell and deliver within a drug-free school zone, was fatally defective, which
deprived the trial court of jurisdiction and rendered the judgments void. Based upon our
review, we affirm the habeas corpus court’s dismissal of the petition.