APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, William Makransky, appeals his convictions for aggravated sexual battery, sexual battery, and two counts of contributing to the delinquency of a minor. He contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and that the trial court applied the incorrect standard for the prejudice prong in denying him relief on this issue in his motion for a new trial. Although we determine that the trial court did apply the incorrect standard for prejudice, our de novo review reveals that the defendant's trial attorney was not ineffective. Because of an error in the judgments, the sentences for contributing to the delinquency of a minor are modified.

The defendant, Orlando Crayton, was convicted of aggravated assault, reckless endangerment, unlawful carrying or possession of a weapon, and two counts of vandalism under $500.00. The trial court sentenced the defendant to 11 months, 29 days for each vandalism count, six years for aggravated assault, two years for reckless endangerment and 11 months, 29 days for unlawful possession of a weapon. Because the sentences were ordered to be served concurrently, the effective sentence is six years. In this appeal of right, the defendant challenges (1) the admissibility of evidence indicating the defendant's gang affiliation; (2) the admission of an estimate regarding the damage to a vehicle; and (3) the admission of a hearsay statement. The judgment is affirmed.

The petitioner appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 1999 guilty plea to and resulting conviction for the attempt to commit first degree murder. He contends that his plea resulted from the ineffective assistance of counsel in that he was not advised that a jury could consider lesser included offenses to the offense charged in the indictment. He also contends that the trial court based the dismissal of his case upon an improper standard. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for further proceedings.

This is an appeal by permission pursuant to Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. The Defendant, Jennifer McClure, was indicted by the Haywood County Grand Jury for various charges arising out of the seizure and subsequent search of the commercial motor carrier in which she and her husband were traveling. The trial court suppressed the evidence obtained as a result of that seizure and search, ruling that the seizure of the motor carrier was unconstitutional. The State then filed a motion for an interlocutory appeal, which was granted by the trial court. This Court likewise granted the State's application for permission to appeal. On appeal, the State asserts: (1) that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing the State's request to either reopen the proof or be allowed to file with the court the rules and regulations governing Department of Safety inspections; and (2) that if these rules and regulations are considered, the trial court erred by granting the Defendant's motion to suppress. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing the State's request to reopen the proof or to file the applicable rules and regulations because the trial court did permit the State to file with the court the rules and regulations regarding Department of Safety inspections. In addition, we hold that the trial court did not err by granting the motion to suppress because the seizure of the Defendant's commercial motor carrier was conducted in violation of the Fourth Amendment's protections against unreasonable searches and seizures.

The Defendant, William Cash Pate, was convicted by a jury of second offense driving under the influence (DUI). In this appeal as of right, he argues that the trial court erred by failing to suppress the evidence obtained against him because that evidence was the fruit of his unlawful seizure at a roadblock. We agree. Accordingly, we reverse the Defendant's conviction and the trial court's order denying the Defendant's motion to suppress.

The Petitioner was convicted of aggravated kidnapping and sentenced to ten years incarceration. Following direct appeal to this Court, which affirmed the Petitioner's conviction and sentence, and to the Tennessee Supreme Court, which denied permission to appeal, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. The post-conviction court conducted a hearing and denied relief. The Petitioner now appeals the post-conviction court's decision. Having reviewed the record, we conclude that the Petitioner's representation at trial was adequate and therefore affirm the post-conviction court's denial of post-conviction relief.

The defendant was convicted by a jury of theft of a vehicle worth more than $10,000, a Class C felony, for which he received a fifteen-year sentence as a career offender. He contends that the evidence is insufficient to convict him of theft and that the trial court erred in allowing evidence of his attempt to steal gasoline that led to his arrest. We affirm the trial court.

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of theft of property less than $500. He was subsequently sentenced to eleven (11) months and twenty-nine (29) days in the Lauderdale County jail. In this pro se appeal, Defendant argues that the State failed to provide him with discoverable material or information under Rule 16 of Tenn. R. Crim. P. After a review of the record, briefs of the parties and applicable law, we conclude that the State complied with the mandates of Rule 16. Thus, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendants, Joshua Lee Williams and Maurice Miguel Teague, encountered each other on the street where Teague produced a pistol and attempted to shoot Williams. When the gun did not fire, Williams knocked it from Teague's hands, picked it up, and fired in turn at Teague, in the process fatally wounding a neighborhood resident. Williams was indicted for first degree murder for the shooting death of the deceased, and criminal attempt to commit first degree murder of Teague, who was indicted for criminal attempt to commit first degree murder of Williams. At the conclusion of their joint trial, Williams was found guilty of second degree murder and criminal attempt to commit second degree murder, and Teague guilty of criminal attempt to commit second degree murder. Williams received an effective sentence of twenty years at 100% as a violent offender. Teague was sentenced as a standard, Range I offender to ten years. Teague raises essentially three issues on appeal: (1) sufficiency of the evidence; (2) not instructing the jury on aggravated assault as a lesser-included offense; and (3) the propriety of his sentence. Williams challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in support of his conviction for second degree murder. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

I respectfully dissent. I agree with the majority opinion that the granting or denial of a mistrial is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court and that a trial court should grant a mistrial only when it is of “manifest necessity.” I would add that the burden of establishing a “manifest necessity” is upon the appellant. State v. Williams, 929 S.W.2d 385, 388 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996).

The defendant, a construction company payroll clerk, was convicted of fourteen counts of forgery, Class E felonies, and one count of theft of property over $1000, a Class D felony, for utilizing her position at the company to write and cash invalid checks on her employer's account. She was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to three years on each forgery conviction, and six years on the theft conviction, to be served concurrently for an effective sentence of six years. In this appeal as of right, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in allowing evidence of her prior crimes to be admitted at trial, and that the evidence was not sufficient to support her convictions. After a careful review, we conclude that the trial court did not err in allowing the State to impeach the defendant's credibility by questioning her about her prior convictions, and that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

On November 24, 1998, the Shelby County Grand Jury indicted the Defendant for one count of aggravated robbery and one count of aggravated assault. Following a subsequent jury trial, the Defendant was convicted on both counts. On September 30, 1998, after a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant as a career offender to serve thirty years incarceration for the aggravated robbery consecutively to fifteen years for the aggravated assault. The court also ordered both sentences served consecutively to a sentence for which the Defendant was on parole. On appeal, the Defendant claims that the trial court should have instructed the jury to consider robbery and theft as lesser-included offenses of aggravated robbery and that the trial court should have instructed the jury to consider reckless endangerment, reckless aggravated assault and simple assault as lesser-included offenses of aggravated assault. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.as lesser-included offenses of aggravated assault. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court., we affirm the judgment of the trial court.