APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The appellant was convicted of possession of a controlled substance and drug paraphernalia with intent to sell after officers discovered 53.5 grams of cocaine in his motel room. Prior to trial, he challenged the search of his motel room under the federal and state Constitutions, but the trial court denied his motion to suppress, finding that he possessed no reasonable expectation of privacy in the room after he disclaimed ownership of the room key. Following his conviction, the appellant urged the trial court to consider as a mitigating factor that his conduct did not cause or threaten serious bodily injury, but the trial court disagreed and sentenced the appellant to serve the maximum term in the range. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the convictions and the sentences, and we granted permission to appeal. Based on our review of the record and applicable legal authorities, we agree that the appellant relinquished his otherwise legitimate expectation of privacy in his motel room by disclaiming ownership of the key and by asserting that it belonged to another person. We also conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the convictions on both charges. Finally, although the trial court should have considered the mitigating factor in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-113(1),  we conclude that the maximum sentence in the Range is nevertheless appropriate. The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed.

The defendant appeals from the trial court's denial of probation or some other form of alternative sentencing. After a review of the record, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

For denying that a key to a hotel room belonged to him, the defendant has been stripped of
his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The majority
imposes this harsh result even in the face of obvious and undisputed evidence that the subject
premises were under the defendant’s exclusive and private control. Because I am unable to agree
that a refusal to incriminate one’s self in response to police inquiries should result in a loss of Fourth Amendment rights, I respectfully dissent.

We granted review of this case to determine whether the holder of a certificate of need may be held liable for the healthcare facility operator's tortious acts. We hold that the Tennessee statutes and rules governing certificates of need impliedly impose a non-delegable duty upon the certificate of need holder to initiate operation of the healthcare facility. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals, reverse the trial court's judgment, and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings.

In September 1991, the Defendant pled guilty to aggravated assault and possession of a weapon with intent to employ it in the commission of aggravated assault. The Defendant was sentenced to six years for the aggravated assault conviction and to two years for the weapon conviction. The sentences were to run consecutively, for an effective sentence of eight years, with six months to be served in jail and the remainder to be served on intensive probation. Following several probation violation reports, the trial court revoked the Defendant's probation. The Defendant now appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in revoking his entire eight-year probated sentence when his six-year sentence had expired prior to the issuance of the probation revocation warrant. Finding that the probation revocation warrant was not timely filed as to the aggravated assault conviction, we reverse the judgment of the trial court revoking the Defendant's probation for that count. Finding that the probation revocation warrant was timely filed as to the weapons conviction, we affirm the judgment of the trial court revoking the Defendant's probation for that count.

Drawer of checks and Bank failed to exercise ordinary care in transactions under Tenn. Code Ann. §47-3-406. Drawer was assessed 80% of fault and Bank 20%. Drawer appeals. We affirm, as modified. 

I concur in so much of the majority opinion as holds that Citizens is precluded from raising an issue on appeal as to the dismissal of First Tennessee Bank. I disagree, however, with the majority’s conclusion that the facts do not preponderate against the trial court’s finding that Citizens was 80% at fault for the loss occasioned by Frieda Gray’s forgery. In my judgment, Citizens did not engage in negligent conduct that substantially contributed to the forgery, as that concept is embodied in T.C.A. § 47-3-406. Accordingly, I would hold that the Bank, who was clearly negligent in allowing checks made payable to a business to be deposited directly into an individual’s bank account, was 100% at fault for the loss.

The sole issue in this appeal is whether the trial court erred when it admitted into evidence a booking record purportedly containing the defendant's fingerprints. The defendant contends that the booking record is hearsay and not admissible under the business records exception to the hearsay rule. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the introduction of the defendant's booking record into evidence was proper as a business record. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The defendant, Latroy W. Askew, appeals from the order of the Knox County Criminal Court which revoked Defendant's probation and required him to serve his sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Having reviewed the record and the briefs submitted by the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Eddie F. Depriest, appeals as of right from the Wayne County Circuit Court's dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief. Petitioner claims that the circuit court lacked the necessary jurisdiction to convict him because he was a juvenile when he committed the offense and a proper transfer hearing had not been conducted. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The buyers of a new residence filed this action against the builder and their realtor after discovering that the house was defective. The claims against the realtor alleged negligent misrepresentation and violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act based in part on the agent's representation that the builder was licensed. The jury, using a jury verdict form, found that the realtor had committed a deceptive act or practice prohibited by the Consumer Protection Act, but determined that the buyers had suffered no loss therefrom. The jury also found the realtor liable for negligent misrepresentation, calculated the damages resulting from the realtor's negligent misrepresentation, and apportioned fault at 10% to the buyers, 10% to the realtor, and 80% to the builder, a nonparty. On appeal, the buyers argue that the verdict was inconsistent and challenge the assessment of costs and the failure to award attorney fees. We affirm the verdict, the denial of attorney's fees, and the apportionment of court costs. We vacate the denial of discretionary costs and remand for determination of that issue.

The Defendant pled guilty in 1999 to ten counts of forgery committed in Bedford County. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range II multiple offender to an effective sentence of six years, four months incarceration. In this direct appeal, the Defendant argues that she was improperly sentenced. Having reviewed the record, we conclude that the Defendant's sentence is appropriate and therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This case presents a tragic set of facts involving an automobile accident which occurred in Giles County on May 8 or 9, 1997, sometime between 11:15 p.m. and 12:15 a.m. Michael Niedergeses died as a result of this accident. His parents, Larry Niedergeses and Roberta Niedergeses, instigated this suit against Giles County alleging that the county's negligence in failing to maintain the bridge signage caused their son's accident and resulting death. The case was tried non-jury in the Circuit Court of Giles County. That court found Mr. Niedergeses fifty percent at fault and Giles County fifty percent at fault. Plaintiffs appeal this ruling asserting that the trial judge was in error and should have found Giles County more than fifty percent at fault. The appeal presents for review the question of "whether the evidence preponderated against the trial court's finding that John Michael Niedergeses was fifty percent at fault in the May 9, 1997 accident." We find that the evidence does not preponderate against the judge's findings and affirm the trial court's ruling.

Petitioner appeals the trial court's decision to deny his petition for common law writ of certiorari challenging a Board of Paroles decision to revoke his parole and the court's grant of Respondent's motion for summary judgment. Petitioner appeals the order on two grounds, (1) his due process rights were violated by the introduction of inadmissible evidence, and (2) these procedural flaws led to the hearing officer becoming biased and unable to conduct a fair and impartial hearing. For the reasons below, we find both claims without merit and affirm the trial court.

This case involves the termination of Johnson City police officer, Larry Robbins. Dissatisfied with his department's handling of certain allegations of sexual harassment made by a secretary against officer Mike Lukianoff, Robbins authored an anonymous letter and sent it to each of the City Commissioners. The Chief of Police, who later learned of the letter, conducted an investigation. Robbins eventually admitted to writing the letter, to relating the allegations even though he had no personal knowledge of them, and to having a personal vendetta against the alleged harasser. The City terminated Robbins, primarily for conduct unbecoming an officer. Robbins appealed to the City Civil Service Commission, which upheld Robbins' termination. Robbins then appealed to the Washington County Chancery Court, which reversed the termination, but remanded for appropriate discipline. The City appeals the reversal of Robbins' termination, and Robbins appeals the remand for discipline. We find that the trial court erred in reversing the termination.

This workers’ compensation case presents the question of how a “temporary partial disability”
benefits award, as defined in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-207(2), is calculated. The trial court held that an award is calculated based on the employee’s “average weekly wage,” which is the measure of benefits for the other categories of disability listed in the Workers’ Compensation Law (“temporary total disability,” “permanent total disability,” and “permanent partial disability”). The employer appealed this decision to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel. The case was transferred to the full Supreme Court before the Panel handed down its decision. We now reverse the trial court and hold that the express terms of the statute indicate that a temporary partial disability award has a unique method of calculation, based on “the difference between the wage of the worker at the time of the injury and the wage such worker is able to earn in such worker’s partially disabled condition.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-207(2). This method does not include the average weekly wage definition. Under the correct calculation, the plaintiff in this case is not entitled to any temporary partial disability benefits. The award of $3,258.20 is accordingly reversed and the cause remanded to the trial court. Appeal pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e); Judgment of the Circuit Court Reversed and Remanded.