APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Petitioner, Kip Dylane Buie, pled guilty to second degree murder and attempted second degree murder. He received an effective forty-year sentence. Subsequently, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his plea counsel was ineffective during the plea process and that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition, and the Petitioner appealed to this Court. On our review, we respectfully affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Terrell Craft, appeals his Shelby County Criminal Court jury convictions
of second degree murder and three counts of aggravated assault, challenging the sufficiency
of the convicting evidence and the trial court’s omission of a jury instruction on the defense
of necessity. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Defendant, Christopher Layne Spencer, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of two counts of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony, and violating the sexual offender registration act, a Class E felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-504 (2018) (aggravated sexual battery); 40-39-211(k) (2019) (sexual offender registry). The Defendant was sentenced to an effective fourteen years for the convictions. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for violating the sexual offender registry, (2) the trial court erred by admitting text messages as evidence, (3) the trial court erred by denying his request for a mistrial, (4) the trial court erred by limiting his closing argument, (5) the prosecutor engaged in improper closing argument, (6) the trial court erred with its jury instructions, and (7) the cumulative effect of the alleged errors entitles him to relief. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In this personal injury case, Appellants, Husband and Wife, alleged that Appellee’s dog collided with Husband’s bicycle causing him to crash and sustain injuries. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellee dog owner, finding that Appellants failed to meet their burden to show that Appellee’s dog was involved in the accident. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand.

This appeal arises from a single-car accident in which the vehicle crashed into a fence,
dumpster, and construction materials in the far-right lane of a city street. The plaintiff,
who was sitting in the front passenger seat of the vehicle at the time of the accident,
executed a release with the driver and the driver’s insurance company. The plaintiff
subsequently filed a complaint against the construction company who placed the
construction materials on the street, alleging negligence and negligence per se. The
defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motion on the
ground that the claim against the defendant was precluded by the release. The plaintiff
appealed. We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The Plaintiff hired the Defendant to build a concrete foundation for his new home. The
foundation was allegedly defective. The Plaintiff hired a third party to remove the concrete
and to properly complete the work. The Plaintiff then sued the Defendant, alleging breach
of contract, negligent construction, and fraud. The case languished for several years. The
trial court ordered the Plaintiff to provide dates on which the Defendant could inspect
certain evidence, but the Plaintiff failed to comply. The trial court then orally granted the
Defendant’s motion to dismiss with prejudice for failure to prosecute. Before the trial court
entered a written order, the Plaintiff filed a notice of voluntary dismissal. The trial court
concluded that the Plaintiff’s notice was untimely submitted, coming after the oral ruling
granting the motion to dismiss, and entered a written order dismissing the Plaintiff’s case
with prejudice for failure to prosecute. Concluding that the Plaintiff maintained his right
to a voluntary dismissal under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 41.01(1), we reverse.

The Defendant, Jeffrey Clay Dale, was convicted by a Maury County Circuit Court jury of two counts of driving under the influence, third offense, which the trial court merged. See T.C.A. §§ 55-10-401(1) (2020) (driving under the influence of an intoxicant), -401(2) (driving with a blood- or breath-alcohol concentration of 0.08% or more), 55-10-402 (a)(3)(A) (2020) (subsequently amended) (third offense driving under the influence). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to eleven months, twenty-nine days, with 140 days to be served in jail and the balance on probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and (2) the trial court erred in allowing a law enforcement officer to testify about his observations during field sobriety testing of the Defendant. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Tavaris D. Bledsoe, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing
that the post-conviction court erred in concluding that he received the effective assistance
of counsel. Upon our review, we conclude that Petitioner has failed to prepare a sufficient
brief in compliance with Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27(a)(7) and Tennessee
Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 10(b). Accordingly, his issues are waived, and the appeal
is dismissed.

The notice of appeal in this case was not timely filed. Therefore, this Court lacks
jurisdiction to consider this appeal. The appeal is dismissed.

The appellant is the Mayor of Shelby County. He filed a complaint for divorce, and the
Shelby County chancellor originally assigned to the case recused herself. The case was
reassigned to another Shelby County chancellor who accepted the case. Six months later,
the appellant filed a motion to recuse the chancellor based on the Mayor’s budgetary duties
regarding Shelby County government, including the chancery court and the chancery court
clerk. The chancellor denied the motion, finding that it was not filed promptly in
accordance with Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B. We affirm.

Appellant David Hutchins challenges the trial court's denial of his Motion to
continue a summary judgment hearing and its denial of his Motion to Alter or Amend
the Court's summary judgment. The appeal was referred to the Special Workers'
Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and
conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm.

This appeal concerns a lawsuit challenging the Tennessee Education Savings Account Pilot Program, Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-6-2601, et seq. (“the ESA Act”). A group of parents and taxpayers from Davidson and Shelby Counties (“Plaintiffs”) sued state officials (“State Defendants”) in the Chancery Court for Davidson County (“the Trial Court”). In their operative amended complaint, Plaintiffs alleged that the ESA Act violates the Tennessee Constitution and state law by diverting taxpayer funds appropriated for public schools in Davidson and Shelby Counties to private schools, resulting in unique harm to these localities. A group of parents with children eligible for the ESA Act (“Bah Defendants”) and another group (“Greater Praise Defendants”) (all defendants collectively, “Defendants”) intervened in defense of the ESA Act. Defendants filed motions to dismiss, which the Trial Court granted on grounds that Plaintiffs lack standing and their claims are not ripe for judicial review. In reaching its decision, the Trial Court found that the ESA Act has not caused the affected counties any unequal hardship. Plaintiffs appeal the dismissal of their first, second, and sixth causes of action only. We conclude that the Trial Court erred by deciding factual disputes over the impact of the ESA Act on Plaintiffs at the motion to dismiss stage. Plaintiffs alleged enough in their amended complaint to establish standing both as parents and taxpayers. Plaintiffs’ claims also are ripe for judicial review. We, therefore, reverse the judgment of the Trial Court as to Plaintiffs’ first, second, and sixth causes of action and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

Syeda C. (“Mother”) and Hosea T. (“Father”) (Mother and Father collectively, “Parents”) are the biological parents of Gabrella T. (the “Child”).  The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) petitioned the Juvenile Court of Memphis and Shelby County (the “Juvenile Court”) for an adjudication that the Child was dependent and neglected in the care of Parents and for an award of temporary legal custody of the Child to DCS.  The Juvenile Court granted DCS’s petition, adjudicated the Child dependent and neglected, and awarded temporary legal custody of the Child to DCS.  Mother appealed the Juvenile Court order to the Shelby County Circuit Court (the “Circuit Court”).  Mother failed to appear at the hearing in the Circuit Court on her appeal; upon oral motion made by DCS, the Circuit Court dismissed Mother’s appeal.  Mother now appeals to this Court.  Upon thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court.

Bobby V. Summers, Petitioner, appeals the post-conviction court’s summary dismissal of his petition as time-barred. Upon review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Christopher Laron Matthews, Defendant, appeals the trial court’s consecutive alignment of twelve-year sentences for sale of methamphetamine in Case No. 27504 and Case No. 27505 for an effective twenty-four-year sentence. The trial court based the consecutive sentencing on its finding that Defendant was an offender whose record of criminal activity was extensive. We affirm.

This is an appeal of a trial court’s valuation of a marital asset, division of a marital estate, and award of alimony in solido as a result of the divorce of Eric Wayne Barton (“Husband”) and Mechelle Scholmer Barton (“Wife”). In its 2018 Final Judgment of Divorce (“2018 Judgment”), the Chancery Court for Blount County (“the Trial Court”) found that Husband’s 100% interest in Vanquish Worldwide, LLC, (“Vanquish Worldwide”) was marital property and that Vanquish Worldwide’s outstanding claim for potentially $32 million against the U.S. Government (“Government Claim”) was marital property. The Trial Court accordingly awarded to Wife a portion of the Government Claim. In Husband’s first appeal, this Court reversed the Trial Court’s finding that the Government Claim was marital property and its awarded portion to Wife. This Court, concluding that the Government Claim was nevertheless relevant to an accurate valuation of Vanquish Worldwide and the total value of the parties’ marital business interests, instructed the Trial Court on remand to revalue Vanquish Worldwide, and in doing so, to consider the Government Claim. On remand, the Trial Court found that Husband had dissipated $12.375 million of the Government Claim proceeds by using the funds to satisfy a personal judgment against him. The Trial Court accordingly added the dissipated $12.375 million to its $4 million valuation of Vanquish Worldwide. Husband has appealed, contesting the Trial Court’s consideration of the Government Claim proceeds in its valuation of Vanquish Worldwide, as well as its overall division of the marital estate, award of alimony in solido, and placement of a lien and an assignment in trust to Wife on Husband’s ownership interests in his numerous LLCs, including Vanquish Worldwide. We affirm the Trial Court’s finding that Husband dissipated marital property and its valuation of Vanquish Worldwide but modify the Trial Court’s judgment to the extent it awarded interest on Wife’s award of alimony in solido. The balance of the Trial Court’s judgment is affirmed, including its division of the marital estate and award of alimony in solido to Wife. We further decline to award Wife attorney’s fees on appeal.

Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights based on Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(14). Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

The plaintiff filed an action for breach of contract and fraud against his former attorneys and the attorneys’ law firm. The defendants moved for a judgment on the pleadings, arguing that the plaintiff failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted, and that the action was untimely. The trial court granted the defendants’ motion, and, having determined that the plaintiff’s action is untimely under Tennessee Code Annotated section 28-3-104(c)(1), we affirm.

Plaintiff’s attorneys appeal the trial court’s imposition of sanctions against them in the amount of $68,617.28 and the denial of their second motion to disqualify the trial court judge. We affirm the trial court’s discretionary decision to impose sanctions, but we vacate the amount of sanctions awarded and remand for the trial court to calculate the reasonable amount of monetary sanctions in keeping with the procedures and considerations outlined in this opinion. We have determined that Plaintiff’s attorneys’ issue regarding the trial court’s denial of their second motion to recuse is moot. Finally, we decline to award attorney’s fees on appeal.

In this action initiated by the mother to modify the parties’ permanent parenting plan for their minor child, the trial court limited the father’s co-parenting time to include no overnight visitation with the child after finding by a preponderance of the evidence that the father had committed domestic abuse against two women whom he had previously dated. The trial court relied on Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-6-406 to restrict the father’s parenting time based on its determination that the father’s acts of domestic violence and hostility toward women had a negative effect on his ability to effectively parent the minor child. The father appealed, but this Court dismissed that appeal because the trial court’s order was not a final judgment. See McDonald v. Coffel, No. E2021-00460-COA-R3-CV, 2021 WL 4958475 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 26, 2021). On remand, the trial court addressed all pending matters and entered a final judgment, keeping in place the residential co-parenting schedule limiting the father’s parenting time to exclude overnight visitation. The father has again appealed, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by denying him overnight co-parenting time and by relying on Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-6-406. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

The Petitioner, James Moore, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of attempted first
degree murder and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, for
which he received an effective sentence of twenty-six years’ imprisonment. He now
appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of relief, arguing that trial counsel was
ineffective by failing to: (1) subpoena records that might have shown the victim’s
intoxication; and (2) adequately advise the Petitioner about testifying. Alternatively, he
argues that the cumulative effect of trial counsel’s deficiencies entitles him to relief. After
review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

In this divorce appeal, the husband challenges the trial court’s classification of real estate as marital property. Following a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

While a prior lawsuit was still pending on appeal, the Plaintiff filed a nearly identical lawsuit. The trial court dismissed this second suit based on res judicata. Although the second suit was not barred by res judicata because the first suit was not final for res judicata purposes, we nevertheless affirm the dismissal on the basis of the prior suit pending doctrine.

Five easement holders filed suit against two other easement holders and the servient estate owners seeking a declaratory judgment regarding whether the easements could be used for commercial logging activities. The trial court concluded that commercial logging activities were not a permissible use of the easements and entered an order restraining and enjoining use of the easements for such activities. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Appellant, Kelvin Montgomery, was convicted of especially aggravated kidnapping
and aggravated sexual battery. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of thirtyseven
years’ confinement. On appeal, the Appellant argues that: (1) the evidence is
insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the trial court committed plain error by failing
to provide the jury instruction required under State v. White, 362 S.W.3d 559, 580-81
(Tenn. 2012), in connection with his aggravated rape charge; and (3) the trial court abused
its discretion by imposing the maximum within-range sentences and ordering that they be
served consecutively. Upon our review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.