APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Davidson County jury convicted the Defendant, Damon Cordell Parson, of three counts of selling .5 grams or more of cocaine, and the trial court sentenced him to a total effective sentence of twelve years, to be served consecutively to a previous sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it admitted audio recordings of the drug transactions and that, without the recordings, the evidence is insufficient to convict him. He further contends that the trial court erred when it sentenced him because it improperly sentenced him to the maximum sentence within his applicable sentencing range and did not make proper considerations with regard to alternative sentencing. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

This is an appeal from a final order entered on September 20, 2024. The envelope within which the notice of appeal was mailed reflects that it was mailed from the prison mailroom of the facility where the appellant was incarcerated on November 9, 2024, more than thirty days from the date of entry of the order from which the appellant is seeking to appeal. Because the notice of appeal was not timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

This appeal arises from the dismissal of a health care liability action. The plaintiff’s husband passed away after a complication that occurred during a medical procedure. The plaintiff provided pre-suit notice of her claim to five health care providers but ultimately filed suit against only three of the providers. The plaintiff voluntarily dismissed her initial action, but then she re-filed it within a year. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the re-filed suit, alleging that the plaintiff failed to substantially comply with the requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss after finding that the plaintiff failed to substantially comply with section 29-26-121(a)(2)(E) due to limiting language included in HIPAA authorizations she had provided to the defendants. The trial court also found that the plaintiff failed to substantially comply with section 29-26-121(a)(4), which requires plaintiffs to file certain documentation with their complaint. We hold that the trial court erred in finding that the plaintiff failed to comply with section 29-26-121(a)(4) but did not err in finding that the plaintiff failed to comply with section 29-26-121(a)(2)(E). Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part and reversed in part.

This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B § 2.02 from the trial court’s denial of a motion for recusal. We have determined that the petition must be summarily dismissed due to substantive failures to comply with Rule 10B. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

A Knox County Jury convicted the Petitioner, James Theodore Menard, of one count of rape of a child, one count of exhibition of pictures depicting sexual conduct harmful to a minor, and two counts of aggravated sexual battery.  The trial court imposed an effective sentence of forty-two years in the Tennessee Department of Correction.  On appeal, this court affirmed the trial court, and our supreme court denied review.  State v. Menard, No.  E2021-00164-CCA-R3-CD,  2022 WL 1498767, at * 1 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 12, 2022), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Sept. 9, 2022).  The Petitioner filed for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.  After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief.  On appeal, the Petitioner maintains that his attorney was ineffective for failing to disclose a plea offer and failing to review discovery.  After review, we affirm the post-conviction court's judgment.

The Defendants, Jeffrey Pete Fautt and Robin Leanne Osborne, appeal their convictions for selling one-half gram or more of methamphetamine. They argue the evidence was insufficient to support the guilty verdicts because officers’ testimony was inconsistent, unreliable, and uncorroborated. Specifically, they assert that the controlled purchases were not captured by audio and video recordings, the searches of the confidential informant’s vehicle were not recorded, and officers did not deploy a canine unit during the searches of the informant’s vehicle. The Defendants additionally contend that Defendant Osborne’s testimony should have been accredited over the confidential informant’s testimony. The State avers that the testimony, video evidence, and laboratory results introduced at trial were sufficient to support the jury’s verdicts. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Brandon Eugene Beard, pleaded guilty to three counts of aggravated assault and one count of being a felon in possession of a handgun.  After the plea, but before the sentencing hearing, the State filed a notice to seek enhanced punishment offering exhibits showing that the Defendant qualified as a Range II offender and asking the court to impose consecutive sentences and the maximum sentence.  After the hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range II offender to eighteen years for each of the assault convictions to be served concurrently at 85% and to ten years for the handgun conviction to be served at 35% and consecutively to the assault sentences, for a total effective sentence of twenty-eight years.  On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it ordered partial consecutive sentencing and when it considered the State's notice to seek enhanced punishment, which the State filed after he pleaded guilty.  After review, we affirm the trial court's judgments. 

The defendant, Montreal Portis Robinson, appeals the twenty-five-year sentence imposed by the trial court upon resentencing for his second-degree murder conviction arguing the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. Upon our review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. However, our review has revealed a possible issue as to the sentences imposed in Counts 5 and 6, and we remand for the trial court to make further findings. 

A Madison County jury convicted the defendant, Cordaro Dywon Black, of four counts of rape of a child and one count of incest. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of sixty-four years and six months in confinement. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Zion Houston, appeals from the Madison County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for aggravated robbery and misdemeanor theft. On appeal, the State contends that the post-conviction court properly dismissed the petition as untimely because it was filed more than one year after the Petitioner’s judgments were entered. The Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred when it determined the petition was untimely because the judgments in question did not become final until thirty days after they were entered, and the petition was filed one year after the judgments became final. We reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand the case for preliminary consideration of the post-conviction petition consistent with this opinion and pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-106.

The pro se petitioner, Marlon McKay, appeals from the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus by the Circuit Court for Lake County, arguing the habeas court erred in finding the petitioner was not entitled to relief as a matter of law and summarily dismissing his petition without appointing counsel. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the habeas court.

In accordance with the reasoning set forth in this court’s recent opinion in Jarrett v. State, I would dismiss Petitioner’s appeal due to his failure to file a timely notice of appeal and his failure to acknowledge that his notice of appeal is untimely or otherwise request that this court accept his late-filed notice of appeal.

A minor Plaintiff, acting through his grandmother, sued several healthcare providers for injuries stemming from his birth. The Plaintiff later voluntarily dismissed his lawsuit. The Plaintiff provided statutorily compliant pre-suit notice to each defendant within a year of dismissal but did not refile the suit for over a year after dismissal. The Plaintiff asserted this was permissible in accordance with the 120-day extension available under Tennessee’s Healthcare Liability Act. The trial court rejected this contention and dismissed the suit. On appeal, much of the parties’ respective briefing tracked the arguments before the Tennessee Supreme Court in the case of Richards v. Vanderbilt University Medical Center, __ S.W.3d __, No. M2022-00597-SC-R11-CV, 2025 WL 259059 (Tenn. Jan. 22, 2025). While the suit was pending on appeal, the Tennessee Supreme Court decided that the 120- day extension does not apply to the one-year deadline for refiling suit after a voluntary dismissal. This case is controlled by the Richards decision. Accordingly, we affirm.

In this action filed pursuant to 42 United States Code § 1983, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant law enforcement officers had violated one plaintiff’s constitutional rights by using excessive force when the officers shot and injured him at the scene of a “road rage” incident that did not involve the injured plaintiff. The defendants subsequently moved for summary judgment, arguing that the officers’ use of deadly force was objectively reasonable under the totality of the circumstances because the injured plaintiff had appeared at the scene of the road rage investigation suddenly and without warning, had approached the officers rapidly, and had been armed with a rifle. Following a hearing, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants and dismissed the action with prejudice, determining, inter alia, that the officers’ use of deadly force had been objectively reasonable. The plaintiffs timely appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

The plaintiff filed this lawsuit against his former attorney and her law firm, alleging legal malpractice and related claims. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, supported by the affidavit of the defendant-attorney and various other documents. Just days before the hearing on the motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff filed an untimely response to the motion for summary judgment along with voluminous exhibits. The defendants asked the trial court to disregard the late-filed exhibits and grant them summary judgment. The trial court found that the plaintiff’s response was untimely and deemed it stricken. In the absence of a response, the trial court also took the defendants’ statements of undisputed material facts as true. It then examined each of the causes of action asserted by the plaintiff and concluded that no genuine issues of material fact existed and that the defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on all claims. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm and remand for further proceedings.

Quality Motors, LLC, a defunct used car dealership owned by Chris Yousif, filed suit in the Circuit Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”) against Ali Hussein Khalil and Motohaven Automotive Group, LLC (“Motohaven”), pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29- 30-101 to -111. Quality Motors claimed that Khalil had converted for his personal benefit fourteen of its cars, four of which had been sold to Motohaven. At the conclusion of Quality Motors’ proof at trial, the Trial Court granted Motohaven’s motion for directed verdict, which we construe as a motion for involuntary dismissal. At the conclusion of trial, the Trial Court found that Quality Motors had failed to meet its burden of proof against Khalil and entered a judgment dismissing Quality Motors’ case. The Trial Court granted Khalil’s and Motohaven’s respective motions for exemplary damages pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-30-110. Quality Motors appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

The Defendant, Clyde E. Willis, was convicted by a Madison County Circuit Court jury of trafficking for a commercial sex act from a law enforcement officer posing as a minor, a Class B felony; patronizing prostitution from a law enforcement officer posing as a minor, a Class A misdemeanor; and solicitation of a law enforcement officer posing as a minor to commit aggravated statutory rape, a Class D felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-309(a)(3) (Supp. 2019) (subsequently amended) (trafficking for a commercial sex act from a law enforcement officer posing as a minor), 39-13-514(a)(2) (Supp. 2019) (subsequently amended) (patronizing prostitution from a law enforcement officer), 39-13-528(a)(7) (2018) (solicitation of a law enforcement officer posing as a minor to commit statutory rape). The trial court merged the patronizing prostitution conviction with the trafficking conviction and sentenced the Defendant to an effective nine-year sentence in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction of trafficking for a commercial sex act and that his convictions for patronizing prosecution from a law enforcement officer posing as a minor and for solicitation for a commercial sex act from a law enforcement officer posing as a minor violate double jeopardy and must be merged. Because we agree that the evidence is insufficient to support the trafficking conviction, we vacate the conviction, reverse the judgment, and dismiss the charge. We affirm the Defendant’s remaining convictions, and we remand for completion of sentencing for the patronizing prostitution conviction and entry of an amended judgment.

I concur with my colleagues’ reasoning and judgment in affirming Defendant’s convictions in Counts 2 and 3 for patronizing prostitution from a law enforcement officer posing as a minor and solicitation of a law enforcement officer posing as a minor to commit aggravated statutory rape. I depart, however, from the majority’s opinion regarding the sufficiency of the evidence to support Defendant’s conviction in Count 1. I dissent on this point alone.

Petitioner, Guary Wallace, appeals the post-conviction court’s order denying his petition for post-conviction relief in which he challenged his convictions for attempted first degree murder, especially aggravated robbery, two counts of aggravated robbery, and two counts of aggravated assault and his effective 100-year sentence. On appeal, Petitioner contends that the prosecutor made improper comments during closing arguments at trial and that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the prosecutor’s comments. Because Petitioner filed an untimely notice of appeal, we dismiss the appeal.

This is the second appeal arising from a lawsuit in which the plaintiff alleges the defendants engaged in tortious conduct and committed breach of contract when they filed certain medical records into the record of a separate healthcare liability lawsuit. The plaintiff is the same in both cases as are two of the defendants. The defendants’ motion to dismiss was granted, and sanctions were imposed against the plaintiff’s attorney. The plaintiff appealed to this Court, and we affirmed. We also deemed the appeal to be frivolous and awarded the defendants attorneys’ fees and costs incurred litigating the appeal. Upon remand, the trial court calculated the attorneys’ fees and costs incurred and the plaintiffs subsequently filed this appeal. Finding that our award of fees in the prior appeal became the law of the case, we affirm.

Husband and wife divorced. In dividing the parties’ marital assets, the trial court granted Husband significantly less equity than Wife in the parties’ marital residence. In its oral ruling, the trial court also set a five-year horizon before Wife needed to sell or refinance the home. On appeal, Husband challenges both the amount of the equity in the home that he was awarded and the failure to order a quicker sale or refinancing by Wife of the marital residence. Both parties agree the trial court inadvertently failed to memorialize in its written final order a sale or refinancing requirement for the end of this five-year horizon. We remand to the trial court for modification of its order in accordance with the parties’ agreed understanding; otherwise, we affirm the trial court’s order.

The probate court declared a will executed on September 5, 2021, to be the decedent’s last will and testament and admitted it to probate. The beneficiary under an earlier will contested the validity of the 2021 will. In moving for summary judgment, the beneficiary argued that the decedent lacked testamentary capacity to make the will. Based on the undisputed facts, the trial court agreed. We affirm.

The Plaintiff, who was injured by tripping on a sidewalk, filed suit against the private property owners and city but failed to properly serve the city. In their original answer, the private property owners asserted the city’s comparative fault but not in express terms. The Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the city as a defendant. In an amended answer, the private property owners expressly asserted comparative fault against the city. The Plaintiff promptly amended her complaint to add the city as a defendant under Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-1-119, which provides a plaintiff 90 days after the filing of an answer asserting comparative fault against a non-party to add that non-party as a defendant, even if doing so would otherwise be barred by a statute of limitations. The city asserted this was not in accordance with the statute because the private property owners asserted comparative fault against the city in the original answer. The trial court determined that, although the original answer did raise comparative fault of the city, this did not trigger the 90-day window under the statute because the city was a party at the time. The trial court concluded that the amended answer was timely filed within 90 days of the filing of the first answer alleging comparative fault against a non-party, which was the amended answer. The city appeals. We affirm.

In this estate case, appellant, decedent’s son, and appellee, decedent’s partner of twenty-seven years, are the beneficiaries of decedent’s will. The will appointed the parties co-executors, and they served in this capacity for several months until disputes arose between them and this litigation ensued. In its final order, the trial court found in favor of appellee on every disputed issue. On appeal, appellant raises issues concerning the trial court’s: (1) rulings during trial; (2) final order; and (3) award of attorney’s fees to appellee. Both parties ask for an award of appellate attorney’s fees. Because the evidence does not support the attorney’s fee amount awarded to appellee, and because the trial court failed to consider the relevant reasonableness factors, we vacate this award and remand for a new determination of reasonable attorney’s fees owed to appellee. The trial court’s orders are otherwise affirmed. We grant appellee’s request for appellate attorney’s fees, and we deny appellant’s request for same. Appellee’s request for frivolous appeal damages is denied.

In this boundary dispute, the plaintiff brought an action seeking a declaratory judgment to establish the boundary line between the plaintiff's improved real property and the defendants' improved real property. Following a bench trial, during which the court heard expert testimony from two competing surveyors, the trial court declared the property boundary to be established according to the survey prepared by the plaintiff's expert witness. The defendants have appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. The plaintiff's request for attorney's fees on appeal is denied.