APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal arises from a declaratory judgment action regarding a decision of the Knox County Commission to amend zoning for the subject property. The trial court affirmed the rezoning. Finding no error, we affirm the ruling of the trial court.

After being convicted by a jury of multiple drug charges, possession of a firearm during the commission of or attempt to commit a dangerous felony, and three alternative counts of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, Torsaunt Lamont Shanklin, Petitioner, was sentenced to an effective sentence of thirty-five years in incarceration.  His direct appeal challenging the denial of a motion to suppress was unsuccessful.  State v. Shanklin, No. M2019-01896-CCA-R3-CD, 2021 WL 1082043, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 22, 2021), perm. app. denied (Tenn. May 12, 2021).  Petitioner sought post-conviction relief primarily based on ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief.  We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Petitioner’s ex-wife became romantically involved with the Respondent. The Petitioner sought an order of protection for himself and his children against the Respondent, asserting that the Respondent stalked him and his children. The Respondent opposed the petition, asserting that he had only ever been near the Petitioner for the legitimate purpose of protecting Petitioner’s ex-wife and children from Petitioner, who has a troubling history of violence and who allegedly continued to emotionally harm the children during their online visitation. The General Sessions Court concluded that the Petitioner failed to prove stalking and declined to grant an order of protection. Petitioner advanced the petition to Circuit Court. The Circuit Court also refused to grant an order of protection and found that the Petitioner made knowingly false allegations at the time of filing his order of protection petition. Accordingly, the Circuit Court awarded attorney’s fees and costs to the Respondent. The Petitioner appeals. We affirm.

This is an appeal from a directed verdict in a personal injury lawsuit. Glenya Cole-Jackson (“Plaintiff”) sued Costco Wholesale Corporation d/b/a Costco (“Defendant”) in the Circuit Court for Shelby County (“the Trial Court”) over an incident in which she was hit by a shopping cart pulled by one of Defendant’s employees. The case went before a jury. At the close of Plaintiff’s proof, Defendant moved for a directed verdict. The Trial Court granted the motion, finding that Plaintiff failed to submit evidence that the shopping cart incident caused her injuries. Plaintiff appeals. Contrary to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27 and Rule 6 of the Tennessee Court of Appeals, Plaintiff’s brief fails to cite the record. In addition, the record contains no transcript or statement of evidence of the trial, hence we have no basis for determining that the Trial Court erred. We find that Plaintiff has waived her issues. We affirm.

The Defendant, Grover Beverly, was convicted by a Sevier County jury of two counts of rape of a child, for which he received an effective sentence of eighty years' incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Following our review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. 

In this divorce action the husband appeals the classification of two substantial assets as marital property, each of which he contends are separate property because they were gifted to him by his father. The husband also challenges the trial court’s determination of his income for purposes of child support and alimony. On different grounds, the wife challenges the trial court’s determination of the husband’s income for child support purposes. The wife also appeals the trial court’s denial of her request for attorney’s fees as alimony in solido based upon its finding that her fees had been paid out of marital assets pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-4-121 and that an award of alimony in solido would constitute “double dipping.” She further seeks an award of her attorney’s fees on appeal. We affirm the trial court’s determination of the husband’s income for purposes of child support and alimony. Moreover, we affirm the classification of the 7.6-acre parcel with the cabin as marital property but reverse the classification of the husband’s partnership interest in Berry’s Chapel Ventures, LLC, as marital property and remand with instructions to classify it as Husband’s separate property. We further find that the appreciation in the value of the husband’s interest during the marriage is his separate property. Resultingly, on remand, the trial court is to reconsider the equitable division of the marital estate and enter judgment accordingly. Because of significant changes in the marital estate, we vacate the award of alimony in futuro and remand with instructions to reconsider this award upon settling the marital estate and to enter judgment accordingly. We affirm the trial court’s denial of Wife’s request for attorney’s fees as alimony in solido, albeit on different grounds. Each party shall be responsible for their attorney’s fees and expenses incurred on appeal. 

Petitioner, Donald K. Moore, Jr., appeals the summary dismissal of his petitions seeking post-conviction relief from his 1996 convictions for first degree murder and especially aggravated robbery in case number 96-C-1428 and second degree murder in case number 96-C-1423, for which he was sentenced to life, twenty years, and twenty-one years’ incarceration, respectively. The post-conviction court concluded that, even if Petitioner’s allegations were taken as true, he would not be entitled to relief and summarily dismissed the petitions. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

In 1996, the Petitioner, Alvin Dean Shaver, pled guilty to two counts of first degree murder and was sentenced to concurrent terms of life without the possibility of parole. In 2024, the Petitioner applied for a writ of habeas corpus. He alleged that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear and adjudicate the charges because the statute pursuant to which he was convicted did not have the constitutionally required style, “Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Tennessee.” The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the application for the writ, and the Petitioner appealed. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

Defendant, David Edward Seickendick, appeals the judgment of the Cumberland County Criminal Court revoking his probation and ordering him to serve the balance of his previously ordered probationary sentence in confinement. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to consider Defendant’s medical conditions in revoking his probation and ordering him to serve his original sentence. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Nathan David Bassett, pled guilty in the Madison County Circuit Court to theft of property valued $10,000 or more. Pursuant to the plea agreement, he received a five-year sentence as a Range I, standard offender with the trial court to determine the manner of service of the sentence. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered that the Defendant serve the sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by denying a sentence alternative to confinement. Based on our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The pro se Defendant, Darrell E. Nance,1 appeals from the trial court’s summary dismissal
of his Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 motion to correct an illegal sentence.
Specifically, the Defendant argues that (1) the trial court erred in concluding that his
sentence of life imprisonment was legal, (2) the State’s motion to dismiss his motion was
untimely, and (3) the trial court erred in declining to appoint counsel and hold a hearing on
his motion. Because we conclude that the Defendant’s notice of appeal was untimely filed
and that the interest of justice does not require waiver of the timely filing requirement, we
dismiss the appeal.

Following an automobile accident, Appellant filed a complaint for negligence and personal injuries against appellees, the at-fault driver and her husband. Appellees moved for summary judgment, arguing that appellant’s claims should be dismissed because she settled with appellees’ insurance carrier and released her claims against them prior to filing suit. The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment. Because there are disputes of material facts concerning whether appellant agreed to settle and release her claims, we reverse.

The Defendant, Forrest Scott Evans, pled guilty to the offense of aggravated assault, and the trial court sentenced him to a term of seven years and six months. The court suspended the sentence and placed the Defendant on probation. Thereafter, the Defendant committed new crimes in Virginia. When the Defendant was returned to Tennessee, the trial court revoked the suspended sentence and ordered him to serve it in full. The Defendant appeals, arguing that a full revocation was an abuse of discretion. Upon our review, we respectfully disagree and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Pro se Appellant, Michael Adams, has appealed an order of the Shelby County Circuit Court that was entered on November 1, 2024. We determine that the trial court’s order does not constitute a final appealable judgment. As a result, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed.

The Defendant, James R. Holley, appeals the Henderson County Circuit Court’s denial of his request for alternative sentencing after his guilty pleas to eight counts involving drugs, weapons, and traffic offenses. Based on our review, we conclude that the Defendant failed to provide this court with an adequate appellate record. Accordingly, his appeal is dismissed.

The Petitioner, Rickius Grant, appeals the Madison County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for two counts of attempting to traffic a person for a commercial sex act and resulting concurrent six-year sentences. On appeal, he contends that the post-conviction court erred by finding that his petition was barred by the statute of limitations because due process required that the statute of limitations be tolled. Based upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Roger Bridges, 1 was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of three counts of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony; sexual battery, a Class E felony; rape, a Class B felony; and rape of a child, a Class A felony, and was sentenced by the trial court to an effective term of fifty-one years at 100% in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The four victims involved were three sisters and their female first cousin, and the offenses occurred over a two-month period that culminated on June 12, 2018, when one of the three sisters divulged the abuse to her father, who called the police. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and argues that the State violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S 83 (1973), “by failing to produce information concerning the pending investigation of a male family member for sexual abuse crimes against some of the same family group.”2 Based on our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A petitioner obtained an ex parte temporary order of protection in general sessions court. The respondent counter-petitioned to dismiss under the Tennessee Public Participation Act (“TPPA”). After a hearing, the general sessions court denied the respondent’s petition, but it also declined to extend the temporary protective order and dismissed the underlying petition for lack of proof. The respondent appealed the decision on “attorney’s fees” to circuit court. After a de novo review, the circuit court determined that the respondent was not entitled to attorney’s fees under either the order of protection statute or the TPPA. In this appeal, the respondent challenges denial of his request for attorney’s fees under the TPPA. Because the circuit court lacked appellate jurisdiction over the general sessions court’s order denying the petition to dismiss under the TPPA, we vacate in part and remand.

Defendant, Detarus Brown, appeals from the Maury County Circuit Court’s order partially denying his motion to correct his sentence, and Defendant contends that the trial court should have treated his motion as a petition for post-conviction relief. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Kurt Franklin Luna, was convicted after a jury trial of driving without a license, driving an unregistered vehicle, and violation of the financial responsibility law. The trial court sentenced him to serve forty-eight hours in the county jail. On appeal, Defendant raises a variety of claims. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that Defendant has waived his issues for failure to create an adequate record and failure to comply with the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

A Dyer County jury found the Defendant, Daniel McCaig, guilty of unlawfully possessing methamphetamine and a firearm. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of twenty-six years to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the evidence is legally insufficient to support his convictions. He also argues that the trial court erred by denying his right to represent himself and imposing consecutive sentences. Upon our review, we respectfully disagree and affirm the trial court’s judgments.

This appeal concerns whether a railroad employee’s negligence claim brought under the Federal Employers Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 51, et seq. (“FELA”) is precluded by the Federal Railroad Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. § 20101, et seq. (“FRSA”). Troy L. Rouzer (“Plaintiff”), a locomotive engineer, sued CSX Transportation, Inc. (“Defendant”) in the Circuit Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”) under FELA for injuries he sustained in a collision. Plaintiff alleged insufficient training. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that FRSA precludes Plaintiff’s FELA claim. Defendant argued that national uniformity in safety rules requires this result. The Trial Court granted Defendant’s motion. Plaintiff appeals. We hold, inter alia, that in view of the United States Supreme Court’s holding in POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 573 U.S. 102, 134 S.Ct. 2228, 189 L.Ed.2d 141 (2014), exemplified in its statement that “[w]hen two statutes complement each other, it would show disregard for the congressional design to hold that Congress nonetheless intended one federal statute to preclude the operation of the other[,]” id. at 115, Plaintiff’s FELA claim is not precluded by FRSA as both federal statutes complement one another toward the goal of rail safety. We, therefore, reverse the Trial Court’s grant of summary judgment to Defendant and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

Because the order from which the appellant has filed an appeal does not constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B § 2.02 from the trial court’s denial of a motion for recusal. We have determined that the petition must be summarily dismissed due to substantive failures to comply with Rule 10B. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

A Knox County jury convicted Defendant, D’tearius Carvell Southern, of second degree murder, aggravated assault, two counts of reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon, tampering with evidence, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. Defendant received an effective sentence of twenty-three years to be served in confinement. On appeal, Defendant contends that the evidence was not sufficient to support his conviction for second degree murder and that the trial court erred by declining to instruct the jury that Defendant had no duty to retreat before using deadly force as part of the self-defense instruction. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.