APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

In this appeal, we hold that the right to petition in the Tennessee Constitution is enforceable against governmental entities, not private parties, and that it cannot be the basis for a “public policy” exception to the employment-at-will doctrine as against private employers. Here, the plaintiff at-will employee emailed members of the Tennessee General Assembly expressing grievances about the COVID-19 vaccination mandate implemented by her employer, a private organization. After the employer told the plaintiff that the email violated the employer’s policies, the employee sent a second similar email to legislators. The defendant terminated the plaintiff’s employment. The plaintiff sued the defendant private employer for retaliatory discharge, asserting her employment was terminated for exercising the right to petition in Article I, Section 23 of the Tennessee Constitution. The trial court dismissed the complaint, and the Court of Appeals reversed. On appeal, our review shows that, for hundreds of years dating back to early England, the constitutional right to petition has been considered a bulwark against government oppression, not a constraint on private parties. No state in the nation has held that the right to petition applies to limit the ability of private employers to terminate the employment of at-will employees, and the language in Article I, Section 23 does not mandate such a holding. We hold that Article I, Section 23 is enforceable only against the government, not against private actors; consequently, private employers do not violate a clear public policy by terminating employees for exercising the right to petition. Thus, at-will employees may not base claims of retaliatory discharge against private employers on the right to petition in the Tennessee Constitution. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals and affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s complaint.

I join in full the majority’s opinion holding that the right to petition in the Tennessee Constitution cannot provide the basis for a retaliatory discharge claim against private employers. I write separately to suggest that, in an appropriate case, we should reconsider whether the Court is the correct entity to create public policy exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine

The Petitioner, Gemeyal Strowder, was charged with aggravated robbery, aggravated assault, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and theft of property valued at one thousand dollars ($1000) or less. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Petitioner entered a guilty plea to aggravated robbery, and the remaining charges were dismissed with the sentence and manner of service to be determined by the trial court. Following a hearing, the trial court imposed a sentence of eighteen years’ imprisonment. The Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied. In this appeal, the Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This action involves the termination of a mother’s parental rights to her minor child. Following a bench trial, the court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to establish the following statutory grounds of termination: (1) abandonment for failure to provide support and (2) the persistence of conditions which led to removal. The court found that termination was in the child’s best interest. We affirm the termination decision.

This is an appeal from the trial court’s entry of a permanent parenting plan involving one minor child. The trial court named the father the primary residential parent, entered a parenting plan awarding the father the majority of parenting time during the school year, and gave the father authority over the child’s education. The mother appeals. We affirm.

After this Court dismissed the appellant’s first appeal as untimely, he filed a Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02 motion for relief in the trial court. The trial court denied the motion. We affirm.

Petitioner, Isaih Tatum, pleaded guilty to possession of more than 0.5 grams of
methamphetamine with intent to sell or deliver and unlawful possession of a weapon by a
convicted felon and received an agreed sentence of ten years. He subsequently filed a
petition for post-conviction relief, which the McMinn County Criminal Court denied after
a hearing. On appeal, Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred when it
denied relief on his claims that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel and that
his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. Following a thorough review,
we affirm.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner, Jimmie Martin, of second degree murder of Martha J. Bownes, and the trial court sentenced him to serve twenty years. On appeal, this court affirmed the judgment. State v. Martin, No. W2013-00889-CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL 2566490, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 5, 2014), no perm. app. filed. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, claiming that he had received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. On appeal, the Petitioner maintains that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney had a conflict of interest at the time he represented the Petitioner and because Counsel failed to call an eye witness, Christopher Martin, to testify at his trial. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

The Defendant, Charles Jordan, II, pled guilty in the Dyer County Circuit Court to possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a felony crime of violence and possession of more than one-half ounce of marijuana with intent to sell or deliver. Pursuant to the plea agreement, he was to receive an effective ten-year sentence with the trial court to determine the manner of service. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered that he serve the sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant claims that the trial court erred by denying his request for alternative sentencing. Based on our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This post-divorce appeal arises from competing petitions to modify a parenting plan and a petition for criminal contempt. At the time of the divorce, Brandy Leigh Frame Taylor2 (“Mother”) and Joseph Daniel Taylor (“Father”) adopted a parenting plan naming Mother the primary residential parent of the parties’ minor child and awarding Father visitation. The child was four years old at the time of the divorce. Five years later, the then nine-year-old child purportedly began refusing to visit Father. Thereafter, Mother petitioned the trial court to modify the parenting plan to, inter alia, stop all visitation with Father. Father filed a counter-petition to modify the parenting plan to, inter alia, name him the primary residential parent. Father also filed a contempt petition alleging, in relevant part, that Mother intentionally and repeatedly obstructed his visitation and coached the child to refuse to visit Father. After a two-day hearing in which the trial court found Father was a credible witness and Mother was not credible, the court determined that a material change in circumstances had occurred due to Mother’s severe alienation of the child from Father and that a drastic modification of the parenting plan was in the child’s best interest. The court’s modifications of the parenting plan included designating Father as the primary residential parent with sole decision-making authority, reducing Mother’s parenting time to what Father had been awarded in the previous order, and restricting Mother to supervised visitation pending a Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 35 psychological evaluation. In a separate order, the court found Mother guilty of seventy-one counts of criminal contempt for willfully violating the parties’ visitation schedule and sentenced Mother to serve concurrent ten-day terms in jail for six of the seventy-one acts of contempt but suspended the sixty-day sentence except for the service of three weekends on the condition that Mother strictly adhere to the court’s orders going forward. Mother appeals the modification of the parenting plan and the trial court’s seventy-one criminal contempt findings. Both parties challenge the sentence imposed for Mother’s criminal contempt. We affirm. Father also requests his attorney’s fees on appeal. We find Father’s request to be well taken and remand for a determination of Father’s reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees incurred in this appeal.

The Petitioner, Jacquet Moore, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s summary denial of his post-conviction petition, seeking relief from his conviction of aggravated rape and resulting sentence of sixty years to be served at one hundred percent. On appeal, the Petitioner claims, and the State concedes, that the post-conviction court erred by denying his amended petition without conducting an evidentiary hearing on his claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Based on our review, we conclude that the post-conviction court properly denied relief as to one of the Petitioner’s grounds for relief but that the case must be remanded for an evidentiary hearing on his remaining grounds. Therefore, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case is remanded to the post-conviction court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

A Rutherford County jury convicted the Defendant, Luis Mendoza-Sanchez, of multiple offenses against two victims, a child and her mother, including aggravated assault of the mother, rape of a child and four counts of aggravated sexual assault of the child.  He was additionally convicted of violating the Child Protection Act.  The trial court sentenced the Defendant to fifty-nine years of incarceration.  On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred when it denied his motion to sever the trials for charges against the victim and her mother; (2) the trial court erred when it allowed the State to ask leading questions of their own witness; (3) the trial court erred when it limited the Defendant’s cross-examination of an expert about the victim’s sexual orientation; and (4) the cumulative effect of these errors entitled him to a new trial.  After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The Defendant, Jennifer Ruth Barber, appeals from the Montgomery County Circuit Court’s probation revocation of her eight-year sentence for possession of methamphetamine.  On appeal, she contends that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering her to serve her sentence.  We affirm the court’s judgment.

Petitioner, Demarcus Keyon Cole, acting pro se, appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition seeking a writ of error coram nobis, claiming that Judge Donald H. Allen erred by summarily dismissing the petition while Petitioner’s motion to recuse Judge Joseph T. Howell was pending. We conclude that Petitioner is not entitled to relief and affirm the summary dismissal of the petition. However, we remand for Judge Howell to enter a written order granting the recusal motion.

Appellant appeals from the trial court’s denial of a motion to vacate a default judgment. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand.

The Defendant, Jerry Buckner, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of second degree murder, a Class A felony, and unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, a Class B felony. T.C.A. §§ 39-13-210 (2018) (second degree murder), 39-17-1307(b)(1)(A) (2018) (subsequently amended) (unlawful firearm possession).  The trial court sentenced the Defendant to serve concurrent sentences of forty years for second degree murder and twenty years for the firearm possession.  On appeal, he contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erred in declining to instruct the jury on the defense of self-defense.  We affirm the judgments of the trial court and remand for correction of a clerical error on the judgment for the firearm conviction.

The appellant, Ann Blankenship d/b/a Ann Blankenship Bonding, appeals her suspension from writing bonds in the Twenty-Fourth Judicial District due to her failure to comply with the applicable statutes. Based upon the record, the parties’ briefs, and oral argument, we affirm that decision of the trial court.

This is an appeal arising from a decision by the Tennessee Board of Nursing (“the Board”)
to revoke a registered nurse’s license after she retrieved the wrong medication from an
automatic dispenser and administered it to a hospital patient, resulting in the patient’s
death. The Tennessee Department of Health (“the Department”) brought an initial
complaint against the nurse concerning the incident, which it first determined did not merit
further action but then later re-opened. Simultaneously, the nurse faced criminal
prosecution and was ultimately convicted of two criminal charges related to the incident.
Following a contested hearing in the administrative proceedings, the Board revoked the
nurse’s license. The nurse sought judicial review of this decision pursuant to Tennessee’s
Uniform Administrative Procedure Act. During the judicial review proceeding, the nurse
raised, for the first time, the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel as affirmative
defenses to the Department’s complaint. In response, the Board argued that the nurse had
waived these affirmative defenses because she had failed to raise them during the
administrative proceedings. While the petition for judicial review remained pending, the
criminal case moved to the sentencing phase. A doctor, who had testified as an expert
witness in both the contested administrative proceeding and the criminal case, wrote a letter
of support for the nurse to the criminal court judge in preparation for her sentencing. When
the nurse learned of the doctor’s supportive letter, she moved the trial court to remand the
instant case to the Board so that the Board could consider the contents of the letter in its
decision. The trial court declined to remand the matter to the Board or to allow the nurse
to present the letter to the Board as additional evidence. The trial court subsequently
entered a final order, determining that the nurse had not waived the affirmative defenses of
res judicata or judicial estoppel but declining to reverse the Board’s decision on those
grounds. The trial court then affirmed the Board’s decision to revoke the nurse’s license.
The nurse has appealed. Upon review, we determine that the nurse waived the affirmative
defenses of res judicata and collateral estoppel because she failed to present those doctrines
during the administrative proceedings  Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s
determination concerning waiver of those defenses. In all other respects, we affirm.

After being convicted of several drug offenses, Charles R. Johnson, Petitioner, was sentenced to an effective thirty-year sentence.  State v. Johnson, No. E2021-01106-CCA-R3-CD, 2023 WL 3535344, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 18, 2023), no perm. app. filed.  Petitioner's direct appeal was unsuccessful.  He sought post-conviction relief by filing a pro se petition in which he argued that trial counsel was ineffective and that his due process rights were violated in various ways.  The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition without appointment of counsel.  On appeal, Petitioner argues that the post-conviction court improperly dismissed the petition.  After a review, we affirm the post-conviction court's summary dismissal of Petitioner's standalone due process claims.  However, we reverse and remand the post-conviction court's summary dismissal of Petitioner's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel without appointment of counsel or a hearing.  Consequently, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.  On remand, the post-conviction court should appoint counsel for Petitioner, allow Petitioner to amend his pro se petition, and hold a hearing on the petition.

Petitioner, Dale Merritt, appeals the denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence, filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Michael Dunford, appeals as of right from his jury convictions for two counts
of aggravated robbery and two counts of aggravated kidnapping, for which he received an
effective sentence of fifteen years. On appeal, Defendant contends that the evidence was
insufficient to prove his identity as the perpetrator and that the trial court erred by imposing
a longer sentence than the minimum in-range sentence of twelve years. Following our
review, we affirm.

When Daniel Barillas failed to appear for a scheduled court appearance, the trial court entered a conditional forfeiture against Mr. Barillas and Bail U Out Bonding (“Bail U Out”). Bail U Out moved for exoneration of the bail bond, claiming that Mr. Barillas had been deported. Following a hearing, the trial court ordered forfeiture of the full amount of the bond. After a thorough review, we determine that the trial court did not abuse its discretion and affirm the judgment.

The pro se Petitioner, Jamauri Ransom, appeals the Hardeman County Circuit Court’s order granting the State of Mississippi’s request that he be extradited to Mississippi on a murder indictment.  We conclude that the Petitioner has waived consideration of his claim regarding the alleged invalidity of the extradition paperwork by failing to include an adequate record for appellate review.  Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

Property owners retained a licensed engineer to develop subdivision lots. As partial compensation for his services, the engineer agreed to accept a 6% share of the gross proceeds when the lots were sold. The agreement was to be binding on the property owners’ heirs and assigns. After both owners died, ownership of the remaining unsold lots passed to a daughter through probate. She sold some of the lots without payment of the engineer’s 6% share. The engineer sued the daughter for breach of contract and unjust enrichment. Among other things, the daughter argued that the engineer’s action was barred by the probate statutes. The trial court held that the engineer’s 6% share was secured by a statutory lien on the real property and its proceeds and that such lien was not subject to any affirmative defenses. After careful review, we reverse.

A Knox County jury convicted the Defendant, Antonio Gipson, of second degree murder and unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and the trial court imposed a sentence of forty years. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence is legally insufficient to support his conviction for second degree murder. He also asserts that the trial court erred by (1) finding that prior threats made by the victim were hearsay; and (2) excluding a video of the victim displaying a firearm in the weeks before the shooting. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgments of the trial court.