APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal arises from an action for breach of a contract wherein the defendants had agreed to assist the plaintiff in purchasing improved real property. Following a bench trial, the trial court found that the plaintiff had committed the first material breach of the parties’ contract, had acted in bad faith, and had misrepresented information to the defendants regarding her performance of the contract. However, the court determined that the defendants had continued to accept payment on the contract after the plaintiff’s breach. The trial court awarded to the plaintiff a judgment in the amount of $170,470.04, representing reimbursement of all payments she had made to the defendants, plus interest, but minus expenses incurred by the defendants over the course of the agreement. The trial court denied the plaintiff’s request for specific performance. The plaintiff has appealed. Due to significant deficiencies in the plaintiff’s appellate briefs, we conclude that she has waived consideration of all issues on appeal. Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal. We deny the defendants’ request for an award of attorney’s fees incurred on appeal.

In this matter involving the sale of a parcel of improved real property, the buyer claimed
that the sellers should be held liable for fraudulent misrepresentations regarding the
condition of the property. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the sellers,
determining that the presence of an “as-is” clause in the parties’ sales contract precluded
the buyer’s recovery. Upon review, we reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment
with respect to the buyer’s claims of fraudulent misrepresentation and fraudulent
concealment as well as her claim based on the Tennessee Residential Property Disclosures
Act. We remand these issues to the trial court for further consideration. We affirm the
trial court’s grant of summary judgment concerning the buyer’s remaining claims and deny
the buyer’s request for reassignment to a different trial court judge upon remand. We also
deny the sellers’ request for an award of attorney’s fees.

This appeal arises from a petition for judicial review under Tennessee Code Annotated § 4- 5-322 of a decision of the Tennessee Occupational Safety and Health Administration Review Commission (the “Review Commission”). Asserting that the petition was untimely because it had been filed more than 60 days after entry of the agency’s final order, the Review Commission filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(1). The petitioner opposed the motion by asking for an enlargement of time pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 6.02. The trial court denied the petitioner’s motion for an enlargement of time and granted the Review Commission’s motion to dismiss. The petitioner appeals. Finding no error, we affirm.

The Defendant, Jennifer Leigh Sexton, was convicted in the Knox County Criminal Court
of vehicular homicide by recklessness, a Class C felony; initiating a false report, a Class D
felony; driving on a suspended license, a Class B misdemeanor; and following too closely,
a Class C misdemeanor, and received an effective sentence of ten years in confinement.
On appeal, the Defendant claims that (1) the trial court abused its discretion by admitting
testimony from the State’s expert because the expert’s method of data collection was
unreliable, (2) the trial court erred by failing to provide the Defendant’s requested special
jury instructions, and (3) the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction of initiating
a false report. Based on our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This matter arises from two failed real estate transactions. A buyer contracted to purchase two townhomes from a real estate developer. However, after the sales failed to close, the developer purported to cancel the transactions. The buyer then sued the developer, seeking decrees for specific performance and damages for breach of contract. The buyer also asserted a claim under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. After a bench trial, the trial court entered an order awarding the buyer specific performance but denying his claim for damages. The trial court also found a TCPA violation and awarded the buyer his attorney’s fees and costs. On the breach of contract claim, we have determined that the developer breached the contracts and that the buyer failed to sufficiently prove his damages, and we affirm the trial court’s decision. We also conclude that the trial court erred in finding a TCPA violation and reverse this finding, as well as the award of fees and costs pursuant to the TCPA. Finally, we have determined that the developer was not the prevailing party in the trial court or on appeal and deny its request for an award of attorney’s fees.

This matter is before the Court upon the application of the Defendant, Christopher Lee Faulkner, for an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 9. The Defendant seeks to challenge the trial court’s order denying his motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant. The State has filed a response in opposition to the motion. Based on the following, we deny the Petitioner’s motion for an interlocutory appeal.

A developer failed to use proper erosion control measures, resulting in recurring sediment runoff into a pond owned by neighboring landowners and increasing accumulation of sediment therein. The trial court concluded that developer’s actions constituted a temporary, not permanent, nuisance and awarded injunctive relief and damages. Damages for emotional distress were included among the damages the trial court awarded. The developer appeals, challenging the trial court’s finding as to proximate causation and asserting that its actions, if a nuisance, were a permanent and not temporary nuisance, and accordingly the landowners’ suit was barred by the statute of limitations. The developer also asserts that the trial court erred as to the remedies awarded, challenging both the injunctive relief and emotional distress damages. We affirm the trial court’s findings as to proximate causation and its conclusion that the nuisance is temporary. We also affirm the trial court’s imposition of an injunction. However, we reverse the award of damages for emotional distress based upon deficient pleading.

This matter is before the Court upon application of the Defendant, Jonathan Abernathy, for permission to pursue an interlocutory appeal. Tenn. R. App. P. 9. The State has filed a response in opposition. The Defendant seeks review of the trial court’s order denying his motion to suppress evidence. Upon full consideration, the application is denied for the reasons stated below.

The defendant was involved in a motor vehicle collision with a tractor-trailer truck in
another state. The insurance company that insured both the truck and the trailer filed a
lawsuit in the Shelby County circuit court based on negligence. The defendant filed a
motion to dismiss for improper venue pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure
12.02(3). The trial court held that the terms of Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-4-
101(a) did not provide for venue in Shelby County because the action did not arise there
and the defendant did not reside there. The insurance company appeals. We affirm.

Defendant, Gerald Elijah Crossley, challenges his Madison County Circuit Court jury convictions of first degree murder, attempted first degree murder, aggravated assault, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, arguing that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of Defendant’s alleged gang affiliation and expert testimony about gang-related activities and that the evidence was insufficient to establish his identity as the perpetrator. Because we conclude that the trial court did not err in admitting the challenged evidence and that the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant’s convictions, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Amanda Jean Phillips, was convicted by a Scott County jury of aggravated
assault with a deadly weapon, a Class C felony; two counts of especially aggravated
kidnapping, a Class A felony; two counts of aggravated child neglect of a child eight years
of age or less, a Class A felony; and carjacking, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced
the Defendant to four years for the aggravated assault conviction, twenty years for each of
the especially aggravated kidnapping convictions, twenty years for each of the aggravated
child neglect convictions, and ten years for the carjacking conviction. Finding the
Defendant to be a dangerous offender, the trial court ordered partial consecutive sentences
for an effective total sentence of thirty years at 100% service in the Tennessee Department
of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in
support of her aggravated child neglect convictions and argues that the trial court erred by
not considering a mandatory mitigating factor in imposing her especially aggravated
kidnapping sentences and by classifying her as a dangerous offender under the consecutive
sentencing statute. We conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the Defendant’s
convictions for aggravated child neglect and that the trial court did not err in its application
of enhancement and mitigating factors but failed to make adequate findings in support of
consecutive sentencing under the dangerous offender criterion of the consecutive
sentencing statute. However, upon de novo review, we conclude that the record supports
the imposition of consecutive sentences based on the Defendant’s having committed the
offenses while she was on probation. Accordingly, we affirm the Defendant’s convictions
and the sentences imposed by the trial court.

A majority of the members of the State Executive Committee of the Tennessee Democratic Party approved adding unelected “ex-officio members” as full members of the Executive Committee with voting rights. A group of dissenting Executive Committee members brought suit, claiming that the addition of voting members of the Executive Committee in this manner violated statutory provisions governing the composition of state party executive committees, codified at Tennessee Code Annotated section 2-13-101 et seq. In response, the Executive Committee argued the statutory provisions permit adding ex-officio members as full voting members and invoked constitutional avoidance principles in support of the Executive Committee’s interpretation of the statutory scheme. The Executive Committee filed a counterclaim challenging the constitutionality of the statutory scheme based on freedom of association principles. Both parties sought judgment on the pleadings. The trial court granted the Executive Committee’s motion for judgment on pleadings, construing the statutory scheme as permitting the Executive Committee’s actions. Accordingly, the trial court pretermitted the constitutional issue, dismissing the Executive Committee’s counterclaim as moot. The dissenting members appealed. We conclude the trial court erred in its interpretation of the statutory scheme. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

This matter is before the Court upon the Appellant’s petition for an accelerated interlocutory appeal pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, § 2. The Appellant asks this Court to review the post-conviction court’s November 14, 2025 order denying his motion to recuse Judge Chris Craft from his capital post-conviction proceeding. The State has filed a response in opposition to the petition. Having reviewed the petition, the supporting documents, and the State’s response, this Court has determined that additional briefing and oral argument are unnecessary. See Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B, § 2.05, 2.06. For the reasons set forth below, the post-conviction court’s order is hereby AFFIRMED.

Defendant, Martha Jane Durocher, was indicted by the Maury County Grand Jury for reckless endangerment with a weapon. Defendant was convicted as charged after a bench trial, and the trial court imposed a two-year sentence to be suspended on probation. Defendant appeals, arguing the evidence at trial was insufficient. Because the evidence does not establish that Defendant’s conduct placed any person or persons in imminent danger of serious bodily injury or death, we reverse and vacate her conviction for felony reckless endangerment with a weapon.

The plaintiffs appeal from the trial court’s dismissal of their claims against two sets of
defendants. We now affirm, holding that this court does not have jurisdiction to consider
the appeal filed more than 30 days from the entry of the final orders appealed from. We
also affirm the dismissal of a counter-complaint filed against the plaintiffs.

This action involves the termination of a mother’s parental rights to her minor children. Following a bench trial, the court found that clear and convincing evidence established several grounds of termination and that termination was in the best interest of the children. We now affirm.

This appeal arises from a modification of a Permanent Parenting Plan (“PPP”), pursuant to which Randy Arnold, (“Father”) replaced Kamilah Sanders, (“Mother”), as the primary residential parent of the parties’ only child. Mother timely filed a Motion to Review the decision of the juvenile court magistrate pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 37-1- 107, which motion the juvenile court judge denied. This appeal followed. We affirm the ruling of the juvenile court and remand with instructions to set child support.

This breach of contract case involves a partnership dispute where one partner who undertook the winding down of the long-term partnership sought (1) reimbursement of loans and advances made to cover partnership expenses together with interest thereon; (2) compensation for services rendered on behalf of the partnership and attorney fees; and (3) taking into account the foregoing, disbursement of partnership funds to the partners. The other two partners disputed the claims and made counterclaims. Because we cannot ascertain whether the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law support the judgment, we vacate the judgment and remand it for the entry of a more detailed order that reflects that it is the product of the trial court’s individualized decision-making and independent judgment.

The Petitioner, Shun M. Ramey, acting pro se, appeals the Wilson County Criminal Court’s order summarily dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief as untimely. After review, we affirm.

The Defendant, John Wayne Hamby, was convicted by a Cumberland County jury of rape
of a child, for which he received a sentence of forty years’ incarceration at one hundred
percent service. On appeal, the Defendant claims that the evidence is insufficient to
support his conviction and that the trial court erred by imposing an excessive sentence.
Because we conclude that the Defendant’s notice of appeal was untimely filed and that the
interests of justice do not merit waiver of the untimeliness, we dismiss the appeal.

In this case, two brothers accused each other of exerting undue influence on their aging mother, Latona Joyce Walsh. Timothy Walsh (“Defendant”) alleged that his brother Anthony Walsh (“Plaintiff”) had exerted undue influence over Ms. Walsh, resulting in her deeding her home to him, naming him as the executor of her estate, and placing his name on her bank accounts approximately four years before her death. Shortly before her death, Ms. Walsh made Defendant her attorney-in-fact and Plaintiff’s name was removed from her accounts. Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that Defendant had exerted undue influence over Ms. Walsh, and Defendant filed a counterclaim against Plaintiff for undue influence. Ms. Walsh died two days later. The Chancery Court for Anderson County (“the Trial Court”) found that both sons had exerted undue influence over their mother but that Defendant had not dissipated any of her assets, unlike Plaintiff. The Trial Court accordingly ordered that Ms. Walsh’s home was part of her estate and was to be distributed by the terms of her 1991 will. The Trial Court further credited Plaintiff with receiving $49,000 in rental income from renting his mother’s home after her death. Plaintiff appeals the Trial Court’s finding of undue influence. Based upon our review, we affirm.

Because the order from which the appellant has filed an appeal does not constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

The Defendant, James Lee Dennis, pled guilty to vehicular homicide by intoxication. After
a sentencing hearing, the trial court entered judgment ordering the Defendant to serve ten
years’ incarceration at one hundred percent service. The trial court also ordered the
Defendant to pay $113,700 in the form of child maintenance restitution pursuant to
Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-219. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the
trial court erred by ordering excessive restitution and by imposing a sentence above the
minimum required by law. Following our review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The notice of appeal in this case was not timely filed. Therefore, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

The Petitioner, Marterious O’Neal, was originally convicted of two counts of felony murder, eight counts of attempted aggravated robbery, and one count of aggravated assault, for which he received an effective sentence of life imprisonment. He filed for post-conviction relief, alleging various grounds of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel including (1) trial counsel’s failure to file a motion under Rule 608 of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence to impeach a witness for the State, (2) appellate counsel’s failure to include the transcript of the motion to suppress on direct appeal; and (3) appellate counsel’s failure to withdraw from representation in compliance with Rule 14 of the Tennessee Supreme Court thereby depriving the Petitioner of a timely application to appeal pursuant to Rule 11 of the Tennessee Supreme Court. Following a two-day evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court granted a delayed appeal upon finding that appellate counsel had failed to withdraw in compliance with Rule 14, thereby depriving the Petitioner of the ability to file a timely Rule 11 appeal to the Tennessee Supreme Court. In the same order, the post-conviction court determined that whether trial counsel was ineffective in failing to file a Rule 608 motion had been previously determined by this court and that the Petitioner had failed to establish prejudice with respect to appellate counsel’s failure to include the motion to suppress transcript on direct appeal. In this appeal, the Petitioner contends, and we agree, that the post-conviction court erred in determining that the Rule 608 issue had been previously determined and in granting a delayed appeal to the Tennessee Supreme Court. With respect to the remaining issues, the Petitioner also contends that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received the effective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. Although appellate counsel failed to withdraw in accordance with Rule 14, we conclude that appellate counsel filed a timely application for permission to appeal from the Petitioner’s convictions in this case. Accordingly, we reverse and vacate the order of the post-conviction court to the extent that it grants the Petitioner a delayed appeal. We also conclude that because the Petitioner’s Rule 608 claim challenges trial counsel’s failure to file the motion rather than the trial court’s denial of the same, this issue has not been previously determined by this court. Nevertheless, the Petitioner failed to establish that trial counsel’s decision in not filing a Rule 608 motion 03/25/2026 - 2 - prior to trial was ineffective. Finally, we conclude that trial counsel’s failure to include the transcript of the motion to suppress on direct appeal was deficient; however, the Petitioner failed to establish prejudice. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.