APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The plaintiff filed this lawsuit in circuit court against the University of Tennessee (at Martin), alleging twelve separate counts relating to the University’s handling of a charitable gift made by the plaintiff. The claims ranged from breach of contract to defamation to infliction of emotional distress, among others.The circuit court granted the University’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that the Tennessee Claims Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over suits against the Statefor the torts alleged by the plaintiff and any breach of contract claim. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

In protracted litigation concerning a dispute over church property, a new chancellor took office several years after a jury verdict, post-trial motions, and an order granting partial summary judgment. The new chancellor set aside the jury verdict and the summary judgment order. We have determined that, under the unique circumstances of this case, the trial court erred in setting aside the jury verdict and in setting aside the order granting partial summary judgment.Therefore, we reverse and remand.

The Tennessee Department of Revenue issued a business tax assessment against a companybased on the company’s gross receipts from sales of computer software, cloud hosting, and cloud-based services.The company challenged the assessment by filing a complaint in the chancery court. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. The court granted summaryjudgmentto the company, finding that the sales of computer software and cloud hosting were not subject to business tax. The court upheld the Tennessee Department of Revenue’s assessment of business tax against the company’s sales of cloud-based services. Lastly, the courtfound that the company was the prevailing party and awarded the company attorney’s fees pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-1-1803(d). The Tennessee Department of Revenue appealed. Discerning that the court erred in its determination that the company’s cloud hosting sales were not subject to business tax, we reverse that portion of the court’s decision. Because this affects the attorney’s fees award, we vacate the award of attorney’s fees and remand for further proceedings. We affirm the trial court in all other respects.

Petitioner, Martin B.Montemayor, pled guilty to second-degree murderand received a life imprisonment sentence without the possibility of parole. Petitioner subsequently sought post-conviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court in Rutherford County denied relief after a hearing, and Petitioner appealed to this Court. He argues that the post-conviction court erred in dismissing his petition because (1) his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary; (2)he received ineffective assistance of counsel; and (3) he was incorrectly sentenced as a repeat violent offender. Upon review of the entire record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

In this case, we determine whether prejudgment interest may be awarded in an action brought against a tortfeasor and defended by an uninsured motorist carrier under Tennessee’s Uninsured Motorist Act. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 56-7-1201–1206 (2016 & Supp. 2025). The trial court determined that Plaintiff Cinda Haddon could not recover prejudgment interest because her claim was for personal injury. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that Ms. Haddon brought a contract action. Haddon v. Vanlier, No. M2023-01151-COA-R3-CV, 2024 WL 4590434, at *2–3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 28, 2024), perm. app. granted, (Tenn. March 17, 2025). Accordingly, the Court of Appeals remanded this matter to the trial court for a determination of prejudgment interest. Id. at *5. Upon review, we find that this is a personal injury action. Because prejudgment interest is not available in a personal injury action, we reverse the Court of Appeals and reinstate the judgment of the trial court denying Ms. Haddon prejudgment interest.

Appellant was named conservator over her mother in 2019 over her sibling’s objection and posted a $25,000.00 surety bond in connection with the conservatorship. After several years in which accountings were approved by the trial court, a new judge was designated to preside over the case. The new trial judge refused to approve several of the expenses in the later accountings, finding that they were either not for the benefit of the ward or constituted payment to the conservator without prior court approval. As a result, the trial court ruled that the conservator was required to reimburse over $30,000.00 in expenses to the conservatorship account. Appellant argues that the trial court erred in finding that these expenses were unauthorized and directing reimbursement, as well as in granting a judgment to the conservator’s surety for the amount it paid to reimburse the conservatorship account pursuant to the surety bond. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

This matter is before the Court upon motion of the Defendant, Bruce Bowen, for review of the trial court’s order denying his motion to reduce his pretrial bond.  See Tenn. R. App. P. 8; Tenn. Code. Ann. § 40-11-144.  The State opposes.  For the reasons discussed below, the Defendant’s motion is denied.

The Defendants, Tony Banks and Tyrone Banks, were both convicted of misdemeanor assault following a bench trial, and they each received sentences of ten months. On appeal, the Defendants argue that the evidence was insufficient to support their convictions and that the trial courterred by allowing a State’s witness to testify remotely through the use of a videoconferencing platform. After our review of the record and the applicable case law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendants, EvelynD.Kennedy1
and Christoper L. Kennedy, bring this consolidated
appeal from their convictions for firstdegree felony murder and aggravated neglect of an elderly or vulnerable adultresulting in serious bodily injury,a Class B felony. SeeT.C.A. §§39-13-202(a)(2)(2018) (subsequently amended) (felony murder),39-15-508 (2025) (aggravated neglect of an elderly or vulnerable adult resulting in serious bodily injury). The trial court sentenced both Defendants toconcurrent terms oflife for their felony murder convictions and twelve years for their aggravated neglect convictions. On appeal, the Defendants contend that: (1) their convictions violate the ex post factoprotections of the State and federal constitutions and (2) the trial court abused its discretion in admitting graphic autopsy photographs. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Joseph Trent McGregor, was convicted by a Carroll County Circuit Court
jury of evading arrest, a Class E felony; and resisting arrest, a Class B misdemeanor; and
was sentenced by the trial court as a Range II offender to an effective term of four years in
the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Defendant raises a single issue in this
appeal: whether the trial court erred in refusing the Defendant’s request for special jury
instructions on pretextual stops, unlawful detentions, and attempted unlawful arrests. We
conclude that the Defendant has waived our consideration of the issue based on the
inadequacy of his brief, which fails to provide any meaningful argument or appropriate
references to the record. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In this matter involving alleged violations of federal and state wiretapping statutes,
evidence was presented to a jury during a two-day trial. Following the conclusion of the
trial, the jury deliberated and ultimately found in favor of the defendant. The trial court
entered judgment for the defendant, and the plaintiffs filed a motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict or, alternatively, for a new trial. The trial court denied the
motion, and the plaintiffs timely appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

Plaintiff/Appellant has filed an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, Section 2, seeking review of the Davidson County General Sessions Court’s order denying Appellant’s motion to recuse the General Sessions judge in a civil warrant proceeding against Defendant/Appellee.  We conclude this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain a Rule 10B appeal from the General Sessions Court of Davidson County when it is not exercising concurrent jurisdiction with a court of record.  Accordingly, this appeal is transferred to the Circuit Court of Davidson County for disposition.

The Petitioner, Demetrice Livingston, appeals the denial of his petition for postconviction
relief from his second degree murder conviction. On appeal, the
Petitioner argues that the post-conviction court erred in denying his petition after
concluding that trial counsel provided effective assistance of counsel. After review,
we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant in this case, Jay Burroughs Chandler, was charged with fifty-four counts of violating Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-1003 by possessing material depicting a minor child engaged in sexual activity.  Prior to trial, the Defendant filed two motions to suppress, both of which the trial court denied.  After a bench trial, the Defendant was convicted as charged.  The trial court subsequently imposed an effective sentence of one hundred years in prison.  In this direct appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying both of his motions to suppress and in sentencing him.  We affirm the Defendant’s convictions.  We vacate the Defendant’s sentence and remand this matter for a new sentencing hearing.

A Maury County jury convicted Defendant, Ethan Allen Compton, of possessing a firearm after having been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence and unlawfully carrying or possessing a weapon. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days to be served on probation. On appeal, Defendant contends that Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-1307(f)(1)(A), which prohibits a person who has been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence from possessing a firearm, violates the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution on its face. Upon review, we conclude that Code section 39-17-1307(f)(1)(A) is constitutional on its face. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

I concur in the result reached by the majority. I write separately, however, because I disagree with the majority’s analysis on three key points.

Defendant, Gerry Stitts, appeals from his jury convictions for rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery, for which he is serving an effective sentence of thirty-five years. On appeal, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erred by denying his motion for new trial based upon newly discovered evidence. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm.

The Defendant, Ronald David Ballard, was convicted in the Henderson County Circuit Court of fifteencounts of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court mergedall counts andsentenced himas a Range III, persistent offender to twenty-eight years in confinementfor count one. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions because the State failed to showhe constructively possessed the firearm.Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the Defendant’s convictionsbut remand the case to the trial court for sentencing on counts two through fifteenand for correction of the judgments pursuant to State v. Berry, 503 S.W.3d 360, 364 (Tenn. 2015).

The Petitioner, Jason Henderson, Jr., appeals the Madison County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief,claimingthat he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Based upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Inthis case involving termination of the mother’s parental rights to her child, the Shelby County Chancery Court (“trial court”) determined that one statutory ground for termination had been proven by clear and convincing evidence. The trial court further determined that clear and convincing evidence demonstrated that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. The mother has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

After an extended trial, the court adopted a permanent parenting plan for the child of unwed parents and determined the father’s child support obligation.  Mother takes issue with both decisions.  Discerning no abuse of discretion, we affirm. 

This appeal requires us to determine whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the Appellees, finding that Appellant’s own inattention was the cause of her accident and that she was more than 50% at fault for her injuries.  Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Defendant, Sharod Demon Greer, was convicted by a jury of aggravated sexual battery and assault by offensive touching, for which the trial court imposed an effective sentence of twelve years’ imprisonment. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his aggravated sexual battery conviction because the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that any touching of the victim was sexually motivated and (2) the trial court failed to consider the purposes and principles of sentencing when it imposed the maximum in-range sentence for aggravated sexual battery because it did not explain why the sentence was more justly deserved than a lesser sentence. After review, we affirm.

In 2016, a Davidson County jury convicted the Petitioner, Earnest Costosteno Woodley, of four counts of attempted first degree premeditated murder. The trial court sentenced him as a repeat violent offender to four concurrent terms of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Nine years later, the Petitioner applied for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that his criminal history did not qualify him as a repeat violent offender. The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the application, concluding that the petition failed to state a cognizable claim for relief. The Petitioner appealed. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

Defendant, William Lloyd Smith, III, pled guilty to one count of possession of methamphetamine with intent to sell and received an agreed sentence of eight years as a Range I offender, to be served on probation. Following a hearing on a warrant for violation of his probation, the trial court revoked Defendant’s probation and ordered him to serve the balance of his original sentence incarcerated. Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in revoking probation rather than allowing him furlough to a residential treatment facility previously approved by his probation officer. Following a review of the entire record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.