APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Both the trial court and the majority of this panel have decided that Tom and Karen Moore are not entitled to a jury trial on their medical malpractice claim against Dr. Lloyd A. Walwyn because of shortcomings in the affidavits they filed in opposition to Dr. Walwyn’s motion for summary judgment. While I do not relish defending sloppy lawyering, I am convinced that my colleagues have scrutinized the Moores’ counter-affidavits using standards stricter than those required by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.05 and Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-115 (1980). I would vacate the summary judgment because the counter-affidavits demonstrate the existence of genuine and material factual issues that only a jury should resolve.
 

The captioned respondent has appealed from an order entered by the Trial Court regulating visitation of the two children of respondent with the captioned petitioners, parents of respondent's deceased husband. Respondent-mother has remarried, and her husband, David McClintock, has adopted the children. However, he is not a party to this proceeding.

This case presents what is purportedly an appeal under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b). The issue of law involves a juvenile's plea of guilty to delinquency in the Circuit Court of Dickson County.

From the decision of the Trial Court modifying the final decree of divorce between the parties, terminating payments of spousal support previously ordered to be paid by the husband to the wife, the wife appeals.

Plaintiff-Appellant Blake Weber brought suit against the Defendants-Appellees, Jack Moses and Jefferson Pilot LIfe Insurance Company ("Jefferson Pilot"), alleging that he was unlawfully discharged due to his refusal to participate in Appellee Jefferson Pilot's illegal employment practices. The chancellor dismissed Appellant's suit, stating that this cause of action was barred by the applicable one year statute of limitation. Weber appeals the lower court's dismissal of his Complaint.

From the decision of the Trial Court establishing a boundary line dividing tracts of land owned by the parties, the Defendants appeal.

General Oils Company ("plaintiff") filed suit in the Chancery Court of Davidson County against the Assessor of Property for Hamilton County ("Hamilton County Assessor") and the Tennessee State Board of Equalization ("Board of Equalization") seeking judicial review of the decision by the Assessment Appeals Commission ("AAC") of the Board of Equalization that for tax assessment purposes plaintiff's petroleum storage tanks located in Hamilton County were real property. The chancellor reversed the AAC, holding that the tanks were personal property. On appeal Hamilton County Assessor and Board of Equalization present one issue 1On appeal the Board of Equalization only challenges the lower court's action to the effect that tanks are automatically considered tangible personal property under T.C.A. § 67-5-903(f) for property tax purposes. Because the broader issue raised by Hamilton County Assessor in essence encompasses this secondary issue, we approach this case from the standpoint of Hamilton County Assessor. 2 for our consideration: Whether the trial court erred in holding that the storage tanks should be classified as personal property for tax assessment purposes.1 For the reasons hereinafter stated, we find no error and affirm.