APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

In 1987 the United States Supreme Court placed limits on the use of private lawyers to prosecute criminal contempt cases in federal court. Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils, S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 107 S. Ct. 2124 (1987). This appeal calls upon us to decide whether similar limitations should be placed on the use of private lawyers to prosecute criminal contempt cases in state court. The majority has declined to adopt the reasoning of the Young decision based on an
unduly narrow view of this court's responsibility. I cannot join the majority’s opinion. Instead, I would find that the resolution of this important question must await another day because the appellant has waived his right to raise the issue by failing to make a timely demand for another prosecutor in the trial court.

This appeal represents a consolidation of three actions. The first case, styled V.R. Williams & Company v. Paul M. Quandt and Nelle Quandt, is an appeal to Circuit Court from a judgment in the General Sessions Court of Franklin County finding Paul Quandt indebted to V.R. Williams & Co. in the amount of $3664.69 for past due insurance premiums. The second case, styled In Re: Estate of Paul Max Quandt, Deceased, is a probate proceeding filed in the Chancery Court of Franklin County to administer the estate of Paul Max Quandt. The only issues in the probate proceeding heard on consolidation concern creditors' claims filed against Paul Quandt's estate and the exceptions filed thereto. The third case, styled Mid-South Bank & Company, V.R. Williams & Company and Franklin County Bank v. Paul Max Quandt Estate, Nelle S. Quandt, Jessica Quandt, Paul Quandt, Jr. and Paul Max Quandt, III., is a Chancery Court action to set aside fraudulent conveyances of property owned by Paul M. Quandt Defendants/Appellants

The plaintiff, Forrest City Grocery Company, filed a declaratory judgment action in the Chancery Court of Davidson County alleging that the Unfair Cigarette Sales Law violates (1) the Sherman Antitrust Act, and (2) the plaintiff's right to due process. The chancellor found the issues in favor of the statute and dismissed the complaint. We affirm.

One of the captioned defendants, Reuben Bonilla, has appealed from the judgment of the Trial Court overruling his motion to set aside a default judgment in favor of the captioned plaintiff. The notice of appeal states: Notice is hereby given that Reuben Bonilla, defendant named herein, hereby appeals to the Court of Appeals from the order entered in this cause on the 21st day of November, 1994.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the lower court finding the respondent in contempt for failing to pay child support. The lower court sentenced the respondent to six months in jail but allowed him to remain free if he complied with the court's current support order and remained within the state. On appeal, the respondent argues that he had no notice of the original support order, that he was not given proper notice of the contempt charges, that the trial judge improperly denied his request for a jury, and that the trial judge erred in denying him the right to leave the state. In accordance with the following opinion we reverse the lower court's sentence for contempt and its injunction against leaving the state. Otherwise, we affirm.

This is an appeal by the petitioners/appellants, Tennessee State Department of Transportation ("TDOT") and Metropolitan Nashville Airport Authority ("MNAA"), from a jury verdict and judgment valuing four acres of  condemned property owned by the respondent/appellee, Overnite Transportation Company ("Overnite"), at $1,759,578.10.

This appeal arises out of a paternity action filed by the Plaintiff-Appellee, Bessie Lee King, against the Defendant-Appellant, Davidson Taylor, to establish the paternity of King's minor child, Davene. The action was originally filed in the Juvenile Court of Memphis and Shelby County, but was transferred to Circuit Court after Mr. Taylor requested a jury trial. Mr.  Taylor, Ms. King, and Davene submitted to a blood test. The sworn blood test results, which accompanied Appellee's motion for summary judgment, established that Mr. Taylor had a 99.65% probability of being Davene's father. Relying on both the blood test and T.C.A. § 24-7-112(b)(2) (Michie 1994), the trial court granted Ms. King's motion for summary judgment. Mr. Taylor appeals the decision of the trial court.

This case involves the question of whether a custodial parent may claim the benefit of changes in the child support guidelines promulgated after trial on her Petition for Increased Child Support, but before the trial court filed its Final Order. Because those changes were not raised in the  proceedings below, we decline to act on them here. Instead, we remand  the cause to the trial court for further proceedings.

In this divorce case, Charles Edward Cutsinger (Husband) has appealed the trial court's judgment which awarded Laura Patricia Cutsinger (Wife) a thirty percent (30%) interest as a seller in the contract of sale of Husband's chiropractic practice. Husband also has appealed the trial court's ruling which ordered Husband to indemnify Wife for any judgment that might arise as a result of an indebtedness for a pleasure boat purchased during the marriage.

Defendants-Appellees.This appeal involves a suit seeking recovery under the uninsured motorist provision of a liability insurance policy. Plaintiffs, James R. Fruge and Jane Fruge, appeal from the order of the trial court granting summary judgment to the unnamed defendant-appellee, State Farm Insurance Company.

This appeal involves a suit on a guaranty agreement. Defendant, Douglas Sarmento, appeals from the trial court's order granting plaintiff, Mid-State Advertising, d/b/a "The Nashville Scene," summary judgment. The only issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment.

Plaintiff, Cynthia D. Gentry, appeals from the order of the chancery court that affirmed the final administrative order of the Department of Human Services (DHS). The controversy in this case arose from the receipt by Mrs. Gentry's husband of a lump sum social security disability payment in July, 1991. At the time of the payment, Mrs. Gentry was the recipient of Aid for Dependent Children (AFDC) benefits. DHS determined that the lump sum payment constituted income sufficient to render Mrs. Gentry ineligible for AFDC benefits for a period of four months. Mrs. Gentry was notified by DHS that her benefits would be terminated for four months because of the receipt of the lump sum social security payment.