APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is a declaratory judgment action. In the complaint, Wendy Setters (Mrs. Setters) seeks a declaration that an exclusion in her automobile insurance policy is invalid as against public policy; and, alternatively, that the exclusion, due to an ambiguity in the insurance policy, is unenforceable against her. The subject provision excludes the extension of liability coverage to an insured when that person's negligence causes injury to a family member. Relying on this exclusion, the defendant, Permanent General Assurance Corporation (Permanent General), denied coverage with respect to claims asserted by Mrs. Setters individually and on behalf of her children arising solely out of injuries sustained by the children in an automobile accident. The accident was caused, in part, by the negligent driving of her husband. The trial court granted Permanent General's motion for judgement on the pleadings, finding the exclusion to be valid, enforceable and not violative of the public policy" of Tennessee. Plaintiff appeals, raising two issues that present the following questions:

1. Is a provision in an automobile insurance policy excluding coverage for liability to a "family member" violative of the public policy of Tennessee?

2. Is the liability coverage in the subject policy ambiguous so as to warrant a strict constructino against Permanent General?

Woods filed suit against various defendants; however, the judgment before us enters summary judgment in favor of Omaha only and was rendered final by the trial court in accordance with Rule 54.02 T.R.C.P. Thus, Omaha is the only Appellee for purposes of this appeal. This case concerns the validity of a “Compromise Settlement Release” executed by the appellant, Howard A. Woods (Woods), in favor of the appellee, Mutual of Omaha (Omaha). Woods challenges its validity on the ground of mental incapacity. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Omaha  Woods has appealed. For reasons hereinafter expressed, we affirm.

This is a case involving a trustee’s improper accounting procedures and misuse of funds regarding a trust set up to receive Social Security Insurance payments. At issue is whether Tennessee state courts have subject matter jurisdiction to hear a dispute between a beneficiary and his representative payee over alleged misuse of Social Security benefits. The trial court found it had jurisdiction. We affirm.

This is an action for negligence in the conducting of a paternity test. The  trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the appellees, Gary D. Niblack, M.D., Laboratory Investments, Inc. and Ren Laboratories, Inc. d/b/a Ren Histocompatibility Laboratory, a joint venture, and John Doe. The appellants, Melanie Miller, individually and as next friend for Ashley Miller Luna, a minor, and next friend of Gregory Luna, deceased, have appealed presenting the single issue of whether the trial court erred in doing so. For reasons hereinafter set forth, we affirm in part and reverse in part the  judgment of the trial court.

Zella Balentine (“plaintiff”) filed a petition in the Juvenile Court of Hardin County seeking to have that court declare Simon White (“defendant”) to be the natural father of the parties’ minor child, Ashley Balentine. The Hardin County General Sessions Court, in its role as Juvenile Court, found defendant to be the father of the child and awarded plaintiff retroactive child support dating back to November 1, 1992. The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court abused its discretion by not awarding retroactive child support back to the date of the child’s birth. For the reasons stated, we find that the trial court did abuse its discretion. Accordingly, we reverse as to this issue and remand this cause to that court for further proceedings.

The trial court terminated the parental rights of Dana D. Defriece (Mother) to her son, John Defriece (John)(DOB: Januar 9, 1988). Mother appeals, raising three issues that present the followig questions:

David K. Hinchy and Pearline Henchy, who are residents of Indiana, appeal judgment of the Chancery Court for Cocke County. The Chancellor, first, granted a default judgment against them in favor of Ronald D. Mackie and Brenda L. Mackie, who are residents of Florida. The Court also ordered the sale of certain real estate, the proceeds of which would be applied to the satisfaction of the indebtedness secured by the real estate and, preliminarily, a personal judgment in the amount of $18,200, plus interest at the rate of 8.65 percent per annum from October 1, 1989. Second, after sale of the property and giving credit for payments previously made, he awarded a definciency judgment in the amount of $15,719.97, which included court costs and expenses of the sale.

The wife of a prisoner in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction filed for divorce, claiming that her husband was guilty of inappropriate marital conduct. The husband answered and counterclaimed, and moved the court to order the wife to file a Bill of Particulars, setting forth the facts she was relying upon as grounds for the pending divorce. The court did not respond to the husband’s motion, nor did it respond to the husband’s Motion for Writ of Habeas Corpus ad Testificandum, but granted the wife an absolute divorce without affording the husband the opportunity to present any evidence. We reverse, and vacate the trial court’s order.

In this case, the Plaintiff, Richard D. Phillips, sues Interstate Hotels Corporation and Instate Hotels Corporation #L07, D/B/A Chattanooga Marriott and Kicks Lounge, seeking damages by reason of the Defendant's violating his civil rights under the provisions of  T.C.A. 4-21-301( 2) .

This is an appeal from the judgment of the chancery court for Hamilton County, whereby the court affirmed the decision of the City Council of the City of Chattanooga finding the appellant, a police officer, guilty of violating Chattanooga Police Manual Orders and imposing disciplinary sanctions. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The counter-plaintiff, Connie Argo Smith, appeals from the Trial Court’s judgment awarding her a divorce on grounds of cruel and inhuman treatment. The Trial Court also awarded her the marital residence and contents, a 1990 Astro Mini Van, and $100,000.00 cash. The Trial Court required the counter-defendant, Jimmy E. Smith, to pay all marital debts including the mortgage on the home. The court also awarded Mr. Smith a farm, commercial property, the “Smart Station” property, a houseboat, a bass boat, a Chevrolet truck, Mercedes automobile, riding mower, tractor, personal effects and unspecified stocks.

I concur with the majority’s conclusion that the criteria for determining the
validity of antenuptial agreements announced in Randolph v. Randolph, ___
S.W.2d ___, ___ (Tenn. 1996)1 should be applied to reconciliation agreements.
I also agree with the majority’s determination that the reconciliation agreement
involved in this case is not enforceable because Mr. Smith has not demonstrated
by a preponderance of the evidence that he disclosed the value of his interest in
National Sheet Metal Company to Ms. Smith or that Ms. Smith had independent
knowledge of the nature, extent and value of this interest. Accordingly, I agree
that the trial court erred by enforcing the reconciliation agreement.

This is a suit by a judgment creditor to set aside a fraudulent transfer of assets and to subject said assets to the satisfaction of the judgment.

The City of Knoxville appeals judgments rendered in favor of Elmer Richardson, surviving spouse of Goldie H. Richardson, for personal injuries received by him and the wrongful death of his wife in the amount of $30,000, and $130,000, respectively.

The mother and father lived together in Michigan for approximately fifteen (15) years but were never married. They had a daughter, Cnanah, now seven (7) years of age.

In this post-divorce proceeding, Kafait U. Malik (“husband”) appeals from the trial court’s judgment ordering him to cash out and/or borrow against his pension and retirement funds in order to satisfy the court’s prior distribution of marital property to Susan K. Malik (“wife”).

Plaintiff-Appellant, Lamar Fletcher (“Fletcher”), appearing pro se, appeals the trial court’s order granting the motion to dismiss filed by Defendant-Appellee, John W. Campbell (“Campbell”).

This case concerns liability in connection with the default on a promissory note for the purchase of stock in a closely held corporation. After a bench trial, the trial court awarded a judgment in favor of the plaintiff and also awarded attorneys’ fees to plaintiff. Two principal issues are before the Court. The first is whether the plaintiff gave the necessary parties proper notice of default under the terms of the promissory notes executed by the parties. The second is whether the guarantor of the promissory notes is liable under the personal guaranty if proper notice was, in fact, given. We find that the trial court was correct in its holding that proper notice was given and that the personal guarantor was liable. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s conclusion.

This is an appeal by plaintiff/appellant, Jeannie Farrow, from two orders of the trial court which granted the motion to dismiss filed by defendant/appellee, Charles F. Barnett, M.D. (“Dr. Barnett”), and the motion for summary judgment filed by defendant/appellee, Fort Sanders Parkwest Medical Center (“the Medical Center”). In its orders, the trial court concluded that plaintiff failed to file her action within the applicable statute of limitations. The facts out of which this controversy arose are as follows.