APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Defendant, Michael Kent Walker, pleaded guilty to selling Schedule I and Schedule II controlled substances in a drug-free zone.  The plea agreement provided that the Defendant would receive concurrent Range I sentences for one Class B felony and one Class C felony, with the trial court to determine his sentences.  Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to serve an effective sentence of twelve years of incarceration.  The Defendant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering an effective twelve-year sentence.  After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The Fentress County Grand Jury indicted Appellant, Leslie Warren Blevins, with three counts of aggravated assault.  After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of one count of aggravated assault and two counts of assault.  As a result, he was sentenced to an effective sentence of five years in confinement.  Appellant appeals, challenging both the sufficiency of the evidence and his sentence.  After a review of the record and the applicable authorities, we determine that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Appellant.  Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The Petitioner, Mike Settle a/k/a Michael Dewayne Settle, appeals the Lauderdale County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus. The Petitioner contends that, because his sentence is illegal because it was ordered to run concurrently with a federal sentence he had received in another case rather than consecutively, the habeas corpus court erred when it dismissed his petition. Upon a review of the record in this case, we are persuaded that the habeas corpus court properly dismissed the petition. Accordingly, the judgment of the habeas corpus court is affirmed.

A Sullivan County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Travis Wilson, of driving under the influence (DUI), second offense; unlawful carrying or possession of a weapon; possession of drug paraphernalia; and possession of a handgun while under the influence. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the appellant to eleven months and twenty-nine days for each conviction, with release eligibility after service of seventy-five percent of the sentences. The trial court ordered that the appellant serve the DUI sentence in confinement and the remaining sentences on probation. The court further ordered that the sentences for possession of drug paraphernalia and DUI, second offense, be served concurrently with each other but consecutively to the remainder of the sentences. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by allowing two Tennessee Bureau of Investigation (TBI) agents to testify as experts about the effects of drugs on human performance; that the trial court erred by failing to exclude his blood test results; that the trial court erred by failing to require the State to refer to “bath salts” by their chemical name; that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions; and that the trial court erred in sentencing. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The father of two minor children appeals the trial court’s decision to terminate his parental rights. The trial court terminated the father’s parental rights upon finding two grounds of abandonment, failure to visit and failure to support, and finding that terminating the father’s parental rights would be in the children’s best interests. We affirm.

The Petitioner, Anthony Boyland, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for first degree felony murder, aggravated assault, and aggravated burglary and his effective life sentence. The Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal is from a Final Default Judgment entered against the Defendant, Northridge Package Store, LLC (“Northridge”). In the order granting judgment against Northridge, the trial court also accepted the voluntary dismissal without prejudice of all claims filed by the Plaintiff, Timothy W. Hudson (“Hudson”), against the Defendant, Delilah M. Grunloh (“Grunloh”). Because only Grunloh has appealed from the judgment and the judgment is not adverse to her, we grant Hudson’s motion to dismiss this case for lack of jurisdiction.

Angela E. (“Mother”) appeals the termination of parental rights to her minor child, Aaron E. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) placed the child in protective custody based upon evidence of physical abuse.  The abuse occurred while the child was in the care of Mother’s boyfriend. The Juvenile Court later made a finding that the child was dependent and neglected and granted temporary custody to DCS. DCS ultimately filed a petition to terminate Mother’s and the father’s parental rights. The Juvenile Court terminated the father’s parental rights at a separate hearing, and the matter proceeded to trial against Mother only. Following the trial, the Juvenile Court entered an order also terminating Mother’s parental rights, relying on the grounds of abandonment and persistence of conditions. We have determined that the record contains clear and convincing evidence to support terminating Mother’s parental rights on one of the two grounds relied upon by the Juvenile Court and to support the court’s conclusion that terminating Mother’s parental rights is in the child’s best interest.

Defendant, Tony Demarcus Williams, was indicted by the Knox County Grand Jury for possession of more than .5 grams of cocaine within a school zone with the intent to sell and possession of more than .5 grams of cocaine within a school zone with intent to deliver. A petit jury convicted Defendant as charged, and the trial court merged the two convictions. The trial court sentenced Defendant to 15 years in confinement. Defendant asserts on appeal that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the search warrant; that accomplice testimony was not sufficiently corroborated; and that the trial court erred by not allowing Defendant to make a proffer of evidence at the hearing on the motion for new trial regarding alleged prosecutorial misconduct. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Kwaku Aryel Okraku, was convicted of one count of aggravated child neglect where the neglect caused serious bodily injury to the child, a Class A felony, one count of aggravated child neglect where a controlled substance was used to accomplish the neglect, a Class A felony, and one count of reckless homicide, a Class D felony.  He received a sentence of sixty years for each conviction of aggravated child neglect and a twelve-year sentence for reckless homicide, all to be served concurrently, for an effective sentence of sixty years.  On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal because the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; the trial court erred in permitting the jury to hear testimony regarding a prior incident involving drugs; and the trial court erred in permitting testimony about the defendant’s statements about selling cocaine.  After reviewing the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand the case for entry of a corrected judgment sheet that reflects the merger of the aggravated child neglect convictions, with aggravated child neglect through the use of a controlled substance remaining as the sole conviction for aggravated child neglect.      

I concur with the majority Opinion’s rulings with regard to the procedural issues in this case, as well as its reversal of the trial court’s remittitur of the loss of earning capacity damages. However, because I disagree with the majority’s procedure in further remitting the jury’s verdict with regard to loss of enjoyment of life damages, I must respectfully dissent, in part, from the majority Opinion.

Plaintiff was injured in an accident involving three tractor-trailer trucks. Plaintiff, who was riving a tractor-trailer, sued the other truck drivers and the trucking company owners of the ehicles. However, prior to trial, Plaintiff entered into an agreement with one of the trucking companies whereby Plaintiff and the agreeing defendant agreed to cooperate regarding the litigation and to work together to expose the defenses asserted by the non-agreeing defendant. The jury returned an itemized verdict of $3,705,000 for the Plaintiff against the non-agreeing defendant. The trial court denied the non-agreeing defendant’s motion for a new trial, but it suggested a remittitur of $1,605,000, for a total award of $2,100,000. Plaintiff accepted the remittitur under protest and the non-agreeing defendant appealed to this Court. For the following reasons, we affirm in part and we reverse in part. Specifically, we affirm the physical pain and mental anguish and permanent injury awards as reduced by the trial court; we reverse the trial court’s suggested remittitur of the loss of earning capacity award and we instead reinstate the jury verdict of $1,455,000; and we further reduce the loss of enjoyment of life award to $50,000. Thus, we approve a total award to Plaintiff of $2,105,000.

Five separate groups of Pennsylvania-domiciled insurance companies filed five separate tax refund claims in which each challenges the imposition of retaliatory insurance premium taxes by the Tennessee Department of Commerce and Insurance pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-4-218. The central issue presented is whether Pennsylvania’s surcharges or assessments forthree Workmen’s Compensation funds are imposed upon Tennessee-domiciled insurance companies doing business in Pennsylvania and, therefore, fall within Tennessee’s retaliatory insurance premium tax statute. The Tennessee Claims Commission ruled in favor of the state and all of the Pennsylvania insurance companies appealed. Finding no error, we affirm.

Five separate groups of Pennsylvania-domiciled insurance companies filed five separate tax refund claims inwhicheach challenges the imposition of retaliatory insurance premium taxes by the Tennessee Department of Commerce and Insurance pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-4-218. The central issue presented is whether Pennsylvania’s surcharges or assessments forthree Workmen’s Compensation funds are imposed upon Tennessee-domiciled insurance companies doing business in Pennsylvania and, therefore, fall within Tennessee’s retaliatory insurance premium tax statute. The Tennessee Claims Commission ruled in favor of the state and all of the Pennsylvania insurance companies appealed. Finding no error, we affirm.

Following a jury trial, the defendant, Coy J. Cotham, Jr., also known as Cory J. Cotham, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder and especially aggravated robbery and sentenced to life without parole and twenty-five years, to be served consecutively.  On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in:  (1) denying his motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to search warrants; (2)  denying his motion to suppress Wi-Fi evidence; (3) denying his motion to recuse; (4) concluding that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the convictions; (5) allowing evidence of statements to the police by the victim’s husband; (6) allowing evidence of threats made by the defendant; (7) allowing proof as to the affidavit of indigency; (8) instructing the jury regarding parole; and (9) setting the defendant’s sentences and determining that they would be served consecutively.  We have carefully reviewed the record and conclude that the defendant’s assignments of error are without merit.  Accordingly, the judgments are affirmed.

Claimant insurance company challenges the state’s calculation of the retaliatory tax. It filed claims for refunds in the claims commission. The commission ruled for the state. Claimant appealed, alleging that New York law required the charges at issue to be passed on to the policy holder, so the charges should not be included in the retaliatory tax calculation. We find that four of the charges should be included in the retaliatory tax calculation and two should not. Claimant also raises several constitutional challenges, all of which we reject.

A Davidson County grand jury indicted the Defendant, Kevin R. Beasley, for attempted first degree premeditated murder.  The trial court ordered that the Defendant undergo a forensic evaluation, after which it found the Defendant was competent to stand trial.  The Defendant filed a motion to suppress his statement to police, which the trial court granted.  The case was dismissed, and the State filed a notice of appeal.  After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion when it granted the Defendant’s motion to suppress.  As such, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand this case for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Five separate groups of Pennsylvania-domiciled insurance companies filed five separate tax refund claims in which each challenges the imposition of retaliatoryinsurance premium taxes by the Tennessee Department of Commerce and Insurance pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-4-218. The central issue presented is whether Pennsylvania’s surcharges or assessments forthree Workmen’s Compensation funds are imposed upon Tennessee-domiciled insurance companies doing business in Pennsylvania and, therefore, fall within Tennessee’s retaliatory insurance premium tax statute. The Tennessee Claims Commission ruled in favor of the state and all of the Pennsylvania insurance companies appealed. Finding no error, we affirm.

Five separate groups of Pennsylvania-domiciled insurance companies filed five separate tax refund claims in which each challenges the imposition of retaliatory insurance premium taxes by the Tennessee Department of Commerce and Insurance pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-4-218. The central issue presented is whether Pennsylvania’s surcharges or assessments forthree Workmen’s Compensation funds are imposed upon Tennessee-domiciled insurance companies doing business in Pennsylvania and, therefore, fall within Tennessee’s retaliatory insurance premium tax statute. The Tennessee Claims Commission ruled in favor of the state and all of the Pennsylvania insurance companies appealed. Finding no error, we affirm.
 

Father in this juvenile court custody dispute has filed a Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B petition for recusal appeal seeking an interlocutory appeal as of right from the trial court’s denial of his motion for recusal. Having reviewed the petition for recusal appeal de novo as required by Rule 10B, §2.06, we summarily affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion for recusal.

In 2011, for approximately four months, Plaintiff worked as a car salesman for Ted Russell Ford (“the dealership”) in Knoxville. After he was fired in November 2011, he brought this action against the dealership and others alleging, among other things, retaliatory discharge under the common law and the Tennessee Public Protection Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-1- 304 (2008 & Supp. 2013). Plaintiff alleged that his former employer fired him because he (1) refused to be involved when prospective customers test drove vehicles and (2) informed his supervisor that the dealership was breaking the law when it allowed test drives in cars that did not have dealer license plates or adequate proof of financial responsibility. The trial court granted the defendants summary judgment, holding that plaintiff did not establish a prima facie case because, in the court’s words, the plaintiff “did not engage in protected
activity by refusing to take test drives without a license plate on the vehicle or proof of registration or insurance in the vehicle.” The trial court held that these infractions did not implicate “a matter of fundamental or significant public concern, such as would overcome Tennessee’s employment-at-will doctrine.” Alternatively, the court held that the person responsible for firing plaintiff was not aware, prior to the firing, that plaintiff had refused to participate in test drives. The court held that “[t]he allegedly protected activity was not the basis of the adverse employment action taken against Plaintiff.” We affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment and its dismissal of plaintiff’s action.

Claimant insurance companies challenge the state’s calculation of the retaliatory tax. They filed claims for refunds in the claims commission. The commission ruled for the state. Claimants appealed, alleging that New York law required the charges at issue to be passed on to the policy holder, so the charges should not be included in the retaliatory tax calculation. We find that four of the charges should be included in the retaliatory tax calculation and two should not. Claimants also raise several constitutional challenges, all of which we reject.

Eric Johnson, acting individually and as next of kin of the decedent, Jana Lanell Johnson, and the Estate of Jana Lanelle Johnson (“Plaintiffs”), filed the instant action on April 27, 2010, regarding Ms. Johnson’s death. The action alleged health care liability claims pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-26-115, as well as other claims, including ordinary negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress. An agreed order granting partial summary judgment to Parkwest Medical Center (“Parkwest”) was entered with regard to Plaintiffs’ non-medical claims. Parkwest subsequently filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that Plaintiffs failed to comply with all of the requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-26-121 regarding the health care liability claim. Upon hearing, the trial court granted the motion. Plaintiffs filed additional motions regarding newly discovered evidence, including a motion seeking to set aside the prior order granting partial summary judgment or to amend the complaint, a motion to amend the certificate of good faith, and a motion seeking sanctions. The trial court denied Plaintiffs’ motion seeking to set aside the prior order granting partial summary judgment or to amend the complaint, as well as Plaintiffs’ motion to amend the certificate of good faith. The trial court failed to rule on Plaintiffs’ motion seeking sanctions. Plaintiffs have appealed to this Court. We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ health care liability claim based on Plaintiffs’ failure to substantially comply with the requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-26-121. We vacate the trial court’s rulings with regard to Plaintiffs’ motions to amend and motion to set aside the partial summary judgment order. We remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Five separate groups of Pennsylvania-domiciled insurance companies filed five separate tax refund claims inwhicheach challenges the imposition of retaliatory insurance premium taxes by the Tennessee Department of Commerce and Insurance pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-4-218. The central issue presented is whether Pennsylvania’s surcharges or assessments forthree Workmen’s Compensation funds are imposed upon Tennessee-domiciled insurance companies doing business in Pennsylvania and, therefore, fall within Tennessee’s retaliatory insurance premium tax statute. The Tennessee Claims Commission ruled in favor of the state and all of the Pennsylvania insurance companies appealed. Finding no error, we affirm.

Five separate groups of Pennsylvania-domiciled insurance companies filed five separate tax refund claims in which each challenges the imposition of retaliatory insurance premium taxes by the Tennessee Department of Commerce and Insurance pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-4-218. The central issue presented is whether Pennsylvania’s surcharges or assessments forthree Workmen’s Compensation funds are imposed upon Tennessee-domiciled insurance companies doing business in Pennsylvania and, therefore, fall within Tennessee’s retaliatory insurance premium tax statute. The Tennessee Claims Commission ruled in favor of the state and all of the Pennsylvania insurance companies appealed. Finding no error, we affirm.