APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Tennessee Department of Human Services appeals an order of the trial court reversing the Department’s holding that an applicant was not eligible for food stamp benefits or to apply for certain medicare coverage due to excessive income. Upon consideration of the record, we reverse the judgment of the trial court, affirm the decision of the Department and dismiss the petition for review.
 

This is a post-divorce case stemming from the parties’ competing pleadings, both of which sought a modification of their earlier-filed agreed permanent parenting plan as well as other relief. Within a few months of their divorce, Mary Katherine Taylor (“Mother”) had filed a petition to modify the residential parenting schedule. Joshua Wayne Taylor (“Father”) filed a counterclaim also seeking a modified residential schedule and, furthermore, a change in the custody designation. Following a bench trial, the court found that there was no material change in circumstances warranting a change in the identity of the primary residential parent, but that there was a material change supporting a modification  of the residential schedule. The court ordered a new schedule that substantially increased Mother’s parenting time and provided Father with only standard visitation. The court dismissed each party’s attempt to find the other in contempt. Father appeals. We affirm.

This is a breach of contract case in which an administrator filed suit against a school for unpaid severance pay. The school claimed that the administrator did not provide the requisite 30-day notice for severance pay pursuant to the terms of his contract. The trial court found that the administrator satisfied the notice requirement under the term of his contract and awarded him damages. The school appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

The federally-incarcerated Petitioner, Marcus Boales, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Henderson County Circuit Court, seeking relief from his two 1996 drug convictions that were used to enhance his federal sentence. The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the petition, and the Petitioner appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

After a work-related accident in August of 2010, the employee filed suit against his employer for workers’ compensation benefits, claiming permanent injury to both knees. The employer agreed that the injury to the employee’s right knee was compensable, but contended that the injury to the left knee was not work related. The trial court found for the employee, awarding benefits for injuries to each knee. The employer appealed. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The General Sessions Court of Montgomery County entered a final judgment against the garnishees for the full amount of the judgment debtor’s debt, even though the garnishees had filed an answer and informed the court of the amount of their payments made to the judgment debtor. On appeal, the Circuit Court affirmed this final judgment, and the garnishees timely appealed to this Court. We vacate the final judgment for the full amount of the debt because (1) no conditional judgment was entered, (2) the garnishees were not provided with notice of a conditional judgment, and (3) the garnishees answered and properly informed the court regarding the amount of their payments made to the judgment debtor. We remand this action to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The defendant, Christopher A. Howard, was convicted of attempted possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to sell and aggravated robbery, for which he was sentenced to six years and twelve years, respectively, to be served concurrently. On appeal, he argues that there was insufficient accomplice testimony corroboration to sustain a conviction on either charge. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Tiffany Davis, appeals the Marshall County Circuit Court’s dismissal of her petition for writ of habeas corpus.  In the petition, she challenged her Marshall County drug convictions, which had resulted in an effective sentence of 30 years in the Department of Correction.  Because we agree with the habeas corpus court that the petitioner’s claims of double jeopardy violations and ineffective assistance of counsel do not render her convictions void, we affirm that court’s dismissal of the petition.

Petitioner, Eugene Mark Hogbin, was convicted of two counts of aggravated sexual battery and sentenced to an effective sentence of twenty years.  Petitioner filed the instant petition for post-conviction relief, in which he alleged that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.  Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief.  On appeal, petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when trial counsel told petitioner that she would win his case at trial.  After our review of the parties’ briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Pedro Ignacio Hernandez, appeals from his Davidson County Criminal Court jury convictions of three counts of rape of a child, one count of attempted rape of a child, and five counts of aggravated sexual battery, claiming that the trial court erred by deeming him competent to stand trial; that the trial court erred by denying a motion to suppress his pretrial statement to police; that the trial court erred by denying a motion to suppress the results of DNA testing conducted using DNA that was unconstitutionally obtained; that the trial court erred by allowing the State to present evidence that the defendant displayed a photograph of his genitalia to the victim; that the evidence was insufficient to support two of the defendant’s convictions of rape of a child; that dual convictions of rape of a child in count one and aggravated sexual battery in count twelve were prohibited by principles of due process; and that the trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentences and by sentencing the defendant as a Range II offender.  Because the trial court erroneously imposed a Range II sentence for the defendant’s convictions of rape of a child in violation of constitutional ex post facto protections, the sentence for each conviction of rape of a child is modified from a sentence of 28 years to a sentence of 25 years.  The judgments of the trial court are affirmed in all other respects.

The issue in this case is whether a tolling agreement between the parties precludes the application of the savings statute set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-1-105(a). We agree with the trial court that the tolling agreement does preclude application of the savings statute and that the plaintiff’s legal malpractice action is barred by the termination date established in the agreement.

Appellant, Terry Scott Yarbrough, pleaded guilty to driving under the influence (“DUI”), first offense, and received a sentence of eleven months, twenty-nine days, with all but forty-eight hours suspended to supervised probation.  As a condition of the plea agreement, appellant reserved the right to certify a question of law challenging the trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress.  Following our review, we conclude that we do not have jurisdiction to address the certified question of law because it does not comply with the strict requirements of Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2) and State v. Preston, 759 S.W.2d 647 (Tenn. 1988).  Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

A jury convicted the Defendant, Bobby Charles Farley, Jr., of driving under the influence (“DUI”); unlawful carrying of a weapon; violating the financial responsibility law; and violating the seatbelt law. After a hearing, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of eleven months, twenty-nine days, to be served in the county jail. In this direct appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence underlying his DUI offense and the trial court’s instructions to the jury. Upon our thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

A jury convicted the defendant, Michael Jarrod Brady, of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. The defendant’s sole issue on appeal is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Because we find that the evidence is sufficient to sustain the verdict, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Burton W. Webb, pleaded guilty to three counts of reckless aggravated assault, Class D felonies, two counts of vehicular assault, Class D felonies, and driving under the influence (DUI) second offense, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-102, 39-13-106, 55-10-401 (2010). The trial court merged the DUI conviction with the vehicular assault convictions and sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to two years for each reckless aggravated assault conviction and to three years for each vehicular assault conviction. The court ordered consecutive service of the vehicular assault convictions, for an effective six-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred (1) by applying certain enhancement factors to the vehicular assault convictions, (2) by denying alternative sentencing, and (3) by ordering consecutive sentences. Although we conclude that the trial court erroneously applied two enhancement factors, the lengths and the manner of service of the sentences are proper. We also conclude that the trial court erred by failing to state its factual findings underlying its conclusion that consecutive sentences were warranted pursuant to State v. Wilkerson, 905 S.W.2d 933, 938 (Tenn. 1995). We remand the case in order for the court to state its factual findings on the record.

The Petitioner, Christopher Scott Chapman, appeals as of right from the Lake County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The Petitioner contends that he was denied pretrial jail credits. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

Appellant, Janet Lynn Jared, was convicted of theft over $10,000.  She was sentenced to six years, with the sentence to be served on probation if she paid restitution of over $82,000 to her victims.  To satisfy the judgment, she sold the family farm, but the sale resulted in net proceeds of only about $48,000.  The State subsequently filed a motion to order that the remaining amount of restitution be paid.  After several hearings, the Criminal Court ordered that Appellant pay the remainder of her obligation at the rate of $500 a month.  Appellant does not challenge the amount of restitution ordered by the Criminal Court, but she contends on appeal that the Court erred by ordering a payment schedule without considering her means and ability to pay, in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-304(d).  The State asks us to dismiss this appeal because under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(b) there is no appeal as of right from a decision to modify the conditions of probation.  We agree with the State.  This appeal is dismissed.

In this appeal, the Petitioner, Scott Clevenger, contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Specifically, he alleges that trial counsel failed to meet with him an adequate amount of times and failed to give him a copy of the discovery materials so that he could make an informed decision about his case. After considering the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Milton L. Kirk, Jr., (“the Petitioner”) was convicted by a jury of sale of .5 grams or more of cocaine. The Petitioner then pleaded guilty to tampering with evidence and possession with intent to sell or deliver cocaine. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner to an effective sentence of sixteen years’ incarceration. The Petitioner subsequently filed for postconviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied following an evidentiary hearing. The Petitioner now appeals, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and that his guilty plea was constitutionally invalid. Upon our thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The father of the parties’ four-year-old child appeals the permanent parenting plan established by the juvenile court judge; specifically, he challenges the designation of Mother as the primary residential parent, the parenting schedule, the income imputed to each parent, and child support he is ordered to pay. He also contends Mother waived her right to a de novo rehearing of an earlier “order” by the magistrate, which favored Father, as she did not file a timely request for a de novo hearing; therefore, the juvenile court judge was without authority to conduct a de novo hearing or to enter judgment contrary to the magistrate’s order. We have determined the magistrate’s “order” was not a final judgment because the magistrate never prepared “findings and recommendations in writing,” which are to be provided to the juvenile court judge, as is expressly required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-107(d). Following the de novo hearing before the juvenile court judge, Mother was named the primary residential parent and she was awarded 218 days of parenting time; Father was awarded 147 days. In calculating child support, the trial court found that Mother was attending college part-time but that she was voluntarily unemployed and imputed income to her based on federal minimum wage. The court found that Father’s evidence concerning his modest income was unreliable and imputed income to Father pursuant to Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 1240-02-04-.04(3)(a)(2)(iv). The court additionally afforded Mother a day care credit of $516 per month and set child support pursuant to the guidelines based upon the above findings. Father appeals. Finding no error, we affirm.

An employee sustained work-related injuries to his head, neck, and shoulders after being struck by a falling ladder. The trial court awarded the employee 60% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. The employer appealed, arguing that the employee failed to prove causation. After carefully reviewing the record, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Defendant, Charles Sharp, was originally indicted for one count of especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor, four counts of rape, one count of sexual battery by an authority figure, one count of statutory rape, and one count of vandalism under $500. Defendant was acquitted of all charges except especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor, on which the jury was hung. See State v. Sharp, 327 S.W.3d 704, 708 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2010). Defendant was tried again on the charge of especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor and convicted. Id. This court reversed Defendant’s conviction and remanded for a new trial based on the State’s having read a witness’s testimony from a prior trial into evidence without having shown the witness’s unavailability. Id. at 709-712. Defendant was tried twice more on the charge of especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor, and the juries were unable to reach a verdict. In the case sub judice, Defendant was tried and convicted again on the same charge and sentenced to 12 years of incarceration. Defendant now appeals his conviction and sentence and asserts the following: 1) the trial court erred by not dismissing the indictment pursuant to our supreme court’s holding in State v. Witt, 572 S.W.2d 913, 917 (Tenn. 1978); 2) the trial court erred by allowing into evidence testimony of prior bad acts; and 3) the trial court’s imposition of a 12-year sentence was presumptively vindictive. After a careful review of the record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm Defendant’s conviction; however, we conclude that Defendant’s sentence violates Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 159 L. Ed. 2d 403 (2004), and therefore, we modify Defendant’s sentence from twelve years to ten years.

A jury convicted the Defendant, Norman Branch, of theft of $500 or less and intentionally evading arrest in a motor vehicle. After a hearing, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of six years, eleven months, and twenty-nine days, to be served in the workhouse. In this direct appeal, the Defendant contends the following: (1) the trial court erred in allowing him to be impeached with twelve prior convictions; (2) the trial court erred in excluding certain of his testimony as inadmissible hearsay; (3) the evidence was not sufficient to support his evading arrest conviction; (4) the trial court provided an improper jury instruction on the evading arrest charge; (5) the trial court erred in sentencing him as a career offender; and (6) cumulative error entitles him to a new trial. Upon our thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Cedric Dickerson (“the Petitioner”) was convicted by a jury of first degree felony murder and aggravated robbery. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner to life without the possibility of parole for his first degree felony murder conviction and eleven years for his aggravated robbery conviction and ordered the sentences to run concurrently. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed the trial court’s judgments. See State v. Cedric Dickerson, No. 02C01-9802-CR-00051, 1999 WL 74213, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 17, 1999). The Petitioner subsequently filed for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied following a post-conviction hearing. The Petitioner now appeals, arguing that “the Eighth Amendment should prohibit life without parole sentences for juvenile offenders.” Upon our thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the post-conviction court’s decision denying relief.

The petitioner, Mark L. Peck, appeals the denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis, arguing that newly discovered evidence of the unreliability of an FBI agent’s firearms testimony entitles him to a new trial. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.