APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The pro se petitioner, Charles Orlando Fields, appeals the denial of his motion to reopen his post-conviction petition. Because he failed to comply with the statutory requirements for seeking review of a dismissal of a motion to reopen a post-conviction petition, we dismiss the appeal.

The Defendant-Appellant, Phillip Harris, was indicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court Grand Jury for six counts of attempted second degree murder and one count of unlawful employment of a firearm during the attempt to commit a dangerous felony. Following a jury trial, Harris was convicted of one count of attempted second degree murder (count two), five counts of misdemeanor reckless endangerment (counts one, three, four, five, and six), and one count of unlawful employment of a firearm during the attempt to commit a dangerous felony (count seven). The trial court sentenced Harris to twelve years for the attempted second degree murder conviction and to a mandatory consecutive sentence of six years for the unlawful employment of a firearm during the attempt to commit a dangerous felony. The court also imposed sentences of eleven months and twenty-nine days for each of the reckless endangerment convictions and ordered these sentences served concurrently with the sentence for attempted second degree murder. On appeal, Harris argues: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions, and (2) his sentence is excessive. Upon review, we affirm the convictions and remand for resentencing as to the conviction for attempted second degree murder.

Appellant, Rodriquez Jones, was convicted of aggravated sexual battery and sentenced to ten years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and that the assistant district attorney general committed prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court; however, we must remand this matter to the trial court to correct the judgment form.

This case arises from a personal injury lawsuit in which a plaintiff sought damages for injuries she sustained in a car accident. The defendant driver requested documents from plaintiff’s healthcare provider. The healthcare provider failed to produce all of the requested documents and was held in civil contempt. As sanctions, the trial court, inter alia, discharged the healthcare provider’s fees for medical services charged to the plaintiff and held the provider in violation of certain chiropractic regulations.  On appeal, the healthcare provider asserts that the trial court lacks authority to discharge the healthcare provider’s fees or to find it in violation of the chiropractic regulations. We agree that the trial court erred, and we vacate that portion of the trial court’s order discharging the fees for medical services and finding a violation of the chiropractic regulations.

The defendant appeals a jury verdict of guilty of aggravated burglary and theft, alleging the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law.  The defendant also alleges the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant, Michael Brandon Adams, appeals the trial court’s summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief.  The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The petitioner, Jamar McField, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which challenged his 2009 Hamilton County Criminal Court jury convictions of felony murder and aggravated child abuse. In this appeal, the petitioner claims that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Discerning no error, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.
 

This is a health care liability action involving a physician’s duties when supervising a physician’s assistant. The plaintiff alleged the supervising physician negligently supervised a physician’s assistant which resulted in the eventual amputation of the plaintiff’s leg. The physician moved for summary judgment, contending that he complied with all statutory duties. The plaintiff responded to this motion and simultaneously moved to amend her complaint to allege that the physician was vicariously liable for the negligent actions of the physician’s assistant. The trial court denied the plaintiff’s request to amend her complaint and granted the physician’s motion for summary judgment. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Father appeals the Juvenile Court’s ruling with regard to custody of his minor child. Because the court did not comply with Rule 52.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, we vacate its judgment and remand the matter for entry of an order with appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law.

The Defendant-Appellant, Charles T. Fletcher, Jr., was charged with the offense of aggravated assault, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. § 39-13-102(a)(1)(A)(iii). While in Johnson County General Sessions Court, the Defendant- Appellant executed a waiver of his right to counsel, a waiver of his right to a preliminary hearing, and a waiver of his right to be tried only upon presentment or indictment of a grand jury. In Johnson County Criminal Court, he repeatedly informed the trial court that he had waived his right to counsel, that he had represented himself in a criminal case before, and that he wished to represent himself in this case. On the day of trial, the Defendant-Appellant signed a waiver of his right to be tried only upon presentment or indictment of a grand jury. The same day, the prosecutor and the Defendant-Appellant signed an information charging the Defendant-Appellant with aggravated assault. A Johnson County Criminal Court jury subsequently convicted the Defendant-Appellant as charged, and the trial court imposed a three-year probationary sentence. In this appeal, the Defendant-Appellant argues: (1) he failed to knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to counsel because (a) he was not informed of his charges, potential penalties, and rights and (b) because the trial court never inquired as to his competency to represent himself; (2) he failed to knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to be tried only upon presentment or indictment of a grand jury because he was unable to read the waiver, to have the assistance of counsel, or to have the court explain his right to presentment and indictment; (3) the trial court erred in failing to continue the case or to appoint counsel or advisory counsel when it became obvious that he could not properly represent himself; (4) the trial court erred in denying his motion to set aside the jury verdict; and (5) the cumulative errors caused by the absence of counsel and his inability to represent himself were so prejudicial as to deny his right to a fair trial and due process. Upon review, we reverse the judgment of the trial court, vacate the Defendant-Appellant’s conviction, and remand the matter to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Father appeals the Juvenile Court’s ruling with regard to custody of his minor child. Because the court did not comply with Rule 52.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, we vacate its judgment and remand the matter for entry of an order with appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law.

The Defendant-Appellant, Marvin Harold Dorton, II, was charged with two counts of sale or delivery of a Schedule II controlled substance (counts 1 and 2), possession of a Schedule IV controlled substance with the intent to sell or deliver (count 3), and possession of a Schedule II controlled substance with the intent to sell or deliver (count 4). A Greene County Criminal Court jury convicted the Defendant-Appellant as charged, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to concurrent sentences of six years for each of his convictions in counts 1 and 2, four years for his conviction in count 3, and six years for his conviction in count 4, for an effective sentence of six years in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant-Appellant argues: (1) the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury in all four counts on the inference of casual exchange pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-419; (2) the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury in counts 1 and 2 on the lesser included offense of casual exchange pursuant to Code section 39-17-418(a); (3) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions in counts 3 and 4 because the State failed to prove that he possessed the drugs found in a safe; and (4) his sentence is excessive. Upon review, we remand the case for entry of corrected judgments in counts 1, 2, 3, and 4 to reflect that the trial court resentenced the Defendant-Appellant on May 3, 2013, after the presentence investigation report was amended, even though the Defendant-Appellant’s sentence did not change from the original sentence imposed. In all other respects, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The employee suffered bilateral shoulder injuries in January and March of 2008. After undergoing separate surgeries on each shoulder, the employee agreed to a voluntary buyout of his employment. Later, he filed suit for workers’ compensation benefits. The trial court awarded temporary total disability benefits and assessed a 90% permanent partial disability award after determining that the employee’s permanent partial disability benefits were not capped at one and one-half times the impairment rating. The employer appealed and, pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, the case was referred to a Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel. The Panel ruled that the employee’s benefits should have been capped at one and one-half times his impairment rating and reduced the award of permanent partial disability benefits to 37.5%. We granted the employee’s motion for full Court review and have determined that because the employee acted reasonably by accepting the voluntary buyout for reasons related to his work injuries, the award for permanent partial disability is not subject to the one-and-one-half-times cap. The judgment of the Panel is, therefore, modified to the extent that the trial court’s award for permanent partial disability benefits is reinstated, but otherwise affirmed.

The appellant, Keyonna Nicole Wooten, pled guilty in the Lincoln County Circuit Court to one count of selling one-half gram or more of a Schedule II controlled substance and one count of delivering one-half gram or more of a Schedule II controlled substance.  After a sentencing hearing, the trial court merged the latter conviction into the former and sentenced the appellant as a Range I, standard offender to nine years, six months in confinement.  On appeal, the appellant contends that her sentence is excessive and that the trial court erred by denying her request for alternative sentencing.  Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Darryl Alan Walker (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a jury of driving under the influence (“DUI”) and unlawfully carrying another person on a motorcycle. Following a sentencing hearing, the Defendant received a total effective sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days, suspended to supervised probation after the service of sixty days. In this direct appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the results of a warrantless mandatory blood alcohol test, arguing that the mandatory blood withdrawal provision of the implied consent statute is unconstitutional and that the term “injury” within that provision is unconstitutionally vague. The Defendant also asserts that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress certain statements he made to police. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The order appealed is not a final judgment and therefore, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

The petitioner, Mark Alan Deakins, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, asserting that he had “flattened” his sentences for his convictions of especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor, sexual exploitation of a minor, and statutory rape.  He alleged that the Tennessee Department of Correction improperly calculated his pretrial jail credits and sentencing credits.  The habeas corpus court denied the petition, and the petitioner appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

An employee sustained a work-related injury to her back while working as a nursing assistant for her employer. The employee received medical care, returned to work, but experienced pain in performing her job. Two years later, the employee resigned, citing back pain related to her work. After an unsuccessful Benefit Review Conference, the employee filed an action for workers’ compensation benefits. The trial court determined that the employee did not make a meaningful return to work following her injury and awarded permanent partial disability benefits in excess of one and one-half times the employee’s anatomical impairment rating. The employer appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by concluding that the employee did not make a meaningful return to work. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this case, the employee alleged tha he sustained a compensable aggravation of preexisting arthritis in his knee as a result of a fall at work. His employer denied that he had a permanent disability as a result of the event.  The trial court awarded benefits, and the employer has appealed. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51.  We affirm the judgment.   

This appeal involves an alleged breach of a construction contract. The plaintiff general contractor hired the defendant subcontractor to build cabinetry for a new movie theater. The work was to be completed by the time the movie theater opened. At the time of the opening, some items regarding the cabinets remained undone, and the contractor refused to pay until the work was completed. The general contractor filed this lawsuit for breach of contract for failure to complete the project in a timely manner and for defective work, and the defendant subcontractor filed a counterclaim for breach of contract for failure to pay under the contract. The trial court held in favor of the subcontractor and awarded damages. The general contractor now appeals. We vacate the trial court’s judgment and remand the matter for findings of fact and conclusions of law as required under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 52.01.

June Loudermilk (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a jury of driving under the influence (“DUI”), fourth offense. After a hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to two years in the workhouse, suspended to supervised probation after seven months in confinement. In this direct appeal, the Defendant attacks the validity of his indictment and also contends that the trial court’s jury charge was so defective as to entitle him to a reversal of the jury’s determination that he was a multiple DUI offender. Upon our thorough review of the record and applicable law, we modify the trial court’s judgment of conviction and remand this matter for resentencing.

After a default judgment was entered against Appellee and in favor of Appellants on claims of intentional interference with business relationships, common law and statutory inducement to breach a contract and intentional interference with a contract, and breach of contract, a writ of inquiry hearing was held to determine the appropriate amount of damages to which the Appellants were entitled. Therein, the trial court went outside the pleadings to  consider the issue of liability. We conclude that the trial court erred in considering the issue of liability because the well-pled facts contained in the Appellants’ respective complaints were dispositive on that question upon the grant of default judgment. Our review of the complaints leads us to conclude that the Appellants have set forth sufficient facts to prove the prima facie elements of their causes of action. Accordingly, Appellants are entitled to damages, and the trial court erred in denying them. Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s order, and remand for a determination of damages. Reversed and remanded.

The defendant, Elmer Herbert Simpson, appeals his Hawkins County Criminal Court jury convictions of possession of a Schedule III drug with intent to deliver, see T.C.A. § 39-17- 417(a)(4), (d)(1), and maintaining a dwelling where controlled substances are kept or sold, see id. § 53-11-401(a)(5), both Class D felonies. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the propriety of his effective three-year sentence. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Defendant, Michael Kent Walker, pleaded guilty to selling Schedule I and Schedule II controlled substances in a drug-free zone.  The plea agreement provided that the Defendant would receive concurrent Range I sentences for one Class B felony and one Class C felony, with the trial court to determine his sentences.  Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to serve an effective sentence of twelve years of incarceration.  The Defendant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering an effective twelve-year sentence.  After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The Fentress County Grand Jury indicted Appellant, Leslie Warren Blevins, with three counts of aggravated assault.  After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of one count of aggravated assault and two counts of assault.  As a result, he was sentenced to an effective sentence of five years in confinement.  Appellant appeals, challenging both the sufficiency of the evidence and his sentence.  After a review of the record and the applicable authorities, we determine that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Appellant.  Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.