APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Lake County jury convicted the Defendant, Randy Sherrill, of sale of a Schedule II controlled substance in a drug-free zone. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to serve eight years as a multiple offender. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) “Markham Park” is not listed as a “park” by the State of Tennessee, the City of Tiptonville, or the Federal Government; (2) the State committed a Brady violation by not informing defense counsel of its confidential informant’s drug use during the time period of his transactions with the Defendant; (3) the State failed to prove chain of custody; and (4) the trial court, Tiptonville Police Chief England, and the State, engaged in improper conversations with the jury after jury deliberations had begun. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Defendant, Deon Lamont Cartmell, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of second degree murder, a Class A felony, and received an eighteen-year sentence.  See T.C.A. § 39-13-210 (2010).  On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred (1) in admitting the victim’s statements into evidence, (2) in admitting evidence that the victim’s wedding ring was missing, (3) in admitting evidence that Megan Prisco had a flirtatious relationship with him before the victim’s death, (4) in admitting evidence that he boasted about his treating his wife poorly to Metro Police Field Training Officer Mackovis Peebles, (5) in admitting evidence that he carelessly left weapons around his house and used profanity when Antoya Brandon confronted him about it, (6) in admitting evidence of his conversation with Metro Police Chaplain James Duke, (7) in admitting proof of his relationships with other women after the victim’s death, (8) in allowing the State to question him about his contact with Paige Merriweather, (9) in allowing the State to question him about an incident three years before the victim’s death when he confronted her about having sex with other men, (10) in ordering redaction of a portion of the defense expert’s report, and (11) in enhancing his sentence.  We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal involves the denial of unemployment compensation benefits. The petitioner was employed by the defendant bank. When the petitioner employee arrived for work, the employee’s supervisor smelled alcohol on her and asked her to take an alcohol test. The employee refused to take the alcohol test, and as a result her employment was terminated. The employee filed for unemployment benefits.  The defendant commissioner held that the employee was discharged for work-related misconduct and was disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits,and the denial of benefits was affirmed in the administrative appeals process. The employee then filed the instant lawsuit for judicial review of the administrative decision. The trial court affirmed the agency’s decision, and the petitioner now appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Father appeals the trial court’s order setting aside its prior judgment terminating Mother’s parental rights. After a hearing, the trial court ruled that Father’s failure to comply with the statutory notice requirements rendered the termination judgment void. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This is a petition for dependency and neglect, child support, and breach of contract arising out of an international adoption.  The respondent adopted the subject child from Russia.  A few months later, after experiencing difficulties with the child, she placed the child on a oneway flight to Russia and sought to annul the adoption. The adoption agency that brokered the adoption filed this lawsuit against the respondent in juvenile court, seeking child support and alleging that the child was dependent and neglected. The juvenile court dismissed the case, and the case was appealed to the circuit court below. On appeal to circuit court, the petition was amended to add the child as a petitioner and to seek child support and damages arising out of the adoption contract. After protracted proceedings, the trial court granted the petitioners’ motion for default judgment against the respondent for failing to file an answer to the petition and failing to cooperate in discovery. The trial court later conducted a hearing on damages, at which the respondent did not appear. The trial court awarded damages to the petitioners and ordered the respondent to pay child support. It later denied the respondent’s motions for post-judgment relief. The respondent now appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm.

I concur with Judge Stafford’s thorough opinion. After several discussions and independent research, I believe that my colleagues are correct on the law.

This appeal concerns a dispute over damages in a fraud case. Bradley M. Barkhurst and his wife Judith R. Barkhurst (“the Plaintiffs”), victims of a Ponzi scheme, filed a complaint against Amparo Goyes Jarosh, personal representative of the estate of Charles D. Candler (“Defendant”) , in the Chancery Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”). 1 The Trial Court granted summary judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs. The Plaintiffs appeal, arguing, among other things, that they should have been granted enhanced damages under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act (“the TCPA”). We hold that enhanced damages are not available in an action against an estate. We also modify the Trial Court’s judgment to include in the award to Plaintiffs certain taxes and interest that the Plaintiffs incurred in the Ponzi scheme.
We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court as modified.

This contract action stems from the defendant’s, H. Michael Chitwood’s, failure to pay for construction work that was performed by the plaintiff, Raines Brothers, Inc. (“Raines”). The work was performed on a home that was occupied by Mr. Chitwood but owned by a trustee, James Dreaden, who was also named as a defendant. Following a bench trial, the trial court awarded Raines a judgment against Mr. Chitwood and Mr. Dreaden (collectively “Defendants”) in the amount of $66,762.71. The trial court also awarded pre-judgment interest at the rate of eighteen percent per annum, beginning August 14, 2007. The trial court denied Raines’s claim for attorney’s fees. Defendants timely appealed the trial court’s ruling. Having determined that Raines adequately proved its entitlement to this amount pursuant to the parties’ contract, we affirm the trial court’s judgment of $66,762.71 against Mr. Chitwood. We reverse the trial court’s judgment against Mr. Dreaden. We modify the trial court’s award of the rate of interest from eighteen percent per annum to ten percent in accordance with relevant statutory and case law. We also reverse the trial court’s denial of Raines’s claim for attorney’s fees pursuant to the parties’ contract and remand for a determination of the proper amount of interest to be charged, as well as a reasonable award of attorney’s fees.

Appellant, Robert King Vaughn, Jr., pled guilty to aggravated burglary and theft in case number F-64238 and aggravated burglary in case number F-68086 in Rutherford County Circuit Court.  As a result, in case number F-64238, Appellant was ordered to serve 90 days in incarceration and the remainder of a four-year sentence on probation.  In case number F-68086, Appellant was sentenced to thirteen years.  The sentence was suspended and Appellant was ordered to serve the term on Community Corrections.  A warrant was filed against Appellant for a violation of the terms of the Community Corrections sentence and probation.  After a hearing, the trial court ordered Appellant to serve the remainder of the four-year sentence and thirteen-year sentence in incarceration.  Appellant appeals.  After a review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand the matter to the trial court for correction of the order revoking Appellant’s Community Corrections sentence in case number F-68086 to reflect a violation of Community Corrections rather than probation.

The Petitioner, Gary Carr, appeals the Circuit Court for Lauderdale County’s denial of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Kenneth Moore, appeals his DeKalb County Criminal Court jury conviction of aggravated sexual battery, claiming that the trial court erred by denying his motions to introduce certain evidence, including evidence offered pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Evidence 412, and that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction.  Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this case, we are called upon to review the trial court’s decision to set aside a consent order regarding an annexation on the basis of the subsequent passage of legislation allegedly affecting the agreed-upon annexation. Because we conclude that Tennessee Code Annotated Section 6-51-122 does not apply to prohibit the annexation ordinance at issue, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and reinstate the consent order.

Aaron Guilliams (“the Defendant”) pleaded guilty to one count of attempted aggravated assault. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Defendant was sentenced to two years, suspended to supervised probation, and reserved the right to have a hearing to determine his eligibility for judicial diversion. After a hearing, the trial court denied the Defendant’s request for judicial diversion. The Defendant timely appealed the trial court’s ruling. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Estate of Mary Lou Lamb appeals a grant of summary judgment to defendant Ernest L. Joyner raising issues regarding whether the Chancery Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”) erred in finding that the plaintiff’s response to the defendant’s motion for summary judgment was filed untimely and therefore was not considered by the Trial Court, and whether the Trial Court erred in granting summary judgment on the issue of adverse possession. We find and hold: (1) that the Trial Court did not err in finding that the plaintiff’s response was filed untimely; and (2) that Ernest L. Joyner failed to show that he was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. We vacate the grant of summary
judgment on the issue of adverse possession and remand this case to the Trial Court for further proceedings.

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the plaintiffs are not time barred to establish that they have standing to contest David Rose’s 2006 Trust Agreement. I fully concur with the affirmance of the dismissal of the other underlying cases.

Petitioner, Robert Jason Burgess, pled guilty to two counts of the sale of a controlled substance and two counts of rape in Marshall County.  As a result, he was sentenced to an effective sentence of twenty-six years.  After the denial of post-conviction relief, Petitioner sought habeas corpus relief in which he argued that his guilty plea was unknowingly or involuntarily entered because he was not informed that his sentence carried a community supervision for life provision.  After a review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court which dismissed the petition for relief.

The petitioner, Tyrone Chalmers, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis in which he challenged his death sentence resulting from his 1997 conviction for first degree felony murder. On appeal, the petitioner contends that he is entitled to coram nobis relief because he is intellectually disabled and, therefore, ineligible for the death penalty. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Holder of easement (dominant estate) brought suit against owner of land (servient estate) alleging interference with his use of the easement by the servient estate’s construction of a building on the easement. The trial court found that the servient estate’s actions did not constitute unreasonable interference with the dominant estate’s use of the easement for ingress and egress. Because the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings, we affirm.

Capital Bank filed a complaint seeking a deficiency judgment against Oscar Brock and Frank E. Cowden, III (“Defendants”) after they defaulted on a loan and following the sale at foreclosure of the property securing the debt. After settlement discussions were unsuccessful, Capital Bank moved for summary judgment. It asserted that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that it is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Defendants contested the motion but only as to the amount of the deficiency and the issue of whether Capital Bank is entitled to an award of attorney’s fees. As a defense to the deficiency claim, Defendants stated that the property was sold at foreclosure for an amount “materially less” than its fair market value and that Capital Bank’s knowledge of the alleged less-than- arketvalue sales price amounted to fraud, collusion or misconduct. The trial court granted Capital Bank’s motion. It was awarded a judgment of $168,798.98 which amount includes 70,628.85 in attorney’s fees. Defendants appeal.  We affirm.

After the death of David Rose, his two putative non-marital sons became involved in three separate lawsuits related to the proper distribution of his property. When Mr. Rose’s Executrix filed to probate his Will in solemn form, the putative sons, who were named residuary beneficiaries, objected, but later withdrew their objection. They then filed suit to set aside a 2006 Trust Agreement in order to reinstate prior trusts, the assets of which were to be distributed to Mr. Rose’s issue at his death. They also filed a separate lawsuit to establish Mr. Rose as their biological father. Their attempts to obtain some of their father’s assets were all unsuccessful. In all three cases, the trial court held that they were barred from establishing a father-son relationship because their attempts were time barred. We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the sons’ petition to establish paternity filed in the probate case two years after the order admitting the will to probate. However, we reverse the trial court’s dismissal of the petitioners’ complaint challenging the validity of the 2006 Trust Agreement because they have standing to attempt to establish that they are “issue” of Mr. Rose. The deadline imposed by the trial court applied only “for purposes of intestate succession,” and the trust case did not involve inheritance through the statute regarding heirs of a person dying without a will. Mr. Rose had a will, which was probated. Any assets to be distributed to Mr. Locke and Mr. Avian from the preexisting trust(s) would be pursuant to the terms of the trust document(s), not pursuant to intestate succession. For the purpose of establishing their interest in the prior trust(s), the purported children were entitled to present proof that they were the children of Mr. Rose and were not time barred.

The Defendant, Donald Wayne McCall, was convicted by a Crockett County Circuit Court jury of rape of a child, a Class A felony, and two counts of aggravated sexual battery, Class B felonies. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-522, 39-13-504(a)(4) (2010). The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to forty years for child rape at 100% service and to twenty years for each aggravated sexual battery conviction at 100% service. The trial court ordered consecutive sentences, for an effective eighty-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, (2) the trial court erred by failing to exclude evidence related to one victim’s credibility, and (3) the trial court erred by permitting the State to impeach him with his previous convictions. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Mother of two children appeals the denial of her petition to modify the parenting plan, the increase of her child support obligation, and the award of attorney fees to the Father. We reverse the increase in Mother’s child support obligation; we affirm the judgment in all other respects.

The petitioner, Marvin Bobby Parker, was convicted of reckless aggravated assault, two counts of assault, and one count of reckless endangerment after a violent confrontation at a racetrack.  He appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief.  On appeal, the petitioner asserts that the post-conviction court erred in rejecting his argument that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel when: (1) trial counsel did not allow him to testify at the grand jury proceedings; (2) trial counsel did not request an instruction on self-defense during trial; (3) trial counsel failed to call certain witnesses at trial and at the preliminary hearing; (4) trial counsel failed to prepare him to testify; (5) trial counsel failed to pursue or advise him regarding pretrial diversion; (6) trial counsel did not introduce a videotape into evidence; and (7) trial counsel’s cumulative errors deprived him of a fair trial.  After a review of the record, we conclude that the petition was properly dismissed, and we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the plaintiffs are not time barred to establish that they have standing to contest David Rose’s 2006 Trust Agreement. I fully concur with the affirmance of the dismissal of the other underlying cases.

The petitioner, Chivous S. Robinson, filed a petition for habeas corpus relief in the Hardeman County Circuit Court challenging his 2000 convictions of second degree murder and solicitation of first degree murder. Because the petition fails to present a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief, we affirm the habeas corpus court’s summary dismissal of the petition.