APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The appellant, Sharris Nicole Thompson, pled guilty in the Lawrence County Circuit Court to theft of property valued $1,000 or more but less than $10,000; misappropriation of rental property valued $1,000 or more but less than $10,000; three counts of theft of property valued $500 or less; and one count of misappropriation of rental property valued $500 or less and ultimately received an effective four-year sentence to be served on probation.  Subsequently, the trial court revoked probation and ordered that the appellant serve her effective sentence in confinement.  On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by denying her request for alternative sentencing.  Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioners sought to terminate the parental rights of both parents. After a trial, the court found that the grounds of wanton disregard, abandonment by willful failure to visit, and abandonment by willful failure to pay support did not exist as to the father. Petitioners took a voluntary dismissal as to the mother. Petitioners appealed the trial court’s decision as to the father. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Defendant, William Henry Albright, Jr., pleaded guilty to aggravated burglary and theft over $1,000, and the trial court imposed an agreed-upon sentence of ten years for the aggravated burglary conviction and eight years for the theft conviction, concurrent, to be served on supervised probation. In 2015, the trial court issued a probation violation warrant and, after a hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant's probation and ordered that the Defendant serve his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering him to serve his sentence in incarceration. After review, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

Due to Plaintiff’s failure to reissue summons within one year of the issuance of the original, unserved summons, the trial court granted Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for Plaintiffs’ failure to comply with Rule 3 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Benton County jury convicted the Defendant of one count of rape of a child and one count of aggravated sexual battery as a lesser-included offense of a second count of rape of a child. The trial court sentenced him to thirty-five years, to be served at 100%, for the rape of a child conviction and to a concurrent sentence of ten years for the aggravated sexual battery conviction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) the trial court erred when it instructed the jury that aggravated sexual battery was a lesser-included offense of rape of a child; and (3) the trial court erred when it sentenced him. After review, we conclude that aggravated sexual battery is not a lesser-included offense of rape of a child. State v. John J. Ortega, Jr., No. M2014-01042-CCA-R3-CD, 2015 WL 1870095, at *10 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Apr. 23, 2015), no perm. app. filed. As such, the trial court erred when it instructed the jury. The Defendant's conviction for aggravated sexual battery is vacated. His conviction and sentence for rape of a child is affirmed.

A Chester County jury convicted the Defendant of theft of property valued over $500, and the trial court sentenced him as a Career Offender to six years of incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence presented at trial is insufficient to sustain his conviction and that the trial court erred when it sentenced him. After review, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

The Petitioner, Steven Q. Stanford, appeals the Campbell County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2010 convictions for initiation of a process to manufacture methamphetamine and for misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia and from his effective fifteen-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because (1) counsel failed to file a motion to suppress evidence obtained during a search of the Petitioner’s mother’s property and (2) counsel failed to explain two plea offers adequately. Although we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court, we remand for the entry of a corrected judgment relative to the initiation of a process to manufacture methamphetamine conviction.

A Shelby County jury found the Petitioner, Darrell Johnson, guilty of three counts of facilitation of attempted aggravated robbery and two counts of facilitation of aggravated burglary. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner as a Career Offender and imposed a total effective sentence of twenty-four years of incarceration. This Court affirmed the Petitioner's convictions and sentence. State v. Darrell Johnson, No. W2012-01467-CCA-R3-CD, 2013 WL 5522220, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Oct. 3, 2013), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Feb. 12, 2014). The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied after a hearing. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred when it denied his petition. He contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court's judgment.

Paul Samuel Eslinger, the Defendant, pleaded guilty to two counts of sale of a Schedule II controlled substance, both Class C felonies, and one count of sale of a Schedule I controlled substance, a Class B felony, and was sentenced pursuant to a plea agreement to three thirty-year concurrent sentences. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred when it did not allow him to withdraw his guilty pleas. Upon review, we conclude that the Defendant's negotiated sentences were illegal and the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction when it accepted the negotiated sentences as part of the plea agreement. Therefore, the trial court should have allowed him to withdraw his guilty pleas. The judgments of the trial court are reversed, and the case is remanded.

Samuel W. Hirsh (“the Petitioner”) entered a best interest plea to first degree felony murder and was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. He then filed a timely pro se Petition for Post-Conviction Relief alleging numerous grounds. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief and dismissed the petition. On appeal the Petitioner claims that (1) counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress the Petitioner's statements and (2) “[the] conviction was based upon a coerced [p]lea [a]greement predicated upon an innate fear of receiving the [d]eath [p]enalty.” Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

In 2013 the Petitioner, Timothy Jermaine Cox, entered a best interest plea to aggravated sexual battery and violation of the sex offender registry. By agreement, the trial court sentenced the Petitioner to ten years, to be served at 100%, with a concurrent sentence of two years for violating the sex offender registry, to be served at 35%. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied after a hearing. On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that the post-conviction court erred when it denied his petition because he received the ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court's judgment.

At issue in this case is whether the parties entered into a contract that granted Plaintiff a right of first refusal to purchase Defendants’ real property. Defendants leased their property to Plaintiff for a twelve-month period. After the lease was renewed several times, Plaintiff inquired with Defendants’ agent as to whether Defendants would be interested in selling the property. The agent informed Plaintiff via email that Defendants did not wish to sell their property at the time, but should they decide to in the future, Plaintiff “would have the first right of refusal.” Defendants subsequently decided to sell the property to a third party and did not provide Plaintiff the opportunity to purchase the property. Plaintiff then filed this action for specific performance and breach of contract, asserting that Defendants granted Plaintiff an enforceable right of first refusal. After discovery, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the purported contract fails for lack of mutual assent and consideration. The trial court granted summary judgment, holding that the language in the email correspondence was too indefinite to create a binding contract. We have determined that the agreement to provide Plaintiff with a right of first refusal was not supported by consideration; thus, it did not constitute a binding contract. Accordingly, we affirm.

The defendant, Antonio McMiller, appeals his Sullivan County Criminal Court jury convictions of the sale and delivery of cocaine within a drug-free zone, claiming that the trial court erred by permitting him to proceed pro se, that the trial court violated his constitutional right to be present at trial, that the trial court erred by denying his right to counsel of choice, that he was deprived of the right to a fair and impartial jury, that the trial court erred by failing to give certain jury instructions, that the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to support his convictions, that the trial judge's rulings evinced judicial bias requiring recusal, and that the sentence imposed was excessive. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Juvenile Court for White County (“Juvenile Court”) terminated the parental rights of Briana M. (“Mother”) to the minor child Bryson C. (“the Child”) after finding and holding that grounds existed to terminate for abandonment by willful failure to visit and by willful failure to provide support pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(1) and § 36-1-102(1)(A)(i); for failure to comply with the permanency plan pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(2); and for persistent conditions pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(3). The Juvenile Court also found that it was in the Child’s best interest for Mother’s parental rights to be terminated. Mother appeals to this Court. We find and hold that clear and convincing evidence was not shown that grounds existed to terminate Mother’s parental rights for abandonment by willful failure to provide support or for failure to comply with the permanency plan, and we reverse that portion of the Juvenile Court’s order terminating Mother’s parental rights for abandonment by willful failure to provide support and for failure to comply with the permanency plan. We further find and hold that the evidence in the record on appeal does not preponderate against the Juvenile Court’s finding by clear and convincing evidence that grounds existed to terminate Mother’s parental rights for abandonment by willful failure to visit and for persistent conditions, and that it was in the Child’s best interest for Mother’s parental rights to be terminated. We, therefore, affirm the termination of Mother’s parental rights to the Child.
 

Defendant, Christopher Roy McGill, received an eight-year sentence on community corrections and was placed into a drug court treatment program.  A violation warrant was filed alleging that Defendant brought drugs into the treatment program.  After a hearing, the trial court revoked Defendant’s community corrections sentence after finding that Defendant failed to report other residents bringing drugs into the treatment program.  On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court improperly admitted hearsay testimony, that the evidence was insufficient to support the trial court’s finding that Defendant violated the terms of his community corrections sentence, and that the trial judge should have recused himself because he was also a member of Defendant’s drug court team.  Upon our review of the record, we hold that the trial court erred by admitting hearsay testimony without a finding of good cause or reliability, that the trial court erred in revoking Defendant’s community corrections sentence on a ground of which Defendant had no notice and for which there was a lack of evidence in the record, but that the trial court did not err in failing to recuse itself.  We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

A Madison County jury convicted the Defendant-Appellant, Dontavious Hendrix, of one count of second degree murder. See T.C.A. § 39-13-210(a)(1). The trial court imposed a twenty-five-year sentence of confinement at the Tennessee Department of Correction to be served at 100% release eligibility. On appeal, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for second degree murder and that his sentence is excessive. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Company conducting business in Tennessee filed a complaint against the Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development seeking a declaratory judgment that the subpoenas issued by the Department for business records violated the company’s right to due process of law and constituted an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and seeking injunctive relief. The trial court granted the Department’s motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim for relief, and the business appeals. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment.  

The petitioner, Shelly Minor, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court denying the petition for post-conviction relief.

The defendant, Danielle Rush, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of two counts of attempted second degree murder, three counts of aggravated assault, two counts of reckless endangerment, and vandalism over $1000. The trial court merged two of the aggravated assault convictions and sentenced the defendant to an effective term of eleven years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is a property line dispute involving adjoining landowners. The plaintiff filed the instant action when the defendants began clearing land that the plaintiff asserted was his. The defendants filed a counter-complaint, claiming ownership of the disputed property. Following a bench trial, the trial court determined the location of a boundary line between the parties, thereby awarding to the plaintiff ownership of most of the disputed area. The defendants have appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The defendant, Lorenzo Brown, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of attempted voluntary manslaughter, possession of a firearm during the attempted commission of a dangerous felony, and aggravated assault. The trial court sentenced him to four years for the attempted voluntary manslaughter conviction, three years for the firearm conviction, and five years for the aggravated assault conviction, with the four- and three-year sentences to be served consecutively and the five-year sentence concurrently, for an effective sentence of seven years, in the county workhouse. On appeal, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his attempted voluntary manslaughter and firearm convictions. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In this divorce appeal, Husband raises several issues concerning marital property and alimony. We modify the trial court‟s alimony award to award Wife $1,644.00 per month pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 36-5-121(f), but otherwise affirm the decision of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Melvin James Branham, appeals the Sevier County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2012 conviction for robbery and his fifteen-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Tracy Lorenzo Goodwin, appeals from the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s order revoking his probation and ordering execution of the original sentences imposed. The Defendant’s counsel has filed a motion to withdraw pursuant to Rule 22 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. We conclude that counsel’s motion is well-taken and, in accordance with Rule 22(F), affirm the trial court’s judgments pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals.