APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The plaintiff filed this case against an adult defendant and his parents, after the adult defendant allegedly attacked the plaintiff. The trial court granted parents’ motion to dismiss, concluding that no special relationship existed between the adult defendant and his parents that would confer a duty on parents to control the adult defendant, a guest in parents’ home. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Defendant in detainer action appeals the grant of summary judgment to Plaintiff. In ruling on the motion, the trial court declined to consider testimony from four depositions taken in related federal lawsuits which Defendant argued established disputed issues of material facts and precluded summary judgment. We have determined that three of the four depositions were not admissible and the fourth should have been admitted. Considering the record, we affirm the grant of summary judgment.  

Intervening plaintiffs appeal from the dismissal of their petition to intervene in this wrongful death action. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The defendant, Rebekah Dearmond, appeals from her Maury County Circuit Court guilty-pleaded conviction of second offense driving under the influence (“DUI”), claiming that the trial court erred by denying her motion to suppress.  Because the defendant failed to properly preserve a certified question of law for our review, the appeal is dismissed.

Aimee Denise Wallace (“the Defendant”) pleaded guilty to one count of possession of drug paraphernalia and requested that she be placed on judicial diversion. The trial court, after acknowledging that the Defendant was a “qualified defendant” for judicial diversion under Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-313(a)(1)(B)(i), denied the Defendant’s request based solely upon the fact that she had a prior conviction for a class A misdemeanor. On appeal, the Defendant asks this court to reverse the trial court’s order denying judicial diversion, conduct a de novo review, and order that the Defendant be placed on judicial diversion. The State concedes that the trial court erred. After review, we conclude that the trial court erred because it denied judicial diversion without considering and weighing all the relevant factors. Because the trial court failed to conduct an evidentiary hearing, the record before us is not sufficient for us to conduct a de novo review. The judgment of the trial court is reversed and remanded for reconsideration and a hearing on the issue of judicial diversion.

We granted permission to appeal in this case to determine whether a criminal defendant who pleads guilty may later seek to overturn his plea via a petition for writ of error coram nobis filed pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-26-105. Although this Court held in Wlodarz v. State, 361 S.W.3d 490 (Tenn. 2012), that guilty pleas may be subject to a collateral attack via a petition for writ of error coram nobis, we now overturn that decision. We hold that the statute setting forth the remedy of error coram nobis in criminal matters does not encompass its application to guilty pleas. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals on the separate grounds stated herein.

A Montgomery County jury convicted the Defendant, Bernard Nelson, of two counts of indecent exposure.  On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the State breached its duty to preserve potentially exculpatory evidence.  The Defendant also contends that the convicting evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions.  We affirm the trial court’s judgments.

I concur completely in the majority’s opinion terminating the parental rights of Myron J. T. based upon the provisions of Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(1) and § 36-1-102(1)(A)(i). I dissent from so much of the majority’s decision as holds that father does not fall within the ambit of Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(9)(A) and § 36-1-117(c). I would hold that father is within the class of persons covered by these latter two statutes. On this point, I adhere to the majority opinion authored by me in the case of In re F.N.M., No. M2015-00519-COA-R3-PT, 2016 WL 3126077 (Tenn. Ct. App., filed Apr. 11, 2016).

This appeal arises from a negligence case brought after an automobile accident. James Boshears (“Boshears”) was a passenger in a vehicle driven by his girlfriend that was struck by a vehicle driven by Cleave C. Brooks (“Brooks”). Boshears sued Brooks in the Circuit Court for Anderson County (“the Trial Court”). Boshears alleged that Brooks was negligent in operating his vehicle. Brooks asserted that he suffered a stroke immediately prior to the accident, that he lost consciousness, and that, consequently, he could not be found negligent. The case was tried to a jury. The jury found that Brooks was not at fault. Boshears appealed to this Court. On appeal, Boshears argues that the Trial Court erred in charging the jury with sudden emergency when comparative fault was not raised by Brooks. Boshears also asserts that the Trial Court erred in charging the jury on both sudden emergency and loss of consciousness. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

The defendant, Mark Stephen Williams, appeals the trial court’s revocation of his probation after a revocation hearing at which the defendant was not represented by counsel. He argues that he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to counsel. Following our review, we conclude that the defendant did not execute a knowing and voluntary waiver of his right to counsel. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this case for the appointment of counsel.

This appeal arises from the murder of two teenagers, accompanied by the dismemberment of one of them. A jury convicted the defendant, Howard Hawk Willis, of two counts of premeditated first-degree murder and one count of felony murder in the perpetration of a kidnapping. The jury sentenced the defendant to death on each conviction. The defendant appealed, and the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed his convictions and sentences. On appeal, the defendant contends, inter alia, that certain incriminating statements he made to his ex-wife should have been excluded because she was acting as an agent of the State at the time the statements were made. He asserts that the admission into evidence of the statements violated his right against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 9 of the Tennessee Constitution. For purposes of the right against self-incrimination, we hold that this is a case of “misplaced trust” in a confidant and there was no violation of the Fifth Amendment. The defendant also argues that the admission of the statements violated his right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 9 of the Tennessee Constitution. The incriminating statements to the ex-wife were made during in-person meetings with her at the jail and during recorded telephone calls from jail. As to statements made to the ex-wife prior to indictment, we hold that the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel had not attached, so there was no violation regardless of whether the ex-wife was acting as an agent of the State. As to statements made in person to the ex-wife after indictment, the evidence shows only that the State willingly accepted information from a cooperating witness. We hold that, for a cooperating witness or informant to be deemed a “government agent” for purposes of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, the defendant must show that the principal—the State, personified by law enforcement officers—manifested assent, either explicitly or implicitly, to have the cooperating witness act as a government agent, and that the State had some level of control over the witness’s actions with respect to the defendant. Agency cannot be proven based solely on the actions of the alleged agent, so proof that the ex-wife repeatedly contacted law enforcement is not sufficient in and of itself to show that the State assented to have her act as its agent. Therefore, the admission into evidence of the statements made in person to the ex-wife after indictment did not violate the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel. As to the incriminating statements made by telephone, we hold that, by placing the telephone calls to his ex-wife from jail with full knowledge that all calls were subject to monitoring and recording, the defendant implicitly consented to the monitoring and recording of his conversations and waived his Sixth Amendment rights. After full review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court and the Court of Criminal Appeals upholding the defendant’s two convictions of first degree murder, and we affirm the sentences of death.

The Petitioner, Ronnie Mills, appeals as of right from the Knox County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, he contends that his pleas were unknowing and involuntary due to counsel’s misinforming him regarding the specific terms of his plea agreement with the State and counsel’s subsequent failure to get those terms in writing or object when the alleged agreement was not honored. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

I concur fully with the Court’s opinion except for the analysis in Section II(E)(4) regarding the proportionality review. In 1997, this Court narrowed the scope of the proportionality review required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 39 13 206(c)(1)(D) by limiting its consideration to only those cases in which the death penalty had been sought. State v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d 651, 666 (Tenn. 1997). A majority of this Court reaffirmed this truncated approach in State v. Pruitt, 415 S.W.3d 180, 217 (Tenn. 2013). In Pruitt, I joined Justice William C. Koch, Jr. in dissenting from the Court’s decision to continue following the Bland approach, as it improperly narrows the proportionality review required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 39 13 206(c)(1)(D). Pruitt, 415 S.W.3d at 230 (Koch and Lee, JJ., concurring and dissenting). We determined that the Court should return to its pre-Bland proportionality analysis by considering “all first degree murder cases in which life imprisonment or a sentence of death has been imposed” and focusing on whether the case under review more closely resembles cases that have resulted in the imposition of the death penalty than those that have not. Id. at 230-31 (Koch and Lee, JJ., concurring and dissenting).

The Defendant, Christopher Lindsey, appeals from the trial court's revocation of his community corrections sentence and order that he serve the balance of his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in admitting a certified copy of his nolo contendere plea to a shoplifting charge in violation of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 410; that the court erred by “tolling” his community corrections sentence; and that the trial court did not properly calculate his pretrial jail credits or credit for time served on community corrections. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. However, we remand this case to the trial court for the correction of inaccuracies in the revocation order relating to the calculation of credit for time-served.

After the trial court denied his motion to suppress, the Defendant, Richard Dale Smith, pled guilty to driving under the influence (“DUI”). See Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-401. As a condition of his guilty plea, he sought to reserve the right to appeal a certified question of law challenging the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress. Following our review of the record, we dismiss the appeal because the Defendant failed to properly certify his question of law in accordance with Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2).

A Maury County Circuit Court Jury convicted the Appellant, Lemonique Scherod Johnson, of facilitation of aggravated robbery.  The trial court sentenced the Appellant as a Range III, persistent offender to twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction.  On appeal, the Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence sustaining his conviction, contending that the alleged victim was a participant in the robbery, that the evidence did not support a conviction of facilitation aggravated robbery because the victim was not “in fear,” and that the Appellant was not involved in the robbery.  Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal stems from a final judgment of divorce entered in the Anderson County Chancery Court. Wife appeals several issues, including the propriety of the trial court’s decision to grant a divorce based on irreconcilable differences in the absence of an agreed written marital dissolution agreement. Upon review of the record transmitted to us on appeal, we agree that because there was no written marital dissolution agreement, the trial court erred in granting the divorce between the parties on the basis of irreconcilable differences. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s final judgment and remand for such further proceedings as are necessary and consistent with this Opinion.

Petitioner, Marcie Lynn Pursell, appeals from the denial of her petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that she received ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failure to have expert witness testimony excluded, failure to impeach expert witnesses with prior inconsistent statements, and for lack of experience.  The decision of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

In this post-divorce child support case, we granted interlocutory appeal to determine whether the Knox County Fourth Circuit Court (“trial court”) erred by finding that the mother was entitled to ongoing and/or retroactive child support from the father for the parties’ adult disabled child. In October 2001, the mother had been granted a default divorce judgment by the Rutherford County Circuit Court (“divorce court”) upon constructive notice by publication to the father. As to child support for the parties’ only child, who was then seventeen years old, the divorce court reserved the issue pending personal service of process upon the father. In March 2014, the State of Tennessee, acting on behalf of the mother, filed a petition to set child support. Prior to the petition’s filing, no child support obligation had been set. Following a hearing, the child support magistrate recommended that the trial court consider the reservation of child support to be a prior child support order and find that it could exercise jurisdiction to set child support.

Defendant, Dennis Sprawling, was indicted by the Shelby County Grand Jury for one count of driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI), one count of driving with a blood alcohol content of more that 0.20% (DUI per se), and one count of reckless driving. A separate count alleged that Defendant had previously been convicted of DUI. In this interlocutory appeal, the appellant, State of Tennessee appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court's order granting a motion to suppress filed by Defendant. The State claims that the trial court erroneously suppressed Defendant's blood test results because the “arresting officer had both actual and implied consent” to draw a sample of Defendant's blood following Defendant's arrest for DUI. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Although I concur with the majority's conclusion that the trial court did not err in suppressing the Defendant's blood test results and agree that the trial court's judgment should be affirmed, I write separately because I cannot agree with the inclusion of two sentences in the majority opinion concerning the adoption of a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule in Tennessee. The first sentence is: “We believe that Tennesseans have adjusted well for over three decades under our State's constitution without adoption of any good faith exception….” The second sentence is: “We should not alter Tennessee Law.”

The defendant, Charles Henry Midgett, III, pled guilty to two counts of attempted aggravated child abuse, a Class B felony. As part of the agreement, the defendant pled guilty as a Range I offender but waived the release eligibility within his range, and he agreed that the trial court would determine the length of the sentences, the release eligibility, and whether the sentences would run concurrently or consecutively. The trial court sentenced him to twelve years’ imprisonment for each count, to be served at forty-five percent. The sentences were to be served concurrently. The defendant appeals, asserting that the aggregate sentence is excessive and that the trial court erred in applying certain mitigating and enhancing factors. Discerning no abuse of discretion, we affirm the sentences imposed.

This direct appeal presents a certified question of law pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2)(A). Defendant, Charles William Reed, properly reserved a certified question of law as part of his plea agreement in which he asks this Court whether there was sufficient probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

I concur in the result reached by the majority Opinion with regard to whether the Epstein Entities owed a duty to Mr. Cunningham, but I write separately to address a concern with how the majority reaches this conclusion. I also concur with the majority Opinion‘s holding that the Service Agreement cannot be relied upon by Ms. Cunningham in this case, albeit for a different reason. Thus, I respectfully file this concurrence and will address each of my concerns in turn.