APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Appellant, Kari Diane Speck, appeals the denial of her motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1.  Because Appellant has failed to state a colorable claim that her sentences are illegal, the decision of the trial court is affirmed.

The defendant, Edward Allen Carter, pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine with intent to sell within a drug-free zone, possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, unlawful possession of a firearm, possession of an item with a defaced serial number, evading arrest, and driving on a suspended license, and he reserved certified questions of law relative to the validity of the city ordinance that formed the basis of the traffic stop which led to his arrest. Because the certified questions are overbroad and fail to meet specificity requirements, the appeal is dismissed.

In this divorce proceeding, Husband appeals from the trial court’s classification of an account as Wife’s separate property. On appeal, Husband asserts that the account is marital property based on the doctrine of transmutation. Discerning no error, we affirm.

At issue in this case is the custody of a minor child. Although the child had previously been in the physical custody of his maternal grandmother pursuant to a temporary order, the child’s mother regained custody after the grandmother failed to show that the child would be subjected to substantial harm if returned to the mother. We affirm.

Shango Aton Ramsey (“the Petitioner”) appeals the Cocke County Circuit Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with his guilty plea and that the State withheld evidence pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1962). Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Bryant Montrell Hunt, pled guilty to one count each of arson, aggravated burglary, and vandalism of property over $500. The plea agreement provided the defendant would be sentenced as a Range I, standard offender. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied the defendant’s request for alternative sentencing and imposed the maximum sentences of six years for arson, six years for aggravated burglary, and two years for vandalism over $500, to be served concurrently in confinement. On appeal, the defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion for alternative sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Adrian Delk, appeals from the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief and from its dismissal as time-barred of his petition for writ of error coram nobis based on newly discovered evidence. Following a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the post-conviction court and remand for entry of a corrected judgment in Case No. 13-05543 to reflect the correct code sections.

Defendant, Terron Kinnie, was indicted by the Madison County Grand Jury for two counts of felony murder, two counts of aggravated robbery, and one count each of aggravated burglary and aggravated assault. Defendant filed a motion to suppress a statement he gave to the police, arguing that his statement was not voluntarily given. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted Defendant's motion to suppress, finding that Defendant's statement was coerced. The State filed a motion seeking permission to file an interlocutory appeal under Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, and it was granted. Upon a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In the second appeal of this case, Plaintiffs seek reversal of orders awarding damages to Defendants for Plaintiffs’ prosecution of a frivolous appeal and denying motions for relief from orders which served as the basis of the first appeal. Finding no error, we affirm the judgments. We have also concluded that this appeal is frivolous and remand for the trial court to determine the amount of damages which Defendants are entitled to pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-1-122.

This case involves the termination of a mother’s parental rights to her son. The trial court found that two statutory grounds for termination were proven by clear and convincing evidence – abandonment by willful failure to support and persistence of conditions. The trial court also concluded that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. We conclude that there is not clear and convincing evidence of either ground for termination relied upon by the trial court. Therefore, we reverse the termination of the mother’s parental rights.  

The Defendant, David Allen Jackson, was arrested without a warrant for driving under the influence (DUI), a Class A misdemeanor; failure to exercise due care while driving, a Class C misdemeanor; and failure to provide evidence of financial responsibility, a Class C misdemeanor. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 55-8-136, -10-401, -12-139. Over a year after the Defendant's arrest, he waived his right to a preliminary hearing and agreed to have his case bound over to the grand jury. The grand jury subsequently indicted the Defendant for the misdemeanor offenses listed above as well as two counts of reckless aggravated assault, a Class D felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-102. After the grand jury returned the indictment, the Defendant filed a motion in Sullivan County Criminal Court seeking to dismiss the misdemeanor charges. The Defendant argued that the affidavit of complaint filed following his arrest was void and that prosecution had not commenced with respect to the misdemeanor charges until after the applicable statute of limitations had expired. The trial court granted the Defendant's motion to dismiss the misdemeanor charges. The State sought and was granted an interlocutory appeal of the trial court's decision. On appeal, the State contends that the fact that the affidavit of complaint was sworn before a notary public rather than a qualified judicial officer was a mere “technical defect” that should not render it void. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal involves the termination of a mother’s parental rights to her minor child. Following a bench trial, the trial court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to support termination on the statutory grounds of substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan, persistent conditions, and severe child abuse. The court further found by clear and convincing evidence that termination was in the child’s best interest. The mother appeals. Having reviewed the record, we hold that only the ground of substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan is supported by clear and convincing evidence. Additionally, we hold that clear and convincing evidence supports the trial court’s finding that termination is in the child’s best interest. Because the record contains clear and convincing evidence to support one statutory ground for termination and that termination is in the child’s best interest, we affirm the trial court’s termination of the mother’s parental rights.

The pro se petitioner, Tommy L. Harris, appeals the post-conviction court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief and/or his petition for a corrected judgment, arguing that the court erred by summarily dismissing the petition without an evidentiary hearing or the appointment of counsel. Following our review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition.

The petitioner, Anthony Dewayne Blaylock, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received effective assistance of trial counsel. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court denying the petition.

Capital defendant brought a declaratory judgment action seeking to enjoin his execution, asserting that he meets the statutory criteria of being intellectually disabled and, therefore, is ineligible to be sentenced to death. Defendants, the warden of the institution where he is incarcerated and the Tennessee Attorney General, moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, that the suit was barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity, and that the suit failed to state a claim for relief. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the case. Finding no error, we affirm the holding of the trial court.

Capital defendant brought a declaratory judgment action seeking to enjoin his execution, asserting that he meets the statutory criteria of being intellectually disabled and, therefore, is ineligible to be sentenced to death. Defendants, the warden of the institution where he is incarcerated and the Tennessee Attorney General, moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, that the suit was barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity, and that the suit failed to state a claim for relief. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the case. Finding no error, we affirm the holding of the trial court.

This appeal arises from post-divorce efforts to modify custody and child support established in a Montana divorce. After the divorce, the mother and the child moved to Tennessee. Although the father was living in Montana, he filed a petition to modify parenting time and child support and for other relief in Tennessee. The trial court found a material change in circumstance sufficient to modify the residential parenting schedule and that modification would be in the child’s best interest. The trial court also found a significant variance between the Montana child support amount and the amount presumed under the Tennessee Child Support Guidelines and modified the child support order. After reviewing the record, we conclude that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to modify the Montana custody determination but did have authority to enter a temporary order enforcing visitation. We also find that, although the court had jurisdiction to modify the Montana child support order, the court incorrectly calculated the mother’s gross income and failed to credit the father for his payment of the child’s health insurance premium. Therefore, we vacate and remand with instructions to dismiss the Father’s petition to the extent it seeks modification of the parenting time. To the extent Father seeks to enforce visitation with his child, we affirm the specific visitation schedule ordered by the trial court and remand for the court to set a time for expiration of the temporary visitation schedule. To the extent the petition seeks to modify child support, we vacate and remand for a calculation of child support in accordance with the Tennessee Child Support Guidelines and this opinion.

The plaintiff purchaser of pharmaceuticals brought suit against the defendant manufacturer of the pharmaceutical for failure to provide discounted pricing based on the parties‘ contract. The defendant filed a motion for partial summary judgment based on the issue of contract interpretation. The trial court granted the defendant‘s motion. The plaintiff requested permission for this interlocutory appeal challenging the trial court‘s interpretation of the parties‘ contract. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The defendant, Jeffrey L. Whitehead, appeals the order of the Montgomery County Circuit Court denying his motion to waive costs.  Because this court lacks jurisdiction of the defendant’s claim, the appeal is dismissed.

The defendant, Brian J. Bledsoe, was convicted by a Gibson County Circuit Court jury of assault, a Class B misdemeanor, and sentenced to six months in the county jail suspended after service of sixty days. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sentence imposed by the trial court. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. However, we remand for entry of a corrected judgment, reflecting that the defendant’s sentence is suspended after service of sixty days.

The defendant, Alexander Jackson, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of two counts of rape, which the trial court merged and sentenced him to a term of nine years. On appeal, he argues that his right against self-incrimination was violated by a statement of the prosecutor during closing argument which he asserts amounts to plain error. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal involves the termination of a father’s parental rights to his two children. In 2011, the children were adjudicated dependent and neglected, and the children were placed in the custody of their great-grandmother, and later, in the custody of a family friend. After the children had lived with the family friend for three continuous years, the caregiver filed a petition to terminate the father’s parental rights. The trial court terminated the father’s rights on the grounds of abandonment, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(1), as defined by both Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(i) and Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv), for failure to visit and support and for engaging in conduct that exhibits a wanton disregard for the welfare of the children. The court further found termination was in the children’s best interests. We have concluded that the trial court erred by relying on Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv), abandonment by wanton disregard, as a ground to terminate the father’s rights. We also hold that the court erred in terminating the father’s rights on the basis of his failure to support the children. However, the trial court correctly determined that the father abandoned the children by willfully failing to visit. Thus, we affirm the trial court’s judgment in part and reverse in part.

Capital defendant brought a declaratory judgment action seeking to enjoin his execution, asserting that he meets the statutory criteria of being intellectually disabled and, therefore, is ineligible to be sentenced to death. Defendants, the warden of the institution where he is incarcerated and the Tennessee Attorney General, moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, that the suit was barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity, and that the suit failed to state a claim for relief. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the case. Finding no error, we affirm the holding of the trial court.

In this appeal as of right, the State challenges the order of the trial court granting the defendant's motion to suppress the evidence obtained during the stop of the defendant and dismissing the driving under the influence charge in this case. Because the community caretaking exception does not apply in this case and because reasonable suspicion did not otherwise justify the stop of the defendant's vehicle, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.