APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The owner of undeveloped property sought a declaratory judgment that restrictive covenants governing an adjacent subdivision did not apply to its property. The developer of the subdivision and the homeowners’ association of the subdivision filed counterclaims seeking a declaratory judgment that the restrictive covenants applied to the undeveloped property and attorney’s fees and costs. On cross-motions for summary declaratory judgment, the trial court granted summary declaratory judgment to the owner of the undeveloped property. On appeal, the defendants argue that the trial court erred in finding no express restrictive covenants applicable to the undeveloped property and in refusing to enforce negative reciprocal easements by implication from an alleged common development plan. We conclude that the restrictive covenants, by their express terms, do not apply to the undeveloped property. We further conclude that the trial court properly declined to impose negative reciprocal easements on the undeveloped property. Thus, we affirm.

This appeal concerns a determination by the Planning Commission (“the Commission”) of the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County (“Metro”) that the Forest View Park planned unit development was “active.” Certain Forest View neighbors (“Petitioners”) filed a petition for writ of certiorari against respondents Metro and The Ridge at Antioch, Limited Partnership (“Respondents,” collectively) in the Chancery Court for Davidson County (“the Trial Court”) challenging the Commission’s decision. Metro filed a motion to dismiss. After a hearing, the Trial Court entered an order dismissing the petition for writ of certiorari for lack of jurisdiction. The Trial Court found fatal defects in the petition for writ of certiorari, including that it was not supported by oath as required. Petitioners appeal to this Court. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

This action presents issues regarding the interpretation and application of a postnuptial agreement previously executed by parties who later filed for divorce. The trial court determined that the parties’ agreement was valid and enforced its terms, including a provision allowing for an award of attorney’s fees to a prevailing party who was attempting to defend the agreement. The trial court granted the wife an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to this provision. In addition, the husband filed two motions seeking the trial judge’s recusal, which the trial court denied. The husband timely appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. We further determine that the wife is not entitled to an award of attorney’s fees incurred on appeal.

Following a trial, a Coffee County jury found the Defendant, Billy Joe Nelson, guilty of aggravated rape, carjacking, robbery, and two counts of aggravated kidnapping.  The trial court sentenced the Defendant to a total effective sentence of thirty years in the Department of Correction.  On appeal, the Defendant challenges whether the State sufficiently proved his identity as the perpetrator of the offenses.  Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.  

We granted this appeal to determine whether the Court of Appeals correctly applied the statutory “rebuttable presumption rule” under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, as codified at Tennessee Code Annotated section 47-9-626, in reversing the trial court and concluding that the Plaintiff, Regions Bank, was not entitled to recover a deficiency from the Defendants, Thomas D. Thomas, Helen L. Thomas, and The Thomas Family Living Trust. We conclude that both the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in their respective applications of the “rebuttable presumption rule.” Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, the judgment of the trial court is vacated, and this matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings as set forth herein.

A Davidson County Criminal Court jury convicted the Defendant, Alan Terry Stein, of driving under the influence (DUI) and driving with a blood alcohol concentration of .08 percent or more (DUI per se), and he received a sentence of  eleven months and twenty-nine days, suspended to supervised probation.  On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erroneously instructed the jury and improperly denied his motions for special jury instructions.  Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.  However, we remand the case for entry of a judgment form as to count one reflecting that the Defendant’s DUI conviction was merged with count two.   

The Petitioner, Carroll Crews, appeals from the denial of post-conviction relief by the Dyer County Circuit Court. In this appeal, she argues that she received ineffective assistance of counsel. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Stephen Alexander Lyczkowski, entered a guilty plea in the Maury County Circuit Court to domestic aggravated assault with the length of the sentence to be determined by the trial court.  Following a hearing, the trial court imposed a sentence of ten years.  On appeal, the sole issue presented for our review is whether the trial court imposed an excessive sentence.  The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

After Appellant failed to comply with the terms of a storm water permit issued to him, he was fined $5,000.00 by the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation. The fine was upheld by an administrative law judge and, upon judicial review, by the Shelby County Chancery Court. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm.

In this appeal as of right, the State challenges the Montgomery County Circuit Court’s dismissal of a probation revocation warrant as untimely.  Because the probationary period of the defendant, Vincent D. Clark, had not expired at the time of the filing of the revocation warrant, the trial court erred in its dismissal.  Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s judgment and remand for a new hearing.

The Defendant, Kandi Sue Gaines, was convicted at a Lawrence County Circuit Court bench trial of shoplifting property valued at $500 or less, a Class A misdemeanor, for which she is serving an eleven-month, twenty-nine-day sentence on probation.  See T.C.A. § 39-14-146 (2014) (amended 2017) (theft of property involving merchandise).  On appeal, she contends that the evidence is insufficient to support her conviction.  We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Following a bench trial, the Defendant, Gregory Ricardo McDonald III, was convicted of one count of criminal impersonation, a Class B misdemeanor; two counts of forgery of $500 or less, a Class E felony; and one count of identity theft, a Class D felony.  See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-14-105, -14-114, -14-150, -16-301 (2012).  The trial court subsequently imposed a total effective sentence of twelve years.  In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends (1) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions and (2) that his statement to police should have been excluded because “there was not an adequate waiver executed in acknowledgement of his” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), warnings.  Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner seeks reversal of the denial of a beer permit by the city. City’s board asserts that the property is unsuitable for a beer permit as it has lost its zoning status as a “grandfathered in” restaurant, bar, or event hall. The trial court affirmed the board’s action. The petitioner filed this appeal. The trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider it. We vacate the trial court’s order and dismiss this case.

Petitioner, Randy A. Rice, appeals the denial of his petition seeking post-conviction relief from his convictions for felony murder and facilitation of especially aggravated robbery. Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of both trial and appellate counsel. Upon our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Because the order appealed is not a final judgment, we must dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

This appeal involves the termination of a mother and father’s parental rights to their minor child.  Following a bench trial, the trial court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to support the termination of each parent’s parental rights on the statutory groundof abandonment for failure to remit child support.  The court further found that termination of each parent’s rights was in the best interest of the child.  The parents appeal.  We affirm. 

This appeal arises from the termination of Mother’s parental rights with respect to her minor child. Father and Grandmother jointly filed a “Petition for Termination and Adoption” to terminate Mother’s parental rights and to allow Grandmother to adopt the child without terminating Father’s parental rights. The trial court granted the petition and Mother appeals. We have determined that petitioners do not have standing to petition the court to terminate Mother’s parental rights in order to allow Grandmother to adopt the child without terminating Father’s parental rights. Therefore, we reverse and remand with instructions to dismiss the petition for lack of standing. 

Father filed a petition to change primary residential parent and for civil and criminal contempt. Because there was no material change of circumstance that affected the wellbeing of the child, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Father’s petition. We also affirm the trial court’s decision not to find Mother in civil contempt.

This case involves the interpretation of a divorce judgment. William August Lockler, III, and Pamela Michelle Barr Lockler were married on January 3, 2002, and divorced on September 6, 2007. In its judgment, the original trial judge, the Honorable Jean A. Stanley, ordered that “If [wife] is entitled under federal law to receive any portion of [husband’s] military retirement benefits[,] then she is awarded one-half (1/2) of those benefits earned during the parties’ marriage.” After husband retired from military service in December 2014, wife filed a petition on February 20, 2015 to reopen the divorce judgment. She sought one-half of husband’s military retirement that had accrued during their marriage. The trial court granted wife’s petition, holding that Judge Stanley awarded wife a portion of husband’s military retirement benefits. Husband appeals, arguing that wife is not entitled to a portion of his benefits because she is only eligible to receive the benefits under federal law and does not have a right to them. We hold that the trial court correctly concluded that the original trial judge intended to award wife onehalf of husband’s military retirement that accrued during their marriage. Accordingly, we affirm.

The Estate of Evelyn Sample (“the Estate”) appeals the March 13, 2017 order of the Circuit Court for Bradley County (“the Trial Court”) granting summary judgment to Life Care Centers of America, Inc. and Life Care Center of Cleveland (collectively “Life Care”) in this health care liability action. We find and hold that Life Care made a properly supported motion for summary judgment negating an essential element of the Estate’s claim, i.e., causation, and that the Estate failed to produce evidence showing a genuine issue of material fact. We, therefore, affirm the grant of summary judgment to Life Care.