APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This case involves the interpretation of a divorce judgment. William August Lockler, III, and Pamela Michelle Barr Lockler were married on January 3, 2002, and divorced on September 6, 2007. In its judgment, the original trial judge, the Honorable Jean A. Stanley, ordered that “If [wife] is entitled under federal law to receive any portion of [husband’s] military retirement benefits[,] then she is awarded one-half (1/2) of those benefits earned during the parties’ marriage.” After husband retired from military service in December 2014, wife filed a petition on February 20, 2015 to reopen the divorce judgment. She sought one-half of husband’s military retirement that had accrued during their marriage. The trial court granted wife’s petition, holding that Judge Stanley awarded wife a portion of husband’s military retirement benefits. Husband appeals, arguing that wife is not entitled to a portion of his benefits because she is only eligible to receive the benefits under federal law and does not have a right to them. We hold that the trial court correctly concluded that the original trial judge intended to award wife onehalf of husband’s military retirement that accrued during their marriage. Accordingly, we affirm.

A man convicted of aggravated assault filed suit for malicious prosecution against the other three persons involved in the altercation that led to his conviction. The trial court determined that the statute of limitations had run on the malicious prosecution claim. We affirm on a different ground: the plaintiff has no claim for malicious prosecution because the aggravated assault case has not been terminated in his favor.

The petitioner, Marquize Berry, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing trial counsel’s failure to file a pre-trial motion regarding video evidence of the crime pursuant to State v. Ferguson, 2 S.W.3d. 912 (Tenn. 1999), was ineffective. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The Defendant, Scottie Lee Mofield, was found guilty by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of aggravated assault, a Class C felony.  See T.C.A. § 39-13-102 (2014) (amended 2015, 2016, 2017).  The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to eight years’ confinement and ordered his sentence to be served consecutively to a sentence in an unrelated case.  On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred (1) during sentencing and (2) by denying his motion for a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence.  We affirm the judgment of the trial court.  

This is an appeal from a jury verdict in favor of the defendants in a products liability action arising out of a deadly vehicle crash in Mexico. The accident was allegedly caused by a separation of the tire tread and resulting blow-out and vehicle rollover. The decedent’s son, daughter, and mother brought suit against the manufacturers of the tire and SUV. The case went to trial, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendants. Plaintiffs appeal an instruction the court gave the jury on contributory negligence and several evidentiary rulings. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment.

This appeal involves an incarcerated inmate’s filing of a petition for writ of certiorari, claiming that the Tennessee Board of Parole acted arbitrarily and without material evidence in denying his request for parole. The respondent filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the time for filing such a petition had passed. The trial court dismissed the petition as untimely. The petitioner appeals. We reverse and remand for further hearing.

Because the order appealed is not a final judgment, we must dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

The pro se appellant appeals as of right from the Morgan County Criminal Court's order denying post-judgment motions filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure "36 et seq." The trial court summarily denied the pleadings based upon the pro se appellant's earlier execution of a waiver of all direct, post-conviction, and collateral challenges to the conviction, in exchange for his codefendant-wife's receiving a more lenient sentence. Because this court has twice ruled that the waiver was knowingly and voluntarily entered, we sua sponte affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Tennessee Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

Defendant, Montrekus Lamon Tiller, was convicted of aggravated assault. He received a sentence of six years’ incarceration to be suspended after 350 days. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. After review, we find that the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

This appeal involves an employment discrimination and retaliation lawsuit initiated by former employees of a hospital’s Security Services Department. The trial court granted summary judgment to the hospital defendants on all claims, holding that plaintiff employees had failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation. The employees appeal. We affirm.

Petitioner, Stephen Nathan Clark, II, was indicted in case number 2011-D-2935 by the Davidson County Grand Jury for conspiracy to sell 300 pounds or more of marijuana and 300 grams or more of cocaine in a drug-free school zone. Petitioner was subsequently indicted in case number 2012-A-24 for possession with intent to sell or deliver not less than 0.5 ounces nor more than 10 pounds of marijuana in a drug-free school zone and possession with intent to sell or deliver 26 grams or more of cocaine in a drug-free school zone. Petitioner entered guilty pleas in both cases to conspiracy to sell 26 grams or more of cocaine and possession with intent to deliver 26 grams or more of cocaine. Petitioner agreed to serve 13 years in confinement as a multiple offender. Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that his pleas were unknowingly and involuntarily entered. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, and after review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

Joshua Hunter Bargery (“the Defendant”) appeals his Lake County Circuit Court convictions for two counts of first degree felony murder and two counts of especially aggravated robbery, for which he received a total effective sentence of two consecutive life sentences. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) his rights under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution were violated by the trial court’s denial of his motions to suppress evidence obtained during the search of the Defendant and his automobile; (2) the trial court erroneously excluded as hearsay the Defendant’s testimony regarding statements made by Mr. Hill, Mr. Hernandez, and “the three Mexicans”; (3) the trial court erred in excluding relevant and material testimony from the Defendant’s crime scene expert; (4) the Defendant is entitled to a new trial based on prosecutorial misconduct; (5) the trial court erred in denying the Defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment based on law enforcement’s intentional destruction of exculpatory evidence; (6) the Defendant’s due process rights were violated by the State’s failure to disclose Mr. Hernandez’s complete criminal record and the State’s agreement not to treat him as a “suspect”; (7) the trial court erred by admitting a copy of a letter written by the Defendant, which was not produced by the State during discovery; (8) the trial court erred in its instructions to the jury; (9) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (10) the trial court erred when it imposed consecutive sentences; (11) the trial court erred in denying the Defendant’s motion for recusal; (12) the Defendant is entitled to a new trial based on violations of the trial court’s order of sequestration; and (13) cumulative error deprived the Defendant of due process and a fair trial. Following a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we reverse the judgments of the trial court and remand for a new trial.

This case should serve as a cautionary tale for any prosecutor, defense attorney, or trial court who attempts to negotiate or accept a guilty plea involving concurrent state and federal sentencing. Petitioner, Tyler James Schaeffer, pled guilty to two counts of vehicular homicide, two counts of aggravated assault, nine counts of vehicular assault, and one count of possession of a controlled substance analogue. He received an effective sentence of forty years to be served concurrently with a separate 100-year federal sentence. Now, Petitioner appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received effective assistance of counsel due to trial counsel’s failure to retain a mental health expert, failure to request a change of venue, failure to properly investigate potential witnesses, and failure to adequately explain concurrent state and federal sentencing. The State concedes that Petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel based on the sentencing issue alone. Following our review of the record and submissions of the parties, the majority concludes that Petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Richard Adrian Vaughn, pleaded guilty to one count of hindering a secured creditor, one count of writing a worthless check, and four counts of theft. The trial court ordered the Defendant to serve an agreed upon five-year sentence, suspended to six years of probation. In December 2015 and May 2016, probation violation reports were filed with the trial court based upon multiple alleged violations. After a hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation for absconding and testing positive for drugs. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his probation. We affirm the trial court’s revocation.

The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant medical provider based upon the expiration of the statute of limitations. On appeal, the appellant asserts that the statute of limitations was tolled because at the time the cause of action accrued, the decedent had been “adjudicated incompetent,” as required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 28-1- 106. We conclude that the appellant failed to meet her burden to show that the decedent was adjudicated incompetent at the time required to toll the statute of limitations. The trial court’s ruling is therefore affirmed.

Plaintiff, the successor administrator for the decedent’s estate, brought a negligence suit against the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County based on the probate clerk’s failure to cite the prior administrator in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 30-2-602. Following the Metropolitan Government’s filing of a motion for summary judgment, the trial court concluded that the asserted claims were barred by the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act’s one-year statute of limitations. For the reasons stated herein, we reverse.   

Defendant, David Roger Petty, was indicted for aggravated burglary and theft of property valued at $1,000 or more, but less than $10,000. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted as charged. The trial court ordered concurrent sentencing for an effective sentence of 15 years in confinement. In this appeal as of right, Defendant contends that: 1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; 2) the trial court erred in sentencing him; 3) the trial court erred by allowing a State’s witness to testify last despite having been present during the testimony of the two preceding witnesses; and 4) the trial court erred by allowing the State to use evidence of Defendant’s prior theft convictions for impeachment purposes. Having reviewed the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal concerns whether a tax on certain property containing oil and gas deposits constitutes an unlawful additional severance tax. The Coal Creek Company (“Coal Creek”) appealed the tax assessments of various county property assessors (“Assessors”). After administrative proceedings and appeals, the Tennessee Assessment Appeals Commission reinstated the original assessments. Coal Creek filed suit in the Chancery Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”) seeking judicial review of the Appeals Commission’s decision. Following a bench trial, the Trial Court entered an order dismissing Coal Creek’s complaint. Coal Creek appeals to this Court. We hold, inter alia, that the taxes assessed upon Coal Creek’s property relative to oil and gas remaining in the ground are property taxes, not a severance tax. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

The Defendant, Christopher Terrell Shipp, was convicted by a jury of one count of criminally negligent homicide, one count of felony murder, two counts of attempted aggravated robbery, and one count of attempted second degree murder, and he received an aggregate sentence of life in prison. The surviving victim of the crimes identified the Defendant as the perpetrator during her testimony at the preliminary hearing, but she died of natural causes prior to trial. The recorded testimony from the preliminary hearing was used to establish the identity of the Defendant at trial. The Defendant appeals his convictions, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to uphold the verdicts and that the victim’s testimony was admitted in error because at the time of the preliminary hearing, he had not had access to a police report which could have impeached her testimony. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to uphold the verdicts and that the testimony was properly admitted, and we affirm the trial court’s judgments. We remand for merger of the criminally negligent homicide conviction into the felony murder conviction.

The Petitioner, Demarcus Jones, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2015 guilty pleas in case number 14-02150 to especially aggravated robbery, attempted first degree murder, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, aggravated burglary, theft of property, and setting fire to property and in case number 14-02151 to especially aggravated robbery, attempted first degree murder, and employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and his effective forty-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty pleas were unknowingly and involuntarily entered. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Jamarius Deon Gant, was convicted by a Madison County Circuit Court jury of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, aggravated kidnapping, a Class B felony, and facilitation of burglary of a vehicle, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-402 (2014) (aggravated robbery), 39-13-304 (2014) (aggravated kidnapping), 39-11-403 (2014) (facilitation of a felony), 39-14-402 (2014) (burglary of a vehicle). The Defendant also pleaded guilty to two counts of possession of a handgun by a convicted felon. See T.C.A. §§ 39-17-1307 (2014) (amended 2017). The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to consecutive nine-year terms for the aggravated robbery and aggravated kidnapping convictions. The Defendant received concurrent sentences of four years for the firearm convictions and eleven months, twentynine days for the facilitation of burglary of a vehicle, for an effective eighteen years’ confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support a conviction for aggravated kidnapping, and (2) the trial court erred during sentencing. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

We granted the application for permission to appeal of the Defendant, Antonio Henderson, in this case to determine whether the evidence is sufficient to support his conviction for especially aggravated robbery. The Defendant contends that the serious bodily injury to the victim occurred after the robbery was complete and that, as a result, he could have committed only an aggravated robbery. We hold that, under the facts and circumstances of this case, the victim’s serious bodily injury was inflicted before the Defendant had completed robbing the victim with a deadly weapon. Accordingly, the evidence supports the Defendant’s conviction of especially aggravated robbery. Therefore, albeit for different reasons, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals.