APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The trial court denied mother’s petition to make her the primary residential parent of the parties’ three children. Based upon this court’s review of the facts, we have concluded that the trial court erred in assessing the best interest of the children and reverse the decision of the trial court.

A purchaser bought real property at a delinquent tax sale in Rutherford County, Tennessee. The delinquent taxpayer who owned the property at the time of the sale moved to redeem the property within one year of confirmation of the sale. After moving to redeem the property, the delinquent taxpayer conveyed it to a third party. The tax sale purchaser contested the redemption and, alternatively, requested reimbursement for expenses paid to preserve the value of the property during the redemption period. The trial court confirmed the redemption, divested title from the tax sale purchaser, vested title in the third party, and found that the tax sale purchaser was only entitled to reimbursement for property taxes paid on the property. The tax sale purchaser appealed. We affirm as modified.

In this post-divorce parenting dispute, the mother appeals the trial court’s judgment modifying the residential co-parenting schedule and reducing the number of co-parenting days allotted to the mother from that provided in the prior permanent parenting plan. Having determined that the order appealed fails to resolve the issue of a corresponding modification in child support, we conclude that it is not a final order. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

This appeal arises from an action for partition of undeveloped real property located in Stewart County, Tennessee. The property consists of three non-contiguous tracts and is owned by three people ─ two brothers and their aunt. The brothers (“Plaintiffs”) seek partition of all of the property by sale. Their aunt (“Defendant”) seeks partition in kind. Pursuant to an agreed order of reference, the trial court referred the case to a special master to determine the ownership interests of the parties, whether the property could be partitioned in kind, and whether there were any encumbrances. Prior to the completion of the master’s report, Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. The court delayed ruling on the motion until after the master’s report was completed. Thereafter, the special master filed a report in which he found that Defendant owned a one-half undivided interest, and each Plaintiff owned an undivided one-fourth interest. The master also concluded that the overall value of the property would be reduced if the property was partitioned in kind among the three parties. Defendant filed eight exceptions to the report. After reviewing the report and evidence presented at the master’s hearing, the trial court concurred with all but one of the master’s findings. As for that one issue, the court ordered a partial partition in kind of one tract, awarded that parcel to Defendant, and ordered her to pay $195,948 to Plaintiffs for the value of that parcel. The remaining property was to be sold with the proceeds divided according to the parties’ respective interests. The court also denied Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Defendant appeals, contending the trial court erred by (1) delaying its ruling on her summary judgment motion; (2) determining that Plaintiffs each owned an undivided one-fourth interest; (3) ruling that the entire property could not be partitioned in kind; and (4) valuing the parcel awarded to her in kind based on incompetent evidence. We affirm the trial court on all issues except for the value assigned to the parcel awarded to Defendant, and modify the judgment in that respect only.

Defendant, Randy Joe Richards, was convicted of theft of property valued over $10,000 but less than $60,000, vandalism less than $500, and driving on a revoked license.  As a result, he was sentenced to an effective sentence of fifteen years as a Range III, persistent offender.  On appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and his sentence.  After a review, we determine that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Defendant to fifteen years in incarceration.

The Petitioner, Eric Demond McCathern, was convicted after a jury trial of possession of twenty-six or more grams of a substance containing cocaine within one thousand feet of a school with the intent to sell or deliver, possession of drug paraphernalia, and aggravated burglary committed with the intent to commit possession of a substance containing cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver. After this court denied relief on direct appeal, the Petitioner filed a post-conviction petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The Petitioner asserts that his trial counsel performed deficiently in advising him to plead guilty to aggravated burglary during trial because the plea essentially conceded elements of the contested drug charge. The Petitioner also asserts that trial counsel was deficient in failing to request a severance or move to suppress evidence. The post-conviction court denied relief. After a review of the record, we conclude that the Petitioner has not established prejudice, and we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Defendant, Melvin L. Horne, appeals the revocation of his probation, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion when it relied on a note on the court file from the original guilty plea hearing.  The State responds that the note is not properly included in the record, that Defendant waived consideration of the issue by failing to object during the hearing, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.  Upon our review of the record, we find no abuse of discretion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Julia Sanford, was indicted for failure to maintain her lane, violation of the financial responsibility law, driving under the influence, and driving under the influence per se with a blood alcohol content of .20 or higher. The Defendant filed a pretrial motion to suppress the evidence resulting from the traffic stop of her vehicle. The trial court denied the Defendant’s motion, and the Defendant pleaded guilty to driving under the influence and reserved a certified question of law pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2) as to whether the stop of the Defendant’s vehicle by law enforcement was lawful. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Petitioner, Jewell Wayne Smith, Jr., appeals from the Robertson County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2013 best interest guilty plea to voluntary manslaughter, for which he is serving a thirteen-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that (1) his guilty plea was involuntary and (2) he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Jeffrey Henry, pled guilty on January 12, 2015, to three counts of aggravated sexual battery and received an effective twenty-year sentence. Subsequently, on September 22, 2016, he filed an untimely petition for writ of error coram nobis, alleging as newly discovered evidence that the victim was taking medication for oppositional defiant disorder, which, he believed, raised questions as to whether her responses were true or, simply, impulsive responses. Not knowing the victim was taking this medication meant that the Petitioner’s pleas of guilty were unknowing and involuntary, according to his argument. Additionally, he asserts that the decision of the Tennessee Supreme Court in Frazier v. State, 495 S.W.3d 246 (Tenn. 2016), violates his right to due process, which, in his view, tolls the one-year statute of limitations for filing his claim. The coram nobis court dismissed the petition, finding that, pursuant to the holding in Frazier, the relief the Petitioner sought was not available because he had entered pleas of guilty. Further, the coram nobis court determined that the Petitioner had been aware that the victim was undergoing “some possible mental health treatment.” Accordingly, the coram nobis court denied relief, and we affirm that determination pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

Defendant, John David Smartt, was indicted for five counts of rape of a child, (Counts 1, 2, 3, 6, and 9); one count of rape (Count 12); three counts of especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a child, (Counts 4, 7, and 10); and three counts of aggravated sexual exploitation of a child (Counts 5, 8, and 11). Following a second jury trial, after the first trial ended in a mistrial, Defendant was convicted as charged on all twelve counts. The trial court imposed and effective sentence of 153 years' incarceration. In this appeal as of right, Defendant contends that: 1) the trial court erred by allowing testimony regarding a recorded phone call by the victim to Defendant; 2) the trial court erred by allowing into evidence Defendant's wife's journal; 3) the evidence was insufficient to support Defendant's convictions; 4) this court should overturn prior case law, so that the testimony of a victim regarding the content of sexually explicit material must be corroborated; and 5) his sentence is excessive. Having reviewed the entire record and the arguments of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In two separate cases, the Petitioner, Marcus A. Parram, pled guilty to domestic assault, stalking, harassment, and three counts of violation of an order of protection. He was sentenced to a total effective sentence of three years, suspended to probation. In his timely petition for post-conviction relief, he claims that trial counsel was ineffective for not obtaining recordings of his jailhouse telephone conversations with the victim and for not securing a certain police officer or a child of the victim to testify on his behalf. It appears that he also claims that his pleas of guilty were involuntary. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, and we affirm that denial.

In this post-divorce litigation, Father, who had been designated primary residential parent of the parties’ two children, filed a petition to modify the parenting plan, citing his military reassignment from Fort Campbell, Tennessee, to Huntsville, Alabama. Mother filed a counter petition, seeking to be named the primary residential parent. The parties reached agreement as to the parenting schedule but could not agree on which of them would be the primary residential parent. The trial court held a hearing and determined that it was in the children’s best interest for Mother to be named the primary residential parent. Father appeals. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Tony Anthony Hatley, pled guilty to theft of property valued at $1000 or more but less than $10,000, a Class D felony, and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor, in exchange for an effective sentence of eight years with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a sentence of confinement, which the Defendant now challenges. After review, we affirm the sentencing decision of the trial court.

A jury convicted the Petitioner, Kenneth Krasovic, of reckless vehicular homicide and five counts of reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon after he decided to pass a truck on a hill and collided with both the truck and an oncoming vehicle. The Petitioner appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, alleging that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial attorney presented inadequate expert testimony and advised the Petitioner not to testify at trial. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of relief.

The pro se Petitioner, Quinton Albert Cage, appeals the denial of his motion to reopen his petition for post-conviction relief.  Following our review, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the Petitioner failed to comply with the statutory requirements to seek discretionary review of a motion to reopen post-conviction proceedings.   

The Defendant, Richard Crawford, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of especially aggravated robbery, attempted especially aggravated kidnapping, attempted second degree murder, and employing a firearm during the attempted commission of a dangerous felony. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred by: (1) determining that alleged prior bad acts of the victim and another witness were inadmissible for impeachment purposes; and (2) preventing the Defendant from subpoenaing the victim to testify a second time about additional prior inconsistent statements. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is an appeal from the trial court’s denial of Appellants’ motion pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02. In In re Estate of Morris, No. M2014-00874-COA-R3-CV, 2015 WL 557970, (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 9, 2015), perm. app. denied (Tenn. June 15, 2015) (Morris I), this Court held that Decedent’s will was invalid for failing to comply with the statutory formalities for executing a will. Following the Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari, the parties entered into an agreed order declaring the will invalid and agreeing to administer the Decedent’s estate as an intestate estate. After our decision in Morris I and entry of the agreed order, the legislature amended Tennessee Code Annotated section 32-1-104 to validate wills executed in the manner of the will at issue here. Relying on this amendment, Proponents of the will filed a Rule 60.02 motion asserting that "it is no longer equitable that the [agreed final judgment] should have prospective effect and relief from the operation is justified.” The trial court denied Rule 60.02 relief and proponents of the will appeal. Discerning no error, we affirm.  

The Defendant, Eric Dewayne Finley, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s revocation of his probation. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by reinstating a sentence of full confinement. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Brandon Lee Clymer, was convicted of rape of a child by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury. He is serving a twenty-six-year, Range II sentence. On appeal, he contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, (2) the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the victim’s forensic interview, (3) the trial court erred in admitting the Defendant’s pretrial statement without redacting opinions expressed by police officers, (4) the trial court erred in overruling the Defendant’s objection to the State’s rebuttal closing argument, (5) he is entitled to a new trial due to cumulative trial error, and (6) the trial court imposed an unconstitutional and excessive sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal involves the trial court’s order of disclosure of certain public records over the objection of the Tennessee Department of Commerce and Insurance and the corresponding denial of attorney fees for failure to disclose the said records. We affirm.  

The Defendant, Charles Timothy Krauss, alias, pled guilty to two counts of theft of property valued at $10,000 or more but less than $60,000 and received a total effective sentence of ten years as a Range III, persistent offender. He applied for but was denied probation. Additionally, the trial court denied his request for pretrial jail credits for the time he had spent in confinement in Mississippi. He filed a Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 motion requesting jail credits for the period from January 9, 2013, to February 9, 2016. According to the Defendant, he was entitled to the credits because he had requested, pursuant to the Interstate Compact on Detainers, that he be transferred to Tennessee to answer to the Knox County charges. The trial court denied the motion, and we affirm that denial.

The Petitioner, Lavely L. Brown, appeals the denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court denying the petition.

This is a divorce case. Appellant/Husband appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion for summary judgment, his motion to vacate the pendente lite award, the division of marital property, and the award of alimony. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand.

Petitioner, Jason Lee Holley, entered a guilty plea to one count of possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to sell in exchange for the dismissal of other charges. Petitioner received a twelve-year sentence as a Range II offender and was ordered to serve one year of the sentence day-for-day prior to being released to community corrections for the balance of the sentence. Petitioner sought post-conviction relief on the basis that his guilty plea was unknowing and involuntary and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied relief after a hearing. Because Petitioner failed to show that he received ineffective assistance of counsel or that his guilty plea was unknowingly and involuntarily entered, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.