APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

As acknowledged by the majority in its carefully considered opinion, trial judges are vested with broad discretionary powers in the conduct of a trial. Courts must monitor all attorney conduct and may direct a remedy if the performance impedes the orderly administration of justice. United States v. Dinitz, 538 F. 2d 1214, 1219 (5th Cir. 1976). That authority necessarily includes the supervision of appointed counsel for indigent defendants. Moncier v. Ferrell, 990 S.W.2d 710
(Tenn. 1998). An extraordinary appeal to this court on any issue relative to the supervision of the trial which requires immediate appellate review may be granted only in limited circumstances: (1) when the trial court has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings as to require intervention; or (2) if necessary for a complete determination of the case. Tenn. R. App. P. 10.

The defendant, Thomas Dee Huskey, brings this extraordinary appeal in which he challenges the order of the Knox County Criminal Court removing his lead counsel of record for his retrial on four counts of first degree murder. The defendant asserts that the trial court’s action is an infringement on his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. We conclude that the trial court’s order violated the defendant’s right to counsel and exceeded its discretion. We vacate the trial court’s order and remand the case for further proceedings.

The defendant was convicted of felony murder and especially aggravated robbery and sentenced to concurrent punishment of life imprisonment and twenty-three years, respectively. In his appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in not remanding the matter for another preliminary hearing after it was discovered that the first hearing had not been recorded; in limiting his cross-examination of two prosecution witnesses as to pending matters; and in admitting an autopsy photograph of the victim's head, with the scalp pulled back, to show the gravity of his wound. Based upon our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The appellant, Lue J. Holcomb, was convicted by a jury in the Shelby County Criminal Court of aggravated burglary. The trial court imposed a sentence of three and one-half years and ordered that six months of the sentence be served in confinement with the balance on probation. The appellant timely appealed, arguing that the evidence is not sufficient to support his conviction. After a review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Gregory Scott Allison, appeals from the Blount County Circuit Court's revoking his probation that was ordered for his sentences for burglary and theft. The defendant contends that although the trial court may have been justified in finding that he violated the terms of his probation, it erred in sentencing him to confinement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant, Tony Walker, appeals the verdict of a Fayette County jury finding him guilty of attempted aggravated robbery. On appeal, Walker raises the single issue of whether the evidence is sufficient to support his conviction. After a review of the record, we affirm.

The defendant was convicted of first degree premeditated murder and theft over $1000, receiving a life sentence for the murder conviction and a consecutive two-year sentence for the theft conviction. Following the denial of his motion for a new trial, he filed a timely notice of appeal to this court. In addition to challenging the sufficiency of the evidence as to his murder conviction, he argues that the trial court erred by allowing the prosecutor to misstate law during voir dire; in not allowing defense counsel to question potential jurors about their personal experiences with crime; in allowing hearsay evidence to be presented at trial; in allowing the State to introduce evidence of uncharged crimes; and in allowing the prosecutor to make improper statements during closing argument. Based upon our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Mario Lambert, appealed as of right from the trial court's dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. This Court held that the trial court was without authority to sentence the Defendant as a Range I standard offender with a thirty percent release eligibility for the offense of second degree murder. We therefore concluded that, based on the record before us, the sentence imposed appeared to be an illegal sentence. We therefore reversed the judgment of the trial court dismissing the petition and remanded the case for further proceedings. See Mario Lambert v. Jack Morgan, Warden, No. M1999-02321-CCA-R3-PC, 2001 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 599 (Nashville, Aug. 7, 2001). On January 23, 2002, our supreme court remanded this case to us, directing us to reconsider our opinion in light of State v. Burkhart, 566 S.W.2d 871 (Tenn. 1978), and further directed us, on remand, to "clarify the action to be taken by the Criminal Court pursuant to the opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeals when the case is remanded to the trial court." We again reverse the judgment of the trial court summarily dismissing the habeas corpus petition and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings.

A Hamilton County jury found the Defendant guilty of third offense driving under the influence and imposed a fine of $10,000. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to eleven months and twenty-nine days' incarceration, ordered him to attend an alcohol rehabilitation program, and revoked his license for a period of five years. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contests the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and argues that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of his restricted driver's license. Although we conclude that sufficient evidence was presented at trial to support the Defendant's conviction, we conclude that evidence concerning the Defendant's restricted driver's license was improperly admitted at trial. We therefore reverse the Defendant's conviction and remand the case to the trial court for a new trial.

The Appellant, Terrance Perkins, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief by the Shelby County Criminal Court. In 1998, Perkins pled guilty to two counts of attempted first degree urder, five counts of aggravated assault, one count of felon in possession of a handgun, and one count of felony escape. Perkins, a Range I Standard Offender, received an effective thirty-one year sentence to be served in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Perkins, challenges the validity of his guilty plea upon grounds of: (1) voluntariness and (2) ineffective assistance of counsel. After a review of the record, the judgment of the post-conviction court dismissing the petition is affirmed.