APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Carolyn A. Wooster, was convicted of aggravated child abuse and neglect, a Class A felony. The trial court imposed a sentence of 15 years. In this appeal, the defendant asserts that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction and (2) the trial court’s failure to give an augmented unanimity instruction was reversible error. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The appellant was sentenced on November 24, 1997 for two convictions, theft of property valued in excess of $10,000 and forgery. Two concurrent three year sentences were imposed with incarceration for one year followed by two years of community corrections. Restitution was not ordered until the appellant's sentenced had expired, and she brings this appeal maintaining that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to impose restitution following the expiration of her sentence. The State concedes that the restitution order in this case was entered following the expiration of the appellant's sentence and is therefore in contravention of Tennessee Code Annotation section 40-35-304(g)(2). We agree and reverse the order of restitution entered in this case.

The defendant was convicted in 1993 of three counts of aggravated burglary, and the trial court imposed three concurrent three-year sentences. In 1995, the defendant was convicted of one count of burglary and five counts of aggravated burglary. The trial court imposed a four-year sentence for the burglary count and six-year concurrent sentences for each of the aggravated burglary counts. The defendant's latter sentences were to be served consecutively to his previous three-year sentence, with probation granted as to all sentences. Subsequently, a petition to revoke the defendant's probation was filed, alleging that the defendant had failed to report to his probation officer and failed to pay restitution as ordered. Following a hearing, the court revoked the probation, and the defendant timely appealed. On appeal, the defendant claims that there was insufficient evidence to revoke his probation, that his due process rights were violated, and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel during his probation revocation hearing. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court but remand for entry of a corrected order revoking probation only as to Docket No. 6112.

The Defendant, Rodney M. Butler, was indicted by a Madison County grand jury for one count of unlawfully driving or being in physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant, one count of unlawfully driving or controlling a motor vehicle with a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .10% or more, and one count of driving under the influence, fourth offense. The Defendant was convicted on all three counts. The trial court merged counts one and two into count three, and, after a sentencing hearing, sentenced the Defendant as a Range II offender to four years in the Department of Correction and reduced the jury-imposed fine of $15,000 to $10,000. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he was in physical control of the motor vehicle and also contends that he was improperly sentenced. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant, Antonio Coach, appeals from the Lake County Circuit Court's denial of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. On appeal, Coach asserts that the trial court's summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus without requiring the State to file a responsive pleading was error. Coach further asserts that his sentence is void because the juvenile court failed to make findings of fact before his transfer to circuit court. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant, Timmy Fulton, appeals from the Lauderdale County Circuit Court's dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. In October of 1996, Fulton was convicted of second degree murder and sentenced to twenty-two years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Fulton contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial based upon: (1) trial counsel's failure to investigate and determine his competency to stand trial or to investigate a diminished capacity defense; and (2) trial counsel's failure to adequately investigate the facts and interview material factual witnesses "in preparation of a possible factual defense." After review, we affirm.

In these consolidated appeals, the Appellant, Jaxie Raymond Jones, has appealed from orders of the criminal courts of Washington County and Johnson County. His "Motion For Order Directing Joe C. Crumley, 1st Judicial District Attorney General To Produce To Jaxie Raymond Jones, A Copy Of The Entire Case File Of Case No. 14189" was denied. Subsequently, a motion to "alter or amend judgment" was also denied, with the trial court imposing sanctions pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated sections 41-21-801 through -818. Upon review of the entire record, we affirm the judgments of each trial court insofar as each order denies the motion. However, we reverse the order of the Johnson County Criminal Court insofar as it imposes sanctions pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated sections 41-21-801 through -818.

Following a consolidated trial, an Obion County Jury convicted Defendant Roger Neal James of the delivery of a controlled substance within 1,000 feet of a school. The jury convicted Defendant George Osborne Wade of the sale of a controlled substance within 1,000 feet of a school. The trial court sentenced Defendant James to twenty-five years incarceration and Defendant Wade to twenty-three years incarceration. Both Defendants now appeal. Defendant James contests the sufficiency of the convicting evidence, the admission at trial of evidence concerning a second drug transaction that took place after the transaction in this case, and the length of his sentence. Defendant Wade also contests the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. In addition, he argues that the trial court erred by refusing to grant a continuance of the case and that the Drug-Free School Zone Act is unconstitutional as applied to his case. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

I agree with the majority opinion except that I would hold that the defendant’s dual convictions for the especially aggravated kidnapping and aggravated robbery of Larry Smith do not violate due process. I would, therefore, affirm the especially aggravated kidnapping conviction.

The defendant was indicted for one count of first degree murder during the perpetration of an attempted robbery and one count of premeditated first degree murder. A Shelby County jury found the defendant guilty of felony murder in count one and the lesser-included offense of second degree murder in count two. The trial court merged the second degree murder conviction into the conviction for felony murder, and the defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment. In this appeal, the defendant alleges: (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) the trial court erroneously neglected to charge the jury on the offenses of second degree murder, voluntary manslaughter, reckless homicide, and criminally negligent homicide as lesser-included offenses of felony murder; and (3) the trial court failed to perform its duties as the "thirteenth juror." After a thorough review of the record, we conclude the trial court erred by failing to charge lesser-included offenses of felony murder. We affirm the guilty verdict for second degree murder; we reverse the conviction for felony murder and remand that count for a new trial with special instructions relating to the second degree murder verdict.

The Defendant, Mack A. O'Baner, was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence presented at trial is insufficient to support a finding of guilty of first degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received effective assistance of trial counsel. The complaints against trial counsel were as to their alleged failure to prepare adequately for trial, to interview and present certain witnesses, and to present an adequate defense. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court dismissing the petition.