APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant was indicted for first degree murder. After a jury trial, he was convicted of the lesser-included offense of second degree murder and sentenced to twenty-two (22) years as a Range I standard offender. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the second degree murder conviction. Although the defendant put on proof that he was acting in self-defense or that any irrational actions were the result of adequate provocation by the victim, both issues are questions for the jury and were resolved in favor of the State. The defendant failed to make an argument or cite to authority in support of his assertion that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the defendant's right to bear arms. In addition, there is no record of the defendant's request for such an instruction or the trial court's denial of such request. Therefore, the issue is waived. After a de novo review, we conclude that the trial court followed the correct sentencing procedure and applied the correct statutory enhancing and mitigating factors in sentencing the defendant to twenty-two (22) years. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The defendant, Sylvester Ford, was tried by jury and found guilty of one count of rape of a child and one count of aggravated sexual battery. The trial court sentenced the defendant to serve twenty years as a Range I offender. The defendant filed a timely motion for new trial, which the trial court denied. The defendant now brings this appeal, alleging that he should receive a new trial because the trial court committed plain error by failing to require the state to elect which acts the jury should consider to support the defendant's indicted offenses. The defendant subsequently filed a writ of error coram nobis, and the trial court denied the defendant's petition, finding that the petition was untimely filed and did not allege information that would warrant a new trial. After reviewing the record, we find that the defendant's direct appeal claim has merit and warrants a new trial, and, therefore, we need not address the merits of the defendant's coram nobis petition.

The defendant appeals the revocation of his probation. After a review of the record, we conclude that the defendant stipulated to the violation at the revocation hearing. Furthermore, the defendant had actual notice of an alleged violation based on two positive drug screens. Therefore, the court properly found a probation violation on that basis. Finally, the defendant's failure to pay court costs and restitution as ordered by the court was not due to an inability to pay but was a willful refusal to pay. As such, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking the defendant's probation. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Defendant, Donald King, Jr., pled guilty to three drug offenses (one Class C felony, one Class D felony, and one Class A misdemeanor), two habitual motor vehicle offender offenses, driving under the influence, and felony reckless endangerment. The plea agreement included an effective five year sentence, with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. After a hearing, the trial court denied an alternative sentence and ordered the Defendant to serve his sentence in the Department of Correction. The Defendant now appeals, contending that the trial court erred in denying him an alternative sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

For the reasons stated in my opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part in State v. Linnell Richmond, No. E2000-01499-CCA-R3-CD, 2001 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 830 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Knoxville, Oct. 15, 2001), I can only concur in the result reached by the majority in this case.

The Defendant, John Henry Sparrow, III, was convicted by a jury of attempted especially aggravated kidnapping, and sentenced to twelve years in the Department of Correction. In this direct appeal the Defendant raises three issues: whether the evidence is sufficient to support his conviction; whether
the trial court made an improper comment on the evidence in its instructions to the jury; and whether the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of attempted false imprisonment. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Davidson County grand jury indicted the defendant for one count of aggravated kidnapping, one count of aggravated rape, three counts of aggravated assault, and one count of assault. At the close of a jury trial, he stood convicted of aggravated kidnapping, two aggravated assaults, and one simple assault. He subsequently received a sixteen year sentence for the aggravated kidnapping; seven years each for the two aggravated assaults; and eleven months and twenty-nine days for the assault. The trial court also set count one to run consecutively to count five resulting in an effective sentence of twenty-three years.1 The case is presently before this Court following the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion for a new trial. Through this  appeal the defendant avers that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for aggravated kidnapping; (2) the trial court erred in allowing the State to present photographic evidence to the  jury; and (3) the trial court erred by permitting the State to amend for a second time the indictment charging him with aggravated rape. After reviewing these issues, we find that none merit relief but remand the case for correction of the judgments.

The Defendant, Keith A. Otey, was convicted one count of driving on a revoked license and one count of possession of .5 grams or more of crack cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I standard offender to ten days for the revoked license conviction and ten years and a $2,000 fine for the drug conviction. The sentences were to be served concurrently. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in (1) denying the Defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized from and a statement made by the Defendant as a result of an illegal stop; (2) allowing the State to introduce evidence of a prior cocaine sale made by the Defendant; (3) allowing hearsay evidence regarding the Defendant's prior cocaine sale; and (4) ruling that a ten-year-old incident involving the Defendant giving a false name to a police officer could be used to impeach the Defendant if he chose to testify. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.