APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A husband and wife disputed the value of the husband’s business for purposes of equitably dividing the marital estate in their divorce. The trial court adopted a value proposed by the wife’s expert. Because we conclude that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Henry T. Johnson, appeals from the Lake County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his second petition for writ of habeas corpus. Specifically, the Petitioner contends he raised cognizable claims for habeas corpus relief and asserts his judgment of conviction of first degree murder is void because (1) the trial court failed to pronounce judgment or sentence pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-20-101(a); (2) the original judgment was not signed by the trial judge; and (3) the trial judge was without jurisdiction to enter a corrected judgment because the original judgment had already become final. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This is a termination of parental rights appeal. The trial court found that four statutory grounds existed to terminate Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to the minor child and that termination of parental rights would be in the child’s best interest. Father has appealed. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

In 2020, a local board of education adopted changes to its student code of conduct requiring, among other things, that teachers participate in a student discipline policy and engage in social and emotional learning support. The local teachers’ association filed suit, arguing that the board of education was required to engage in collaborative conferencing with the teachers’ association before adopting the changes because they constituted “working conditions” under the Professional Educators Collaborative Conferencing Act of 2011, Tennessee Code Annotated section 49-5-608(a). The trial court agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of the teachers’ association. We reverse.

This is a post-divorce civil contempt action stemming from a divorce that was finalized in 2014. At the hearing on the contempt petition in February 2024, the husband moved the trial court to dismiss the petition because the parties’ marital dissolution agreement was not in the record. The trial court granted this motion but later, upon motion by the wife, set aside the 2014 final decree pursuant to Rule 60.01. The trial court re-entered the final decree, nunc pro tunc, with the marital dissolution agreement attached. From this order, the husband timely appeals to this Court. We reverse.

In the Circuit Court for Washington County (“the Trial Court”), Gayla Henry filed a motion to vacate two 2019 judgments entered by the General Sessions Court for Washington County (“the General Sessions Court”) in favor of Jesse Street and Property Listing and Rental Agency (“Property Listing”) and to re-open a case dismissed by the Trial Court in 2020. She named Mr. Street; Property Listing; Robert Stacy, sole proprietor of Property Listing; and Kristi Shepard, a real estate agent employed by Property Listing (“Defendants”) as defendants in her motion. She alleged that the 2019 judgments had been procured through fraud by opposing counsel. The Trial Court denied the motion to vacate. Ms. Henry appeals. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm and grant Defendants’ request for attorney’s fees and costs on appeal.

This appeal concerns service of process. Vernon Lowe (“Plaintiff”) sued Elisha Harvey (“Defendant”) in the Circuit Court for Cumberland County (“the Trial Court”) for personal injuries sustained in a car accident. Defendant lives out of state. Plaintiff attempted to serve Defendant via the Tennessee Secretary of State. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss asserting insufficient service of process. The attempted service on Defendant occurred during the Covid-19 pandemic, when the signature requirement for return receipt mail was suspended by the postal service. The signature space on the proof of delivery shows “E Harvey” handwritten with “MRC1C19” underneath. Plaintiff does not argue that this represents Defendant’s signature. Instead, Plaintiff argues that his service upon the Secretary of State was sufficient in itself. The Trial Court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

Timothy Aaron Baxter, Defendant, appeals from the summary denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. Because Defendant failed to attach a copy of each judgment order at issue, we affirm the summary denial of the motion.

After the death of Calvin Leroy Whitehead, his daughter, Regina Whitehead, petitioned to probate the decedent’s December 2015 will and for permission to sell the decedent’s residence. The probate court admitted the will to probate and letters testamentary were issued to Ms. Whitehead as the executrix. The court also granted permission to sell the residence. Thereafter, the decedent’s step-niece, Elizabeth Otto, filed an intervening petition to probate a purportedly more recent will, from March 2016. The estate answered the petition, alleging fraud and, in its amended answer, requested attorney’s fees in defending the petition. The estate then filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the proffered will was a copy, with no explanation as to the absence of the original, that the post-death affidavits were not valid. The day before her scheduled deposition, Ms. Otto filed a notice of voluntary nonsuit of her petition. The estate responded by moving for an assessment of attorney’s fees and costs against Ms. Otto. The trial court then issued an order that dismissed Ms. Otto’s petition and denied the estate’s motion for attorney’s fees in defending the intervening petition. The estate appeals, arguing that the request for attorney’s fees in its motion to dismiss is a claim for affirmative relief that survives the dismissal. The estate also requests attorney’s fees under alternative legal grounds. For the reasons below, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the intervening petition and, finding no abuse of discretion, affirm the denial of attorney’s fees. We also deny the estate’s post-appeal Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 11 motion for sanctions, as well as Ms. Otto’s claim for attorney’s fees incurred in this appeal.

Defendant, Richard Cole, pleaded guilty to one count of vandalism of property valued at $2,500 or more but less than $10,000, a Class D felony, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range II offender to eight years to be served on supervised probation. A probation violation warrant was subsequently issued. Defendant admitted to the violation and after a hearing, the trial court revoked his probation and ordered his sentence to be executed. Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Jonathan Smith, appeals the trial court’s summary denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

To facilitate the sale of two closely held companies, an employee signed a restrictive covenant agreement containing a release provision. After the sale, the employee filed suit against the buyer, the seller, and others involved in the sale, alleging that he had been defrauded out of his ownership interest in the companies. Later, the employee dismissed the corporate defendants and filed an amended complaint reasserting claims against his alleged former co-owners for intentional misrepresentation, fraudulent concealment, and breach of fiduciary duty in connection with the sale. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint based on the release provision. Concluding that the language of the release was broad enough to encompass the claims in the amended complaint, the court granted the motion to dismiss. We affirm.

Defendant, Lorenzo Romell Brown, was convicted by a Warren County jury of attempted voluntary manslaughter, two counts of aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The trial court imposed an effective twenty-year sentence. Defendant appeals, arguing that the State failed to prove that venue was proper in Warren County, his convictions for aggravated assault must be merged, and the trial court erred in imposing partial consecutive sentences. Following our review of the entire record, briefs and oral arguments of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments of conviction but remand for a new sentencing hearing and for merger of Defendant’s aggravated assault convictions.

The Defendant, Verdell L. Williams, Jr., was convicted in a Davidson County Criminal Court bench trial of four counts of aggravated robbery, one count of aggravated assault, and one count of attempted aggravated robbery. The sole issue he raises on appeal is whether the evidence was sufficient to establish his identity as one of the perpetrators of the crimes. Based on our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Clay Stuart Gregory, was convicted of aggravated robbery, first-degree felony murder, and premeditated first-degree murder, for which he received an effective sentence of life in prison. State v. Gregory, No. M2012-00546-CCA-R3-CD, 2013 WL 6187919, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 25, 2013), perm app. denied (Tenn. May 14, 2014). The Petitioner subsequently filed a petition seeking post-conviction relief, which was denied. In this appeal, the Petitioner argues he received ineffective assistance of counsel based on the following nine grounds: (1) trial counsel’s failure to lodge a pretrial objection to a note found in the Petitioner’s truck and the failure of the post-conviction court to permit juror testimony under Rule 606(b) regarding the impact of the same; (2) trial counsel’s failure to object during the State’s closing argument; (3) trial counsel’s failure to prepare for trial; (4) trial counsel’s failure to investigate, call, or cross-examine key witnesses; (5) trial counsel’s failure to request a jury instruction pursuant to State v. Ferguson, 2 S.W.3d 912 (Tenn. 1999); (6) trial counsel’s failure to present a shooting incident reconstruction and a firearms expert; (7) trial counsel’s failure to ensure the Petitioner could hear during trial; (8) trial counsel’s failure to secure the presence of the Petitioner and Jacqueline Peek for a court ordered deposition; and (9) trial counsel providing the jury with a report that contained inflammatory information about the Petitioner. The Petitioner also argues that trial counsel violated an ethical duty of loyalty by simultaneously representing the Petitioner and two potential defense witnesses. Finally, the Petitioner contends that he is entitled to relief based on the cumulative error doctrine. Upon review, we affirm.

Petitioner, Shamika Fifer, was indicted on charges of first degree murder (Count 1), attempted first degree murder (Count 2), and employing a firearm during the commission of a felony (Count 3). At trial, a Shelby County jury convicted her of Count 2 but could not reach a verdict as to Counts 1 and 3. During a subsequent hearing, Petitioner pleaded guilty to the lesser-included offense of second degree murder in Count 1 and Count 3 was dismissed by the State. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of twenty-one years’ confinement. Petitioner then filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied following a hearing. On appeal, Petitioner maintains that her guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered and that trial counsel was ineffective. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Madison County jury convicted Defendant, Demarqushon Marquis Hinton, of evading arrest in a motor vehicle with risk of death or injury, two counts of attempted second degree murder, two counts of employing a firearm during the commission of or attempt to commit a dangerous felony, theft of a firearm valued at less than $2,500, reckless driving, failure to obey a traffic control device, and failure to stop at a stop sign. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of twenty-four years to be served in confinement. On appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his attempted second degree murder and firearm convictions, and he argues that his sentence is excessive. Upon review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Defendant, Danny Young, appeals the judgment of the Shelby County Criminal Court revoking his probation and ordering the execution of his original sentence. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to place on the record its reasons for revoking his probation and ordering him to serve his original sentence. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In the first appeal of this parental termination case, we affirmed the trial court’s findings that three grounds for termination were sufficiently proven, but we vacated one ground and the trial court’s best interest determination due to insufficient findings in the termination order. On remand, the trial court entered an amended order containing additional findings. The mother appeals. We affirm the termination of parental rights.

The Defendant, Barry McRae, appeals from the Blount County Circuit Court’s probation revocation of the effective eight-year sentence he received for his guilty-pleaded convictions for two counts of delivery of a Schedule II controlled substance. On appeal, he contends that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his probation and ordering him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, John Todd, filed an untimely petition for post-conviction relief claiming he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that due process required the tolling of the statute of limitations because of his alleged mental incompetence. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition, concluding the Petitioner had failed to present a prima facie case of mental incompetence to warrant an evidentiary hearing on the issue of due process tolling. The Petitioner appeals, claiming the post-conviction court erred in summarily dismissing the petition without an evidentiary hearing on the tolling issue because he presented a prima facie case of his mental incompetence. Following our review, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand for an evidentiary hearing on the issue of whether the Petitioner is entitled to a tolling of the statute of limitations.

The Petitioner, Curtis D. Staggs, appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition for a writ of error coram nobis as time-barred by the applicable one-year statute of limitations. He contends that the coram nobis court should have held a hearing on his petition because the newly discovered evidence he intended to present would have established that he was innocent of the conviction offenses. After review, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

This Tennessee Public Records Act (“TPRA”) dispute concerns emails and documents (the “Materials”) requested by Kathleen Marquardt (“Ms. Marquardt”) from the University of Tennessee at Knoxville (“UTK”). Ms. Marquardt argued that the Materials, which include emails pertaining to an article authored by a part-time UTK employee that was published in the Huffington Post, were public records because they were created as a part of the official business of the university in furtherance of its goal of becoming a top-25 university. Following an in camera review of the Materials by the trial court only and a show-cause hearing, the trial court ruled in UTK’s favor, holding that “the requested records do not meet the definition of the [TPRA] statute; that these records were made or received pursuant to law or ordinance, or in [connection] with the transaction of official business by any governmental entity.” Ms. Marquardt challenges this ruling as well as other rulings including the denial of her motion for “an attorney’s eyes only” review of the Materials and the denial of her discovery requests. We affirm.

This is an appeal of the termination of a mother’s parental rights to her children. The Juvenile Court for Sullivan County (“the Juvenile Court”) terminated the parental rights of Angela B. (“Mother”) to her two children, Meadow L. and Greyson L. (“the Children”).1 Mother appeals, contesting the Juvenile Court’s finding that termination was in the Children’s best interest. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

This appeal concerns subject matter jurisdiction. Saad Al Qaragholi (“Petitioner”) filed a petition against the Commissioner of Revenue for the State of Tennessee (“Respondent”) in the Chancery Court for Davidson County (“the Trial Court”) challenging tax assessments against him.  Petitioner opted not to pay the tax before proceeding with his challenge.  However, Petitioner failed to timely sign his petition under penalty of perjury as required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-1-1801(b)(2).  Respondent filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the oath requirement was jurisdictional and could not be corrected after the 90 days in which to file a petition expired.  The Trial Court denied Respondent’s motion to dismiss and granted Petitioner leave to amend, citing the legal principle that leave to amend is freely granted.  This interlocutory appeal, pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 9, followed.  We reverse.